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A brief  note about Polyhymnia 
The cover  illustration on the preceding page is from the Congress des Applications de L’Alcool 
Denature, Dec. 16 – 23, 1902, published by the Automobile Club de France, found at the National 
Agricultural Library archives in Beltsville, MD.   (Congress of  Applications of  Denatured 
Alcohol).   
This muse of  biofuels is probably an adaptation of  the image of  Polyhymnia, the muse of  
agriculture and lyric poetry, one of  the nine muses of  Greek mythology. Of  course, the hair style 
and the cog-wheel brooch are modern for the year 1902, but the diadem and the robe would be 
typical of  depictions of  a Greek muse through the ages. 
She is holding an overflowing bouquet of  roses, looking down over a steering wheel with a rather 
serious expression, which is typical of  Polyhymnia. She is a portrait of  wisdom and beauty, firmly 
in control of  a gentle machine located in some lush flower garden.
The printed program of  the Congress where the muse appears has no explanation, but we 
may interpret the image as a depiction of  the potential for harmony between agriculture and 
industry, and of  the prospect for humanizing industrial machinery by bringing together the two 
major theaters of  civilization (agriculture and industry) in a new synthesis. The idea of  balance 
between these theaters of  civilization has held a fascination for generations, and the potential for 
ethanol and biofuels has been seen as one part of  that larger theme.
The Congress of  1902 was opened by the French minister of  agriculture and was one of  a 
series that had been held in France since 1899 often accompanied by auto races and exhibits. In 
1901 the congress also had an exhibit of  alcohol motors, stoves, coffee roasters, irons, water 
heaters and other household appliances. It was probably first assembled in Germany in the 1895 
– 1900 period. The exhibit was in Paris in 1901, in Germany in Feb. 1902, back in Paris in Dec. 
1902, stayed there for a few more months and then traveled to Italy, Spain and other European 
nations. In 1907 it was shipped to the US and was part of  the 300th anniversary of  Jamestown, 
and then went to several Grange meetings, including one in Baltimore in 1908. We don’t know 
what happened to it afterward. We don’t even have photos of  the exhibit.
Many cars ran on alcohol at the time but these were primarily racing and demonstration 
cars. Racing cars used alcohol because it had less knock in higher compression engines, a quality 
that was later called “octane.”  Alcohol was more expensive than gasoline and far less abundant, 
since of  course there was an existing kerosene distribution system for lamp fuel all over the US 
and Europe, and gasoline was just a refinery byproduct of  the kerosene industry. However, official 
German and French policy was to provide an alternative to petroleum so that the countries 
would not be subject to the whims of  the oil industry, and this was done through research 
support, support for these exhibits, and (in Germany at the time) through tariffs on imported oil.  
By 1925, at least 152 popular and scholarly articles under the heading “Alcohol as a Fuel” 
were published in the US Readers Guide to Periodical Literature; about 20 references to papers 
and books written before 1925 are found in the Library of  Congress database catalog;  52 papers 
and studies are referenced in a 1933 Chemical Foundation report  on alcohol fuels;  24 USDA 
publications were created on the subject of  alcohol fuels before 1920, according to a 1944 Senate 
report; and several technical books from the period list hundreds of  references from the 1900 – 
1925 period.   
And so, when “Ethyl” leaded gasoline was marketed in the 1920s, another “ethyl” fuel was 
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Introduction and historiographic notes 
December 2013   
Twenty years after I defended The Ethyl Controversy dissertation at the University of  
Maryland’s College of  Journalism, it’s time to make the dissertation available as an easy-to-
distribute file for other historians.  Although the dissertation is already public, the delay in wider 
distribution has involved hoped-for releases of  additional industry documents which have not yet 
taken place.   
Even so, a few historiographic notes are in order. 
To begin with, an important origin of  this dissertation was my desire to follow up on 15 years 
of  active journalism in environmental controversy, from about 1977 to 1992, particularly with 
respect to the oil industry and its products and alternatives.  
Before the dissertation, I had been privileged to write two books about biofuels and ethanol: 
one for the London-based International Institute for Environment and Development in 1983 and 
another with two friends, Hal Bernton and Scott Sklar, in 1982.  I’d been especially interested in 
the role of  the press in reporting the controversy and in providing information that helped (or 
sometimes did not help) to unravel the mysterious technical and political fog that surrounded the 
arcane but environmentally significant topic of  “octane” boosting additives for gasoline.  
Ethanol was well known as one of  these additives, but was also considered to be the stepchild 
of  the oil industry, at best an “alternative” to leaded gasoline’s tetra-ethyl-lead (TEL) additive, 
which was always depicted as the standard, economical and most logical choice.       
Yet there were a host of  anomalies and omissions in this hegemonic depiction of  the 
“standard” fuel additive TEL throughout its 90 years of  life.   One of  the most interesting  was 
an apparent Soviet-style erasure of  history in a paper by Graham Edgar, an Ethyl company 
chemist. The paper depicted the benefit of  tetra-ethyl lead in volumetric terms as compared to 
other substances. The chart and its caption claimed TEL was technologically the best option 
because it took the least amount of  the substance to obtain the same octane-boosting results.  
There were 11 depicted, but the chart left room for 12.  It occurred to me that a non-political 
chemist wouldn’t line up 11 of  anything and leave the twelfth place free.  Could someone have 
cut something out of  the picture?  Given the volumetric progression, this twelfth additive would 
very likely have been ethyl alcohol, an octane booster that had to be added at higher volumes to 
achieve the effect in gasoline.   
Alcohol as a fuel had been so well known to engineers from the earliest days of  the 
automobile that European engineers created their own special “muse of  biofuels,” the adaptation 
of  Polyhymnia, on this dissertation’s cover.    Yet, apparently, the American oil and chemical 
industry considered ethanol so politically dangerous that it could not even be acknowledged in a 
scientific paper 50 years later. How was that possible?  
The contrasting images, and many similar misrepresentations from the American oil industry, 
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stayed with me through years of  research.  At the time, I was one of  a handful of  researchers 
who understood that dozens of  refinery workers had died writhing in straight jackets, and 
hundreds more severely damaged for life, and that millions of  consumers had been adversely 
affected by TEL and leaded gasoline.1  So what this missing twelfth image represented, it seemed 
to me, was in its own way as Orwellian, as sinister and as deadly as those old Soviet era photos in 
which a missing person had been assassinated or shipped off  to Siberia.     
My own research was taking place in the 1980s against the backdrop of  the prevailing 
wisdom that environmentalism was an anti-scientific pseudo-religion, and that it had sprung up 
out of  the fertile imaginations of  the 1960s boomers. The view was widely discussed by people as 
diverse as radio personality Rush Limbaugh, novelist Michael Crichton and policy analyst Robert 
H. Nelson.  It was an idea that many conservatives deeply wanted to believe for reasons that are 
rather far beyond this discussion. And yet, despite their claim to the scientific high ground, those 
who championed this ‘environmentalism-as-religion sprung-up out-of-nowhere’ idea never made 
much of  an effort to prove it.  
My own not-so-astonishing historical research had shown just the opposite: that there had 
been plenty of  public environmental controversy in the news media long before the 1960s, 
starting at least as far back as Benjamin Franklin and the Dock Creek water pollution controversy 
in 1739, and including virtually all of  the other great names in American and European 
journalism.  My research also showed that what we call environmental controversy — public 
health, air pollution, water pollution, toxic chemicals, conservation of  farm, forest and wilderness 
land— was widespread through humanity’s historical record. Today this is more or less taken for 
granted, but at the time environmental history was brand new and hotly controversial.             
Also, in 1991, I was concerned about how I might narrow my research framework for this 
dissertation, and kept thinking about the picture of  the missing twelfth octane booster as opposed 
to Polyhymnia.  Great historians like Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner had missed this one 
particular piece of  the puzzle in Dying for Work, but I wasn’t sure I could find it either.   
The breakthrough came in 1992, when I checked with what was then the General Motors 
Institute (now Kettering University) in Flynt, Michigan. I learned that 80 linear feet of  
“unimportant” archives from the office of  leaded gasoline inventor Thomas A. Midgley Jr had 
been released only a few months beforehand. No one had taken the time to look through the 
mass of  disorganized unclassified material.  A former Marine colonel and US Energy 
Department official,  William Holmberg, thought it might be important and insisted that I spend 
a week in Flynt going through the archives.  Holmberg was absolutely right.  Most of  what we 
historians now know about the context of  the development of  leaded gasoline has come from 
those archives — despite a rather large collection of  historical information still (as of  December, 
2013) being withheld by industry. (Specifically, the successors to the Ethyl Corp., such as Afton 
Chemical and New Market Inc.)         
After this dissertation was completed in December, 1993,  the conclusions ran so counter to 
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what was then understood about leaded gasoline that I decided to present papers to a variety of  
historical and engineering groups and benefit from their reactions.  Although confident about my 
own work, I was worried that I had overlooked something or, possibly, that the political interests 
around Ethyl Corp., a Virginia company,  would find ways to attack me, since I was a Virginia-
based academic without tenure at the time.  I was aware, for instance, that Ethyl critics had been 
attacked in past decades, notably Clair Patterson of  Cal Tech and Herbert Needleman of  the 
University of  Pittsburgh.    
The first papers from the dissertation went to the Society of  Automotive Engineers, the 
Society of  Automotive Historians, and the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass 
Communications.   The best that can be said of  the SAE was that it was technically equipped to 
understand the problem, but psychologically constrained to avoid its implications. The paper was 
presented at a conference, and for some engineers, it was a bombshell.  I vividly remember one 
Japanese engineer quickly scanning through it and gasping “this changes everything.”  Yet the 
SAE refused to publish the paper in its series for reasons it would not discuss.  1995, at the SAH, 
on the 50th anniversary of   Farm Chemurgy conference, I was privileged to discuss “Henry Ford, 
Charles Kettering and the Fuel of  the Future,” which was subsequently published by the SAH in 
1998.  That paper  has been widely cited,  for example, by musician and car enthusiast Neil 
Young, former CIA director James Woolsey, and former White House counsel C. Boyden Gray, 
and many other historians.  Branching out, I presented a papers on the topic to the American 
Society for Environmental History in 2003 and was invited to submit an article to the 
International Journal of  Occupational and Environmental Health in 2005. Both of  these were 
well received without a word of  criticism.    
The one criticism of  the dissertation’s thesis took place at the Society for the History of  
Technology conference in 2007.  I presented a paper on the motives of  three famous engineers 
— Henry Ford, Charles Kettering and Harry Ricardo — with respect to fuel development.  The 
SHOT panel’s formal discussant criticized the paper because ethanol “takes more energy than it 
produces,” so why would I want to promote it?  It was also criticized because this was “like 
investigative journalism.”  Leaving aside the question of  whether history is, in itself, a 
promotional endeavor, or whether historians should or should not “investigate,”  or even whether 
ethanol is or isn’t net energy positive (here, reasonable people differ),  the criticism was the 
strongest of  any that directly came my way.  
I can understand and accept a pejorative use of  the term “journalism” as a reference to 
shallow approaches to topics. However, in their most responsible moments, journalists craft their 
work to be the first rough draft of  history, with the idea that second and third drafts may be in 
the offing.  After all, it was a trail of  breadcrumbs, left by an unknown New York World reporter 
in May of  1925, that helped me connect the missing twelfth octane booster and the portrait of  
Polyhymnia with the leaded gasoline disaster.  Despite its all-too-frequent disappointments, there 
are reasons to take a charitable view of  journalism.    
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In 2000, automotive writer Jamie Kitman published an award-winning investigative article in 
the Nation magazine called “The Secret History of  Lead.”  Much of  its historical information 
was based on, and attributed to,  this dissertation.  Kitman checked my conclusions and took the 
time to travel to Flynt, Mich.  And he also followed up with additional information about leaded 
gasoline in the 2000s.  Kitman’s article was the first time the issue emerged beyond scholarly 
circles.   In response, the Ethyl corporation  claimed that Kitman’s article was “a distorted 
interpretation of  known historic events and documents that have long been in the public record.” 
But of  course, those documents have not been in the public record. And after withholding a 
million pages of  evidentiary documents in the Reginald Smith Jr., et al, v. Lead Industries 
Association case of  1999 in Baltimore Maryland, it certainly seemed as if  Ethyl wanted to have it 
both ways.  As noted above, those documents are still being withheld by Ethyl / New Market 
Corp. (For more about these missing documents, see Appendix 6, Research Notes).   
There are two reasons why we need to remember this disaster: One is environmental and the 
other is historical.  
On the environmental side, the Ethyl corporation (now Afton and New Market) is (in 2013) 
widely marketing another metallic additive that is also suspected of  causing neurological damage.  
The additive is Methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl or MMT, and its use in octane 
boosting operations has been seen as questionable by public health advocates and the 
international auto industry.    
Also, historians like Devra Davis, Naomi Oreskes and Deborah Blum2 have seen the Ethyl 
controversy as the first instance of  the “merchants of  doubt” approach to public relations.   They 
have made comparisons to the tobacco controversy of  the 1960s and the climate controversy of  
the 21st century, in which the intent of  industry propaganda has simply been to create enough 
doubt to encourage more research, offset the precautionary principle,   and forestall government 
regulation.   
But the Ethyl controversy is also unique. It is one of  the few environmental controversies that 
have come full circle, through a variety of  stages:   from invention and development, through 
near-universal adoption, to monopolistic marketing and hegemonic science,  through changes in 
the paradigm of  perceived progress, and then to an outright global ban.
On the historical side, this had been a difficult subject for some historians since, all through 
the 20th century, leaded gasoline was a “success story.”  For example,  the University of  Virginia’s 
Joseph C. Robert, chair of  the history department there for many years,  published a book 
funded by the Ethyl Corporation in 1983 that did not even accurately account for the lives lost in 
the development of  leaded gasoline in the 1920s, much less attempt to understand the story from 
an environmental or critical perspective. 3  Many other historians have advanced the idea that 
Ethyl was a great success of  modern empirical engineering.      
It’s hard to escape a general conclusion that there are serious difficulties for historians in 
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approaching relatively closed areas of  technical expertise, and that the very process of  acquiring 
knowledge may involve commitments to world views that may later come into ideological 
conflict.   I’m aware that previous historians may have positivistic views of  science,  loyalty to a 
business,  or even an historical sense of  a stare decisis  resistance to “revisionism.”    
  I take a different view.  Historians have a responsibility, I would argue, to set the record 
straight and to test and re-test conclusions when the foundation of  factual evidence changes. As 
Von Ranke said, it takes courage to be an historian.  
It’s unfortunate that, even 20 years later, the only books in print on the Ethyl controversy are 
by Joseph C. Robert  and the others who have nothing but praise for GM, Standard Oil (Exxon/
Mobil), DuPont and Ethyl.        
The Ethyl controversy is not just about an interesting episode without precedent — although 
it certainly is that. The controversy also foreshadowed a deep structural weakness in handling 
dozens of  similar controversies that would rage across the front pages, and in political debates, 
over the coming decades.  As environmental toxicologist Ellen Silbergeld has said, the Ethyl 
controversy reminds us of  the power of  industry to manipulate imperfectly designed institutions.4  
To her  list of  governmental, scientific and educational institutions, we need to also add the news 
media, which is responsible for public understanding of  science.     
Just how weak was the news media, and what were its strengths? How can we, as the great 
historian Thucydides once asked, use our knowledge of  the past as a guide to an interpretation 
of  the possibilities of  the future?  That is of  course the focus and context of  this dissertation and 
the subsequent publications and research in the field over the past 20 years.  
To the extent that I have been able to approach these questions, albeit imperfectly, I can only 
express gratitude to dissertation committee members James Grunig, Maurine Beasley, and Robert 
Friedel;  and to my family: Linda, Ben and Nick Kovarik; and to a great friend, Col. William C. 
Holmberg.       
Bill Kovarik  
Floyd, Virginia    





From:  Graham Edgar, “Tetraethyllead,”  paper to the American Chemical Society, Division of  Petroleum 
Chemistry, New York, Sept. 3-7, 1951.  Clearly room has been left for a mysterious twelfth substance, a hydrocarbon, 
whose properties would mirror benzene or isooctane as a fuel additive. The lacunae is not likely to be anything but 
ethyl alcohol.    
1. We now know there were close to 1.1 million deaths and economic losses of  $2.4 trillion per year to the world 
economy, according to a United Nations Environmental Program assessment of  2010,
2. Devra Davis, The Secret History of  the War on Cancer (New York: Basic Books, 2007); 
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Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants of  Doubt: How a Handful of  Scientists Obscured the Truth 
on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011); and Deborah Blum, The 
Poisoner's Handbook: Murder and the Birth of  Forensic Medicine in Jazz Age New York (New York: Penguin, 2011).
3. Joseph C. Robert, Ethyl, A History of  the Corporation and the People Who Made It (Charlottesville, Va.: 
University Press of  Virginia, 1983).
4. Ellen K. Silbergeld,  “Blood Lead Levels, Scientific Misconduct, and the Needleman Case.” American 




THE ETHYL CONTROVERSY 
 The responsibility and capability of  the news media to inform public opinion has long 
been a point of  concern and controversy in democratic nations.1 In recent decades,  the role of  
the news media in complex scientific and technological issues has raised questions about similar 
controversies in history.2  Very little research has been performed about the role of  the news 
media in reporting such controversies, and in the vacuum of  history, such ideas have sprung up 
as, for instance, the claim that radical journalists were more or less responsible for the 
environmental controversies of  the latter decades of  the 20th century.3  
This dissertation explores the role of  the news media in a 1924 to 1926 public health 
controversy over the introduction of  "Ethyl"  leaded gasoline, a type of  fuel that was commonly 
on the market until 1986 in the United States and is still used in most Third World countries.4  In 
addition, the dissertation examines new evidence concerning the technical issues that were 
involved in the controversy and that were partially addressed by the contemporary news media. 
 Until recently, historians dismissed the role of  the news media in the Ethyl controversy as 
sensationalistic and irresponsible.  For example, historian Rosamond Young  said  "sensational 
stories" about the Ethyl controversy gave the impression "that gasoline containing Ethyl ... [could 
cause] unconsciousness and death before the victim could wash his hands."5  Industry historian 
Joseph C. Robert said newspapers "pictured in lurid detail the agonies of  the ill and dying.”6  
Mainstream historians have passed along these caricatures of  negative publicity. Even highly 
critical writers have accepted the industry's views of  the press in the Ethyl controversy.7 In sum, 
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virtually all existing histories have been strongly influenced by the perspective of  the automotive, 
chemical and petroleum industries, especially industry's views on the role of  the news media.  
 This dissertation is the first historical study of  the newspaper coverage of  the Ethyl 
controversy and the first time that newspapers, magazines and technical journals have been used 
to establish a more comprehensive history of  this vituperative public health controversy. The 
dissertation  is based in part on articles printed by the New York City news media between 1924 
and 1926 and in part on a set of  primary documents recently made public.  The dissertation 
argues that a broad reconsideration of  the industry perspective is needed in light of  facts recently 
made available. 
 The dissertation concludes that although the contemporary news media could only hint 
at depths beyond the surface of  the controversy, it can hardly be said to have undertaken an 
irresponsible or sensational attack on industry. On the contrary:  the news media were easily 
misled and manipulated by industry scientists who publicly claimed that there was no alternative 
to leaded gasoline and yet privately  tested and  patented a variety of  alternatives.  By wrapping 
the mantle of  scientific authority around a dangerous commercial product, industry scientists 
attempted to demean the news media and the public health scientists who dared to publicly 
criticize the technology they selected.  
Overview of  the Ethyl controversy 
 The historical facts of  the Ethyl controversy are simple, although some of  the related 
technical issues are complex.  The leaded gasoline additive dubbed "ethyl" by famed inventor 
Charles F. Kettering in 1921 is the same leaded gasoline that was phased down by the 
Environmental Protection Agency starting in 1975 and banned in 1986 out of  concern for public 
health.  Cars built in 1975 and later were built to run on unleaded fuel, which  does not contain 
this additive. 
The reason for the lead additive was simply to raise "octane," which is the anti-knock 
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property of  gasoline (as measured by iso-octane reference fuel).  A gasoline that does not 
"knock" (or pre-detonate in the cylinder)  burns more efficiently and allows an engine to produce 
more power.8  The value of  lead in reducing knock  was discovered by Kettering's General 
Motors research team in 1921, and leaded gasoline was first marketed by  G.M. in 1923.  By 
1924, G.M. had developed partnerships with several oil companies, especially Standard Oil of  
New Jersey (now Exxon). 
Technically, the additive was called "tetraethyl" lead. It was simply the metal lead 
suspended in ethyl alcohol. However, it was produced through  an extraordinarily hazardous 
reaction with the explosive element sodium and poisonous liquid ethyl chloride under severe 
temperature and pressure conditions. 
The public controversy began in October 1924 with the severe poisoning of  50 workers in 
a Standard Oil refinery in New Jersey just across the bay from New York City.  When five of  the 
workers  died one day at a time from absorbing the liquid lead, exhibiting symptoms described as 
"violently insanity," the news was carried on the front pages of  newspapers around the country. 
Kettering and other scientists with G.M. and Standard insisted that the progress of  civilization 
depended on their new product and that there were no alternatives.  Public health scientists from 
Harvard and Yale universities vehemently disagreed.  
The facts of  the case and the intense disputes between scientific authorities were 
described in about 124 articles in seven New York City daily newspapers between October of  
1924 and January of  1926. Politically liberal editors were apparently inclined to believe the 
public health scientists like Alice Hamilton of  Harvard University,  who feared the introduction 
of   lead into an everyday product like gasoline. Hamilton was familiar with lead poisoning among 
American factory workers and the historical example of  lead's devastation of  ancient Roman 
civilization. She also insisted that alternatives were available. Politically conservative editors were 
more inclined to take G.M. scientists at their word when they said that Ethyl leaded gasoline had 
been discovered through a careful scientific process and no alternatives were available. When 
these scientists, especially Kettering and his associate Thomas A. Midgley,  evoked the belief  in 
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progress as a justification for a minor risk in 1925, they were calling on a widely accepted world 
view that cut across political and cultural  lines in academia, industry and the news media. 
 Despite the news media's  deep commitment to this world view and to the ideal of  
objectivity in the approach to facts, individual newspapers differed greatly in their emphasis of  
facts and their investment of  credibility in authorities.  Two editors in particular set the agenda 
that others followed. One was Walter Lippmann, who was then editorial page editor of  the 
liberal New York World; the other was Carr Van Anda, who was then editor of  the conservative 
New York Times and who had a particular reputation for understanding science. Van Anda was 
an old-school science booster for whom the authority of  science was a given and the classic 
embodiment of  science was invention. Hence, the scientific view of  the Ethyl controversy, 
according to the Times, was that sentimentality about workers and remote public health dangers 
should not stand in the way of  progress.  Lippmann guided the World's  overrated "crusade" 
against Ethyl partly because of  its progressive anti-business, pro-labor philosophy.  Yet 
paradoxically, Lippmann himself  viewed regulation of  technology as an obstacle to progress and 
“unsuited to the highly dynamic character of  the industrial revolution.”9
Events came to a head when public health and industry scientists were invited to testify at 
a special hearing of  the U.S. Surgeon General on May 20, 1925.  The immediate question 
hinged on how much harm small amounts of  lead could do to people. Would the diluted lead in 
ordinary gasoline be as hazardous to motorists as the concentrated substance was to refinery 
workers? Since blood testing had not yet arrived at the accuracy of  micrograms per milliliter, the 
question was difficult to decide conclusively. Therefore, in the absence of  certainty, the broader 
question was which side had the burden of  proof  and which got the benefit of  the doubt. 
Underlying these questions was the practical issue of  whether Ethyl was absolutely necessary. 
Industry insisted that it was, but  the attempt of  public health scientists to introduce testimony 
about  alternatives appears to have been sidetracked. 
Despite the known dangers of  lead as a poison, the status quo  was on the side of  
industry. In the 1920s, calls for regulation went against the grain of  the anti-labor political 
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climate and the idea that progress should be unfettered by political authority. The Public Health 
Service found "no good reason" for prohibiting leaded gasoline in 1926 following a tightly 
controlled and controversial investigation by a committee of  experts. From that point until about 
60 years later, Ethyl leaded gasoline could be found in nine out of  every ten gallons of  gasoline 
on the American market.  Billions of  pounds of  powdered lead were flung into the air, settling 
mainly in the soil of  urban areas. 
The knot of  problems surrounding government regulation and scientific freedom remains 
at the heart of  the modern public health and environmental regulatory dilemma -- a dilemma 
that has been characterized by late 20th century industry leaders as a frustrating cycle of  
publicity, legislation,  regulation, litigation, and more publicity.10 This pattern  is created in part 
by the uncertain balance of  political power and scientific knowledge.   The role of  the news 
media in the pattern is frequently that of  spotlighting the problem and reporting public debate, 
yet rarely does it help to accredit facts and provide independent perspective.  Public health 
advocates in the Ethyl controversy in 1924 to 1926 hoped the news media would  provide the 
public with the tools to make an evaluation.  Yet even the sympathetic liberal press, unsure of  its 
technical competence, deliberately avoided this role. Ironically, contextualizing facts were readily 
at hand. 
In historical hindsight, the Ethyl case is especially interesting because no uncertainty 
about the effects of  leaded gasoline lingers today. When it was banned in the United States in 
1986, the Environmental Protection Agency said it had documented “overwhelming evidence” of  
its severe health impacts, particularly on brain and nerve development in children. Inner city 
children were particularly victimized. As it turned out, the public health scientists like Alice 
Hamilton were posthumously vindicated, but by 1986 they had been forgotten by the public and 
neglected by historians. 
 By the time widespread public concern about public health and the environment 
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, the Ethyl controversy was totally obscured in the fog of  time. 
When the Chicago City Council voted in 1984 to ban the sale of  leaded gasoline in the city, the 
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New York Times said the ordinance was the first of  its kind in the nation.11 In fact, New York 
City itself  had such an ordinance between 1924 and 1928 and the controversy had been heavily 
covered in the Times. As it happened, the Ethyl leaded gasoline controversy of  the 1970s and 
1980s was resolved in a complete historical vacuum. 
 Had the Ethyl controversy occurred in a different era, it might have been remembered as 
a landmark of  American political confrontation and adjustment to the industrial revolution.  
However, the controversy was coincident with the collapse of  the progressive movement,  and 
meanwhile, two world wars and a subsequent cold war had necessitated the fusion of  science, 
government and industry.  
Although federal anti-trust suits made documents and testimony about the Ethyl 
controversy public in the 1930s and again in the 1950s, it was not until a group of  memoirs, oral 
history notes and secondary documents become available in the 1970s that scholarly histories 
began to be written. It is important to emphasize that these were not primary documents, but 
rather were processed memoirs based on primary documents retained by the companies.   A 
second major group of  documents emerged in the early 1990s when the  General Motors 
Institute (G.M.I.) Alumni Foundation’s Collection of  Industrial History began unpacking about 
80 boxes of  unprocessed primary General Motors memos and reports from the Dayton, Ohio 
research laboratories.  These new documents, on which part of  this dissertation is based,  
illuminated long-hidden  technical and strategic issues behind the public aspect of  the Ethyl 
controversy. A third group of  documents remains to be released, however, and  tens of  thousands 
of  pages of  primary material remain unavailable.12 
The  Ethyl controversy is interesting not only as an important episode in American 
industrial history but also because it demonstrated the extraordinary reach of  the protective 
mantle of  scientific authority, which could be used for commercial reasons when important issues 
were at stake. The question of  whether such use  eroded the credibility of  scientific authority in 
the 20th century is beyond the scope of  this dissertation but may deserve attention..
The Ethyl controversy also demonstrated the struggle of  journalists and editors who were 
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lost in technical issues but attempted to understand and promote science and technology in 
general. And it revealed the difficulty of  engaging in a democratic dialogue in the terra incognita  
of  scientific specialties where expertise and advocacy were almost impossible to distinguish.  Like 
a spotlight striking an unfamiliar scene, the sudden emergence and disappearance of  public 
controversy over Ethyl leaded gasoline in the mid-1920s  illuminated a moment when scientific 
authority seemed to be fragmented, tenuous and coldly partisan rather than confident and full of  
its familiar promise for humanity.  
The 1920s Ethyl controversy was no teapot tempest --  it was a full-blown  front page 
dispute that has been called "the Three Mile Island" of  the 1920s.13 Officials with the companies 
involved in making and marketing Ethyl gasoline --  G.M.,  Standard,  E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
and their creation, the Ethyl Gasoline Corp. -- were not unaccustomed to controversy. Yet in later 
years they insisted that they had been under attack by the press and that their business had been 
publicly thrown into the breach. The memoirs and court statements from industry officials reflect 
a bitterness that is difficult to understand given the fact that industry won the battle.14 They 
apparently believed, as one industry physician claimed at the time, that "nothing should be said 
about this in the public interest."15 This attitude may be interpreted as an example of  outright 
arrogance or it may be seen as an objection to the arrival of  the news media as a new and 
unpredictable force in scientific and technological controversies.It may also acknowledge that 
although the battle was won in the case of  the Ethyl controversy, industry lost the broader war 
over whether  dangerous chemicals were to be regulated.
The Ethyl controversy is important not only because it was an early  public health and 
environmental controversy involving the news media but also because it demonstrates some of  
the problems inherent in the democratic influence of  public opinion over applied science and 
technology. Enormously complex stereotypes emerged in the controversy that seem to have been 
very difficult to escape. These include the stereotype of  yellow journalism (which influenced 
industry and industry historians), of  the "Edisonian" scientific inventor (which influenced nearly 
everyone), and of  greedy industries sacrificing workers for profits (which influenced the 
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progressive forces).  
Defining “Science and Technology” 
 The phrase “science and technology”  is used in a popular and generic sense in this 
dissertation. However, it should be clearly recognized from the outset  that historians of  
technology and historians of  science have seen the two domains as emerging from entirely 
distinct traditions. According to historian Stephen  Mason, the technical tradition and the 
spiritual or philosophical tradition remained separate until the early 19th century, when they 
combined to form a rudimentary science with both practical and theoretical elements.16 Louis 
Mumford also noted that technology arose from the crafts tradition while the philosophical study 
of  the natural world gave rise to what we today call science. The technological achievements of  
early modern Europe  -- wind and water mills, clocks, printing, gunpowder, and so on -- came 
from the crafts tradition.  Although practical applications were on the minds of  many “natural 
philosophers,”  pure science had little direct impact on most people until the late 19th century.17 
Despite the important differences between theoretical science and crafts technology, the 
two are closely linked in public policy writing and in popular culture. John Dewey, for example, 
noted that “the great mass of  people come in contact with science only in its application” and 
therefore “science doesn’t mean technique in the abstract; it means technique as it operates under 
existing political, economic and cultural conditions.”18  According to Vannevar Bush, science 
advisor to President Franklin Roosevelt in World War II, the discussions about politics and crops 
at the corner store may not explicitly involve democracy and science and technology, but these 
elements are constantly in the background. "They determine our destiny, and well we know it."19  
The questions that arise in the Ethyl controversy, although frequently relating only to 
mechanics, engineering or technology, were often so closely linked to popular conceptions of  
science in the minds of  the principal figures as to make contemporary use of  the terms “science 
and technology” inseparable. Ethyl, as we will see, was frequently said to be a “scientific” 
invention as opposed to an “empirical discovery,” and Charles F. Kettering and Thomas Midgley 
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of  G.M. were usually seen as “scientists”  or  “inventors” rather than automotive engineers.  
Midgley often framed his work in terms such as: “So far as science knows...”20  
Risking oversimplification, then, it appears that the Ethyl controversy is best understood 
as involving applied science and technology in the cultural context rather than simply as a 
technological controversy. This approach also seems useful in considering the role of   the news 
media and the public resonance of  controversial ideas. “Science and technology," then, will be 
treated in this dissertation not as two separate historical domains but as the interactive process of  
empirical testing and theoretical advance that has had such profound social, cultural and political 
ramifications in the 20th century.   
Historical Methodology and Research Goals
At the simplest level, the historical methodology employed in this dissertation was to 
search  a dozen important archives for documents and papers relating to Ethyl gasoline.  In some 
cases this meant using catalogues and other finding aids and looking through folders or microfilm 
relating to the subject; in other cases it meant going through cabinet after cabinet of  raw 
unprocessed documents and reading everything with a view toward its relevance to the central 
themes of  the Ethyl controversy.  The role of  the news media was a major concern, as were the 
issues raised in the public controversy, especially the industry experts' knowledge about the 
dangers of  lead  and the availability of  alternatives to leaded gasoline.   
It has been noted that historical research is not  necessarily a straightforward and 
objective process since so many value-laden questions are so often involved.21   It is sometimes 
recommended, therefore,  that  initial hypotheses be disclosed early in the work.   Like many 
historical projects, this one began with questions and assumptions that I developed in part from 
past work on the history of  journalism and the history of  technology and also in part from my 
own news writing interests in the energy technology area.22 The hypotheses that I developed were 
completely subject to challenge, revision or falsification in light of  new data that might emerge. 
This is in keeping with the traditions of  journalism and historical research.  However, the 
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premises underlying the hypotheses themselves were relatively new, the product of  new 
historiographic directions and of  modern concerns about technology and the environment that 
would not have occurred in quite the same way to researchers two or three decades ago.  
When I first heard about the Ethyl controversy  I was struck by the disdainful attitude 
industry historians took toward the press that appeared to be unaccompanied by any serious 
research.  The problem was not merely a churlish view of  the news media. Instead, it appeared as 
though some industry historians were falling back on a convenient stereotype to trivialize not just 
the news media but, more importantly, the issues that the news media explored at the time. As a 
result, these historians relied heavily on archival materials. Ordinarily this is not a problem; 
however, in this particular case, several serious flaws are found in the archives.  For example, in 
some cases, especially that of  General Motors,  secondary documents have taken the place of  
primary documents.23 In other cases, especially the National Archives, documents which should 
have been present were missing.24  
If  contemporary news sources are considered in the Ethyl controversy, then the scientific 
criticism of  the oil, chemical and automotive industries reflected in the press must be examined, 
and a very different perspective emerges. It is impossible to take at face value the industry claims 
that Ethyl was produced through the scientific method, that no alternatives were known to 
science, and that Ethyl was proven to be safe to manufacture and to use. Public health scientists 
quoted by the news media presented their own competing claims, including critiques of  safety 
research and general statements to the effect that  alternatives could be found. 
It would seem as if   the news media played a much more constructive role than had been 
described in the histories of  the Ethyl controversy.  The broader question remained, however, as 
to whether the news media provided the public with  enough information for  informed decision-
making. Reading the news articles more closely, I was often struck by how journalists of  the 1920s 
(much like their counterparts today)  seemed to lack even the most basic understanding of  the 
technical dimensions of  the controversy.  If  the journalists had spent any time examining trade 
and scientific publications in the topic area, the knowledge was not displayed in print. In only one 
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case in 124 news articles was there any reference to a scientific paper.  Hundreds of  
contemporary chemical abstracts, magazine articles listed in the Readers Guide to Periodical 
Literature and articles in professional journals would have been available.
  My mental image of  this "information gap" was that of  a frozen lake in winter, with a 
layer of  wind-driven snow on top, a thick layer of  ice in the center and an unknown amount of  
water underneath. My original hypothesis was that the news media provided a slight glimpse of  
what lay beneath the surface of  the controversy and performed some minimal research to 
broaden the agenda.  However, I found that this was probably overstating the case.  Most of  the 
news reports remained at the superficially objective level, quoting both sides and yet never 
attempting a deeper analysis of  the problem. Using the analogy, we might say that the news 
media never even brushed away the snow, much less plumbed the depths of  the lake. This  
finding does not provide a great deal of  support for the ideal, expressed by presidential science 
advisor Vannevar Bush, that public opinion in a democracy points out the technological path it 
wishes to have pursued.25  It supports Walter Lippmann's idea, expressed in 1922: "The press is 
not so universally wicked [but] ... it is very much more frail than the democratic theory has yet 
admitted."26  
Another hypothesis was that while Ethyl scientists claimed that science knew no 
alternative to leaded gasoline, a few alternatives were generally known at the time. Because 
general statements to that effect were reflected in the contemporary news media, this seemed a 
promising avenue of  research.  I was also encouraged to pursue these areas by historian John 
Staudenmier’s advice to explore the “roads not taken” in history of  technology and to avoid the 
“whiggish” focus on “success stories.”27 Most historians have depicted Ethyl as a success story, 
and the product's 90 percent market dominance for 50 years would seem to argue for a "success" 
approach -- the critics be hanged.  However, in 1986, leaded gasoline was banned from the 
American market because it was proven to be a direct threat to public health. This modern 
development added weight from the present perspective to the need to reassess the history of  the 
Ethyl controversy. More importantly,   histories that emphasized market success and excluded or 
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trivialized contemporary controversy are inadequate because they do not help explain the 
ultimate failure of  the technology. The omissions represent an oversight of  major proportions.  
The central question that has been much overlooked involves the need for leaded gasoline 
and the possibility of  alternatives. Industry scientists vehemently denied any such alternatives 
were possible, while public health scientists insisted in general terms that alternatives to leaded 
gasoline were available.  I expected to find that alternatives would have been generally known to 
the scientific community at the time and were somewhat familiar to General Motors researchers. 
Many documents showed, however, that not only were alternatives to leaded gasoline very well 
known, but they had been universally assumed to represent the fuels of  the future in the face of  
expected oil shortages. Documents in the G.M.I. archive showed that these assumptions played a 
key part in G.M.'s  long term strategy to outlast any oil shortage, although in the public debate 
the company  vehemently denied that alternatives existed or could be used. On this point, G.M., 
Standard and Ethyl researchers engaged in a deliberately crafted and surprisingly bold distortion 
of  facts well known to them. 
Another hypothesis was that despite its knowledge of   the dangers of  lead manufacturing, 
industry pushed ahead recklessly to make a profit and needlessly cost workers lives.  This 
hypothesis was not confirmed so much as it was deepened to take into account a bitter internal 
industry controversy over production technology that broke out between engineers with E.I.  du 
Pont de Nemours Corp. on the one hand and Standard Oil and G.M. on the other over 
dangerous production methods. The controversy raged privately in the spring and  summer of  
1924, a few months before the Bayway, N.J. refinery disaster of  October, 1924 when five workers 
were killed. It was only after the Bayway disaster that the public learned anything at all about 
leaded gasoline.  However, the hazards of  leaded gasoline manufacture were privately 
appreciated long before. This fact stands in sharp contrast to industry histories, which have 
rushed to absolve the industry.  For example, Joseph C. Robert claimed in a 1983 corporate 
history of  Ethyl that following  the Bayway disaster the manufacturing process "was discovered to 
be hazardous ..." and "lethal far beyond original estimates."28 
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The general attitude toward health hazards is another dimension to the problem that  
may be difficult  to appreciate today.  Industrialists and many other people of  the 1920s era 
tended to scoff  at concerns of  public health advocates even when confronted with irrefutable 
evidence of  a problem. For instance, in February, 1923,   Kettering's assistant, Thomas Midgley, 
wrote that he hoped that "fanatical health cranks" would not block plans to market leaded 
gasoline even while he was in Florida recuperating from lead poisoning and experiencing 
symptoms of  severe trembling and shortness of  breath.  A year later two of  his employees died, 
and soon afterwards 17 were dead and hundreds more poisoned. Although Midgley is said to 
have been greatly distressed, and may well have been, he did not use his position as managing 
vice president of  Ethyl Gasoline Corp. to slow down production or marketing in any way that 
could be discerned from the archives.  This scoffing attitude toward health fanatics was also a 
factor in Irenee du Pont’s insistence in 1925 that his company’s prestige was on the line and that 
industry could not back down. Profits were a motive, to be sure, but not the only motivating 
factor; attitudes such as scepticism of  overly cautious critics and willful stubbornness  must also be 
considered.  
Thus, in approaching what the industry knew about alternatives to leaded gasoline and 
about what was known about the hazards of  tetraethyl lead, the hypotheses that industry 
possessed some knowledge was expanded to take into account  the recently released memos and 
reports that provided important new historical information. 
 
Chapter Overviews 
This dissertation is primarily concerned with the role of  the news media in the Ethyl 
controversy. In the literature review in Chapter Two, the dissertation reviews literature about the 
history of  the Ethyl controversy in general and the performance of  the news media in particular. 
Chapter Two also reviews literature about the hazards of  lead poisoning known in the 1920s and 
considers the traditions of  public health advocacy and social reform.
 Chapter Three begins a chronological account of  the controversy with  with the 
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discovery of  Ethyl gasoline in the 1919 - 1924 period before the controversy became public. The 
context of  the discovery is partly to be found in G.M.'s  strategy  to survive any oil shortage by  
accommodating new fuels in its engines. A concerted effort to identify antiknock fuels did not 
arrive at one single solution (Ethyl leaded gasoline) but rather at many possible solutions, from 
which lead was chosen. It is important to recognize that others were tested and patented as fall-
back possibilities.  
Chapter Four follows the public controversy as it emerged in the New York City press in 
October, 1924. Although they tended to present  facts objectively, the news media followed only 
superficial developments and never fathomed the technological depth of  the controversy.  
Significant information easily available in public libraries was overlooked in the hurry to get out 
the news. 
Chapter Five examines the internal controversy among officials of  Ethyl,  Standard, G.M. 
and du Pont in the November 1924 to April 1925 time period, showing that du Pont engineers 
warned of  gross negligence at the Standard refinery at Bayway. However, G.M. pushed both 
Standard and du Pont to meet market demand. Chapter Five also describes Charles Kettering's 
trip to Europe to consider alternatives to leaded gasoline and meet with the famous German 
chemist Carl Bosch. 
 Chapter Six discusses the May 1925  P.H.S.  conference on Ethyl gasoline and the 
Surgeon General’s committee of  experts report. In addition, the chapter notes that Ethyl brand 
leaded gasoline probably contributed to the crash  of  the Navy dirigible Shenandoah in 
September, 1925.  Chapter Six also discusses leaded gasoline marketing in the 1930s through the 
1980s, noting two anti-trust suits involving Ethyl Gasoline Corp.  
 Chapter Seven departs from the chronological history and reviews the historical 
literature that deals specifically with the news media in the Ethyl controversy, noting that the 
supposed sensationalism of  the media has been greatly exaggerated along stereotypical lines. It 
also provides a content analysis of  the news coverage and addresses the canard that the press 




 Chapter Eight is a discussion of  science news writing in the 1920s with a particular focus 
on the differences between the Times and World as illustrated by the Ethyl controversy.  The 
chapter shows that science and technology were important components of  the public affairs 
agenda for both the conservatives and liberals in the news media of  the era.  
 Chapter Nine concludes the dissertation with a discussion of  the crisis of  authority  and 
the role of  the news media in assisting public understanding of  the   relationship between 
democracy and science and technology. 
Because many of  the details, events and technical terms  are  unfamiliar, the Appendices 
include a bibliography, a chronology, a glossary and other associated explanatory materials about 
the technical details of  the controversy.  
Additional Introductory Note 
It is often the case that histories that might shed light on technological controversy and the 
roles of  authority are hampered by a dense fog of  technical details.  The Ethyl controversy is a 
case in which the fog is thin enough that technical issues are possible to understand. It  represents 
only one of  many scientific and technological debates that have emerged throughout the 20th 
century, many of  which we may never be able to understand from the outside and yet may also 
find to be inextricably involved in public policy issues. It also demonstrates that the direction of  
technology is often a matter of  policy choices and not a matter of  pre-determined or inevitable 
conditions that arise from  some intrinsic property of  a technology. 
 In surveying such controversies, it is useful to bear in mind historian Arnold Pacey's 
admonition not to adopt a “drooping despondency which offers no remedy for the abuses it 
bewails.” The direction of  civilization is a matter of  choice, and to the extent that issues can be 
understood, a matter of  democratic choice.  “The problem, therefore, is to define new directions 
of  progress in which there is a promise for the future.”29 How these new directions are defined is 
a responsibility that was not accepted by the news media at the time, and, some argue,  is still 
Ethyl.Controversy
27
problematic for the news media today. 
 The Ethyl controversy demonstrates what happened when the press mistakenly believed 
that the responsibility was too complex for its resources and too easily surrendered its 
independent perspective to the presumed safety of  "interpretive" reporting and the false balance 
between battling experts.  
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THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF 
 PUBLIC HEALTH CONTROVERSY 
 
Public health and environmental controversy  seem to have emerged in the late 20th 
century in what has been called an "historical void."1  Many observers believe that the 
development of  science and technology was "largely unquestioned" until the late 20th century,2 
and that Rachel Carson's 1962 book, Silent Spring, marked the beginning of  environmental and 
public health controversies.3  Historians are starting to find, however, that the problems of  
conservation, oil spills, air pollution, endangered species and dangerous chemicals have all 
engaged public attention in previous decades and centuries.4  
Spanish writer Miguel de Cervantes once said that experience is the mother of  
knowledge. Recent trends in historical writing would seem to bear him out. Knowledge of  
African-American history was animated by the experience of  the civil rights movement of  the 
1960s;  women's history came alive with the feminist movement of  the 1970s;  and the history of  
Native Americans took on a more serious cast with the 500th anniversary of  Columbus' arrival in 
the New World in 1992.5  Similarly, modern concerns about  public health and the environment 
have begun to generate scholarly inquiry about  history of  technology, science and the 
environment.  This is not to say that the agenda for historical research is driven solely by modern 
concerns, but that they can be an appropriate factor.  
Another factor has been a recognition that histories of  wars, politics, great men and great 
institutions have been  overemphasized to the detriment of  other interesting and valid 
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perspectives.  The recognition has given rise to various schools of   social, cultural and intellectual 
history since the 1960s. History of  science and history of  technology have been among these 
schools.  Among concerns in socio-historical approaches to science, according to historian Peter 
Stearns, is the resonance of  scientific ideas among the public and the causal role that popular 
assumptions and demands play in the development of  scientific thinking and scientific 
institutions.6   
In a similar vein, historians of  journalism have examined the way the news media has 
explained science and technology.  Scholarship in the history of  science writing in the 1960s and 
early 1970s7  has been complemented by some recent work,8  but a great deal remains 
unexplored. There are no anthologies of  science journalism, only a handful of  biographies about 
science writers, and only one or two historical studies concerning the performance of  the press in 
scientific controversies.
About a dozen important scholarly  histories dealing with the Ethyl controversy have been 
published in the past two decades, each from a somewhat different historical perspective. 
Although many directly comment on the performance of  the news media, none take a scholarly 
approach to the news media.   Labor historians David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz devoted 
two chapters of  their 1989 book, Dying for Work, to the Ethyl leaded gasoline controversy and 
focus in part on the power of  industry over the government's public health bureaucracy and the 
use of  scientific authority as an exercise in hegemony. They wrote that the poisonings  were “due 
to what the newspapers called ‘loony gas.’”9 Stuart Leslie chronicled the discovery of  Ethyl 
gasoline in one chapter of  his 1983 biography,  Boss  Kettering, as a story of  heroic invention 
more or less in the stereotype of  Thomas Edison. The role of  the news media was characterized 
by "shocking cartoons depicted Ethyl as a greedy giant squeezing blood from an innocent 
public.”10 Joseph C. Robert devoted a chapter of  his 1983  company history of  the Ethyl 
corporation to the discovery of  Ethyl  gasoline and a defense of  Kettering and his research team. 
Robert claimed that newspapers "gave sensational publicity to the Bayway story, picturing in 
lurid detail the agonies of  the ill and dying."11  Hounshell and Smith discussed the development 
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of  Ethyl as one of  many projects exemplary of  du Pont's research and development strategy and 
they mentioned  newspapers "detailing the horrible effects" of  tetraethyl lead.12  In a dissertation 
on health reformer Alice Hamilton by Angela Nugent Young, the role of  the press was seen as 
assisting in creating the “conference system,” a transitional phase in public health regulation in 
the conservative 1920s.13  Also, Joseph A. Pratt said in article on early environmental problems 
that publicity helped create national concern about tetraethyl lead.14 
Several important histories that touch on Ethyl did not mention the press or the 
controversy.  Thomas Hughes wrote about the discovery of  Ethyl leaded gasoline in an article on 
historiographic understanding of  invention.15 Also, S.D. Heron wrote of  the development of  
anti-knock fuels for aviation.16   
Along with these scholarly histories, the literature about the Ethyl controversy includes 
Thomas A. Boyd's 1957 memoir and biography of  Charles Kettering, Professional Amateur, and 
Rosamond Young's 1961 popular biography, Boss Ket.17 Also, a scattering of  public relations 
articles and a few references in scientific papers may be found about the Ethyl controversy.18 
These works, contemporary articles and a few scientific papers represent the relatively small 
amount of  material that has been written about Ethyl gasoline and the Ethyl controversy of  the 
1924 - 1926 period. 
Histories of  the discovery of  Ethyl leaded gasoline and the subsequent uproar over its use 
have been deeply influenced by the perspective of  the oil, chemical and automotive industries 
and have not taken the public controversy very seriously.  For example, most of  the histories that 
mention the news media do so from an extremely negative perspective, claiming that wildly 
partisan stories inflamed public opinion and caused panic and hysteria. The most even-handed 
historians use the idea of  sensationalistic coverage as something of  an indicator of  the bitterness 
of  the controversy. However, the contemporary news accounts do not seem to have been 
consulted in the process of  arriving at this impression, as this dissertation argues in Chapter 
Seven. 
In addition, no history to date has challenged two of  the key contemporary assertions of  
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the oil, chemical and automotive industries:  that no alternatives existed  (and thus  the public 
policy choice was between fear and progress) and that the hazards of  tetraethyl lead 
manufacturing were only  appreciated after the Bayway incident (and thus the lack of  tests for a 
public health hazard prior to marketing was no oversight). In their haste to exonerate themselves, 
industry historians left gaping holes in the story of  the Ethyl controversy that other historians 
have not apparently noticed, in part because the record of  the controversy is found primarily in 
newspaper reports 
Lead Poisoning in History 
At the time Ethyl leaded gasoline was introduced, people were just becoming aware of  
new perils from science and technology, such as radiation, carbon monoxide gas and automobile 
accidents. However, at least  one peril had been well appreciated from antiquity:  that of  lead 
poisoning.  Not only was lead debilitating, but during the Middle Ages, sceptics who did not 
believe in “spirits” were frequently referred to the lead mines to see for themselves the way the 
miners behaved.  Early works on tradesmen's diseases usually note, as did Bernardo Ramazzini in 
1700, that: "The skin [of  lead workers] is apt to bear the same color of  the metal ... Demons and 
ghosts are often found to disturb the miners."19 For over  two millennia, overexposure to lead was 
known to cause hallucinations and severe mental problems. 
Lead is not just the scourge of  miners and a few luckless refinery workers; it has also been 
called the “assassin of  empires.” In a granulated compound similar to tetraethyl lead, the gradual 
and undetectable poison was called  “succession powder” due to its use in regicides since the 
dawn of  recorded history. Egyptian hieroglyphics record such assassinations, while the Bible 
refers to poisons that may have been made of  lead.20   In addition, the fall of  the Roman Empire 
has been linked to lead poisoning since at least 1909,21  but it was commonly suspected since at 
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least the mid-19th century. In 1857, Scientific American  noted: 
 It is remarkable that this metal (lead), when dissolved in an acid, has the property 
of  imparting a saccharine taste to the fluid. Thus the common acetate of  lead is always 
called ‘sugar of  lead.’ It was perhaps on this account that the Greeks and Romans used 
sheet lead to neutralize the acidity of  bad wine -- a practice which now is happily not in 
use since it has been found that all combinations of  lead are decidedly poisonous.22  
Along with wine, other sources of  lead poisoning in ancient Rome included piping, 
cookware, cups and plates. But the use of  grape sweeteners made in lead vessels probably caused 
the most damage. Since the Romans did not have sugar, they frequently  boiled down grape pulp 
(or “must”) and used large amounts as a condiment to sweeten their food.  They called the pulp  
“sapa” or “difrutum.”  According to lead historian and toxicologist Jerome Niragu:  “One 
teaspoonful of  sapa per day could cause chronic lead poisoning, and countless Romans would 
have consumed more than this dosage from their foods and drinks. ... The Roman fondness for 
sweet and sour flavors is well known, and the cooks made common use of  the cheap ... sapa in 
their sauces and seasonings to assuage the appetites of  their patrons.”23  Thus, the Romans 
deliberately consumed large quantities of  lead.  Piping also contributed, although not as much, to 
lead poisoning.  Roman engineer Vitruvius was aware of  its problematic nature:  “We can take 
example by the workers in lead who have complexions affected by pallor.  For when, in casting, 
the lead receives the current of  air, the fumes from it occupy the members of  the body, and 
burning them thereon, rob the limbs of  the virtues of  the blood. Therefore it seems that water 
should not be brought in lead pipes if  we desire to have it wholesome."24  
The sterility and high infant mortality rates experienced by the ruling class during the 
Empire period, as well as reports of  rapid increase of  cases of  gout where the symptoms directly 
mirror chronic lead poisoning, were probably results of   eating foods sweetened with "sugar" of  
lead.25  
It should be noted that the history of  lead poisoning in antiquity has been a matter of  
some dispute by industry.  In 1971, when the Environmental Protection Agency began discussing 
a phase-out of  leaded gasoline,  Ethyl Corp. officials claimed their opponents were embarked on 
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a “witch hunt” and using “scare tactics” by blaming lead for the fall of  the Roman Empire. “The 
clincher by all prophets of  doom is that someone started the rumor that lead was the cause of  the 
fall of  the Roman Empire,” said Ethyl vice president Lawrence E. Blanchard, Jr.  “The legend 
always gets fuzzy -- sometimes it is caused by lead-lined aqueducts, other times it is from their 
wine being drunk from lead-lined flasks."26  [Ethyl's self-serving revision of  the historical record 
shows the corporation's awareness of  the historical problem and the extent to which officials were 
willing to stretch their point.]    
Perhaps the first early modern concern about lead poisoning as a public health problem is 
documented in the 18th century,  when a British physician named George Baker became curious 
about the “Devonshire colic.” Each autumn, it seemed, there was an infestation of  colic that 
tended to be more severe with the age of  the patient. In 1767, Baker examined conditions in 
Devonshire and traced the colic back to apple cider made by presses lined with lead. He also 
noted that no similar colic attended the apple harvest in the cider drinking counties of  Hereford, 
Gloucester and Worcester. The presses there had wooden sides without the lead linings.  Baker’s 
paper to the Royal College of  Physicians also showed that Devonshire cider itself  contained lead. 
Rather than the praise that might have been expected, Baker was condemned by the clergy, by 
mill owners and even by fellow doctors.27 
Benjamin Franklin was also concerned about lead poisoning. In 1724, when Franklin 
worked as printer’s apprentice, he observed that the practice of  heating lead type while cleaning 
off  ink seemed connected to what was called “the dangles,”  an extremely debilitating paralysis 
of  the hands that “dangled” from the wrists for the rest of  the worker's life.  In 1745, Franklin 
also published a paper on the “dry gripes,” or stomach cramps -- an epidemic that plagued 
America that he traced to drinking rum distilled in vessels with lead coils and other parts. 
Franklin and Baker corresponded on scientific matters, and in 1768, Baker said his 
suspicions that lead might be cause of  Devonshire colic “had been greatly confirmed by the 
authority of  Dr. Franklin of  Philadelphia.”  Also around that time, Franklin obtained a list of  
patients in La Charite Hospital in Paris who had been hospitalized for symptoms that would 
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today be diagnosed as lead poisoning and showed that the patients were involved in occupations 
that exposed them to lead.28  In 1786, he wrote a long letter to a friend following a conversation 
on the effects of  lead. He concluded: “The Opinion of  the mischievous Effect from Lead is at 
least above Sixty Years old, and you will observe with Concern how long a useful Truth may be 
known and exist before it is generally receiv’d and practic’d on.”29   
Lead poisoning is often found in literature. One moving account was given by Charles 
Dickens:  
 I saw a horrible brown heap on the floor in the corner, which, but for previous 
experience in this dismal wise, I might not have suspected to be ‘the bed.’ There was 
something thrown upon it and I asked what it was. 
'Tis the poor craythur that stays here, sur; and ‘tis very bad she is, ‘tis very bad 
shes been this long time, and ‘tis better she’ll never be ... and ‘tis the lead, sur.' 
'The what?' 
'The lead, sur. Sure, ‘tis the lead-mills, where women gets took on at 18 pence a 
day, sur, when they makes application early enough, and is lucky and wanted; and ‘tis lead 
pisoned she is, sur, and some of  them gets lead pisoned soon, and some of  them gets lead 
pisoned later, and some but not many, niver; and ‘tis all according to the constitooshun, 
sur, and some constitooshuns is strong, and some is weak, and her constitooshun is lead 
pisoned, bad as can be, sur30 ... '  
In the United States at the turn of  the 20th century, concerns about worker health 
seemed to carry a flavor of  “sentimentality if  not socialism.” Problems like paralysis of  the hands 
among workers in the lead trade were usually attributed to drinking or to a wife's  cooking.31  It 
was difficult even to understand the scope of  the problem --  no law forced industries to admit 
researchers to conduct their studies. Many did so only after a considerable amount of  persuasion 
and assurances that the results of  a study would not be reported individually, but rather about an 
industry in general. 
One of  the most important researchers and advocates for safe working conditions in the 
hazardous trades was Alice Hamilton, an M.D. who had done post-doctoral work at the 
Universities of  Munich and Leipzig in Germany, at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, and at John 
Hopkins University in the U.S.   Her interest in what was called "occupational disease" was 
sparked by her years working with social activist Jane Addams at Chicago's Hull House, a 
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settlement house in the middle of  Chicago's working class slums where social activists lived and 
worked for progressive causes. Hamilton was to become the acknowledged national expert on 
lead toxicology, the first woman on the Harvard University faculty and a key figure in the Ethyl 
controversy. 
 In 1910, the labor department of  the state of  Illinois hired her to look into the question 
of  workers' compensation claims from the lead industry trades.  Hamilton found appalling 
conditions and  578 cases of  outright lead poisoning, some of  which were quite severe, or as 
Hamilton put it,  “equal to those described by French authorities of  the early 19th century.”32 
Shocked that Illinois was a century behind Europe, the legislature quickly passed a law requiring 
ventilation and other safety standards for workers.  The Illinois study brought Hamilton to the 
attention of  the U.S. Department of  Labor,  where she worked from 1910 to 1919 as a special 
investigator of  industrial poisons. She was then invited to join the faculty at Harvard University, 
and was the first woman to do so. This was not out of  egalitarian academic impulse but simply 
because she was by far the best occupational toxicologist in America, according to biographer 
Barbara Sicherman.33   
Hamilton worked with notable tact to popularize the views of  social reformers among 
labor leaders, fellow physicians and industrialists.34 In a speech to the superintendents of  the 
National Lead Company, she praised their efforts to safeguard worker health while at the same 
time noting that their factories were “so dangerous ... that they would be closed by law in any 
European country.”35 
In 1920, she managed to obtain funding from the American Institute of  Lead 
Manufacturers to study lead metabolism in the human body at Harvard.  The study found that 
lead did accumulate in the bones and tissues of  people who were exposed to it, and was not 
quickly or fully metabolized and excreted. As a practical result, lead manufacturers were 
disappointed in their attempts to evade workers compensation claims and civil damage suits.36  A 
few years later, when General Motors began to put lead into gasoline,  Hamilton and others -- 
including Surgeon General Hugh Cumming --  felt that this study laid the key scientific issue to 
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rest.  With the cumulative nature of  the poison, no one could reasonably advocate the sure, slow 
public poison from the use of  lead in gasoline.37 
Contradictory studies about lead poisoning, however, eventually formed a makeshift 
scientific foundation for the Ethyl leaded gasoline industry.  Robert A. Kehoe, a University of  
Cincinnati physician who also played a role in the Ethyl controversy, performed studies in the 
1920s through the 40s  that supposedly showed lead in bones and blood of  indigenous peoples 
never exposed to industrial sources,  and that the human body had a "natural" threshold of  
tolerance for lead.   These studies would later be seen as grossly inaccurate and biased.38  
World Views in Collision  
In its broadest context, the Ethyl controversy reflects the continued development of  a 
progressive, humanistic orientation of  scientific research and advocacy that had roots not only in 
the American progressive movement of  the 1890-1910 period, but also in the European  sanitary 
reform movements stretching back two centuries. It also reflects a growing rift with the ideology 
of  industry and industry-oriented scientific positivism.  The clash between the two world views 
shows an  inability to define common ground and accept criticism and peer review across  
scientific disciplines. 
 The Ethyl controversy takes place amid a welter of  novelty and contradiction reflected in 
the description of  the era,  the “Roaring Twenties.” Most environmental histories, such as A 
Fierce Green Fire by Phillip Shabecoff, see the 1920s as the lull in the storm over public health 
and the environment.  Shabecoff  dismisses the era as a time when the country’s “most tainted 
stewardship of  public resources” occurred under the administration of  President Warren 
Harding,  which  was “slavishly subservient to business.”39  Although, as we shall see, this 
description aptly fits Harding's Treasury Secretary, Andrew Mellon, there is a great deal more to 
say about the 1920s and concern over public health and the natural environment. For example, 
organizations such as the Workers Health Bureau, the Izaak Walton League and the Consumers 
League reflect a path of  continuity from the progressive era to the New Deal.  New federal and 
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academic institutions and agendas were also emerging.  The Corps of  Engineers and the Bureau 
of  Mines both directed studies of  pollution of  the natural environment, while the Department of  
Labor and the Public Health Service took new initiatives in worker health and occupational 
disease. State and municipal organizations such as the National Coast Anti-Pollution League 
helped create federal and international laws about oil pollution in coastal waters.  Harvard 
University established its School of  Public Health.   
These and other developments show a continuity of  the progressive agenda into the post 
World War I years.  Yet the need to establish new institutions also reflects to a certain extent a 
disillusioned retrenchment of  the approach to science and technology and its impact on 
humanity.  Before World War I,  the idea that science could solve virtually all problems had been 
an unambiguous article of  faith, shared by artists and chemists, poets and physicists. All human  
problems, even labor disputes and political debates, would soon be soluble using scientific 
techniques.  The  enthusiasm for science and technology was as dear to the progressive liberal 
reformer as it was to the industrialist tycoon.  The progressive movement embraced the new 
science of  bacteriology, for example, that allowed scientists to identify epidemic diseases and 
paths of  contagion in everything from ice to oysters to milk.  This lowered infant mortality rates 
and may have done more actual social good than all the settlement houses and social work 
combined.  
That new faith in science had been motivated by a belief  in the disinterested  scientific 
method of  inquiry. The method involved the ability of  individual scientists to conduct systematic 
research, cover all possible elements of  the problem and deliver objective answers without being 
influenced by personal considerations or desires.  Newspaper editor Walter Lippmann wrote that 
the inner principle of  modern science was not reflected in technologies such as automobiles and 
refrigerators themselves but in the behavior of  those who invented them with a power of  insight 
that was much like “high religion.”40  
These views on the sanctity of  science were a late reflection of   scientific positivism,  the 
19th century philosophy that stressed positive facts to the exclusion of  faith and speculation. 
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Positivism was rarely articulated in detailed terms. It was often simply labelled  “Progress,” and  
proof  of  its efficacy was everywhere -- the telephone, the electric light, the wireless and the 
automobile. Enthusiasts who elevated science and technology to the status of  a religion also made 
it the focal point of  political and social activity.  No question was too grand, too complex, too 
human or too small that it could not be solved by science.  Not all progressives shared these 
views, and as the decades of  the 20th century unfolded, many developed profound disagreements 
with the ideology of  progress and industry. The flaws in the naive view of  an all-powerful science, 
the collapse of  the positivist /  Newtonian consensus among physicists in Europe, and the general 
cultural malaise of  the post-World War I era led many scientists and social critics to utterly reject 
the doctrine of  positivism. Dissenters from the positivist creed, including Henry Adams in 
America and Georges Sorel in France, rebelled at the eclipse of  innocent, humanistic 
philosophies and the ascendance of  an industrial culture they considered mechanical, sterile and 
profane.  Significantly, their work, although written before World War I, only became popular 
afterwards. As  historian Henry F. May has argued, the war  marked the “end of  American 
innocence” that  “had been the common characteristic of  the older culture and its custodians, of  
most of  the progressives, of  most of  the relativists and social scientists, and of  the young leaders 
of  the pre-war Rebellion...”41 
The old world withered in the wake of  the “catastrophe in heaven and on earth,” as 
psychologist Carl Jung called World War I. The horror of  mechanized warfare withered the 
simple faith in both religion and science, and it destroyed the moral bridge between the two 
foundations of  Western thought. Mankind was no longer “perfectible,” and scientists who had 
passionately embraced the moral purpose of  their work suddenly found themselves in a deep 
moral quagmire.  “Science has made slaughter possible on a scale never dreamed of  before,” 
wrote Alice Hamilton in a popular magazine in 1916, questioning whether science was “for  or 
against” humanity.42  Other  scientists objected to military technology on humanitarian grounds; 
one German scientist who dared to speak out against poison gas was accused of  “conduct 
unbecoming to a German.”43 Facing similar pressures in the U.S., and not wishing to be seen as 
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unpatriotic or  disloyal, Hamilton and others did their best to keep war industries clean even 
though the “bewildering complexity” of  a host of  chemicals led to workers “sickening and dying 
in the effort to produce something to kill other men.” In this light, it was no accident that 
Hamilton and Yandell Henderson of  Yale University, who worked with poison gas production 
during the war, would become the most vocal opponents of  Ethyl gasoline.44 
Scientific positivism was so strongly rooted, however, that even poison gas was not an 
unmitigated evil to some people. Charles Baskerville of  the American Chemical Society noted in 
a conference on industrial hygiene and occupational disease in 1919:  “The universal publicity 
given to poison gas” had drawn great attention to chemistry, with its “mysterious possibilities ... 
and opportunities for production of  wealth and possible control of  trade...” The optimism 
extended to conditions in factories, which, although replete with “evils,”  were being solved in the 
spirit of  American cooperation because “It is good business to have healthy labor.”45   Baskerville 
assumed, as did most Americans, that their working conditions tended to be better and their 
standard of  living higher than that in European countries. This idea, which had become a patent 
falsehood by the dawn of  the 20th century, originated in the myth of  the “machine in the 
garden.”   According to historian Leo Marx, the capacity of  the  American environment to 
“purify” the European factory system, with its  unfortunate feudal residues, was the “central 
theme in the ideology of  American industrialism” of  the 19th and early 20th centuries.  The 
factory system, transferred to the New World, “is redeemed by contact with nature and the rural 
way of  life...”46 Despite the pervasiveness of  the this view, actual standards for occupational 
health lagged far behind those of  England, Germany or France. The lead trades, as already 
noted, had cases of  lead poisoning of  a severity not seen in Europe for a century.47 Working 
conditions in coal mining, railroad work and other heavy industry also tended to be more 
dangerous in the United States than in Europe.  
The myth of  the machine in the garden helped support the headlong rush into 
industrialization in the United States. It was a small rationalization in a larger ideology of  
industry, noted as  “a loosely composed scheme of  meaning and value so widely accepted that it 
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seldom required precise formulation,” according to Leo Marx. In the written record “it appears 
chiefly as rhetoric in homage to ‘progress.’”48 According to historian Thomas Hughes, the 
ideology of  industrialism was the technological and uniquely American expression of  scientific 
positivism, noted as “Fordismus,” and “Americanismus” by German observers.49  
This ideology of  industry is often contrasted with Thomas Jefferson's agrarian vision of  
America, discussed in 1785 in his Notes on Virginia, which extolled the concept of  the yeoman 
farmer as the backbone of  democracy and which disparaged European factories. "The work 
shops of  Europe are the most proper to furnish the supplies of  manufactures in the United 
States," he wrote.  By the early 19th century, the emerging myth of  the machine in the garden 
was sometimes seen as supporting the ongoing movement for America's economic independence. 
Yet by 1816, even Jefferson supported industrialization.
 We must now place the manufacturer beside the agriculturalist... The grand 
inquiry now is, shall we manufacture our own comforts, or go without them at the will of  
a foreign nation. He, therefore, who is now against domestic manufacturers must be for 
reducing us to dependence on that nation, or to be clothed in skins and live like wild 
beasts in dens and caverns. I am proud to say I am not one of  these....50 
Although important, economic independence was not the true mainspring of  the 
ideology of  industry. According to Leo Marx, the machine itself  became “a signal for the 
salvation of  mankind.”  Americans didn’t merely welcome  new technology:  “They grasped and 
panted and cried for it. Again and again, foreign travellers in this period testify to the nation’s 
obsessive interest in power machinery. The typical American, says Michael Chevalier, has a 
perfect passion for railroads: he loves them ... as a lover loves his mistress.”  Recognizing the 
obsession, Jules Verne wrote in 1865 that Yankees “are engineers ... by right of  birth” just as 
Italians are musicians and Germans are metaphysicians.51 
While the pastoral ideal of  an agrarian America was sometimes evoked against railroads, 
mills, steam power and industrialization, the dissent, “aside from apologists for Southern slavery” 
came from small social or literary groups on the fringes of  influence and power.  Even Jacksonian 
democrats were  ambivalent, and “.... not inclined to insist on a root contradiction between 
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industrial progress and the older, chaste image of  a green Republic.”52  
  Eli Whitney, Robert Fulton and Samuel Morse were widely applauded (if  not always 
financially rewarded) for their inventions in the first half  of  the 19th century. However, the  
explosion of  industrial technology in the second half  of  the 19th century so radically 
transformed the American landscape that mere applause seemed irrelevant. Thomas Edison, 
Alexander Graham Bell, the Wright Brothers and Henry Ford had become the American 
equivalent of  a pantheon of  deities.  Although only Bell was in fact a trained scientist,  the 
prestige of  their accomplishments spilled over onto nearly all the scientific and technological 
enterprises of  the age. By the turn of  the century, the  adoration of  science and technology had 
become nearly universal. “We may speak without exaggeration of  a ‘cult of  science,’ a cult at 
whose shrines many thinking men worshipped with ...  fanatic intolerance of  other gods," said 
historian Warren Wagar.53 
Charles F. Kettering, the first president of  the Ethyl Gasoline Corp.,  might be called a 
high priest in the cult of  science in the 1920s; he was certainly among the most visible and 
articulate authorities, as the president of  the Society of  Automotive Engineers and the head of  
General Motor’s research division.  He was also the inventor of  numerous improvements to the 
automobile and internal combustion engines and the director of  the laboratory where Ethyl 
gasoline was discovered. Kettering consciously emulated Thomas Edison’s “scientific foxhunt” 
methods and  organized a “factory” for inventions that was purchased by General Motors in 
1919. Historians have seen Kettering’s “corporate” inventive style as representative of  the 
transitional phase between the heroic individualistic approach (such as that of  Edison)  and the 
more anonymous scientific group efforts that followed.54    
The ideology of  industry that embraced Ethyl gasoline was, to its proponents, a more 
complex proposition than “mere” public health concerns. “The responsibility of   ... the Public 
Health Service is rather simple: Is this a public health hazard?” said Frank A. Howard of  
Standard Oil Co., in partnership with G.M.  to sell Ethyl leaded gasoline.  “Unfortunately, our 
problem is not that simple...  [On automobiles and oil] our civilization is supposed to depend... 
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Now as a result of  10 years research ... we have this apparent gift of  God of  three cubic 
centimeters of  tetraethyl lead.” The “gift” would allow cars to travel 50 to 100 percent further on 
a gallon of  gasoline, he claimed. “If  would be an unheard-of  blunder if  we should abandon a 
thing of  this kind merely because of  our fears.”55   Responding to Howard was Grace Burnham, 
director of  the Workers Health Bureau, who pointed out that tetraethyl lead “was not a gift of  
God when those ... men were killed or 149 men were poisoned.”56   She followed up with this 
idea: “The thing we are interested in, in the long run,  is not mechanics or machinery, but men, 
[and this] is a thing we must bear very carefully in mind in this age of  speed and rush and 
efficiency and machines.”57   Thus, Burnham neatly summed up the difference between a 
humanistic and progressive scientific world view and the increasingly distant ideology of  industry. 
 Three Traditions of  Public Health and Environmentalism   
Although the ideology of  industry  had a great deal of  momentum in the 1920s, those 
who spoke out against Ethyl gasoline had links to scientific and political traditions that were far 
richer than may be appreciated today.  They were only the latest in the long line of  conservation 
and public health advocates who were often in the scientific mainstream and frequently vocal 
about their concerns. Three distinct traditions of  humanistic or progressive science that evolved 
into what is now called "environmentalism" are  found in the 1920s, and  each approached public 
controversy in its own way. 
 First, conservationists have been active in political questions dealing with land and other 
resources from the time of  the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. The doctrine of  efficient land use, as 
defined by forestry scientists and other specialists, was an ideal that was not often applied in 
practice.  Secondly, advocates of  technology regulation had emerged to question the 19th century 
laissez  faire  attitude;  the establishment of  a weak federal bureaucracy guided by scientists at the 
turn of  the century was one result of  the regulatory approach.  Finally, public health reformers  
were part of  a "sanitary reform" movement that began centuries beforehand in Europe had taken 
hold in the US in the mid-19th century.  The movement began with concerns about water and 
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sewer systems but was eventually taken up by the progressive movement as part of  a broad 
“housecleaning” that  addressed food, milk, drugs, child protection and workers health.   
The fact that so little is known about these movements and their mode of  public advocacy 
reflects a narrow definition of  history in various disciplines. Older studies of  public health, labor 
and social history have covered some of  the ground, and new approaches to environmental 
history are beginning to explore it as well.58 However, in the history of  public relations, where an 
understanding of  advocacy in the context of  public controversy is needed, such movements are 
only rarely included in history. The exclusion of  social advocacy in the agenda of  public relations 
history and the focus only on paid self-defined practitioners reflects a tendency toward “whig” 
history in an important component of  the history of  communication.59  
Conservation: a high-profile reform movement  
Most histories of  American environmental issues focus on the conservation movement 
and the disagreements over wilderness preservation or utilization at the turn of  the century.60  
Historian Joseph Petulla and others have noted three major themes of  conservation movements: 
1) the "biocentric"  approach, epitomized by transcendentalists like Henry David Thoreau and 
Ralph Waldo Emerson and wilderness preservationists like James Audubon, John Muir and Aldo 
Leopold;
 2) the ecological and scientific tradition of  thought, which included geographer George Marsh 
and Forest Service chief  Gifford Pinchot; and  3) The economic / utilitarian approach that 
allowed nearly unlimited forestry and mining, curbed theoretically only to the extent that future 
generations also be left with resources.61 
Concerns over the wanton destruction of  forests, fisheries, wildlife and ranges in the late 
19th century led to some of  the earliest scientific studies. The beginning of  the conservation era 
has been traced to 1873, when the American Association for the Advancement of  Science 
advocated laws for forest protection.  The American Forestry Association and the American 
Fisheries Society were both established around this time, and within a decade the  Forestry 
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Service was established in the U.S. Dept. of  Agriculture and a Commissioner of  Fish and 
Fisheries was designated in the Dept. of  the Interior. Yet government was not the motivating 
force in conservation, according to historian Henry Clepper. “In truth, the government did little 
until public-spirited citizens began to criticize it and to challenge its failure to protect forest and 
other resources from despoliation... The rise of  the conservation movement following the Civil 
War was an American phenomenon in that it was started by the crusading zeal of  a small group 
[who]... demanded government protection of  the nation’s woodlands.”62 Supporting and 
sometimes surpassing the efforts of  scientific groups such as the forestry and fisheries societies 
were the sportsmens’ associations, the Sierra Club (founded in 1892) and women’s groups.63 
 "The rationale for women's involvement lay in the effect of  waterways on every 
American home,” said historian Carolyn Merchant. “Pure water meant health; impure meant 
disease and death."64  The General Federation of  Women's Clubs, founded in 1890, was "steeped 
in conservation ideals," Merchant said, while the Daughters of  the American Revolution focused 
attention on conservation of  soil and water resources for future generations.  
Conservationists at the turn of  the 20th century fought to preserve the redwood forests in 
California,  save the ancient Pueblo cliff  dwellings in Colorado from vandals, and rescue the 
scenic Pallisades on the Hudson River from quarrying. Issues such as beautification, saving waste 
paper, cleaning up towns and cities and planting trees were taken up in the spirit of  the 
progressive movement.  The most bitter environmental controversies of  the era involved dams. In 
1905, for example, an electric company wanted to put up a generating dam at Niagara Falls. A 
public outcry against the ruin of  the scenery promptly ensued, and the dam was never built. In 
1906, however, when the city of  San Francisco wanted Forest Service land for the Hetch-Hetchy 
dam to provide drinking water, conservationists bitterly fought the city and the federal 
government -- but the dam was built.65 In 1912, the  Audubon Society led women to help save 
the endangered bird species favored by hat makers by boycotting certain kinds of  hats, and a 
letter campaign led to laws against importation of  wild bird feathers in 1913.66   
A similar campaign in 1923 involved the Izaak Walton League’s lobbying efforts in 
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Washington to block a huge project to dredge parts of  the Mississippi river.  The league’s 
president and founder, Will H. Dilg, “organized and directed what may have been the first 
modern environmental lobbying campaign in Washington, employing a full-time staff  of  
assistants and enlisting the support of  a wide range of  groups, including the General Federation 
of  Women’s Clubs,” according to Shabecoff.67
The conservation movement attempted to replace natural resource politics with science, 
according to historian Samuel Hays. A scientific system guided by the ideal of  efficiency and 
dominated by technicians or engineers would be preferable to a political system geared towards 
pressure groups and partisan debate.  Although the ideal was never realized, it tended to guide 
the arguments by conservation advocates and, on a broad scale, the general trend of  public 
policy. Moreover, the spirit of  efficiency permeated professional societies and many realms of  life. 
It played a role in “the transformation of  a decentralized, nontechnical, loosely organized society, 
where waste and inefficiency ran rampant, into a highly organized, technical and centrally 
planned and directed social organization that could meet a complex world with efficiency and 
purpose.”68  Across the spectrum of  the conservation movement , the “gospel of  efficiency” was 
not that far removed from  the ideology of  industry while the “biocentric” traditions of  Muir and 
Thoreau remained far from the mainstream of  politics.  
 Hays also argued that  conservation was not always coincident with the progressive 
movement.  Certainly,  many disputes erupted between private industry advocates of  exploitation 
and others advocating conservation through public ownership. Yet, Hays points out, there were 
also controversies where private interest and the ideal of  conservation coincided. Federal range 
control and mineral policies are examples of  private interests that promoted conservation, he 
said. The fact that Ethyl officials occasionally invoked the ideal of  conservation of  petroleum in 
promoting tetraethyl lead indicates not only the ubiquitousness of  the ideal of  conservation but 
also reinforces the point that conservation was not always the central issue for progressives. 
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Regulating America’s Technological Explosion 
One of  the most troubling aspects of  the Ethyl controversy facing the federal government, 
and the Public Health Service (P.H.S. ) in particular, was the lack of  authority to regulate the 
safety of  industrial chemicals in the 1920s. The P.H.S.  was reluctant to ask for regulatory 
authority, and the Congress would have been reluctant to grant it, since the political climate of  
the Roaring Twenties was conservative, pro-business  and contrary to new federal initiatives. 
Conservatives saw regulation as expensive and frequently motivated by unreasonable fears of  
technology.  
The reaction to “groundless” fear of  technology comes up frequently in discussions of  
environmental history.  Examples often employed include the battle over smallpox inoculation in 
Boston in the early 18th century;  exploding steam boilers and collapsing bridges in the 19th 
century;  and safety issues surrounding the introduction of  electricity and automobiles in the 20th 
century.69  Even the hum of  telegraph wires evoked a fearful response in the 1840s.70 In Britain, a 
law required that horseless carriages have a flagman precede on foot to warn those in the way in 
the 1890s, while the first horseless carriage in the U.S. was ordered off  the road in 1885 by fearful 
residents of  Berks County, Pennsylvania.71 Similarly, historian Thomas Hughes noted in 
Networks of  Power the dampening effect that regulation had on the development of  electrical 
systems in Britain.72 
However, regulation has also had positive impacts on technologies. For example, steam 
engines had already been operating on boats in U.S. rivers for many decades when the  
Steamboat Inspection Service was established around 1850 following a series of  devastating 
steam boiler explosions.  Federal regulations helped open the Mississippi River basin to 
settlement by making river travel far safer.  Similarly, in the 1860s more than 25 bridges collapsed 
every year, and in 1873 the American Society of  Civil Engineers set up a commission to regulate 
and certify bridge builders and techniques. By the turn of  the century,  bridge failures had 
become rare.73   
Aside from steamboats and railroads, efforts to regulate industry were weak throughout 
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the 19th century.  However, federal regulation increased dramatically after the turn of  the 20th 
century, mainly as a result of   popular demands for progressive reform linked with “muckraking” 
journalism. Example of   expose journalism include Ida Tarbell’s History of  Standard Oil and  
Upton Sinclair’s semi-fictional book about the Chicago meat packing industry, The Jungle. The 
latter inspired the establishment of  the Food and Drug Administration and the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service under USDA in 1906 and 1907.74 “Big business” had become a public 
anathema, and in 1911,  the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in a case 
involving the Standard Oil Company and ordered it dissolved into various components.75 
Big business was also the target of  the first water pollution law, the Refuse Act of  1899, 
which empowered the Secretary of  War, through the Corps of  Engineers, to prohibit any 
industrial discharge into a waterway that had not been granted a permit.76    Dirty coastal waters 
also inspired a movement for  environmental regulation of  oil pollution in the early 1920s. A well 
publicized campaign by the National Coast Anti-Pollution League drew attention to the problem 
in 1921 and 1922. The league was formed by beachfront resort city governments and marine 
insurance agents worried about harbor fires.77 Around the same time, the P.H.S.  asked its 
representatives to report on the quality of  river waters78  and the Corps of  Engineers performed 
a study of  coastal waters and rivers downstream from oil refineries, paper mills and other 
industrial plants.79 The resulting reports invariably mentioned enormous impacts of  pollution on 
fish and wildlife as well as scenery.  By 1924, despite qualms about a lack of  constitutional 
authority, Congress passed a law regulating oil pollution in tidal waters.80 Inter-departmental and 
international conferences on the subject of  oil pollution led to international treaties prohibiting 
the dumping of  water-damaged oil from oceangoing tankers.81
These laws would have been more in tune with the political climate under Democratic 
president Woodrow Wilson a decade beforehand, when the FDA was strengthened and the 
Federal Trade Commission and the Department of  Labor were established. However, following 
the virtual collapse of  the progressive consensus in the postwar era, a less active role for 
government was a theme of  Republican presidents Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge and 
Ethyl.Controversy
51
Herbert Hoover. Government authority was seen as best limited and most useful when used 
informally to convene teams of  experts who could persuade industry to reform.  To Hoover 
especially,  systematic and cooperative planning were much more effective than laws and 
regulations to guide the emergence of  key  industries such as aviation, radio, electric power and 
highway construction.82  This approach also guided the P.H.S.  as it attempted to deal with the 
Ethyl controversy -- a  problem clearly in its jurisdiction for which it had no concrete regulatory 
authority. Most  other worker health issues remained dormant,  according to historians Rosner 
and Markowitz who saw the 1920 as “one of  the most repressive eras in American labor 
history.”83  Not until the 1930s, when the Great Depression ushered in a pro-labor presidency, 
would the federal government once again expand its regulatory role. 
Public Health Reform Movements  
The reforms of  the progressive era at the turn of  the century that influenced the thinking 
of  many progressives at the time of  the Ethyl controversy had been inspired by  several previous 
generations of  sanitary reform campaigns in the U.S. and Western Europe. Most of  these 
campaigns and movements are understood only in outline, and additional research is needed.   
Historian George Rosen traced the origins of  the progressive public health movement to 
the Enlightenment period following 1750, when infant mortality (up to 80 percent in the worst 
slum areas) was first recognized as a serious social problem. English reformers directed their first 
efforts against liquor, especially gin. The campaign combined newspaper editorials, Hogarth’s 
book Gin Lane, letters by physicians and magistrates, and petitions to the government.  It was “a 
prototype of  public health agitation which was to assume crucial significance in the 19th 
century,” said Rosen,  culminating in the 1751 Gin Acts that gave magistrates control over the 
licensing of  pubs. The Foundling Hospital of  London, established in 1741, and other children's 
hospitals in Germany and France, are also examples of  the mounting concern over infant 
mortality. By the turn of  the 19th century, infant mortality had decreased in one London hospital 
from 66 per thousand to 13 per thousand.84 
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Along with infant mortality, concern about prisoners, soldiers and sailors led to reforms 
and laid the groundwork for the sanitary movements of  the 19th century. One well known 
benchmark in public health was the adoption of  lemon juice in the British Navy to prevent 
scurvy. Less well known were the efforts of  reformers like John Howard, sheriff  of  Bedfordshire,  
whose 1777 book  State of  the Prisons aroused public opinion. Howard showed that “people are 
galvanized into action when the facts about social disease are forced upon them and that an 
aroused public opinion could be employed as a lever to compel reform.”85 Concerns about the 
health of  the general population also increased, and by the early 19th century, hundreds of  
hospitals had been established throughout  France, Germany, England and the United States. 
Around the early 19th century, reformers and their allies in the news media generated 
increasing concern about the poor quality of  drinking water and the handling of  sewage. In 
1827, for example,  Londoners learned that a water company’s main inlet was only three yards 
away from the outlet of  a large sewer.  The construction of  city water systems in the U.S. began 
with the 1797 Watering Committee of  Philadelphia and the 1799 Manhattan Company. Water 
supplies usually preceded the development of  sewage systems by anywhere from five to 50 
years.86 Water systems in the U.S. were primarily set up by private companies to turn a profit and 
only  in the 20th century were they incorporated into publicly owned municipal systems. The 
private model did not work as well in Britain. In 1830 the city of  London could boast seven sewer 
boards, 100 paving, lighting and cleaning companies and 172 vestries of  one sort or another. The 
chaos was a stimulus to the sanitary reform movement.87    
Social reform leader Jeremy Bentham addressed the chaos in his Constitutional Code of  
1820, proposing that the prime minister’s cabinet include a minister of  health, whose department 
would be in charge of  environmental  sanitation, the treatment of  epidemics, and the general 
administration of  medical care. Bentham had been influenced by French physicians who 
participated in the revolutionary government’s centralization of  public assistance, and he in turn 
influenced leaders of  the British sanitary reform movement such as Edwin Chadwick and 
Southwood Smith.  Another influence was German health pioneer Peter Frank (1748-1821), who 
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advocated clean water, sewage systems, garbage disposal, food inspection and other health 
measures, including supervision of  worker safety and occupational disease by authorities. 
By the first third of  the 19th century, the human cost of  the industrial revolution 
presented a significant challenge to the structure of   governments themselves. In Britain, the 
Royal Commission inquiries of  1843-45 that exposed dreadful conditions in factories and mines 
also led to the the Public Health Act of  1848 and the appointment of  municipal health boards 
with authority to regulate water and sewer service. Meanwhile, a movement of  volunteer groups 
began attempting to address problems of  housing, sanitation and other reforms. One objective of  
these groups was to organize public opinion in support of  further legislative action. Such support 
was not always forthcoming. When the Public Health Act expired in 1854, and members of  the 
National Board of  Health were fired, the Times of  London approvingly said: “We prefer to take 
our chance of  cholera and the rest than be bullied into health.” Thus, progress toward improved 
living and working conditions proceeded by fits and starts, with variations from one place and 
one nation to another. “Nevertheless, the thread of  continuity is not an illusion, an artifact of  the 
historian,” said Rosen. “Throughout most of  the 19th century health workers confronted 
substantially the same problems... The fundamental doctrines remained virtually unaltered 
because the conditions to which they applied remained fundamentally the same.”88 
Public health concerns in New York city in 1804 led to the appointment of  a health 
inspector whose duties included quarantine and environmental sanitation. Also that year the 
Manhattan Corp. was formed to create a clean water supply. The company evolved into the 
Chase Manhattan Bank. The wave of  immigration from Europe in the 1830s and '40s 
compounded existing public health problems in American cities, and cities began filling up with 
overcrowded tenement slums. The population of  New York alone grew from 123,000 in 1820 to 
515,000 in 1850, and in 1837 Benjamin McCready wrote his pioneering essay on occupational 
medicine and the conditions of  the slums.  Voluntary associations, such as those in Britain, soon 
sprang up to mobilize the community with a high moral purpose. The Massachusetts Sanitary 
Commission was one of  the first of  these, and its 1845 census of  Boston slums showed shockingly 
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high infant and maternal mortality rates as well as a witch's brew of  communicable diseases. A 
second report in 1850 confirmed the findings, but not until 1869 was a state board of  health 
established. 
The American Medical Association, formed in 1847, also surveyed city  conditions 
through a public health committee, but proposals for improving city slums were not adopted. The 
establishment of  the American Public Health Association  in 1872  came along with a wave of  
state health departments and the organization of  the Marine Hospital Service under the 
Treasury Department. In 1879, the U.S. established the National Board of  Health to collect 
information, to advise the federal and state governments, and to report to Congress with a plan 
for a national health organization. The board was terminated four years later, with  partial 
success behind it but the problem of  state versus federal regulation of  public health unresolved. 
It was around this time that Louis Pasteur's theories about the transmission of  disease 
began to be accepted and amplified with further research by Joseph Lister, Walter Reed and 
others. The consequences of  the “bacteriological era” of  science in the decades before and after 
the turn of  the 20th century were profound, with dramatic decreases in mortality and major 
improvements in general public health. In the U.S. and Western Europe, adult death rates began 
falling in the mid-  to late-19th century due to improvements in water supply and sanitation, 
while  infant mortality rates fell  around the turn of  the 20th century due to better nutrition and 
medical care.89 Epidemics of  diphtheria, malaria, yellow fever and bubonic plague were halted, 
and the pathways for contagious spread of  tuberculosis, typhoid and cholera were identified in 
food, milk and water supplies. One index of  public health improvement, the infant mortality rate 
of  New York City, dropped from 273 to 94 per thousand from 1885 to 1915. Child welfare 
movements continued through the turn of  the century well into the 1930s. Voluntary associations 
and settlement houses (such as Hull House in Chicago) set up clean milk stations, then well-child 
clinics that also educated mothers on health issues. Health pioneer Josephine Baker showed how, 
in New York City in 1908, a visit from a public health nurse following the birth of  a child could 
save thousands of  children from death. Reform was stimulated by an aggressive campaign by 
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“that dedicated, militant group of  men and women ... who undertook to curb some of  the worst 
abuses of  industrialization and prepared the way for social legislation we take for granted today,” 
Rosen wrote.90 In 1912, the federal government set up a Children’s Bureau to survey and report 
on the health of  children. 
The problem of  improving the generally dismal working conditions was also seen as 
related to public health in the 1870 - 1930 period. Most of  the responsibility for regulation in the 
United States in the late 19th century rested with the states, and in 1877 Massachusetts passed 
the first factory inspection law, with 22 states following over the next 20 years.91 Coal mining 
safety laws were first passed in Pennsylvania in 1870 following a tragic fire that suffocated 179 
men. “The public press of  the nation throughout the whole length and breadth of  the land 
united in demanding that provisions be made by law for ... safeguards,” said a book written at the 
time.92 A patchwork quilt of  state laws protecting workers in various trades and providing 
compensation for workers injured under certain job descriptions developed in the pre-World War 
I years. For purposes of  worker compensation, the U.S. government listed nine hazards in 
employment, only one of  which was an “occupational disease,” even though “there are 709 
occupations in which poisons are a hazard,” according to a 1926 National Consumers League 
report.  At least 53 industrial poisons were recognized at the time, but only two states gave 
blanket compensation to all industrial diseases. Others listed a few well known diseases: New York 
listed 19; Ohio, 15; and New Jersey, 10.93  
The federal government began to actively study occupational safety in 1885, with the 
establishment of  the  Bureau of  Labor Statistics in the Department of  Labor. The bureau 
reviewed occupational diseases, factory sanitation rules, European laws and workmen’s 
compensation bills, among other topics. With a change in leadership in 1905, the bureau focused 
more on health problems of  workers, including coal miners, workers in phosphorous and dust-
ridden trades,  and workers exposed to dangerous machinery.  Around 1915, a bureaucratic turf  
fight for workers health research broke out between the P.H.S. and the Department of  Labor, and 
the Public Health Service began to actively research an area that until then it had completely 
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neglected.94 Many objected to the P.H.S. growing responsibilities in the area on the ground that 
workers  were not the agency’s primary constituency. Nevertheless, its role grew until, in the 
1920s, it was the logical agency to deal with the Ethyl controversy. By taking the reins and calling 
the conference on leaded gasoline in May, 1925, the P.H.S. would take a bold and somewhat 
progressive move, but at the same time would secure an important and  high profile piece of  
bureaucratic turf. 
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THE DISCOVERY FROM DAYTON  
The discovery of  tetraethyl lead as an antiknock additive to make "leaded"   gasoline has 
long been seen as an example of  scientifically driven research at its finest. According to a leading 
historian of  technology, Thomas Hughes, the discovery  was "a beautiful [piece] of  pure, or at 
least deliberately planned, research" and a systematic approach to the "reverse salient," -- a key 
problem in the broad front of  technological progress. Engine knock was a key problem because it 
occurred at the upper limit of  efficiency , power and cylinder compression in the internal 
combustion engines of  the early 1920s.  General Motors (G.M.)  researchers Charles Kettering 
and  Thomas A. Midgley "tried out all elements possible in a so-called Edisonian style," Hughes 
said.   By overcoming knock,  they opened the door to engines with almost twice the power and 
fuel efficiency.  Hughes saw the discovery of  Ethyl  as closer to the heart of  generic questions 
about invention than most other stories about  other discoveries, that have often been "simplistic 
and adulatory."1  
The fact that Kettering and Midgley combined both the Edisonian "cut and try" method 
and a scientific approach has been well appreciated in books about the discovery and marketing 
of  Ethyl leaded gasoline.   Historians Joseph C. Robert, Stuart Leslie, Joseph Pratt and David 
Rosner and Gerald Markowitz,  along with biographers T.A. Boyd and Rosamond Young, tended 
to focus on leaded gasoline as the final successful step in a progression of  discovery.2  They 
focused on Ethyl brand leaded gasoline as a "success story" and rarely mentioned the alternative 
possibilities in their historical context or the controversy surrounding leaded gasoline. 
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 In recent years, the need for a revised interpretation of  the discovery has  become 
evident.  The focus on the financially successful aspect of  fuel technology  has had, as in other 
instances of  preoccupation with technological success, a "whiggish" tendency. Whig history is a 
term for an approach to history which tends to distort the past through the optic of  the present. 
According to historian John Staudenmier, one way to avoid "whiggishness" is to study some of  
the  “roads not taken."3  Avoiding "whiggishness" may point to useful ideas for the future, as 
Pursel suggested,4 or , more importantly, it may simply help keep ideas in contemporary 
perspective. Another reason for revising the interpretation of  the discovery of  Ethyl leaded 
gasoline is that it is no longer a "success" in any event.   Leaded gasoline was banned from the 
American market in 1986 due to its impact on  public health. Thus, there are many reasons why 
we need to return to the moment in history and try to understand what may have been on the 
minds of  General Motors researchers Charles Kettering and Thomas A. Midgley when they 
discovered the effect of  tetraethyl lead as an anti-knock agent. 
Setting the Stage: the Oil Crisis of  the Early 20th century  
 The antiknock effect of  lead in gasoline was discovered at an historical moment that was 
a complex crossroads of  possibilities for the oil and automotive industries. One major impetus for 
change was the growing demand for new cars after World War I. Consumers also favored higher 
speeds and more powerful engines. At the same time, a troubling problem called engine knock 
began to affect more and more cars.  Motorists found that their car engines would knock loudly 
while going up hills or taking off  rapidly, and they assumed that the declining quality of  fuel had 
something to do with it. Meanwhile, geologists predicted that petroleum reserves would be 
exhausted within 20 to 30 years.   
 Detroit’s response to fears of  an oil shortage had traditionally been to help ensure that 
alternative forms of  fuel would be available. In 1906,  fears of  an oil   shortage were confirmed 
by the U.S. Geological Survey (U.S.G.S).5   In response, legislation was proposed to free farm-
produced ethyl alcohol from beverage taxes so that it could be used as a fuel. Representatives of  
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the Detroit,  Board of  Commerce attended hearings in Washington and told a Senate hearing 
that  car manufacturers worried “not so much [about] cost as ... supply.”6    By the 1920s, Detroit  
again was concerned. Although U.S. oil production doubled between 1914 and 1921, oil 
production did not kept pace with fuel demand as the number of  cars increased.7   Three million 
were on the road in 1918, and another 22 million would be produced within a decade.8   With 
growing demand, the long term petroleum outlook was “precarious,”  as the director of  the 
U.S.G.S.  said in 1920.9 
Compounding fears of  a domestic oil shortage, international diplomacy in the wake of  
World War I had failed to secure any reliable foreign sources of  oil for the United States.10 Fear 
of  oil shortages became the most important factor in international relations,11  becoming so great 
that some analysts warned that the U.S. might go to war with Great Britain to secure access to oil 
in the Persian Gulf  region.12   In 1919,  Scientific American  noted that the auto industry could 
no longer ignore the fact that only 20 years worth of  U.S. oil was left. “The burden falls upon the 
engine. It must adapt itself  to less volatile fuel, and it must be  made to burn the fuel with less 
waste.... Automotive engineers must turn their thoughts away from questions of  speed and 
weight... and comfort and endurance, to avert what ... will turn out to be a calamity, seriously 
disorganizing an indispensable system of  transportation.”13 
Charles Kettering's Solution to the Energy Crisis  
America’s leading automotive engineer in the post-World War I era was unquestionably 
Charles Franklin Kettering.  Tall and ascetic, with a sense of  dignity and humor sometimes 
compared with that of  Abraham Lincoln, Kettering was able to rally a team of  researchers 
around a host of  apparently impossible tasks. He was born in 1876 in Loudonville, Ohio, and 
studied electrical engineering at Ohio State University. He graduated with honors and went to 
work for National Cash Register company, creating the first electric cash register. Although others 
had tried, no one had been able to come up with a mechanism that connected the electric motor 
to the register’s gearing. The mechanism had to engage and disengage quickly.  After Kettering 
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solved that problem, he began thinking about other possibilities for the principle, and developed 
an electric self-starting mechanism for cars. It  replaced the cumbersome and dangerous hand 
cranked magneto  starter. In 1910, Kettering formed the Dayton Engineering Laboratories Co. 
(Delco) and a few years later, electric starters and batteries had become a common feature on 
millions of  cars.  
About the same time, the increasing demand for gasoline led to a decline in fuel quality 
and an increase in engine knock. No one knew what caused it, but many people blamed the 
electric starter motor. Kettering thought the rumors came from magneto manufacturers. “The 
Bosch magneto people had representatives out telling Cadillac dealers that if  they had magnetos 
instead of  battery ignition they wouldn’t have all the trouble,” Kettering recalled in an 
unpublished 1946 memoir.14 As he travelled throughout the Midwest, demonstrating the electric 
starter to various skeptical automakers, he frequently thought about how to find the cause of  
engine knock in order to silence it -- and his critics. 
The problem went on the back burner for several years as he worked on an  electric 
generator for  farm lighting powered by a small gasoline engine.  Before it could be marketed, 
however, insurance companies insisted that Delco switch from gasoline to kerosene, which was 
less volatile and less likely to cause fires. But kerosene caused a profound knock in the Delco 
engine. One day in 1916, a young mechanical engineer fresh from Cornell University had 
finished another project for Kettering. 
“What do you want me to do next, boss?” Thomas Midgley is said to have asked. Over 
the years, Kettering had accumulated some test equipment to look into engine knock, and he now 
suggested that Midgley try it out.   The conversation was the beginning of  a seven year trail of  
research that would lead to the discovery of  Ethyl leaded gasoline.  Midgley  continued working 
on knock even when Kettering sold Delco in 1916 and formed a new company, Dayton Metal 
Products Co. Research Division.  The new company would play with research, Kettering said, in 
much the same spirit as a person plays golf. (With typical humor, he added, “but I don't think we 
used the same proportion of  profanity”).15  
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Kettering recognized that engine knock represented an upper limit on the extent to which 
a given engine could produce power.  An engine using a lower quality fuel would have to use a 
cylinder compression that produced less power. Otherwise, increasing compression would lead to 
violent knocking and rapid engine failure.  In 1916, most engines ran at a four-to-one or five-to-
one compression ratio. Racing cars, on the other hand, commonly used far more efficient engines 
fueled with more expensive fuels such as alcohol and benzene. 
An early success put Kettering and Midgley on the track of  an additive to eliminate 
knocking. In December 1916, the two men were discussing the knock problem when Kettering 
wondered whether it was related to the absorption of  heat. He remembered a small red flower 
called the trailing arbutus that sometimes bloomed in the snow in Ohio and speculated that it was 
able to absorb more heat because of  its red color. Perhaps if  a red dye were added to kerosene it 
would absorb some of  the heat of  combustion and stop the knock. 
This line of  reasoning turned out to be completely off  base, but it shows  both how little 
was known about fuel chemistry at the time and  how much the element of  luck intervened in the 
antiknock research work.  For, as luck would have it, no dyes were available that day, and a 
company chemist located a bottle of  iodine. A few drops in the carburetor of  the test engine 
noticeably decreased the knock. Later when some red dye was located, it proved to have no effect 
at all. The arbutus story is often recounted in the histories of  Ethyl  gasoline because it aptly 
demonstrates that luck favors the prepared researcher who can isolate the essential fact and 
discard encumbering theory.16  
Almost overnight, Kettering and Midgley had taken fuel research to a new plateau.  The 
oil industry was concerned with production, not end-use, and most of  its research was focused on 
squeezing more gasoline from a barrel of  oil. (It was, in fact, this tendency that led to increasing 
engine knock).  The car industry was mostly concerned with metal, not fuel chemistry. Kettering 
and  Midgley had worked their way into an important and unexplored terrain for research. They 
not only began trying different compounds, but they also tried to understand their effects by  
accurately measuring knock and graphically displaying it. This research was the beginning of  a 
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scientific process that resulted in uniform test procedures for  measuring engine knock and also in 
a fuel quality measuring system known today as “octane number” based on  iso-octane as a 
reference fuel.17
In 1917, America's entry into World War I shifted Midgley's early fuel research from 
automotive engine knock to high-powered aircraft engine fuels. He was soon working on a secret 
aviation fuel development project at Wright18  airfield in Dayton using a single cylinder taken 
from a Liberty engine.  Midgley found that some types of  fuels could be used in high 
compression engines while others would knock violently.  In the list of  antiknock fuels, pure ethyl 
alcohol was given as most effective, followed by the “aromatic” petroleum compounds (benzene, 
toluene, xylene),  then petroleum olefins, parafins and ethers. Since the most important target of  
the research was airplane fuel, Kettering and Midgley rejected some choices because they were 
not suitable for aircraft. Benzene, for example, froze at 40 degrees F above zero, while 
temperatures aloft could go as low as 76 F below zero. Olefins (heat-cracked petroleum) were 
eliminated because they tended to form gum after a few months in storage. Alcohol was 
eliminated because it had only about 80,000 BTUs per gallon as compared to gasoline with 
about 120,000 BTUs per gallon.19 This meant that an airplane might have to take about one 
third again as much fuel to accomplish the same mission and thus would carry less cargo.20  
However, problems with the three alternatives could be overcome. Benzene could be made into 
cyclohexane, which had a very low freezing point. Olefin cracked gasolines could be used quickly 
or treated before use to remove gum. Alcohols could be mixed with benzene or gasoline to give 
an antiknock and anti-freeze effect without adding too much fuel weight.  The antiknock 
approach with the most promise for airplane fuel seemed to be a mixture of  50 percent benzene 
and 50 percent gasoline, and Midgley applied for a patent on the mixture on Jan. 7, 1918.21 
Working with the Army Air Corps, Kettering and Midgley settled on  a blend of  
cyclohexane and benzene called “Hecter” fuel. They were prepared to go into production with 
the fuel when the 1918 Armistice was signed.22 In a final report on  the war research, Midgley 
wrote:  “Engineers have heretofore believed knocking to be the unavoidable result of  too high a 
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compression, and while the fact that [ethyl] alcohol did not knock at extremely high compressions 
was well known, it was [erroneously] attributed to its extremely high ignition point23 ...“  Instead, 
Midgley and Kettering said they believed that the effect involved the chemical structure of  the 
fuel. Thus, high heating value fuels such as gasoline (which were preferred for aircraft because of  
relatively lighter weight) could, theoretically, run in high compression engines just as well as 
alcohol or benzene if  some additive could be found to reduce knock. Lower heating value fuels, 
such as alcohol, would then not be needed for aircraft fuel.24  
Kettering's shop becomes G.M.'s research division 
 Shortly after the war ended, G.M.founder William C. Durant had become interested in  
Kettering's work and reached an agreement with Kettering to turn  Dayton Metal Products into 
G.M.’s Research Division. The merger was formalized early in 1919, and Kettering was made 
G.M.'s vice president of  research. About the same time,  in an effort to make the new acquisition 
appear efficient to the new management, Midgley was given two weeks to discover something to 
stiffen G.M.’s resolve to fund fuel research.  “Mr. Midgley has tenaciously adhered to the opinion 
that it was possible to secure a so-called ‘pill’ to overcome motor knock,” said F.O. Clements, the 
lab’s manager.  And yet, he observed, “the balance of  the organization has given him very little 
encouragement.”25   
According to T.A. Boyd, a research chemist working with Midgley who later documented 
some of  the laboratory's work,  Midgley's main research goal in the 1919-1920 era was to make 
alcohols out of  olefins in petroleum by reacting the olefins with sulfuric acid.  “But in view of  the 
verdict setting a time limit on how much further the research for an antiknock compound might 
continue, work was resumed at once in making engine tests of  whatever further compounds 
happened to be available on the shelf  of  the lab... or which could be gotten readily,” Boyd said.26  
Midgley lost no time trying everything he could find in his one-cylinder laboratory test engine. 
On January 30, 1919, just as his deadline approached, Midgley tried a few drops of  aniline in his 
test engine and dramatically reduced the incessant knock. This haphazard approach was hardly 
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the epitome of  deliberately planned research.  
Aniline “was the second real antiknock compound to be discovered,” Boyd said in a 
confidential history of  Ethyl leaded gasoline written in 1943.  However, there were problems. 
Among them was the fact that aniline was toxic, had a distressingly bad smell, and that a 3.5 
percent mixture in kerosene would separate into two distinct liquids (or "phase separate") at 35 
degrees F.27   
The idea that analine was a "real" anti-knock compound is confusing. Boyd never defines 
"real" and, in another part of  his unpublished history, noted that "of  course, antiknock agents 
had already been added to automobile gasoline.."28  
It is also significant that a discrepancy seems to have existed between summary reports and actual 
test data at the time. For example, in a summary "Report of  Fuel Research Work" regarding 
1918 - 1919 G.M. - Bureau of  Mines fuel tests,  Midgley noted that ethyl alcohol blended at five 
percent strength into gasoline as an antiknock had only “slight effect” while analine had the 
best.29  However, raw scores from these same tests appended to the report showed that 20 percent 
alcohol blends gave a markedly improved effect in tests that were not mentioned in the final 
report.  Also omitted was any mention of  analine's toxic nature, smell or propensity toward phase 
separation, which Midgley had discussed in other memos.   Thus, an interest in what was called 
the "pill" approach was evident long before tetraethyl lead was discovered, and the summary 
report seems to have been written with conclusions supporting analine already in mind.   
 In  late 1918 and early 1919, Kettering told fellow engineers that combined industry 
research efforts into the problem of  developing better fuels and better engines was needed.  He 
also made initial contacts with du Pont Corp. and Standard Oil of  N.J. representatives and 
encouraged them to exchange research results with his own researchers at General Motors. He 
shared testing equipment and most of  what his labs had learned, to the chagrin of  the G.M. 
management and patent offices.  Standard’s interest had been piqued when, following a meeting 
with Kettering, Chicago patent attorney F.A. Howard wrote to Standard chairman  E.M. Clark 
on April 16, 1919. “Unless the fuel producers themselves get into this work of  investigating the 
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properties of  their fuels, there is a good chance that they may have to pay tribute to others,” 
Howard said. “There would be such an insistent demand for (antiknock fuel) that any oil 
producer who had exclusive rights could absolutely dominate the entire motor fuel market.”30 
The lack of  research in the oil industry reflected not only the preoccupation with 
exploration and production but also the idea that engine knock was an engine problem.  The 
prevailing view was that a new kind of  engine would be needed that was more tolerant of  low-
grade fuels, and this would probably mean a lower compression engine that was less fuel efficient.  
Although it would be wasteful, such an engine would be able to use lower grade fuels. Since 
higher grade fuels were running out, the oil industry would have to exploit increasingly poor 
quality oil fields and oil shale.  
Even though oil was running out, Kettering felt the industry should refuse to compromise 
the design of  the engine.  In a talk to the Society of  Automotive Engineers, he insisted that the 
route to conservation of  fuel was through better quality fuel to be used in more efficient engines. 
This must have seemed contradictory, since declining fuel quality was the original problem, but 
Kettering took the longer view. In effect, he argued that  low quality fuels would also run out, and 
low compression engines would use them up faster.  If  the fuel could be improved, the engine 
could be developed with higher compression ratios, which would give better mileage, which in 
turn would extend fuel supplies.  However, even with conservation,  experts believed that 
petroleum resources would decline in quality and eventually run out.  Kettering and G.M.had a 
public short term approach and a secret long term approach to the problem. 
In the short term, two  "classes" of  solutions to the engine knock problem were available, 
Kettering said: the “high percentage class” and the “low percentage class.”  The former involved 
adding large amounts of  another liquid fuel to gasoline, such as 40 percent benzene, which 
“makes an engine operate entirely satisfactorily,” Kettering said. The “low percentage class” of  
solution was represented in 1919 by the use of  a one percent iodine solution in gasoline. (Aniline, 
although discovered, was still secret at this time). Iodine was expensive and corrosive, “entirely 
out of  the question” as a commercial proposition, but it provided an interesting example of  a 
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possible “low percentage class” solution to the problem.31 
Although the idea that iodine or some other "low percentage class" material could solve 
the knock problem opened up an entirely new avenue in engine development, historians dealing 
with the Ethyl controversy have not recognized that the “high percentage class” solution to the 
knock problem was well understood by  European and American scientists in the 1920s. Probably 
the most important "high percentage class" solution to engine knock was the addition of  20 to 30 
percent ethyl alcohol (ethanol), distilled from grain or root crops or made from wood pulp.  Also 
well known in 1919 was the use of  20 to 40 percent benzine from coal and "cracked" higher 
grades of  crude petroleum. 
Ethyl alcohol as a fuel parallels and in some cases precedes gasoline.32   In 1918, Scientific 
American  cited war research in France and England and concluded: “It is now definitely 
established that alcohol can be blended with gasoline to produce a suitable motor fuel.”33  Harold 
B. Dixon, working for the British Fuel Research Board, summed up his group’s conclusions that 
alcohol’s greater useful compression ratio compensated for its lower BTU value.  A mixture of  
alcohol with 20 percent benzene or gasoline “runs very smoothly, and without knocking,” he said 
in 1920 in the Society of  Automotive Engineers Journal.34  The consensus,  Scientific American 
said, was “a universal assumption that [ethyl] alcohol in some form will be a constituent of  the 
motor fuel of  the future.”35 Alcohol met all possible technical objections, and although it was 
more expensive than gasoline, it was not prohibitively expensive in blends with gasoline. “Every 
chemist knows [alcohol and gasoline] will mix, and every engineer knows [they] will drive an 
internal combustion engine,” Scientific American said.  The prevailing view in 1920, then, was 
that high percentage class additions to fuels would be necessary if  higher compression ratios were 
to be achieved, and that engines that were more tolerant to low grade fuels would probably also 
be needed.  
Meanwhile,  as aniline and iodine proved expensive and complex to produce, Midgley 
and Kettering’s investigation of  fuel knock had come to a stalemate.  The impasse was the “dark 
hour before a break in the clouds,” Boyd later said. Midgley was depressed and wanted to drop 
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the entire investigation.36   In October, 1920, Midgley filed a patent application on an aniline 
injector for engines.37 Still, the pungent aroma of  aniline exhaust clung to the air in the Dayton 
labs, magnifying the sense of  failure.  “I doubt if  humanity, even to doubling of  fuel economy, 
will put up with this smell,” Midgley wrote C.M. Stine of  du Pont.38 Stine had been asked to 
develop plans for a full scale production effort for aniline. Kettering conceded that du Pont was 
“out of  sympathy with our point of  view,” and that they would have to do something “to 
stimulate interest in what is today the only known solution to the problem.”39
In the spring of  1921, Kettering chanced across a newspaper article on selenium, a 
potential “universal solvent.” Kettering laughed, remembering a joke about a farmer who asked a 
chemist what on earth would hold a "universal" solvent. He pocketed the news clip. When he 
returned to Dayton, out of  the blue, Kettering gave it to Midgley and asked him to try selenium. 
On April 6, 1921, at  the threshold of  abandoning the project, Midgley  discovered that selenium 
had  an antiknock effect greater than aniline, although it smelled worse and was highly corrosive. 
The  research effort shifted into a somewhat more systematic and scientific approach.  
Guided by a periodic table of  elements designed by  Robert Wilson of  MIT, Midgley began 
focusing on groups of  elements with potential antiknock effect.  He pasted a chart of   20 
elements in four groups onto a peg board and mapped the antiknock values of  each element as it 
was tested.   By August, 1921, preliminary tests pointed to lead as the best "low percentage" 
antiknock additive.  Historians would later see the peg board method as a turn from raw 
empiricism to a reasoned scientific method and as marking the broader industrial transition from 
the “heroic” style of  invention in the mold of  Edison to the more scientific, less personal 
corporate inventive approach.40 Yet it is interesting that world famous German chemist Carl 
Bosch felt that his chemists would have rebelled at a method so crudely rooted in the empirical 
tradition.  When he invited Kettering to his laboratory two years later, he smiled at the "cut and 




Experiments on alternatives continue 
As work continued on analine and other low percentage compounds in 1920 and 1921, 
the idea of  what was needed in fuel research continued to evolve.  The primary initial idea, 
according to Boyd's unpublished history, was that gasoline supply was inadequate in the short 
term. Rather than move to heavier and lower grade fuels, which would still be abundant after 
high quality oil was used up, it would be better to use more efficient fuels, as Kettering had told 
the Society of  Automotive Engineers. Midgley and Boyd consulted with experts in the U.S. 
Bureau of  Mines who said that the idea of  improving low grade fuels seemed less urgent than the 
long range petroleum supply problem.42  
Around 1920 and 1921, Kettering and his British counterpart H.R. Ricardo had began to 
believe that alcohol fuel from renewable resources would be the answer to the problem. “At 
almost the same time, both researchers [Kettering and Ricardo] settled on alcohol as the key to 
unshackling the internal combustion engine from non-renewable fossil fuels,” said historian 
Stuart Leslie.  “Ethanol (ethyl alcohol) never knocked, it could be produced by distiling waste 
vegetable material, and it was almost pollution-free. Ricardo compared alcohol fuel to living 
within a man’s means, implying that fossil fuels were a foolish squandering of  capital.”43  
 Despite Ricardo and Kettering’s optimism over the advantages of  alcohol fuel, staff  
researchers had previously concluded that alcohol fuel from farm products would not satisfy the 
enormous fuel need if  a total substitute for petroleum had to be found.   In 1919 a du Pont study  
found that a nationwide switch to ethyl alcohol would take 50 to 60 percent of  the entire grain 
and sugar crop.44  Midgley's assistant T.A. Boyd also compiled statistics in the 1919-1920 period 
and reported that some 46 percent of  all foodstuffs would have to be converted to alcohol to 
replace gasoline on a BTU for BTU basis.45  In April of  1921,  Boyd  surveyed the steep rise in 
number of  new cars and the increasing difficulty of  providing new fuel supplies. The solution,  
Boyd said, would be to use other fuels, and benzene and alcohol “appear to be very promising 
allies” to petroleum.46 Alcohol was the “most direct route ... for converting energy from its source, 
the sun, into a material that is suitable for a fuel...” Boyd said. 
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Despite advantages of  cleanliness and high antiknock rating, there were supply problems. 
In 1921, about 100 million gallons of  industrial alcohol supply was available. Overall, enough 
corn, sugar cane and other crops were available to produce almost twice the demand for gasoline, 
which was about 8.3 billion gallons per year.  But the possibility of  using such a large amount of  
food acreage for fuel “seems very unlikely,” he said.47   In a speech around 1921, Kettering noted 
that “industrial alcohol can be obtained from vegetable products ... [but] the present total 
production of  industrial alcohol amounts to less than four percent of  the fuel demands, and were 
it to take the place of  gasoline, over half  of  the total farm area of  the United States would be 
needed to grow the vegetable matter from which to produce this alcohol.”48
 The question in Kettering’s speech and in the Boyd and du Pont studies is framed in 
terms of  totally replacing gasoline although a related goal of  the research was to create antiknock 
additives. It stands to reason that if  a 20 percent blend of  alcohol were to be used in all fuel, then 
(even using Boyd’s questionable figure) only about nine percent of  grain and sugar crops would 
be needed. Since grain was in surplus after the war, American farmers probably would have 
welcomed a new market for their crop, and the kinds of  supply problems in the G.M. and du 
Pont studies would probably not have materialized. Also, with Prohibition, distillers would have 
welcomed a new use for their services.  Another problem with Kettering's analysis  demonstrates 
a lack of  understanding of  agriculture and the distilling industry. Grain  is not “used” for fuel; it 
is fed to cattle after it is distilled with no loss in food value. This is as true of  brewers' grains from 
beer distilleries as it is of  fuel facilities. 
 Thus, supply of  an additive would not have been the problem that G.M. and du Pont 
engineers apparently assumed that it would have been. The original du Pont and Boyd studies on 
fuel alcohol are missing from the archives, and it is difficult to fathom the reason for their narrow 
frame of  reference. One reasonable explanation is that Kettering, Boyd and Midgley were 
preoccupied with the long-term replacement of  petroleum.  In 1920 and 1921 they were not 
technically or politically opposed to ethyl alcohol as a straight fuel or in blends with gasoline.  
Kettering spoke out against taxes on alcohol as an impediment to fuel research and helped 
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overcome other obstacles.49 For example, in 1920, K.W. Zimmerschied of  G.M.’s New York 
headquarters wrote Kettering to note that the alcohol fuel use “is getting more serious every day 
in connection with export cars, and anything we can do toward building our carburetors so they 
can be easily adapted to alcohol will be appreciated by all.”  Kettering assured him that the 
adaptation “is a thing which is very readily taken care of,” and said that G.M. could rapidly 
change the floats in  carburetors from lacquered cork to metal.50 Midgley also filed a patent 
application for a blend of  alcohol and cracked (olefin) gasoline on February 28, 1920, clearly 
intending it to be an antiknock fuel.51
The problem of  the long-term resource base for the fuel of  the future continued to worry 
Kettering and Midgley. At one point they became interested in work on cellulose conversion to 
fermentable sugar being performed by Prof. Harold Hibbert at Yale University. Hibbert was a 
visionary, and pointed out that the 1920 U.S.G.S.  oil reserve report had serious implications for 
his work. “Does the average citizen understand what this means?" he asked. "In from 10 to 20 
years this country will be dependent entirely upon outside sources for a supply of  liquid fuels... 
paying out vast sums yearly in order to obtain supplies of  crude oil from Mexico, Russia  and 
Persia.”  But the chemist might be able to solve  the problem, Hibbert said, by working on 
abundant cellulose waste from farm crops, timber operations and seaweed as a source of  ethyl 
alcohol.52  In the summer of  1920, Boyd and his family moved to New Haven so that he could 
study with Hibbert. Boyd found Hibbert impressive but the volume of  literature about cellulose 
hydrolysis and synthesis was overwhelming. When Midgley came east in late July, he was more 
interested in meeting Standard Oil Co. officials than with Hibbert, and Boyd left without a clear 
sense of  where the cellulose research could go.53 
Boyd did insist that a source of  alcohol “in addition to foodstuffs” must be found, and that 
the source would undoubtedly be cellulose: “It is readily available, it is easily produced and its 
supply is renewable.” Using it and returning farm crop residues to the soil would not harm soil 
fertility. But the problem of  developing a commercial process for cellulose conversion to alcohol 
was serious, he had learned in his stay with Hibbert.  A ton of  wood yielded only 20 gallons of  
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alcohol in the least expensive "weak acid" process, whereas a commercially profitable "weak acid" 
process would need a yield of  at least 50 gallons, and possibly 60 to 65. Such yields had been 
achieved with the "strong acid" process, but that technology was complex and more expensive. 
Still, success might be found if  the "strong acid" yield could be obtained in a weak acid process,  
and as a result, "the danger of  a serious shortage of  motor fuel would disappear,”  Boyd said. 
“The great necessity for and the possibilities of  such a process justify a large amount of  further 
research.”  
To promote such research among automotive and chemical engineers, Midgley drove a 
high compression ratio car (7:1) from Dayton to an October, 1921 Society of  Automotive 
Engineers (SAE)  meeting in Indianapolis using a 30 percent alcohol blend in gasoline only two 
months before tetraethyl lead was discovered.  “Alcohol has tremendous advantages and minor 
disadvantages,” Midgley told fellow SAE members in a discussion. Advantages included “clean 
burning and freedom from any carbon deposit... [and] tremendously high compression under 
which alcohol will operate without knocking... Because of  the possible high compression, the 
available horsepower is much greater with alcohol than with gasoline...” Minor disadvantages 
included low volatility, difficulty starting, and difficulty in blending with gasoline “unless a binder 
is used.”54  Another unnamed engineer (probably from G.M., possibly Boyd) noted that a seven 
and a half  percent increase in power  was found with the alcohol-gasoline blend “... without 
producing any ‘pink’ [knock] in the engine. We have recommended the addition of  10 percent of  
benzol [benzene] to our customers who have export trade that uses this type of  fuel to facilitate 
the mixing of  the alcohol and gasoline.”55 In a formal part of  the presentation, Midgley 
mentioned the cellulose project. “From our cellulose waste products on the farm such as straw, 
corn-stalks, corn cobs and all similar sorts of  material we throw away, we can get, by present 
known methods, enough alcohol to run our automotive equipment in the United States,” he said. 
The catch was that it would cost $2 per gallon. However, other alternatives looked even more 




 Fellow engineers were clearly interested in Midgley's viewpoint, but there was yet another 
catch -- Prohibition of  alcoholic beverages.  Not only was it increasingly difficult to envision a 
network of  industrial alcohol facilities given the problem of  avoiding illegal diversion of  the fuel, 
but  Prohibition had also made it difficult even to experiment with alcohol fuel. A tone of  
frustration is evident in a memo from F.O. Clements, lab manager in Dayton, to the staff  dated 
September  9, 1921.  “We have finally managed to secure some 96 percent grain alcohol and a 
small amount of  absolute alcohol...” With the laws against alcohol consumption, such a rare 
cache demanded vigilance, and the rest of  the memo detailed complex security, requisition and 
reporting procedures.57 In contrast, European researchers were not only unrestricted in this 
regard but positively encouraged by governments of  countries without domestic oil reserves. 
 Midgley and Kettering’s interest in ethyl alcohol fuel did not fade once tetraethyl lead 
was discovered as an antiknock in December, 1921. In fact, not only was ethyl alcohol a source of  
continued interest as an antiknock agent, but more significantly, it was still considered to be the 
fuel that would eventually replace petroleum.  A  May, 1922 memo from Midgley to Kettering 
was a response to a report on alcohol production from the Mexican  "century" plant, a desert 
plant that contains fermentable sugars.  Midgley said he was "not impressed" with the  process as 
a way to make motor fuel: 
Unquestionably alcohol is the fuel of  the future and is playing its part in tropical 
countries situated similar [sic] to Mexico. Alcohol can be produced in those countries for 
approximately 7 - 1/2 cents per gallon from many other sources than the century plant, 
and the quantities which are suggested as possibilities in this report are insignificantly 
small compared to motor fuel requirements. However, as a distillery for beverage 
purposes, these gentlemen may have a money making proposition.58 
Even as chemists tinkered with various processes to produce tetraethyl lead in a nearby 
lab,  Midgley and Boyd continued working on alcohol for fuel.  In a June 1922 Society of  
Automotive Engineers paper, they said: 
That the addition of  benzene and other aromatic hydrocarbons to paraffin base 
gasoline greatly reduces the tendency of  these fuels to detonate [knock] ... has been 
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known for some time. Also, it is well known that alcohol ... improves the combustion 
characteristics of  the fuel ...The scarcity and high cost of  gasoline in countries where sugar is 
produced and the abundance of  raw materials for making alcohol there has resulted in a rather extensive 
use of  alcohol for motor fuel.  As the reserves of  petroleum in this country become more and 
more depleted, the use of  benzene and particularly of  alcohol in commercial motor fuels 
will probably become greatly extended.”59   (Italics indicate section used only in oral presentation). 
  Some G.M.officials encouraged Midgley to keep looking into alcohol fuel after the 
discovery of  tetraethyl lead. In correspondence with the company's patent attorneys, for example, 
the question of  a patent issued to Industrial Alcohol Co. for a combination of  petroleum and an 
“ester” (made from ethyl alcohol) for antiknock effects had come up in the summer of  1922. 
Midgley was encouraged to experiment with the idea. “Try it out and see if  the U.S. Industrial 
Alcohol Co. have opened up a valuable line of  research,” said J.W. Morrison in the G.M. Patent 
Dept. “Mr. Clements [the lab manager] stated some time ago that it might be worth our while to 
carry our investigations further on the problem of  utilizing alcohols in motors. I think he 
mentioned more specifically combinations of  alcohol and gasoline.”60 
  In September, 1922, Midgley and Boyd wrote that “vegetation offers a source of  
tremendous quantities of  liquid fuel.” Cellulose from vegetation would be the primary resource 
because not enough agricultural grains and other foods were available for conversion into fuel. 
“Some means must be provided to bridge the threatened gap between petroleum and the 
commercial production of  large quantities of  liquid fuels from other sources. The best way to 
accomplish this is to increase the efficiency with which the energy of  gasoline is used and thereby 
obtain more automotive miles per gallon of  fuel.”61  At the time the paper was written, in late 
spring or early summer 1922, tetraethyl lead was still a secret within the company. It was about to 
be announced to fellow scientists and test marketed. The reference to a means to "bridge the 
threatened gap" and increase in the efficiency of  gasoline clearly implies the use of  tetraethyl lead 
or some other additive to pave the way to new fuel sources.  
This inference is consistent with an important statement in N.P. Wescott's  unpublished 
1936 legal history of  Ethyl Gasoline for the du Pont corporation: 
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It is also of  interest to recall that an important special motive for this [tetraethyl 
lead] research was General Motors’ desire to fortify itself  against the exhaustion or 
prohibitive cost of  the gasoline supply, which was then believed to be impending in about 
twenty-five years; the thought being that the high compression motors which should be 
that time have been brought into general use if  knocking could be overcome could more 
advantageously be switched to [ethyl] alcohol.62 
Thus, even after tetraethyl lead was discovered in 1921 (as noted below), there were two 
“ethyls” on the horizon for General Motors:  Ethyl leaded gasoline, which would serve as a 
transitional efficiency booster for gasoline,  and the ethyl alcohol, the "fuel of  the future" that 
would keep America’s cars on the roads no matter what happened to the oil industry. 
 For years after tetraethyl lead was discovered, alcohol blends with benzene and gasoline 
were considered much more reliable antiknock agents.  In 1923, for example, Midgley 
confidentially advised U.S. Navy fliers attempting a cross-Pacific flight not to use Ethyl leaded 
gasoline (which had only begun to be marketed). 
We have made great progress in overcoming the spark plug and valve trouble 
caused by (Ethyl lead) ... but we have not yet solved the problem to our entire satisfaction; 
and, in view of  the fact that it is essential that no engine trouble of  any kind develop, it 
seems wise not to risk the use of  this material ... Probably the best possibilities are offered 
by a fuel consisting of  a gasoline-benzol-alcohol blend...63  
Kettering and Midgley may not have been vocally supportive of  alcohol as a fuel after 
1922, but it probably remained as a fall-back option.  For example, in the summer of  1925, 
newspaper articles announced that G.M. would introduce a  new blend of  benzene and alcohol 
fuel called “Synthol” that would, like Ethyl,  “double gas mileage.”64   The blend was never 
marketed. 
 Not everyone considered alcohol the "fuel of  the future." G.M.'s partner in Ethyl, 
Standard Oil of  New Jersey, would vehemently oppose alcohol fuel in the early 1930s in part 
because of  its experiment with alcohol blends in 1923.  According to the American Petroleum 
Institute, the experiment in Baltimore, Maryland with a 25 percent anhydrous alcohol blend with 
75 percent gasoline caused "uneven and troublesome operation of  motor cars" due to "instability 
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of  the alcohol-gasoline in the presence of  water." It would be unlikely that Standard engineers 
would be unaware of  the fact that a “binder” like benzene was routinely used with alcohol blends 
to prevent such instability, just as Midgley recommended to the aviators. In fact, as we have seen, 
Midgley met with Standard officials in New York City that summer.   If  the experiment was a 
failure as claimed, certainly no reports or reviews of  the experiment were ever published in 
journals or made public;  nor, for that matter, was the Baltimore public aware that it was taking 
part in an experiment.65
Tetraethyl Lead Discovered 
 In the summer and fall of  1921, Midgley and his lab assistants began a series of  tests that 
would have enormous public health significance.  The peg board with 20 elements pasted on it 
guided the Dayton researchers through tests on already known knock suppressors (such as 
bromine, iodine, tellurium, tin and selenium) and novel elements for fuel tests (arsenic and sulfur). 
The atmosphere in the labs grew more expectant as the pegboard seemed to point the way 
toward the heavy end of  the carbon group:  silicon, Germanium, tin and lead.  Visiting his father 
in Massachusetts in late October, Midgley had antiknock results from each new test  sent via 
telegraph daily.  Tetraethyl tin proved effective, but even more exciting was the prospect of  
metallic lead at the bottom of  the column on the peg board. 
By this time, Midgley's “scientific foxhunt” of  seven years had involved tests of  hundreds 
or possibly thousands of  compounds, although there is little agreement on the numbers and no 
way to check them, since the archives do not contain his daily laboratory records.  The earliest 
1925 reference to the number of  compounds tested in the G.M. Dayton labs was 2,500,66 while a 
sales manager for Ethyl told the New York Times on May 20, 1925 that 2,400 compounds had 
been tested.67 An Ethyl  sales pamphlet printed two years later put the number at 33,000.68  In 
the 1950s, as G.M. public relations personnel prepared a history of  the discovery, T.A. Boyd 
wrote "too much" in the margins of  one of  the manuscripts next to a note about 143 compounds 
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tested. In 1960, a Kettering biographer quoted Midgley as saying 14,991 compounds were 
tested;69  and an Ethyl official in 1980 put the number at 144.70 
Whether hundreds or thousands of  compounds were tested, when the research team got 
around to tetraethyl lead on the morning of  December  9, 1921, the knock in the one-cylinder 
laboratory engine was utterly silenced. Even diluted to a strength of  two or three grams per 
gallon, or one thousand to one, tetraethyl lead had a remarkable ability to quiet the relentless 
knocking.  Midgley, Boyd and others in the lab “danced a very unscientific jig” and hurried off  to 
include Kettering in their victory party.  Holding a test tube full of  the stuff  in his fingers, 
Kettering suggested, perhaps ironically, the name "ethyl" for the chemical compound tetraethyl 
lead. Although the term referred to the ethyl alcohol solvent used to dissolve the lead and utterly 
confused the issue of  using blends of  ethyl alcohol as a "high percentage" solution as opposed to 
lead as a "low percentage" solution, the name Ethyl  stuck.71 
 Dayton may have been dancing, but Detroit was yawning. Kettering’s boss, G.M. 
president Alfred P. Sloan, simply could not get enthusiastic about the tetraethyl lead.  An attorney 
for G.M. later recalled Sloan’s attitude:  “When Kettering found that the element iodine would 
do it, he [Kettering] said, this is the answer. And when he had aniline, he said, this is the answer. 
And when he had selenium, he said this is the answer...  And so, when tetraethyl lead was 
discovered, Sloan thought: 'it won’t be long before we get something better than this.'”72  Perhaps 
in order to show Detroit just how interested people were, the Dayton labs announced in February 
1922 that a new gasoline additive could double mileage. The announcement did not mention 
tetraethyl lead, but rather, the discovery which preceded it.  The Associated Press story read: 
“Dayton, Ohio (AP) -- Discovery of  a tellurium gasoline compound which increases gasoline 
mileage by one hundred percent over present gasoline fuel was announced at the research lab of  
the G.M.Co. here today.” Several hundred enthusiastic letters, mostly  from small companies with 
delivery services, landed on Midgley’s desk.73 He answered them with a standard response:
 The newspaper article, like most newspaper articles, does not give the whole story. 
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We do have compounds that influence the rate of  combustion of  gasoline in an internal 
combustion engine; the savings to be effected have to do with doubling the compression 
of  the motor. With the ordinary low compression motor we can do nothing, save to 
completely eliminate the knock.74  
It is interesting that Midgley’s letter reflects such disdain of  the press even though 
someone in the G.M. research labs must have initiated the misleading publicity to promote the 
fuel group’s position inside G.M. It is also interesting that similar statements would soon be made 
about tetraethyl lead doubling or tripling gasoline mileage and that other breakthrough fuels 
(such as "Synthol" in 1925) would mysteriously appear in announcements from Dayton and then 
just as mysteriously vanish. 
If  tetraethyl lead was the solution to the knock problem, troubles soon tested Kettering 
and Midgley's commitment. The compound was hard to make and it broke down quickly in the 
sunlight.  Engine tests showed that particles of  lead burned holes in the exhaust system and valve 
seats. Lead oxide also caked onto spark plugs, stopping the engine after a few thousand miles. 
There was also the problem of  how to physically deliver the dangerous additive to the gasoline 
market. 
Midgley believed all these problems could be overcome. Tetraethyl lead would be kept in 
light-tight containers. Valve seats and exhaust pipes would be made with harder alloys. Reactive 
lead particles could be neutralized with an additional chemical agent, for example, an acid or a 
radical that could combine with lead, such as chlorine, sulphur, selenium or bromine. “We may 
hope at almost any time to find a sufficiently satisfactory solution to the problem so that initial 
marketing at least may be started,” Midgley said.75  Midgley originally wanted to sell a "pill" 
made of  tetraethyl lead and a waxy substance (paratoluidune) that would dissolve in gasoline. A 
patent application in April, 1922 covered the basic concept, and a specific patent application was 
made in October, 1922.76  But "pills" to turn water into gasoline and other fraudulent schemes 
had made the public wary of  such approaches, as Kettering noted in his memoirs, and the first 
product marketed in 1923 was   concentrated "Ethyl fluid" blended by service station attendants 
at the service station pump. 
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Problems with tetraethyl lead were not fully discussed with other scientists when Midgley 
and Boyd presented their paper on the remarkable new antiknock fluid in September, 1922, 
partly because of  a defensive attitude by G.M.’s patent attorneys.77 Yet many other scientists 
inside and outside G.M. were enthusiastic about testing it. Sample batches were sent to du Pont, 
Standard Oil of  N.J., Standard of  Indiana, Sun Oil Co., the Bureau of  Naval Aeronautics, and a 
variety of  university researchers.  Midgley’s work was rewarded in December 1922 with news 
that he had won the prestigious William H. Nichols Medal from the New York section of  the 
American Chemical Society (ACS).  Wilson of  MIT  wrote that it was “just the beginning” of  the 
recognition that Midgley would receive for his work.78 In fact, Midgley would receive three more 
honorary ACS medals in 1937, 1941 and 1942 before he died in 1943.  However, it was the 
Nichols medal that  “had extraordinary importance,” said Midgley’s lab assistant  T.A. Boyd,  “... 
for the effect it had a few years afterwards when the addition of  tetraethyl lead to gasoline was 
under attack by those who claimed that it would poison the whole nation. When that time came, 
those in technological  circles,  having been informed about the development and sympathetic to 
it,  demanded and got a factual rather than hysterical consideration of  the case.”79 
Early warnings about the 'malicious and creeping poison’ 
When Thomas Midgley accepted the Nichols Medal in March, 1923, he had almost 
returned to normal after fighting a winter-long battle with lead poisoning. He and three other lab 
employees80  had experienced “digestive derangements, subnormal body temperatures and 
reduced blood pressure” from handling tetraethyl lead.81  Midgley was exposed routinely but had 
also been caught in at least two laboratory explosions.  In July, 1922, when Kettering and 
Midgley gave a demonstration of  tetraethyl lead production to visiting du Pont engineers, the 
process "got entirely out of  hand, and spewed all over the place, and we had to get out," said 
Willis F. Harrington of  du Pont.82  On another occasion in 1922, Midgley lost control of  the 
process and fragments of  lead embedded in his eyes. According to a note to his doctor, he used 
mercury as an eyewash to dissolve it.83
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Midgley did not attempt to hide his problem. He wrote to decline speaking offers at three 
ACS regional panels in January, 1923, excusing himself  by noting: “After about a year’s work in 
organic lead I find that my lungs have been affected and that it is necessary to drop all work and 
get a large supply of  fresh air.”84 
Despite  his condition, Midgley was remarkably nonchalant about the dangers of  
tetraethyl lead.  Throughout 1922, as the first plans were made to develop tetraethyl lead, 
Midgley had received alarming letters from four of  the world’s leading experts in the field:  
Robert Wilson of  MIT, Reid Hunt of  Harvard, Yandell Henderson of  Yale and Charles Kraus 
of  Pottsdam in Germany. Kraus had worked on tetraethyl lead for many years and called it "a 
creeping and malicious poison"  that had killed a member of  his dissertation committee. Hunt 
had informed   Henderson about the work at G.M. because the Yale researcher was considered 
America's leading expert on automotive exhaust.85  Another warning came from a lab director in 
the Public Health Service (P.H.S.), who had heard about tetraethyl lead and wrote an October, 
1922 memo to the assistant surgeon general warning of  a "serious menace to public health." 
Several other memos traded hands and in November, Surgeon General Hugh Cumming wrote to 
Pierre S. du Pont about the public health question. The Surgeon General's letter was referred to  
Thomas Midgley, who answered that the problem "has been given very serious consideration .. 
although no actual experimental data has been taken."86 
Yet in a December  2, 1922 letter to A.W. Browne at Cornell, who had been contracted 
for some analytical work, Midgley said noted that tetraethyl lead was irritating to the skin and 
should not be breathed or taken in the mouth. “It would not surprise me if  in the course of  using 
tetraethyl lead for a year that some of  your men would experience a slight case of  painter's colic. 
This is nothing to worry about as several of  our boys have it.”87  While in Miami recovering from 
"colic," Midgley also wrote to an oil industry engineer that poisoning of  the public was “almost 
impossible, as no one will repeatedly get their hands covered in gasoline containing tetraethyl 
lead -- it stings and burns... The exhaust does not contain enough lead to worry about, but no 
one knows what legislation might come into existence fostered by competition and fanatical 
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health cranks.”88  Midgley believed this primarily because an early study of  an engine testing 
center that had handled tetraethyl lead gasoline showed the lead content of  a month’s 
accumulation of  dust in the garage was not enough to poison a person.89 Yet he ignored 
warnings from experts and the evidence of  his own health condition. 
 The question of  how and why the warnings were ignored is important relative to what 
was to come. In April, 1924, two G.M.employees working to produce tetraethyl lead in a pilot 
plant died of  lead poisoning. Several more died at du Pont's Deepwater, N.J. plant located in the 
southern part of  the state across the bay from du Pont’s headquarters in Wilmington, Del.  And, 
in October, 1924, five sensational deaths from tetraethyl lead occurred at Standard's Bayway, N.J.  
plant located in northern New Jersey.  In 1925, Midgley  claimed that the hazard of  tetraethyl 
lead “has been recognized and has been guarded against always to the full extent of  the 
knowledge then available.”90 However, this statement reflects none of  the disregard evident in 
earlier memos.  When the two G.M. employees died in April, 1924 from the effects of  lead,  
Midgley was said to be  deeply grieved and  “depressed to the point of  giving up the whole 
tetraethyl lead program.”91 Yet a month or two later, Kettering spurred du Pont to double and 
triple production, which added the loss of  four more workers. 
Clearly, Midgley and Kettering had underestimated the severity of  the poison and the 
difficulties inherent in building medium and large scale tetraethyl lead factories in Dayton, Ohio 
and  Deepwater and Bayway, New Jersey. One factor in this oversight probably had to do with 
Kettering's  research style. Kettering  achieved results in areas where others had not because he 
challenged authority and was willing to attempt what the theoreticians and other experts said was 
impossible.  This approach  may have led him to disregard many of  the warnings his group 
received from academics. Historian Stuart  Leslie noted that Kettering’s group had a similar 
problem in that they “grossly underestimated” the difficulty of  converting a prototype copper-
finned air-cooled engine into a reliable mass production article in the same 1923-25 time period. 
Subjective considerations such as “pride, jealousy and simple petulance”  played a large role in 
determining the fate of  the copper-cooled engine project, which was abandoned in 1925. Hidden 
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motives and subjective evaluations “concealed behind technical jargon and well ordered 
equations” were perhaps part of  the inevitable tensions in corporate research, Leslie said.92  
Even  before two of  its employees died, G.M.had been searching for authoritative 
research consultants to help “refute any false propaganda,” as Midgley put it.  Both Yale and 
Harvard were approached, but no  agreement was reached.  Meanwhile, apparently unconvinced 
by Midgley’s December  30, 1922 response to their inquiry,  the P.H.S.  decided that an 
investigation was necessary and contacted the Bureau of  Mines.  Midgley and Kettering were 
familiar with the Bureau of  Mines petroleum  experts based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and also 
asked them to perform a health study of  Ethyl gasoline. 
Bureau employees felt that the agency was in an uncomfortable position. In June, 1923,  
A.C. Fieldner, a bureau chemist, said that an investigation would be inadvisable:  “The relations 
of  the Bureau of  Mines with some of  the gasoline interests or motor interests will be imperiled 
regardless of  our decision in the matter. The results promise to be so doubtful, the investigation 
will take so much time and cost so much money and chances for getting into trouble with some 
commercial interests are so great that I believe it is inadvisable to take on this investigation.”93  
Yet in September, 1923, an agreement was finalized between G.M. Research Corp. and the 
Bureau of  Mines in Pittsburgh. Ironically, the agreement was finalized the same week that the 
first worker died of  lead poisoning in du Pont’s large-scale tetraethyl lead production facility in 
Deepwater, N.J.94 
 The bureau  agreed to Kettering’s demand that it “refrain from giving out the usual press 
and progress reports during the course of  the work, as [Kettering] feels that the newspapers are 
apt to give scare headlines and false impressions before we definitely know what the influence of  
the material will be.” Kettering and the bureau were so worried about the press that all official 
correspondence used the trade name Ethyl rather than the word “lead” to avoid leaks to the 
newspapers, “as this term is apt to prejudice somewhat against its use,” according to the 
superintendent of  the Pittsburgh field station.95 
The actual tests began in the fall of  1923 with a small Delco motor provided by G.M.. 
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Various animals were exposed to Ethyl gasoline exhaust from the motor, and five puppies were 
born in the test chamber and returned there with their mother each day “without harm of  any 
kind,” Boyd later wrote. The dogs were called the “Ethyl Gas Hounds.”96 The investigation 
continued through July, 1924 and was first reported in the news media on November 1, 1924.  
This report, and any other, would have been approved by G.M. because the contract between 
G.M. and the bureau, signed in June, 1924,  specified that manuscripts were to be submitted to 
G.M.  “for comment, criticism and approval.”97  
 The arrangements with the bureau provide a contrast with the attitude expressed by 
Midgley when he approached Harvard Medical School in 1923: “We would of  course render this 
assistance without any strings attached whatever to the full understanding it is for the purpose of  
increasing the total of  human knowledge and with no ulterior motive in mind whatsoever. 
Freedom to publish all results and everything also would of  course be quite the same as in other 
pieces of  academic research work.”98 Yet other researchers did not believe such freedom would 
be permitted. As research proceeded at the Bureau of  Mines,  R.R. Sayers of  the P.H.S.  wrote 
Yandell Henderson at Yale in 1924 asking to join their research effort. But Henderson pointedly 
rejected the offer, noting:  “I should want a greater degree of  freedom of  investigation and 
funding -- in view of  the immense public, sanitary and industrial questions involved -- than the 
subordinate relations which you suggest would allow.”99  
Henderson was not the only person with misgivings. On June 23, 1924, G.M. president 
Alfred Sloan, “gravely concerned about the poison hazard,” and reeling from two deaths in 
Dayton and one in Deepwater, approved the formation of  a medical committee with W.G. 
Thompson of  Cornell University, a consulting physician to Standard Oil,  as chairman.   A few 
days later, Irenee du Pont wrote to Sloan saying that the development of  tetraethyl lead “may be 
killed by a better substitute or because of  its poisonous character or because of  its action on the 
engine.”100  The medical committee issued a report described as negative and highly cautionary 
on August 20, 1924 and Irenee du Pont reassured Sloan: “I have read the doctors report and am 
not disturbed by the severity of  the findings.” Nitroglycerin was even more hazardous to make, 
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and lead dust from car exhaust would be only a fraction of  that from erosion of  paint, he said.101  
The committee also began a second research project at Columbia University that proved 
controversial in April, 1925, as researchers and university authorities disagreed on the nature of  
the research animal deaths from tetraethyl lead treated gasoline and the extent of  poisoning of  
lab workers themselves.  
Thus, even as G.M. and Standard were about to form a partnership and greatly expand 
Ethyl's role in the gasoline market, its fate was quite uncertain. Health research supporting the 
decision to begin mass marketing was shallow and overtly manipulated. And yet G.M., Standard 
and du Pont proceeded. Why?  One clue is found in a note sent from Midgley to Kettering on 
March  2, 1923, as he recuperated from lead poisoning. 
The way I feel about the Ethyl Gas situation is about as follows: It looks as though 
we could count on a minimum of  20 percent of  the gas sold in the country if  we advertise 
and go after the business -- this at three cent gross to us from each gallon sold. I think we 
ought to go after it as soon as we can without being too hasty102 ...  
With gasoline sales around six billion gallons per year, 20 percent would come to about 
1.2 billion gallons, and three cents gross would represent  $36 million. With the cost of  
production and distribution running less than one cent per gallon of  treated gasoline, more than 
two thirds of  the $36 million would be annual gross profit. Of  course, within a decade 80 percent 
of  the then 12 billion gallon market used Ethyl, for an annual gross of  almost $300 million.   
Manufacturing the New Product   
Three manufacturing efforts got under way in 1923 and 1924 to bring large volumes of  
tetraethyl lead to market. The first was a small operation in Dayton, Ohio, which made 160 
gallons of  tetraethyl lead each day and shipped it out in one-liter  bottles. Each liter would treat 
about 300 gallons of  gasoline. When the two workers on the assembly line packing the bottles 
died in April, 1924, the line was shut down.  Kettering later blamed the lack of  safety on the 
workers themselves. “We could not get this across to the boys,” he said. “We put watchmen in at 
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the plant, and they used to snap the stuff  [pure tetraethyl lead] at each other, and throw it at each 
other, and they were saying that they were sissies. They did not realize what they were working 
with.”103   
The second and by far the largest manufacturing operation was built at du Pont’s dyestuffs 
division in Deepwater, N.J., across the bay from Wilmington, Delaware. Du Pont began with a 
100 gallon per day “bromine” process unit in August of  1923, and increased production in the 
summer of  1924 to 700 gallons per day. A  second 1,000 gallon per day unit using Standard’s 
“chloride” process began operations in January, 1925.   The first du Pont worker died in 
September,  1923; three more died over the summer and fall of  1924 when bromine unit 
production was stepped up;  and four more died in the winter of  1925 in the new chloride unit.  
Workers who were aware of  the effects of  tetraethyl lead called the factory the “House of  
Butterflies” for the hallucinations they experienced.   
The third and smallest manufacturing unit was a 100 gallon per day “semi-works” built in 
the summer of  1924 at the Standard Oil of  N.J. refinery in Bayway, N.J. It began operations in 
September, 1924 and within two months, the violently insanity and death of  five workers set off  a 
storm of  controversy. 
Conclusion 
 The idea that the development of  Ethyl leaded gasoline is exemplary of  "a beautiful piece 
of  pure research" might be reconsidered in light of  new information. Certainly the initial insight 
into the antiknock value of  iodine, which came not from its color but some intrinsic property,  
represents the isolation of  the essential fact from the encumbering theory, as has been noted by 
Hughes and other historians. Leslie, Robert and other lead us to expect steady progress through 
systematic testing of  all available compounds toward an eventual solution to the knock problem. 
Instead, the available documents give a rather different picture. First,the knock problem already 
had several widely recognized solutions before and after tetraethyl lead was discovered, and 
research on these fuel constituents continued through the mid-1920s. Secondly,  Kettering and 
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Midgley showed a clear preference for the low percentage class “pill” solution. Third, the 
research effort was incredibly haphazard and ad hoc. The anti-knock fuel research between 1919 
and 1921 was sandwiched between research on producing cheap alcohol from cellulose and 
petroleum olefins  as G.M.'s gateway into the fuel of  the future.  Which project had priority is 
difficult to determine without detailed documentation, but clearly  Kettering and Midgley's 
progression from iodine to selenium, then tellurium, and finally lead as "the" solution is a vast 
oversimplification. 
 There was not one solution to one problem;  instead, there were many potential solutions 
to a variety of  problems in a range of  conceptual frameworks -- all well known to Midgley and 
Kettering. Why they later claimed that nothing worked but tetraethyl lead (as we will see)  is 
difficult to fathom.  G.M.’s own research showed that the alternatives, especially ethyl alcohol 
blends, were technically quite practical. It is apparent that Kettering and Midgley deliberately 
avoided informing the public about the research directions. It would be consistent with the 
attitudes of  the times if  they felt that they had an absolute right to avoid technical debate, 
although as we shall see, more candor was expected by the public, the government and the news 
media.   
In addition, the overarching frame of  the problem, as historian Leslie noted, was the 
exhaustion of  petroleum supplies within two to three decades, which  had been the automotive 
industry’s biggest  concern.  Kettering’s idea of   improving existing gasoline to run in high 
compression engines does not make sense if  lower and lower grades of  crude petroleum would be 
the only fuels available in the future.  The conclusion of   Wescott's  1936 history  that the original 
motivation for the antiknock research was to pave the way for  alternative fuels seems to be well 
corroborated by other documents. 
With alternatives in existence and the possible long term need for them to replace 
petroleum, why did G.M. persist with a well known poison? It is difficult to account for the 
premium placed by Kettering and others on the prestige invested in particular products. 
Kettering's research style, which might be described as headstrong and uncompromising, was 
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probably one factor. Also, as du Pont’s manufacturing expanded and Standard’s gasoline markets 
began to be developed, the momentum of  financial investment and institutional prestige began to 
accumulate.  By the time the controversy became public, the companies had made an enormous 
investment. Then too, Midgley's rough calculations showed that the use of  tetraethyl lead was 
appealing from an economic point of  view because production costs were low and profits were 
high.  
Historian George Basalla  once said: "The history of  technology would be written far 
differently if, instead of  concentrating on the winning innovations perpetuated by selection and 
replication, we were to make a diligent search for viable alternatives to those innovations."104  
Tetraethyl lead was a winning invention, and history has followed success.  Ethyl leaded gasoline 
worked,  it was cheap to make,  it was easy to distribute and it was profitable to sell.  This chapter 
has shown, however, that Kettering, Boyd and Midgley were well aware that a patented blend of  
benzene or alcohol or other octane boosters would have also been technically viable. Whether the 
history of  automotive technology would have been significantly changed had tetraethyl lead been 
banned by the P.H.S. is an open question.  
The original special motive for fuel research work was not only aimed at an antiknock 
additive but also at long-term survival for the automotive industry in an oil-short future. Ongoing 
investigations of  alternative fuels could be interpreted as a sensible long-term business 
proposition, rather than, as historian Stuart Leslie interpreted it,  the pursuit of  a "will o' the 
wisp."  
1. Thomas P. Hughes, "Inventors: The Problems They Choose, The Ideas They Have and the 
Inventions They Make," in eds., Patrick Kelly, et al., Technological Innovation: A Critical Review 
of  Current Knowledge (San Francisco, San Francisco Press, Inc., 1979), p. 177.
Ethyl.Controversy
96
2. T.A. Boyd, Professional Amateur (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1957); Rosamond Young, Boss Ket: 
A Life of  Charles Kettering, (New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1961); Joseph C. Robert, Ethyl, 
A History of  the Corporation and the People Who Made It (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press 
of  Virginia, 1983);  Harold F. Williamson, et al., The American Petroleum Industry, The Age of  
Energy, 1899-1959 (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963).
3. John M. Staudenmaier, Technology’s Storytellers: Reweaving the human fabric (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Society for the History of  Technology, 1985), p. 175.
4. Carroll Pursell, "The History of  Technology as a Source of  Appropriate Technology," The 
Public Historian  1, Vol. 1 (Winter, 1979), pp. 15 - 22.
5. James Ridgeway, Powering Civilization (New York: Pantheon, 1982), p. 90.
6. Free Alcohol Hearings, US Senate Finance Committee, 1906, Statement of  James S. Capen, 
Detroit Board of  Commerce, p. 59.  Capen also said: “Alcohol can be produced from any old 
thing that has sugar or starch in it, and once given our American inventor a chance at a market 
as great as this, in a very short time he will have processes that will do away with any fear of  
scarcity of  fuel.” Capin said alcohol was “preferable to gasoline” because it was easier to make 
and harder to control than gasoline, and thus artificial shortages could not raise the price in the 
future. Capen also said alcohol was much safer than gasoline,  as well as being “absolutely clean 
and sanitary.”
7. U.S. Dept. of  Commerce, “World Petroleum Production 1900-1925,” cited in Ludwell Denny, 
We Fight For Oil (NY: Knopf, 1928), p. 279.
8. Scientific American, Dec. 4, 1920, p. 570.  Scientific American believed these figures called for 
alternative fuels: “The use of  alcohol as a motor fuel will probably increase, as well as the use of  
benzene produced from coal tar.”
9. Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters (New York: Viking 1975), p. 60
10. John M. Blair, The Control of  Oil, (New York: Random House, 1976), p. 32, citing 66th 
Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document No. 272.  Romanian fields and refineries had been 
sabotaged prior to a German invasion in 1917, and had to be rebuilt.
Ethyl.Controversy
97
11. Blair, The Control of  Oil  p. 32.
12. Denny, We Fight For Oil,p.274; also see E.H. Davenport and S.R. Cooke: The Oil Trusts and 
Anglo-American Relations, London 1923.
13. “Declining Supply of  Motor Fuel,” Scientific American, Mar. 8, 1919, p. 220.
14. Charles F. Kettering, “The Story of  Ethyl Gasoline,” Experimental draft based on interviews 
in 1946, GMI Alumni Foundation Collection of  Industrial History, Flint, Mich. (Hereafter cited 
as GMI).
15. T. A. Boyd, The Early History of  Ethyl Gasoline, Report OC-83, Project # 11-3, Research 
Laboratory Division, GM Corp., Detroit Michigan, (unpublished) June 8, 1943, GMI, p. 2. 
(Hereafter cited as Boyd, Early History).
16. Hughes, “Inventors and the Problems They Chose,"  p. 177.
17. As an interesting sidelight, Kettering was so adamant about the value of  the his research plan 
that he believed that Henry Ricardo copied his plan when Ricardo began fuel research for the 
British air force in 1918.  In  Boyd's Early History, p. 27., an early draft says “Ricardo used” 
Kettering's Bureau of  Mines report. Pencilled in between Ricardo and the word “used” are the 
words:   “may possibly have.”
18. It was called McCook airfield at the time.
19. BTU stands for British Thermal Unit, the amount of  energy it takes to raise one pound of  
water one degree Fahrenheit. It is the extra oxygen in alcohol and the relatively fewer carbon 
molecules that make it a lower-BTU fuel.  Some aviation engineers believe that the presence of  
oxygen should be considered an advantage relative to moderately high altitude flight for piston 
aircraft.
20. The correspondence between performance and heat value is not linear. A pure alcohol 
engine has what Riccardo termed a “higher useful compression ratio” and will deliver the same 
power at the same fuel consumption rate as a comparable gasoline engine with a lower useful 
compression ratio.  It is possible that Midgley was not aware of  this; however, the basic thrust of  
his research was to create a high BTU fuel that could withstand high compression. This initial 
Ethyl.Controversy
98
bias toward high BTU aviation fuels was one reason why alcohol was later discounted as an 
automotive fuel in the U.S.
21. Application Serial No. 210,687 filed Jan, 7, 1918; Patent No. 1,296,832 issued Mar. 11, 1919, 
assigned to GM Research Corp.; Also, Chemical Abstracts 13,  (1919), p. 1636. Ironically, a 
patent issued the same day to another researcher was for a 50 percent blend of  ethyl alcohol and 
gasoline with 2 percent castor oil as a binder. (Patent No. 1,296,902).
22. Patent application  Serial No. 256,874, filed Oct. 4, 1918, Patent No. 1,491,998 issued April 
29, 1924.
23. “A Report of  Fuel Research by the Research Division of  the Dayton Metal Products Co. and 
the U.S. Bureau of  Mines,” July 27,1918, Midgley unprocessed files, GMI.
24. Ibid, cited in Boyd,  Early History.  Boyd said that this showed the advantages of  high 
compression “were pretty clearly understood at the outset.”
25. F.O. Clements to H.E. Talbott, Feb. 4, 1919, Midgley unprocessed files, GMI.  It was not 
clear whether Clements meant this as a criticism of  Kettering or of  the organization as a whole.
26. Boyd, Early History, p. 41.
27. Ibid, p. 41.
28. Ibid, p. 61.
29. "Report of  Fuel Research Work," Research Division, Dayton Metal Products Co., US Bureau 
of  Mines, July 27, 1918, p. 11, Midgley unprocessed, GMI.
30. Trial transcript, p. 3500,  U.S. v.  v du Pont. The  Dept. of  Justice would later cite these 
contacts as evidence of  anti-trust activity by the three giant corporations in the 1953 anti-trust 
suit. However, Kettering insisted that his motive was scientific. The federal courts agreed that 
scientific contacts and “concerted action” did not necessarily constitute conspiracy to restrain 
trade and violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Also, it seems unlikely that at this stage of  
developments Howard could actually expect any one antiknock to dominate the fuel market;  his 
rhetoric was obviously designed to interest Standard.
31. Charles F. Kettering, “Studying the Knocks,: How a Closer Knowledge of  What Goes on In 
Ethyl.Controversy
99
the Cylinder Might Solve the Problems of  Fuel Supply,” Scientific American, Oct. 11, 1919, p. 
364.
32. For example, alcohol ran the first internal combustion engine, built in 1826 in Connecticut, 
and Carl Banz's first horseless carriage experiments in Germany in 1860, according to Lyle 
Cummins, Internal Fire (Warrenton, Pa.: Society of  Automotive Engineers, 1989), p. 81.; also, 
Horst Hardenberg, Samuel Morey and his Atmospheric Engine  SP 922, (Warrendale, Pa.:  
Society of  Automotive Engineers, Feb. 1992), p. 51.
33. Scientific American, April 13, 1918, p. 339.
34. H.B. Dixon, “Researches on Alcohol as an Engine Fuel,” Society of  Automotive Engineers 
Journal, Dec. 1920, p. 521. (Hereafter cited as SAE Journal).
35. Scientific American, Dec. 11, 1920 p. 593.
36. Stanton P. Nickerson, “Tetraethyl Lead: A Product of  American Research,”  Journal of  
Chemical Education, Vol. 31 p. 560  Nov. 1954, reprinted by the Ethyl Corp.
37. Application Serial No. 417,126, filed Oct. 15, 1920, Patent No. 1,501,568 issued July 16, 
1924.
38. Boyd,   Early History  pp. 75-76.
39. Kettering to Midgley, Sept. 14, 1920, Midgley files, unprocessed, GMI.
40. For example, Stuart Leslie, Boss Kettering, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 
158.
41. Testimony of  Charles F. Kettering, Trial transcript p. 3573,  US v. du Pont.
42. Boyd, Early History, p. 60-61, also p. 70.
43. Leslie, Boss Kettering , p. 155. Ethyl alcohol was "income" rather than "capital" because it 
could be produced from renewable resources.
44. The report is not found in archives; Boyd recalled it in the Early History,  p. 54.
45. Boyd,  Early History p. 54. That is, crediting alcohol with only two thirds the BTU value as 




46. Large-scale production of  benzene was questionable. Even if  all the coal mined in the U.S. in 
1920 were used to supply benzene, only about 900 million gallons, or one-fifth of  the U.S. 
gasoline supply would be replaced, he said.
47. T.A. Boyd, “Motor Fuel From Vegetation,” Journal of  Industrial and Chemical Engineering 
13, No. 9 (Sept. 1921), pp. 836 - 841.
48. C.F. Kettering, “The Fuel Problem,” undated, probably 1921, Kettering collection 
unprocessed, GMI.
49. Leslie, Boss Kettering, p. 156.
50. Zimmerschied to Kettering, Feb. 27, 1920; Kettering to Zimmerschied, March 3, 1920, 
Kettering collection, GMI. Note that carburetors had been built with lacquered cork floats before 
this time, which was not a problem with gasoline. However, alcohol was a solvent for the lacquer. 
Therefore, GM switched to metal carburetor floats to accommodate the new international fuel 
blends.
51. Application Serial No. 362,139, Patent No. 1578201, issued Mar. 23, 1926. The patent covers 
blending alcohol and unsaturated hydrocarbons, particularly olefins formed during the cracking 
process.
52. Harold Hibbert, “The Role of  the Chemist in Relation to the Future Supply of  Liquid Fuel,”  
Journal of  Industrial and Chemical Engineering  13, No. 9 (Sept. 1921) p. 841.
53. Boyd to Midgley, July 8, 1920, Midgley unprocessed files, GMI.
54. This is an important point in technical discussions. Many who object to alcohol fuel, 
ostensibly on technical grounds, will omit any mention of  the possibility of  a "binder." Such was 
the case, for example, in the American Petroleum Institutes attacks on the technical qualities of  
alcohol blends in the early 1930s.
55. “The Discussion” transcript of  SAE meeting discussion, Indianapolis, Oct. 1921. Midgley 
unprocessed files, GMI.




57. F.O. Clements to staff, Sept. 9, 1921, Midgley unprocessed files, GMI.
58. Midgley to Kettering, May 23, 1922, Factory Correspondence, Midgley unprocessed files, 
GMI.
59. Thomas A. Midgley and T.A. Boyd, “Detonation Characteristics of  Some Blended Motor 
Fuels,” SAE Journal, June 1922, page 451. Note: italics indicate a section used at the oral 
presentation at a June 1922  SAE meeting but not published in the SAE paper; oral presentation 
from Midgley unprocessed files, GMI.
60. Morrison to Midgley, July 25, 1922, Kettering collection, unprocessed Midgley files, GMI.
61. Thomas Midgley and Thomas Boyd, “The Application of  Chemistry to the Conservation of  
Motor Fuels,” Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, Sept. 1922, p. 850.
62. N. P. Wescott, Origins and Early History of  the Tetraethyl Lead Business, June 9, 1936, Du 
Pont Corp. Report No. D-1013, Longwood ms group 10, Series A, 418-426, GM Anti-Trust Suit, 
Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Del., p. 4.
63. Midgley to Lt. B.G. Leighton, Mar. 16, 1923, Kettering collection, Unprocessed Midgley files, 
GMI.
64. “New Auto, Fuel to Save Costs Are Announced,” United Press Service, Aug. 6, 1925,  
Kettering collection press clipbook No. 2, GMI.
65. American Petroleum Institute Industries Committee memo, April 15, 1933;  Box 52, Pew 
collection, Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, Del.  No record of  the experiment is found 
in the archives of  the Baltimore Sun, in Society of  Automotive Engineers papers, or in American 
Chemical Society papers.  The first  mention in any public document is 1939, in a broadly 
circulated American Petroleum Institute speech by Conger Reynolds against alcohol fuel to be 
found in the API archives.  The price of  alcohol at 20 cents per gallon following Prohibition was 
apparently a factor in the decision to try ethyl alcohol blends. Details of  the experiment -- such as 
the precautions taken with water, the percentage of  alcohol in the blend, or the use of  blending 
agents -- have never been revealed, and no internal or external reports are  available. It is difficult 




66. "To Learn the Truth about Leaded Gas," Literary Digest , April 18, 1925, p. 17.
67. "Scientists to Pass on Tetra-Ethyl Gas," New York Times, May 20, 1925, p. 1.
68. The Story of  Ethyl Gasoline, pamphlet (New York: Ethyl  Gasoline Corp.,  1927), American 
Petroleum Institute Library, Washington, D.C.
69. Rosamond Young, Boss Ket (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1961).
70. John C. Lane of  Ethyl Corp., “Gasoline and Other Motor Fuels,” Encyclopedia of  Chemical 
Technology, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980), p. 656. The crucial series of  tests that were 
run between August 25 and December 7, 1921 involved 16 elements. Some of  these were 
prepared with different solvents, so that a total of  24 test compounds were run. Dozens of  trials 
were run on each of  these under various conditions. This is probably what Boyd had in mind 
when he said 143 was "too much."  If  Midgley kept count of  every test he ever ran over the seven 
year period,  the number 14,991 might not be questionable. The source of  the confusion is 
simply that the actual day-to-day test diaries used by Midgley, Boyd, Hochwalt and others have 
not been turned over by Ethyl or GM to the public GMI archive.
71. Rosamond McPherson Young, Boss Ket : A Life of  Charles F. Kettering (New York, 
Longmans, Green, 1961);  Joseph C. Robert, Ethyl, A History of  the Corporation and the People 
who Made It (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of  Virginia, 1983). Standard Oil and General 
Motors officials outside the research labs did not want to use the name Ethyl for the company or 
the product in 1924, but did so to accommodate Kettering and Midgley.
72. Ferris E. Hurd, G.M. Attorney, summary argument, US v du Pont, p. 7986.
73. Enthusiasm was so contagious that even William J. Hale, the prestigious Dow Chemical Co. 
chemist,  offered in 1923 to bid on production of  tetraethyl lead. Hale was not oblivious to the 
fact that Dow’s main rival, du Pont, was at this point a partial owner of  General Motors; but he 
believed that a process based on magnesium, which Dow had in abundance, would be cheaper 
for making tetraethyl lead. Kettering wrote him: “Don’t go to too much trouble” in preparing a 
bid.  Hale bid $4 a pound, or twice what du Pont had contracted for.  Ironically, 11 years later 
Ethyl.Controversy
103
Hale would become the Ethyl Corp.’s chief  antagonist, denouncing “poison-spreading gasoline” 
and promoting 10 percent ethyl alcohol as the safe anti-knock alternative. See Hal Bernton et al., 
The Forbidden Fuel, p. 14.
74. Midgley to Joseph L. Wood, The Orange Tip Co., Feb. 9, 1922. About 50  other identical 
letters are found in the Kettering collection, unprocessed Midgley files, GMI.
75. Midgley to Kettering, “Summary of  Present Situation on Antiknock Material,” Nov. 20, 
1922, Factory Correspondence, unprocessed Midgley files, GMI.
76. Application Serial No. 553,040 filed April 15, 1922, Patent No. 1,605,663 assigned Nov. 2, 
1926;  Application No. 592,435 filed Oct. 4, 1922, Patent 1,492,953 issued July 20, 1926.
77. Thomas Midgley, “The Chemical Control of  Gaseous Detonation with Particular,  Reference 
to the Internal Combustion Engine,” Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, Oct., 1922.
78. Boyd, Early History, p. 193.
79. Ibid, p.  179.
80. Listed in Early History as Hochwalt, Calingaert and Mead (no first names).
81. Boyd, Early History, p. 192.
82. US vs. du Pont,  testimony of  W.F. Harrington, p. 3814,
83. Midgley to  Dr. R.L. Allen, Sept. 9, 1922, Unprocessed Midgley files, GMI.
84. Midgley to H.N. Gilbert, Jan 19, 1923,  Unprocessed Midgley files, GMI.
85. Boyd, Early History, p. 164 - 170.
86. William M. Clark to A. M. Stimson, Oct. 11, 1922, A. M. Stimson to R. N. Dyer, Oct. 13, 
1922, Dyer to Surgeon General, Oct. 18, 1922,  N. Roberts to Surgeon General, Nov. 13, 1922,  
H.S. Cumming to Pierre Du Pont Dec. 20, 1922, and Thomas Midgley to Cumming,  Dec. 30, 
1922, all in US Public Health Service Record Group 90, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
87. Midgley to A.W. Browne, Dec. 2, 1922, Unprocessed Midgley files, GMI.
88. Midgley to G.A. Round, Vacuum Oil Co., Feb. 14, 1923, unprocessed Midgley files, GMI.
89. Charles F. Kettering, “The Story of  Ethyl Gasoline: Growth History of  a New Product, 
Experimental Draft,” unpublished manuscript, Dec. 1946, GMI. Kettering also mentions the 
Ethyl.Controversy
104
Bureau of  Mines study and the consulting work of  Dr. Robert A. Kehoe of  the University of  
Cincinatti. He does not mention Krause, Hunt or Wilson.
90. Thomas Midgley, “Tetraethyl Lead Poison Hazards,” Industrial & Engineering Chemistry, 
Aug. 1925, p. 827.
91. Joseph C. Robert, Ethyl, p. 121
92. Stuart W. Leslie, “Charles F. Kettering and the Copper Cooled Engine,” Technology & 
Culture 20, No. 4 (Oct 1979), p. 752.
93. Joseph A. Pratt, “Letting the Grandchildren Do It: Environmental Planning During the 
Ascent of  Oil as the Major Energy Source,” The Public Historian  2, No. 4  (Fall, 1980), p. 35, 
citing correspondence between R.R. Sayers and A.C. Fieldner, file 182, General Classified Files 
1923, US Bureau of  Mines, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
94. Frank W. Durr, operator, from Wescott, “Origins and Early History," p.  D1.
95. David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, "A Gift of  God?" in Dying For Work: Workers Safety 
and Health in 20th Century America, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1989),  p. 
123.  The authors describe in detail the progress of  the research work and the correspondence 
between GM and the Bureau. Citations here include A.C. Fieldner to Dr. Bain, Sept. 24, 1923; 
S.C. Lind to Fieldner, Nov. 3, 1923; and the agreement between the Dept. of  Interior and 
General Motors; all in Record Group .70, 101869, File 725, US Bureau of  Mines, National 
Archives, Washington DC.
96. Boyd, Early History, p. 268.
97. Rosner & Markowitz, "A Gift of  God?" p. 124.
98. Verbatim from Joseph C. Robert, p. 121.  Run-on nonsensical context may be that of  Robert 
and not  Midgley.
99. Henderson to Sayers, Sept. 27, 1924, Record Group 70, 101869, File 725, Bureau of  Mines, 
National Archives. Cited in Rosner & Markowitz, Dying for Work., p 125.
100. Irenee du Pont to Sloan, June 28, 1924, NP Wescott, “Origins and Early History,” p. 21
101. Irenee du Pont to Alfred Sloan, Aug 29, 1924, included as appendix to N.P. Wescott, 
Ethyl.Controversy
105
“Origins and Early History,” B-3. Note that the medical report itself, like many original 
documents referred to in GM reports,  is not available in the archives.
102. “Midge” to “My dear Boss:” March 2, 1923, Factory Correspondence, Kettering Collection, 
unprocessed Midgley material, GMI.
103. Testimony of  Charles F. Kettering, US v. Du Pont,  p. 3565.  The idea that workers were to 
blame for poisoning deaths would be frequently repeated by Kettering, Midgley and Standard 
officials, although not by du Pont chemists.
104. George Basalla, The Evolution of  Technology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 






THE NEWS FROM BAYWAY 
 William McSweeny left work early feeling queasy and frightened as he stumbled home to 
315 Fulton Street from the Standard Oil refinery in Bayway, New Jersey, just west of  Staten 
Island. The sweet smell of  a new gasoline additive called Ethyl  spiced the dry and dusty air at 
the plant that Tuesday afternoon in late  October of  1924 . McSweeny worked in a building 
where lead, sodium and ethyl chloride reacted to form the additive in a large tubular vat. The vat 
tumbled on rollers so that the ingredients could be mixed. Then McSweeny and fellow workers 
distilled a thick, clear liquid from the top of  the vat and dumped a  gummy grey residue from the 
bottom through an open grid in the factory floor. McSweeny and the other men would push the 
lead residue through the grid with pikes, boots and their own hands. McSweeny also worked on 
the bottling line where he poured the liquid into two-liter containers.  He must have been puzzled 
at how quickly his skin absorbed the thick clear liquid and the strange hallucinations it sometimes 
caused.  
McSweeny had come to America to see his brother and to get away from Ireland’s 
"troubles" with the British. As a young brigadier general in the Irish Free State Army, he had seen 
enough fighting. Perhaps he felt lucky to have survived. Ironically, he would be the first refinery 
worker to feel the effects of  Ethyl lead, and one of  the first victims of  the most controversial 
public health crisis of  the 1920s. 
After what was probably an uneasy night's sleep, McSweeny  awoke Wednesday morning, 
October 22, 1924, shaking uncontrollably. He was deluded and fearful, witnesses said. When his 
hallucinations became violent, his sister-in-law called for a policeman, who had to call out to 
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neighborhood men for help. It took three of  them, plus the policeman, to wrestle McSweeny into 
a police van, screaming and writhing. He must have seemed suddenly possessed to the bewildered 
neighbors who stood in the street gawking as the van lurched off  to the hospital.  The next day at 
the same Bayway refinery, a handsome young Swede named Ernest Oelgert began shrieking. He 
could see three hooded figures. “They’re coming after me,” he howled, scrambling across the 
factory floor in terror. Workers stuffed Oelgert into a straitjacket and took him to a hospital. 
The plant foreman brought in a doctor to look at the remaining 43 workers. Two more 
men who complained of  a strange sickness were sent home.  Friday  morning, one of  them 
jumped headlong from the second story window of  his home. The other began threatening his 
family. Again, police and neighbors had to fight him into an ambulance. A fifth man checked into 
the local hospital with the same strange illness. On Saturday,  all five were taken to New York 
city’s Reconstruction Hospital, which specialized in what were called “occupational diseases.”  
Oelgert died there Saturday evening, convulsing in his straitjacket, “violently insane,” his blood 
literally boiling from an unknown gas.  The Elizabeth, New Jersey medical examiner who had 
been called in to examine Oelgert’s blue-black body was horrified. He contacted the Union 
County New Jersey district attorney, who began an investigation.   
Once public officials stepped in, news of  the incident spread. On Sunday, October 26, 
reporters from New York City's major newspapers raced to cover an unusual incident across the 
Hudson River. The incident occurred on what might have been called a slow news day:  ten days 
away from the 1924 presidential elections, a collection of   political barbs and run of  the mill 
police stories were the only competition for the strange mystery gas that killed workers by driving 
them crazy.  The articles appeared the next day, Monday, October  27, 1924, on the front pages 
of  the major New York City daily newspapers -- the New York Times, Joseph Pulitzer’s World, 
the newly merged Herald-Tribune, the newly created Daily News, the old evening Sun, the 
Brooklyn Daily Eagle and the city’s sensational, best-selling paper, William Randolph Hearst’s 
Evening  Journal.  Within three days, as more workers died, news articles about the strange 
sickness at the Standard refinery ran on the front pages of  newspapers across the country. 
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 First Reports  of  the Sudden Disaster  
No one knows how reporters first learned about something unusual happening around 
the Standard Oil refinery. Perhaps a public official or a sick worker’s relative called, or perhaps a 
beat reporter heard about it on routine assignment. It would have been unusual if  reporters had 
missed it.  Bayway and Elizabeth N.J.  were just across New York harbor from the world’s largest 
and most competitive newspaper market, and the story, as an internal du Pont  history said later, 
was a "natural."1  
What they learned was that five men who worked at the refinery had to be dragged away 
from home and work in screaming fits, having gone barking, fighting mad. One died Saturday. 
Reporters questioned county officials and local hospital physicians who did not understand the 
strange refinery worker's sickness. The officials had no idea what kind of  poison was involved, 
although they knew it was connected with the refinery.  The refinery managers had no comment, 
and referred all questions “to 26 Broadway,”  Standard’s international headquarters. Reporters 
managed to track down the chief  chemist of  the Bayway  works,  Dr. Matthew  D. Mann. When 
asked for a comment by a pair of  reporters from the Times and World,  Mann went into another 
room to think it over for about 15 minutes. He returned with the following written statement:  
“These men probably went insane because they worked too hard.” The World carried the 
statement verbatim, and the Times found the statement so extraordinary that Mann was quoted 
in a headline on the front page. The reporters probably did not know that Mann himself  was 
suffering from the same “mystery gas” and had probably made the statement while in a delirious 
state of  mind.2 Standard’s  consulting physician at Reconstruction Hospital,  Dr. W. G. 
Thompson, claimed that he had no knowledge of  what had happened but simultaneously 
insisted: “Nothing ought to be said about this matter in the public interest.”3  
Oelgert’s father vowed:  “The Standard Oil will hear more of  this.”  He told the Times 
that doctors had assured Oelgert that he couldn’t be hurt working at the plant. “They said he’d 
have to get used to it,” Oelgert’s father said.4  Enterprising Times  and World reporters found 
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others who worked at the plant who told a slightly different story:  volunteers for the higher 
paying jobs knew they would be working in what the workers openly called the “loony gas 
building.” Other workers frequently gave them farewells with mock-solemnity, seriocomic 
funerals and jokes about going insane. 
The headlines on the first day indicated a high level of  alarm: 
• “Odd Gas Kills One, Makes Four Insane,” read the Times headline. 
• “Gas Madness Stalks Plant; 2 Die, 3 Crazed,” read the headline in the World, which 
scooped the Times on the second death, probably by keeping a reporter at the hospital to relay 
any early-morning developments. 
• The Herald Tribune headlined a story “Mystery Gas Crazes 12 in Laboratory,” 
following up on the new additions to the hospital sick list that the Times and World missed. 
• The  Brooklyn Daily Eagle reported on the “Gas Mystery Probe,” focusing on an 
interview with Oelgert’s attending physician.
•   Hearst’s afternoon Journal, well known for “yellow journalism,” published an article 
heavily plagiarized from other newspapers that featured an apparently exclusive interview  with 
Oelgert’s undertaker who described the blue and black bruises on the body.  
• The aging afternoon Sun wrote: “Company Denies Negligence Led to Gas Deaths,” 
primarily quoting Standard Oil's Thompson.  
Other newspapers, such as the Daily News and the Daily Worker, missed the story the 
first day, and like the Eagle, the Journal and the  Sun, followed the three major papers in a weak 
and passive role during most of  the controversy.
Although he was the first of  the five Bayway employees to show the effects of  the mystery 
gas,5   McSweeny fought the poison for eight days. He died on Wednesday, the 29th.  Three more 
workers, for a total of  five, died by Friday, and 32 more were hospitalized. 
 What exactly was the mystery gas?  Standard wasn’t saying, and the garbled first-day 
accounts quoted Union County  officials as saying it was “ethylene” and “ethyl chlorid” (instead 
of  chloride ). The Times account included a paragraph that cautioned that ethylene gas was an 
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unlikely poison, as it had been proven safe as an anaesthetic at the University of  Chicago. This 
attention to scientific detail is consistent with Times editor Carr Van Anda’s reputation as an 
expert in scientific matters. The World and most other papers simply reported “ethylene” gas was 
the cause of  the “gas madness.” The Herald Tribune reported “ethylchlorid,” and scientifically, 
this was the closest any of  the newspapers would come to the truth on the first day of  the crisis.6   
Technically, the substance in question was tetraethyl lead being manufactured through a process 
employing ethyl chloride. (An alternative but less efficient process using ethyl bromide was 
employed at the du Pont facility in southern New Jersey). 
Monday morning, as gates were locked and confused silence reigned at the Bayway 
refinery, Thompson spoke with reporters at Standard’s headquarters at 26 Broadway in 
downtown New York. Thompson confirmed that two men were dead and five others seriously ill 
as a result of  chemical “experiments” at Bayway. Although Thompson said that the chemical 
poison was some kind of  gasoline additive, he could not tell reporters its exact nature, nor could 
Standard tell local physicians. Thompson also said  Standard “has given a great deal of  attention 
to safety measures and no expense has ever been spared to safeguard employees against illness or 
accidents.“7  The clear  impression was that Thompson had no way of  knowing about the 
process.  However, as noted in Chapter Three,  Thompson was in fact the chairman of  a medical 
committee of  company physicians from Standard, du Pont and G.M.  who were specifically 
charged with ensuring worker safety  in connection with the previous secret deaths of  workers  at 
G.M.’s  Dayton, Ohio plant and  du Pont’s Deepwater, New Jersey Ethyl gasoline plant.8 
Reporters returning from Thompson’s press conference might well 
have been disappointed with the small amount of   information he provided. 
Then a new angle on the story emerged from a labor group called the Workers 
Health Bureau, located uptown at 799 Broadway.  It turned out that Yandell 
Henderson, a Yale University professor who was an expert on World War I gas 
poisoning and auto exhaust, knew something about the mystery gas. 
Henderson had read that morning of  the refinery deaths and sent a telegram 
to the Workers Health Bureau, which in turn alerted newspapers. The mystery 
gas was  called “tetraethyl lead,” and it was “one of  the most dangerous things 
in the country today,” the Times quoted Henderson as saying in its Tuesday, 
October 28 issue. While other newspapers, including the World, were vague 
about the exact health threat, the Times provided ample space for 
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Henderson’s ideas. Since tetraethyl lead was already being sold around the 
country, Henderson said, an incident could happen on the streets of  
Manhattan any day.  A car with problems on Fifth Avenue could “release a 
quantity of  gas with the lead mixture, (and) it would be likely to cause gas 
poisoning and mania to persons along the avenue.” Similarly, the escape of  
such gas fumes in a garage “probably would have disastrous results on those 
who breathed it.” The danger of  mania appeared to be quite different from 
anything ever encountered before. Someone exposed to the gas would not 
know it from the odor, and the symptoms would not occur immediately. As a 
result, Henderson said, a person “does not know his danger and the damage 
may take place later.”9
Henderson’s initially inaccurate view had been formed by G.M. 's  original plans to use 
tetraethyl lead at full strength in a second gas tank to be installed in every car,10 and he was not 
familiar with the exact nature of  the gradual impacts on people exposed to relatively small 
amounts of  lead. Two days later,  on October 30, Henderson revised his view of  the immediate 
danger, and the World quoted him as saying that a ton of  lead powder would be discharged on 
Fifth Avenue per day. This alone would be dangerous, he said.  
With silence from Standard headquarters, one newspaper turned to  published scientific 
information to interpret events. On Tuesday, October 28, the Herald Tribune noted that, some 
10 months beforehand, G.M. ’s Thomas Midgley had presented an American Chemical Society 
paper on the new product's  novel dangers and benefits. “He said at the time that the dipping of  
one’s finger into ... tetraethyl lead brought on insomnia and  loss of  appetite, and its further 
seeping into the body produced wild hallucinations of  persecution, the nature of  which never 
varied.”11  This was the only time, it should be noted, that newspapers consulted scientific papers 
or journals in the controversy, despite the fact that they were readily available in public libraries.  
The Herald Tribune also noted that Standard had also refused to speak with local authorities, 
and that the authorities reacted with indignation when they discovered that Standard was 
“engaged not with experimentation ... but in regular manufacture” of  tetraethyl lead. 
 The next day,  Wednesday,  October  29, the Herald Tribune reported that local 
authorities were beginning to figure out what had happened.  “Little by little the Union County 
officials are picking their way through the maze of  heretofore contradictory assertions that 
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followed the disclosures of  the wholesale poisoning,” the Herald Tribune said.12    Lead poisoning 
from tetraethyl lead remained the leading suspect in the search for chemical culprits, although the 
local New Jersey medical examiner told several reporters he had never known lead poisoning to 
act so violently.  As late as Thursday, October 30, nine days after McSweeny was taken to a 
hospital, Standard did not tell  health authorities what they were dealing with.
 Meanwhile, victims had been rushed to Reconstruction Hospital and put under 
Thompson’s care in a closed-off  ward. No information about the ward was ever printed, except 
for official statements about treatments being attempted. There were no "lurid details" in any of  
the press, with the possible exception of  some mildly descriptive material in Hearst’s Journal.  
Nor was there any follow up, then or in months to come, on the condition of  the 32 Bayway men 
who survived but endured life-long brain damage.  
Standard Oil’s Blue Funk 
 Standard Oil Co. directors were frozen in fear when they realized what had happened at 
Bayway.   “They were in a blue funk over the whole thing, and the directors were very much 
afraid about it,” said Kettering 30 years later. “They didn't know what was going to happen to 
them.”13  The implication was that they may have feared criminal prosecution for their role in 
the disaster. In any event, Standard issued only short, guarded comments.  A flurry of  telegrams 
flew between Kettering, who was then in Paris on business,  and Standard headquarters in New 
York.  Meanwhile,  New Jersey authorities banned leaded gasoline;  then state legislatures in New 
York, Pennsylvania and others in New England had condemned the new additive and forced 
gasoline dealers to take it off  the market. The  bright future for G.M. ’s  new invention lay in 
ruins, and five men were known to be dead.  The effect was “disaster -- sudden, swift and 
complete,” said du Pont's unpublished history of  the incident.14  
 Midgley rushed to New York from the General Motors research labs in Dayton, Ohio. 
On Thursday, October 30, 1924, after five deaths and five days of  silence, Midgley was 
introduced to a press conference at 26 Broadway to discuss the “mystery gas.”  Midgley's 
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reputation for demonstrating the safety of  leaded gasoline had preceded him, and on Tuesday 
the World  had cited dispatches from Detroit saying that Midgley “frequently bathed” in 
tetraethyl lead to prove its safety to industry skeptics. Now the inventor used the same trick to 
impress the cynical New York press corps. He poured a thick stream of  a clear liquid over his 
hands and then rubbed the excess off  with a handkerchief, according to the Times.15  Then he 
held a bottle of  liquid under his nose “for more than a minute,” the Herald Tribune said, and 
“insisted that the fumes could have no such effect as was observed in the victims if  inhaled only a 
short time.” Midgley insisted the injuries were “caused by the heedlessness of  workers in failing to 
follow instructions” rather than by the danger of  the poison itself.16 
The news media was openly skeptical. Reporters asked Midgley whether it was true that 
other workers had been hospitalized and had died in Dayton, Ohio. He admitted two deaths had 
occurred in April, 1924,  and that over 50 G.M.  workers had been “under observation” for the 
effects of  lead poisoning. He acknowledged that the du Pont corporation had also had “similar 
problems,” which was the first  time that du Pont had been mentioned in the affair. 
Standard  physician Thompson was also present at the press conference and noted that 
the tetraethyl lead was used only in diluted amounts in gasoline, and could not have the same 
effects on motorists as it did on refinery workers.   Standard’s formal statement written by the 
public relations office was passed out. It read: 
Tetraethyl lead is a substance first known to chemists in 1854. Since that time it 
frequently has been experimented with in chemical laboratories where it was known to 
be, in concentrated form, poison. It is a compound of  metallic lead and one of  the 
alcohol chemical series. Its recently discovered use for greatly promoting the efficiency of  
gasoline engines has let to its manufacture on a commercial scale through processes still 
more or less in a stage of  development. This has occasioned unforeseen accidents which 
as processes and apparatus are further perfected should be avoidable in the future. 
One of  these has been the sudden escape of  fumes from large retorts and the 
inhalation of  such fumes gives rise to acute symptoms, particularly congestion of  the 
brain, producing a condition not unlike delirium tremens. Although there is lead in the 
compound, these acute symptoms are wholly unlike those of  chronic lead poisoning such 
as painters often have. 
There is no obscurity whatsoever about the effects of  the poison, and 
Ethyl.Controversy
114
characterizing the substance as ‘mystery gas’ or ‘insanity gas’ is grossly misleading... It 
should be emphasized that the product as destined for final use in gasoline engines has to 
be greatly diluted, usually with 1,000 parts of  gasoline. This extremely dilute product has 
been for more than a year in public use in over 10,000 filling stations and garages and no 
ill effects thus far have been reported.”17
It is understandable that Standard would say the term "mystery gas" was misleading, but 
Standard’s own reticence had been the original source of  the mystery, not only with the press, but 
among public health officials, doctors and other state and local New Jersey officials. The 
symptoms of  chronic lead poisoning in the plumbing and printing trades were like those of  acute 
lead poisoning from tetraethyl lead, although not so violent. And tetraethyl lead was not 
frequently “experimented with” -- it was considered to be a scientific curiosity.18 These minor 
discrepancies are probably due to a lack of  communication between the public relations 
department and scientists such as Midgley, who probably would not have ventured so far from 
basic facts.  
It is also interesting to note the contrast between Midgley inhaling tetraethyl lead fumes 
and the statement in the press release about “the sudden escape of  fumes from large retorts.” If  
the fumes were not harmful enough to suddenly poison Midgley at the press conference, and by 
Midgley's inference, the workers in the refinery, then there must have been not one but many 
“sudden escapes” of  fumes.19 If  reporters wondered at the contradiction, their skepticism 
emerged  obliquely. For example, the Herald Tribune quoted Reconstruction Hospital doctors 
saying “the violent insanity and nervousness that gripped the sufferers (was) brought on by the 
gradual infiltration  of  lead into their systems."  
The discrepancy shows that despite the amount of  time that had passed, Standard had 
not coordinated statements between the public relations office, its engineers and its doctors. 
Moreover, despite the "public information" policy of  public relations pioneer Ivy Lee, who was 
closely associated with Standard and the Rockefeller family, an official silence left the field open 
to speculation.  One New York World editorial writer at this time was historian Allen Nevins, who 
later wrote: “Business feared that its relations with the government would be injured by the full 
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truth... The whole province of  business-government relations was enveloped in a haze that is 
even yet (the 1950s) not entirely dispelled. This being so, companies were loath to open their 
records to the public gaze. ... Secrecy seemed to many businessmen desirable and to some 
indispensable.”20   
By November 1, even after Midgley's press conference, secrecy and mystery still 
surrounded Ethyl gas. Reconstruction Hospital doctor C.K. Flynt said “it had not been 
established whether the lead or the higher alcohol in the tetraethyl lead was the cause of  the 
illness and deaths.” Another physician of  uncertain connection to Standard or the hospital 
thought the Ethyl gas would be reduced to pure alcohol in the blood and cause “acute 
alcoholism.”21 The mystery as reported in the Times is surprising in contrast with the Herald 
Tribune of  two days before, which reported in a headline: “Cure Found for Mystery Gas.” The 
discoveries  “are considered a signal triumph of  medical skill,” the Herald Tribune said. The cure 
-- hyposulfite of  soda -- was photographic “hypo” injected into the veins of  the poisoned men to 
help them metabolize the lead. Hypo is not used in the 1990s as a “chelating” agent, nor are 
modern agents  considered to be particularly effective.22 The effects were probably small but 
greatly exaggerated by both public relations agents and reporters who may have been equally 
hopeful for some positive or heroic aspect to the ghastly story.  
By the end of  the first week, the press was inclined to take Standard at its word, and 
report without comment or contradiction  claims that every precaution had been taken to protect 
workers; that the “mystery gas” was merely “Ethyl,” which was nothing new to science; that it 
was safe for motorists; and that Standard, G.M.  and du Pont were simply trying to improve the 
efficiency of  automobiles. The  Herald Tribune reported without comment Thompson’s October 
31 statement that this form of  poisoning “was nothing new to science.”23 The statement 
contradicted its own enterprising report on Midgley's American Chemical Society paper two 
days before.  
Editorial reaction  
Despite front page coverage around the city, the New York Times   editorial staff  was 
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almost alone in following the issue in its first week. On Tuesday, October 28, in an editorial 
entitled  “Better Let it all Come Out,”  a Times editorial referred to the “mysterious poison” and 
said: “Concealment or even an attempt at it will result in making a bad matter worse.” This was a 
lecture that noted public relations consultant Ivy Lee could very well have been giving Standard 
officials the same day.  The Times also said the “experiment” at Bayway would result in the 
increase in the store of  knowledge “...  not for the first time at deplorable cost.”24
 By Wednesday, October 29, it became clear that production, not “experimentation” was 
going on at the refinery, and the editorial frame of  reference shifted from scientific progress to 
public health and the unique nature of  the disaster. Still, the Times maintained that there was a 
need for public acceptance of  inevitable technological risks.  “What chiefly concerns public safety 
is not what happened in the laboratory but the possibility, by some experts called the probability, 
that the use in automobiles of  gasoline thus modified may diffuse through the streets of  heavy 
traffic the same deadly form of  lead that had such terrible results in the laboratory.” The Times 
also observed dryly: “It may be assumed that Standard Oil Company does not intend to poison 
its customers.”25 
The most significant editorial in the Times appeared October 31, as the  implications of  
the incident were fully recognized. “In all the history of  chemistry, no case like this is recorded,” 
it said. “Laboratory workers, of  course, have been killed before now, but in each instance the 
number has been small, and usually they have died while experimenting with known explosives 
or seeking to find new ones. The Bayway disaster has many entirely novel features... For many 
days workers showed no signs of  illness. The fumes evidently were cumulative in their effects ... 
(and) mental disturbance ... soon turned to outright mania with wild and violent delirium in the 
worst cases.”26 
On the same day, a separate editorial said the liability of  the company toward workers 
was a “Question for the Courts.” The editorial said:  “The men did know the danger and they 
risked it voluntarily in the belief  that all the resources of  chemical science would be used for their 
protection and that these resources would suffice. That they did not suffice, the event 
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demonstrated, but did not demonstrate of  itself  that the failure was anybody’s fault. The 
obligation (by the company) to guard against risks unknown and therefore unexpected is not like 
that to ward off  those that are known.”27 Of  course, the Times could not know just how well the 
risks were appreciated in the years before the Bayway disaster took place.
The Sun, on November  1, weighed in with a conservative editorial statement that the 
“startling and tragic” loss of  life at Bayway should make readers alert to danger that was 
probably similar to that posed by  carbon monoxide. “Tetraethyl lead can probably be used safely 
if  there is a real effort to surround its use with the proper precautions.”28 
A little less than a month later, the Times decided that there was “No Reason for 
Abandonment” of  tetraethyl lead. In a November 28, 1924 editorial, the Times noted that the 
American Chemical Society saw the deaths at Bayway “not a sufficient reason for abandoning 
the use of  a substance by means of  which a large economic gain could be effected -- that is, a 
considerable increase in the value of  gasoline as a source of  power...  As there is no measurable 
risk to the public in its proper use as a fuel, the chemists see no reason why its manufacture 
should be abandoned. That is the scientific view of  the matter, as opposed to the sentimental, 
and it seems  rather cold-blooded, but it is entirely reasonable. The making of  explosives is not 
stopped merely because it necessarily is a dangerous industry, and nobody suggests that the 
building of  airplanes should cease, though every flight is at some risk of  life.”29 
In other words, a modern society will have to accept some risk. The scientific view, as 
opposed to the sentimental view, was in favor of  progress if  the public would not be hurt by the 
product. This one-dimensional view of  progress was clearly not shared by populist papers such as 
the World and the Journal, that  focused more on the public safety perspective than did the 
Times or Herald Tribune.  As the week of  news about Ethyl gas ended, even the more liberal 
newspapers became less and less critical in their news columns,  and more inclined to give 
Standard the benefit of  the doubt. No editorials were run, and as the alarming headlines of  the 
first few days gave way to reassuring headlines at the end of  the week,  the prospect of  immediate 
danger gave way to more remote and less probable risk. 
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Poison gas and the resonance of  fear 
There was one sticking point in the entire episode that made it difficult to entirely dismiss 
the risk. In the age of  normalcy, of  the triumph of  hard-nosed Republican pragmatism over war-
weary Progressive ideals, the press and public could ignore the occasional deaths of  workers in 
dangerous trades in the name of  Progress. But if  tetraethyl lead was so benign, why was the 
Army studying it for use in trench warfare? Why, indeed, was it a focus of  research at Egdewood 
Arsenal, the home of  the Army Chemical Warfare branch?30
According to a World story on October 31, the arsenal had tested tetraethyl lead in 
previous years and found that 100 drops on the skin would probably prove fatal in 24 hours. If  
applied in smaller amounts, the effect might be cumulative and death might not come for weeks, 
the World quoted Army chemical warfare experts as saying.31 
Gas warfare was the subtext of  the New York Journal’s editorial cartoon published 
October 31 -- a cartoon that was certainly the most “lurid” report of  the entire episode. 
Cartoonist Hal Coffman’s regular daily six-panel strip at the top of  the Journal’s second page 
frequently lampooned public officials and industry. On October 31,  Coffman accurately 
depicted refinery workers tearing out their hair,  wrapped up in straitjackets and dying in agony 
in a hospital. One was jumping from a window with a bizarre look on his twisted face. “Just as 
doctors thought they had discovered the antidote for the deadly Ethyl gas, another victim dies in 
agony,” Coffman wrote. “The terrible ‘looney gas’ affects the victims differently -- they will be 
perfectly normal, then suddenly burst into insane fury.” 
Coffman usually wrote a personal comment under his daily cartoon. This one said: 
Chemists of  the Standard Oil Co. little realized what they had discovered in the 
deadly and horrible ethyl gas. Originally intended to mix with ordinary gasoline to help 
eliminate carbon from automobiles, it has proven itself  the most diabolical thing yet 
discovered by man. Imagine, if  possible, what the next war will be like, with such stuff, 
and other gasses, perhaps even worse, being dropped by airplanes over cities and wiping 
out multitudes in an instant. Will there be other wars? Of  course there will be. But for 
downright fiendishness, all past wars will be like a little boy playing with his soldiers. May 
the time when foolish men declare it be far off..  
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It is  important to note that Coffman’s cartoon was always provocative; it was not 
especially so for the Ethyl controversy.   A few days before the “loony gas” cartoon he dealt with a 
half-witted boy sentenced to hang  for a suspicious death. He depicted the judge with his face in 
his hands and the boy sucking a lollypop as the verdict was read, and poignantly indicted “our 
half-baked civilization.”  Coffman’s strangely sensible message of  peace at the end of  an 
obviously  “lurid” description of  the dangers of  tetraethyl lead, and his concern for justice for the 
mentally retarded, shows that what may be seen as “sensationalism” is not easily dismissed as 
mindless recreation at the expense of  facts, but  rather that it incorporates a wide mix of  motives 
and is used to promote ostensibly good causes when other techniques seem weak.32 
The poison gas issue lingered over the controversy. On November  1, the Times quoted 
Brigadier General Amos O. Fries,  chief  of  the Army Chemical Warfare Service, reporting that 
an investigation of  the use of  tetraethyl lead gas for warfare had shown that tetraethyl lead was 
an effective agent. “Samples of  the so-called ‘loony gas’ were used at the Edgewood Arsenal six 
months ago to see whether this reason-destroyer had any promising possibilities for war and also 
to discover antidotes and other protections against it,” the Times report said. “It was found that it 
was dangerous unless the greatest precautions were taken in handling it.” How the danger might 
differ from or exceed that of  other chemical agents typically used at Edgewood Arsenal was not 
reported.33 
These stories and cartoons illustrate one of  the underlying themes of  the coverage and 
the difficulty faced by Standard Oil and General Motors:  the idea of  an invisible poison gas 
driving people suddenly mad, without warning, was one that resonated strongly with the problem 
of  gas warfare in World War I.  Nation’s Health  noted that tetraethyl lead was a more 
sensational topic than the many thousands of  industrial accidents and poisoning that occurred 
routinely. “There is something that appeals to the editorial imagination in the idea of  inhaling a 
gas that will cause a period of  violent insanity followed by death.”34 
Aside from leaded gasoline, poison gas itself  had become a controversial issue with a life 
of  its own after World War I, partly due to the war stories that continued to surface from  
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veterans and partly due to the continued discussions in Geneva during 1924 and 1925 on 
banning chemical weapons .  By coincidence, League of  Nations activities on poison gas directly 
coincided with the Ethyl controversy  in the U.S. The Ethyl controversy began in late October, 
1924, peaked again in May, 1925 with a Washington Public Health Service (P.H.S.)  conference, 
then stopped in 1926 following a report from a P.H.S.-appointed board of  experts. The chemical 
warfare controversy began with a July, 1924  report that warned "that all nations should realize to 
the full the terrible nature of  the danger which threatens them." By the end of  September, 1924, 
the League circulated a draft document. And in June,  1925, the conference approved a protocol 
against poison gas. The U.S.  Senate debated but did not ratify the protocol until 50 years later, in 
1975.   
 Both sides in World War I used a total of  124,200 tons of  poison gas.  About 70,000 
soldiers,  for a total of  27 percent of  all U.S. casualties but only two percent of  U.S. deaths, were 
from poison gas. Around four percent of  all deaths of  British, French and German soldiers was 
from gas. Gas was “never a decisive element in the war,” according to historian Edward M. 
Spiers.  Some have argued, however, that the horror of  gas warfare was concealed by statistics, 
and many tens if  not hundreds of  thousands of  gas deaths were listed in categories such as 
missing in action or death on the battlefield.35 
Banning poison gas was a bipartisan issue in the 1920s. Presidents Woodrow Wilson, 
Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, joined by General John Pershing, all hoped to end its 
use.36 In Britain, politics stopped use of  poison gas by the British army against troublesome 
Afghan tribesmen in the 1920s. Using gas would have "very serious political and moral 
consequences,”  according to Edwin Montague, Secretary of  State for India. He was supported 
by Lord Fisher, who wrote: "The British public thought that poison gas was a low game and they 
think so still."  Sir Edward Thorpe said use of  poison gas was a "degradation of  science," and he 
told the British Association for the Advancement of  Science that “civilization protests against a 
step so retrograde."  German scientists were not always so sentimental, and when one young 
German chemist argued that science was a force for good that should not be diverted to inhuman 
Ethyl.Controversy
121
purposes, a senior scientist, Fritz Haber, “... overreacted and accused his younger colleague of  
conduct unbecoming to a German.”37 In the U.S., the American Chemical Society (ACS) and the 
Army’s chemical warfare service opposed measures to restrict chemical warfare research, calling 
those opposed pacifists, ignorant politicians and military dunderheads. Fear of  the unknown, of  
the new and incomprehensible, was at the root of  the anti-scientific opposition, according to the 
ACS.38 
The deep-seated fear was hardly an irrational anti-scientific behavior. Ordinary people 
understood all too rationally that gas attacks on cities would be likely in wartime. They dreaded 
gas warfare in the same way that people dreaded nuclear warfare in the second half  of  the 20th 
century. “Expert opinions added to apprehensions which were further increased by newspaper 
reports, novelists and not the least by alarmist forecasts based on scientific rubbish disseminated 
by people who knew better," said historian L.F. Haber.  "The mixture of  bizarre fantasies and 
plausible scenarios, together with the common experience shared by thousands of  ex-soldiers, 
had an enhancing effect,  so that poison gas held the public attention through the 1920s and ‘30s. 
The particular issue which touched a sensitive area ... was that of  civilian protection against 
gas...”39 
Some organizations used the sensitivity about the issue to reach their audiences. For 
example, the Workers Health Bureau  published a warning to garage workers in 1924 entitled: 
“Carbon Monoxide: Poison Gas War on the Job.”40  Other groups began to see a direct 
connection between military poisons and industrial poisons.  Dr. Alice Hamilton, the Harvard 
professor who led the opposition to Ethyl gasoline, was among those attending an open house at 
the  Army Chemical Warfare Service headquarters at Edgewood Arsenal, Md. sometime in the 
summer of  1924, before the Bayway incident.  This demonstration, which may have  involved 
tetraethyl lead as a military poison, accelerated rather than calmed the group’s opposition to gas 
warfare experiments.  “The effect was the opposite of  what the Chemical Warfare Service 
intended to achieve by the open day, and the WILPF grew into an active lobby... (whose job it 
became to tell the public) very vividly indeed, what chemical warfare against civilians entailed.”41  
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America's leading expert on industrial toxins and lead poisoning, Hamilton had travelled to 
Europe  in October, 1924 when the Bayway disaster occurred, and was not able to participate in 
the public debate until she returned in February, 1925.  
Public Relations Fails to Relieve the Fear   
Thomas Midgley's October 30 press conference in New York did little to relieve the 
growing pressure on Standard, and by Halloween, the company’s second wave of  public relations 
efforts moved into high gear. First, Rockefeller’s personal public relations agents issued a “joke” 
from the oil tycoon. It had nothing at all to do with leaded gasoline; perhaps it was only 
coincidence that it appeared in a boxed sidebar next to the Ethyl gasoline story in the Times  
November  1:  
Nobody enjoys a joke better than John D. Rockefeller and he doesn’t mind telling 
one on himself. This is the latest he is telling his friends. ‘I was in the central part of  the 
state this summer to visit some of  the spots where I spent my childhood. My car had 
stopped and I was looking around when an old farmer came up to the car and started to 
talk to me. He didn’t know who I was. We chatted together for about five minutes and 
then he asked me where I was going. ‘I’m going to heaven,’ I replied with a smile. ‘Get 
out,’ he said. ‘You ain’t got enough gas.’42 
Rockefeller’s joke would not have become known to the press if  it was not intended to be. 
If  there was a subtext, perhaps something about Ethyl boosting efficiency and stretching oil 
reserves, it was probably lost on readers. But the tone of  the joke is very much in character for 
Rockefellers under pressure.  It is similar to the tone employed by public relations agent Ivy Lee 
following the Ludlow, Colorado massacre in 1914, when 53 striking miners,  women and children 
were killed by the state’s national guard. Even conservative newspapers called Ludlow  a disaster 
and blamed Standard Oil Co. and John D. Rockefeller (Sr.). Ivy Lee's strategy was to have John 
D. Rockefeller, Jr.  project a more humane image. Rockefeller went to a miner's church, danced 
with miners’ wives,  and descended briefly into the mines themselves. These public relations 
efforts were meant to convey the impression that despite the tragic loss of  life, despite the toil and 
travail of  this world, the Rockefellers were ordinary people who enjoyed dancing and a good joke 
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and who were bound by the same sense of  morals as most people.  In the months following the 
Ludlow massacre, Lee began to transform the Rockefeller name from an object of  hatred to one 
with neutral and often pleasant connotations.43 The Bayway disaster did not necessitate a full-
blown rehabilitation of  the Rockefeller image. But John D.'s  "joke" may have been part of  the 
image maintenance effort of  the public relations group, and is certainly in character for Ivy Lee.   
Aside from the joke, the substance of  the public relations response was a hasty U.S. 
Bureau of  Mines report on  experiments that had been conducted at its Pittsburgh, Pa. lab for 
General Motors.  On October 31 the bureau issued a statement in Washington, D.C.  concluding 
that the danger of  the public breathing lead in the exhaust of  automobiles is “seemingly remote” 
based on observations of  animals exposed to leaded gasoline exhaust. None of  the animals 
apparently had any problems that could be detected, even though a few of  them had been 
exposed to leaded gasoline exhaust for six hours a day for eight months.  Critical reaction came 
almost immediately from the scientific community, but nothing about it was published in the 
press until April, 1925. As it turned out, the bureau kept animal cages well ventilated and did not 
allow lead dust to accumulate, and critics from Harvard Medical School soon charged that this 
avoided real-world study conditions. Research contracts between the bureau and General Motors 
show that G.M. had control over the release of  any information  the bureau's study of  tetraethyl 
lead, and the report was undoubtedly released at G.M. or Ethyl's request since contracts 
stipulated that G.M. would have final control over all information released from the study.44  
The public controversy smolders:  November  1924 - April 1925 
News reports of  the Bayway disaster were overshadowed by other events, especially the 
presidential election. Ethyl gasoline continued to be sold in the Midwest, but sales stopped in 
New York City, Philadelphia, New Jersey and in many other East Coast areas where it was 
officially banned or unofficially discouraged. 
The New York Times continued to follow the controversy.  On 
November  9, the Times  quoted a New Jersey chemical society president 
Carleton Ellis saying that simple improvements in petroleum refining could 
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improve the antiknock value of  gasoline in the future “without resort to 
additions such as lead ethyl.”  The chemist also noted that many  gasoline 
additives discovered through an "empirical" trial-and-error method had been 
proposed,  “but this criticism does not apply to tetraethyl lead, which rests on a 
true scientific foundation.”  Presumably, Ellis had been informed about the 
peg board method. His view was common among chemists and engineers, 
although historians later said Ethyl research had been “proceeding mostly on 
an  empirical basis.”45  Ellis’ comment is significant because it reveals the deep 
investment of  credibility that many in the scientific community had already 
made in the new “scientific” gasoline additive, despite, as he noted in the same 
breath, commonly known alternative methods to control engine knock .    
The public controversy also continued around the danger of  tetraethyl 
lead. In a November  13 Times article about the autopsy reports on Bayway 
refinery workers, a New York City medical examiner  said that tetraethyl lead 
had been discovered in Germany in 1854 “and it has not been used in 
industry during most of  the 70 years since then because of  its known 
deadliness.”46  This statement was probably a reaction to the Standard press 
release of  October 30,  which claimed that tetraethyl lead had been a frequent 
subject of  experimentation.47 
 Two weeks later, on November  27, 1924, both the Times  and World quoted the New 
Jersey Labor Commission saying that worker health could not be safeguarded at the Bayway 
refinery and it would have to be shut down. (Du Pont's Deepwater, New Jersey plant continued 
operations until May, 1925, and then resumed again in 1926).   Both articles also noted a 
statement by Harrison E. Howe, editor of  the journal of  the American Chemical Society, saying 
it would be “folly” to discontinue the use of  a substance that would so greatly improve the 
conservation of  petroleum. While the public may be concerned about small amounts of  lead in 
gasoline, Howe said a far greater concern was felt by manufacturers “who realize to what extent 
they would be the subject of  attack should it develop that the public is endangered by the use of  
this fuel.”48  
 One of  the few positive articles about Ethyl appeared around this time. A speech by 
Thomas Midgley explaining the process of  discovering tetraethyl lead was printed in the January, 
1925 issue of  Motor magazine. In his speech, Midgley attributed success to "luck and religion, as 
well as to the application of  science." He told the story  of  the false trails that led to iodine, 
aniline, selenium, tellurium and then to lead. He did not mention any of  the alternatives such as 
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benzene, alcohol or iron carbonyl that G.M. had investigated.49  
Meanwhile, the Ethyl controversy continued  simmering. The Times wrote about a “six-
month progress report” from the Bureau of  Mines on January 7.  The World ignored the report 
that day, but reported on February 11  Henderson’s negative reaction to the report.50  On 
February 12, the Times reported that a grand jury  cleared Standard Oil Co. of  criminal charges 
in the Bayway accident . The World ignored the grand jury but reported on February 18 that 
another Deepwater worker for du Pont  had died from tetraethyl lead poisoning and no inquest 
was planned. The Times on February 24 noted two recent deaths at Deepwater. 
This journalistic ping-pong illustrates the competitive approach to news taken in the late 
19th and early 20th century.  Before most American newspapers became monopolies in their own 
cities,  it was common for competing newspapers to be aware of  each others’ “scoops,” to let 
them go unacknowledged,  and then  try to beat the competition to fresh information.  To get a 
complete view of  events,  readers often read more than one paper. The Times ostensibly 
attempted to transcend the “ping-pong”   approach.  In its motto -- “all the news that is fit to 
print" --  is the implicit claim that  as the newspaper of  record it could be trusted to follow the 
details of  important issues. Editor Carr Van Anda,  well  known for his insight into scientific 
questions, had probably been consulted by Times editorial writers who called it an “episode 
without precedent,” and the Times commitment to continuing coverage shows that 
unprecedented nature of  the Ethyl controversy was understood. Thus, the Times attempted to 
cover the issue fully and fairly.   And yet, it is clear that the agenda of  the Times in the Ethyl 
controversy was aligned with the other, less heralded objective stated by founder Adolph Ochs: 
“to allay rather than excite agitation.”51   Thus, "all the news"  did not always include voices of  
agitation and dissent that the World’s editors not only heeded but, on occasion, championed. 
Thus, while the content of  the news articles was in itself  accurate, and while reporters remained 
in non-interpretive and passive roles, the editors of  the two great New York newspapers clearly 
had different agendas in assigning coverage and placing news items in the papers.   
 In the spring of  1925 the contrast between the Times and the World continued to grow, 
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as the Ethyl controversy continued to build momentum.  In March, the  Times carried stories 
about a European controversy over leaded gasoline. A Swiss scientist said lead was already 
detectable in street dust, but an Ethyl spokesman countered a day later by saying that leaded 
gasoline had not been marketed in Switzerland. It is likely that the Swiss scientist had measured 
industrial lead contamination. The article is significant because it shows the concern of  
Europeans about what the Swiss scientist called the “death-dealing liquid.”52  
The Times also covered Thomas Midgley's speech to the American Chemical Society 
April 6, in which he claimed a number of  benefits for tetraethyl lead and, significantly, that there 
was no alternative to its use:
 
... Conservation of  petroleum due to the increased mileage obtainable by using a non-
knocking gasoline in high compression motors; the reduction of  carbon monoxide 
contamination of  the atmosphere due to increased efficiency of  combustion and reduced 
first cost of  automotive apparatus are some of  the benefits ... So far as science knows at 
the present time, tetraethyl lead is the only material available  which can bring about 
these results, which are of  vital importance to the continued economical use by the 
general public of  all automotive equipment... [italics added]53 
News accounts of  the statement ran in the Times without contradiction or question, 
although other newspapers ignored it.  The claim that “science” knew of  no alternatives must 
have surprised many chemists and automotive engineers, who would have known  about other 
antiknock fuels from articles that had appeared in  automotive and chemical journals. Midgley 
himself  had been an enthusiastic leader for other fuel alternatives, as already seen in Chapter 
Three. Yet no reporter questioned his ACS speech,  and the only scientists who publicly broke 
ranks and criticized Midgley were those who were experts in public health, not automotive 
engineering. It is interesting to note that the ACS may have come to regard Midgley with some 
coolness. His defense of  tetraethyl lead at the ACS meeting may have been headlined in the New 
York Times, but was noted among many hundreds of  reports in only 17 words in an ACS 
conference report a month later: “Midgley, in his characteristic style, discussed the poison 
hazards in the manufacture and use of  tetraethyl lead.”54  ACS apparently did not  believe that 
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the fortunes of  the chemical industry were tied to G.M. 's latest antiknock fluid. 
On April 5, the Times also carried a guest column by a Mellon Institute scientist 
concerning the research vessel “S.S. Ethyl” that had been commissioned to extract the element 
bromine from sea water. The article noted that tetraethyl lead “is needed to silence the knock in 
automobile motors” and that bromine was needed in turn to keep tetraethyl lead from fouling 
spark plugs.  In  glowing and heroic terms typical of  1920s science writing, the author noted: “It 
is curious how one industry gives rise to another. Twenty years ago, no one could have foreseen 
that the search for a better motor fuel for the automobile would lead to the extracting of  valuable 
minerals from the sea.”  The article rambled into a broad discussion of  the riches of  the sea, 
including the amount of  gold to be found in sea water and the sources of  bromine in Germany 
and in Midland, Michigan.  The article is an example of  the subtle public relations Ethyl and its 
parent corporations were pursuing. The premise that leaded gasoline was “needed” is carefully 
embedded throughout the article. So, too, is the idea that du Pont could become independent 
from other bromine suppliers.55  These suppliers included I.G. Farben and Dow Chemical Co. of  
Midland, Michigan. Although the S.S. Ethyl experiment cost $400,000 and the ship was only at 
sea for a few weeks,  du Pont later said in an internal history:  “There was undoubtedly a large 
measure of  compensation in the effect of  this well publicized experiment in the minds of  the 
established domestic and foreign producers of  bromine, who set the prices that the new 
consuming industry was forced to pay.”56   
The World did not cover the S.S. Ethyl, the  Swiss controversy or Midgley's speech. It did 
cover scientific criticism of  the November 1924 Bureau of  Mines report by two Harvard 
University medical school faculty members, Cecil Drinker and David Edsall. On April 4, the 
World   reported their February, 1925, paper in the Journal of  Industrial Hygiene. Drinker and 
Edsall said that the bureau’s study of  lead’s effect on animals did not reflect real-world conditions. 
The chambers where animals were kept had been constantly ventilated, and thus lead particles 
did not settle, they said. This would tend to keep lead absorption rates artificially low. The World   
quoted Drinker as saying the experiments “do not show the substance safe for general use.” A 
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follow-up World editorial April 12 said a new investigation “must begin at once.”  It is likely that 
the report came to the attention of  editorial page editor Walter Lippmann through his friendship 
with Harvard Professor Alice Hamilton.57 
The Bureau of  Mines also came under fire in late April in a speech by Yandell Henderson 
to the American Society of  Safety Engineers.  The Times, the World and most other newspapers 
covered the inflammatory speech. Henderson insisted that the issue was not one of  immediate 
lead poisoning, and yet the Bureau of  Mines experiments were designed as if  that were the 
threat. Rather, the serious public health danger was that “breathing day by day of  the fine dust 
from automobiles will produce chronic lead poisoning on a large scale...” The problem was “... 
the greatest single question in the field of  public health which has ever faced the American 
public,” Henderson said. “Perhaps if  leaded gasoline kills enough people soon enough to impress 
the public, we may get from Congress a much needed law and appropriation for control of  
harmful substances other than foods. But it seems more likely that the conditions will grow worse 
so gradually and the development of  lead poisoning will come on so insidiously ... that leaded 
gasoline will be in nearly universal use and large numbers of  cars will have been sold that can 
only run on that fuel before the public and the government awaken to the situation.”  The 
question, Henderson said, was whether “commercial interests are to be allowed to subordinate 
every other consideration to that of  profit. It is not a matter of  millions or even hundreds of  
millions of  dollars, but literally billions.”58 
Most New York newspapers carried at least some of  Henderson’s remarks.  The Sun 
carried a modest five-inch article covering the highlights of  the speech.59 The Journal carried a 
full banner headline with text across the top of  the flag:  “Looney gas auto exhaust threatens 
health of  nation.”60  The World reported far less of  the speech than the Times, but noted that 
Henderson “attacked the powerful commercial interests which he says are preparing to make 
poisonous ethyl gasoline the universal fuel.”  A World  editorial said the next day: “There must be 
a new investigation, an immediate investigation, and an investigation which makes use of  the best 
scientific opinion in the country.”61  
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The New York Times, the Sun and the Journal carried Thomas Midgley's response April 
23, but the World apparently did not think it deserved the space. Midgley attacked Henderson’s 
integrity, asking why he “unsuccessfully sought a retainer” from G.M.  to investigate leaded 
gasoline. Midgley claimed G.M.  “preferred to entrust such an investigation to an arm of  the 
government than to a private investigator paid by it.”62  Henderson’s rejoinder was carried April 
24 only in the New York Times; rather than seeking money, he had “foretold” his “attack” on 
ethyl gasoline and he believed the results of  any investigation “would scarcely fail to show that 
the public use of  leaded gasoline would involve an intolerable hazard to public health.”63
Meanwhile, another research controversy had developed at Columbia University. Two 
researchers had apparently been poisoned by tetraethyl lead in the laboratory, and the research 
director talked with reporters from the World, Herald Tribune and Sun on April 28. He noted 
the “collapse of  the investigators from fumes” that was “evidence of  the deadly effects of  the 
poison.”64   Again, the New York  Times missed a story that the  World’s enterprising work had 
uncovered, but the next day, the Times ran a university official’s  angry denial without delving 
into the details of  the original story:  “The reports were evidently spread by some person whose 
imagination exceeds his sense of  responsibility,” the Times quoted Horatio B. Williams, 
physiology department chairman, as saying. The “sensational story ... is absolutely without 
foundation in fact,” he said.65  The Journal followed the Columbia story with a banner headline 
above the flag, proclaiming: “Early Verdict on Looney Gas.”  The Journal’s article was balanced 
by a statement by Dr. Haven Emerson, a senior faculty member, saying the reports of  lead 
poisoning of  researchers had been exaggerated, and that they have “not been compelled to give 
up their work.”66 
The World stood the April 29 Columbia denial on its ear. While Columbia said the report 
was utterly false, the World reported, “it was admitted that lead was found” in fecal samples taken 
from lab workers. The headline echoed the contradiction: “Columbia, denying ethyl poisoning, 
admits 2 cases in researchers.” The World also defended its previous reporting, noting that the 
sources had been Emerson and one of  the affected researchers, Frederick B. Flinn. “Asked about 
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the death rate of  animals subjected to dilutions of  ethyl gas and air, Dr. Flinn replied: ‘Well, a few 
of  them haven’t died yet.’”67 
The accelerating controversy took a new turn when, on May 1, U.S. Surgeon General 
Hugh Cumming announced that an unprecedented conference of  all interested parties would 
take place in Washington on May 20, 1925. All New York newspapers and most around the 
country carried the story. The conference was a  response to  Harvard university professor Cecil 
Drinker’s review of  the Bureau of  Mines report, Cumming told the news media.  
On May 3, the World presented an in-depth look at the Ethyl controversy in a Sunday 
opinion section. The headline asked whether Ethyl would poison everyone and underscored a 
theme that would be repeated many times in the decades to come:  “Scientists Disagree.”  An 
artists sketch showed Yandell Henderson holding a rather elaborate piece of  analytical 
equipment with an inset of  a jowly  Thomas Midgley. The article by reporter John E. Mitchell68  
primarily summarized Henderson’s opinions on leaded gasoline and Midgley's defenses. The 
article observed that  lead poisoning is a “nasty, serious business” that had been known since the 
Roman Empire. It quoted Henderson as calculating that with cars burning two gallons of  fuel 
per hour, the deposit of  lead on a New York street would be in about a pound per hour per block. 
The dusty rain of  lead on Fifth Avenue alone, Henderson said, would be 30  tons per year. 
The World article also gave readers background on the two protagonists.   Henderson was 
not a spurned consultant. Rather, he had been employed by the Bureau of  Mines labs to help 
develop poison gas in World War I. “The mental pictures that he carried with him in wartime of  
the havoc his gases would play with the German Army have made him acutely sensible of  the 
possibility of  mass poisoning and eager to protest against it,” the World article said.  The article 
also quoted Midgley telling a story about eating dinner with a friend who ordered Camembert 
cheese after dinner. The friend peeled back the tin foil and said with mock horror that the acid in 
the cheese would have dissolved some of  the lead. “My friend pretended to leap up from the 
table, asking in mock anger if  I intended to give him lead poisoning,” Midgley told the World. 




In later years, industry scientists would argue (erroneously) that a certain amount of  lead 
in the human body is “normal,” but Midgley's attempt to calm the alarmed public had fallen 
completely flat. In a board of  directors meeting in late April, 1925, Kettering and Midgley were 
removed as president and vice president of  Ethyl Gasoline Corp., and the decision was made to 
suspend all sales. Although the shake-up in the company was kept secret, on May 4, the company 
announced that leaded gasoline sales would be stopped until some resolution was reached by the 
P.H.S. on the issue.  All New York city newspapers carried the story on May 5; the Times merely 
reported the announcement, but the Herald Tribune and the Daily News erroneously claimed 
that the main reason for Ethyl’s retreat was the lack of  supply. “It is understood that the difficulty 
of  obtaining deliveries was because of  the war being waged against the product here,” the 
Herald Tribune said.69  The Sun attributed the suspension of  sales  “to the controversy being 
waged among scientists as to whether Ethyl gasoline is dangerous.”70 
In a self-congratulatory tone, the World attributed the suspension of  sales to itself. 
“Dangerous leaded gasoline sale stopped after fight by the World,” the World headline said. The 
article described  “the World’s successful fight to stop the sale of  tetraethyl gasoline pending a 
thorough inquiry into its danger.”  A second story noted that “Dr. Yandell Henderson of  Yale 
took a large part in the crusade.” In a sidebar, Henderson said:  “I congratulate the World 
heartily for the high service it has rendered, for without the intelligent support given this 
undertaking no such victory could have been achieved.”71 
Not to be excluded,  the Daily News the next day claimed a little of  the glory for itself, 
saying “Journalistic vigilance has accomplished what the paid servants of  the people failed to 
do.”72  
Reaction against journalistic vigilance came quickly.  “The fortunes of  one of  (our 
industry’s) branches have been rudely thrown into the balance by the hysteria of  a newspaper 
and a physiologist...” the Times quoted H.C. Parmelee, editor of  Chemical & Metallurgical 
Engineering on May 7. “The research and development that produced tetraethyl lead were 
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conceived in a fine spirit of  industrial progress looking toward the conservation of  gasoline,” 
Parmelee said. “One can imagine how chemical progress in the past might have been hampered 
by a similar crusade by self-appointed guardians of  the public health.”73 
Parmelee’s attitude, however, was hardly universal among scientists.  Industrial & 
Engineering Chemistry, in a June 1925 editorial, said there was a danger that “another lead trade 
hazard” could be introduced. Backing away from Harrison Howe's original support for Ethyl in 
November, 1924,  the American Chemical Society’s  journal said that the attitude of  industrialists 
was not that far afield from academics, labor organizations and other groups. The editorial also 
said that the idea of  increased government regulation over chemicals “is a subject worthy of  
further discussion.”74  Strong backing for Ethyl  is also missing from the Society of  Automotive 
Engineers Journal and other scientific journals of  the era. 
At the World, coverage continued with a May 8  story noting that Ethyl gasoline was still 
being sold despite the company’s decision to  voluntarily withdraw it from the market. On May 8 
a World reporter wrote of  an interview with Midgley in Dayton, Ohio. Midgley said the best 
proof  of  the safety of  Ethyl gas was in the lack of  complaints from users. Midgley also rubbed a 
thick, clear liquid on his hands, saying it was tetraethyl lead: “I’m not taking any chances 
whatever. Nor would I take any chance doing that every day.”75
One of  the fascinating sidelights of  the Ethyl controversy shows up in a 
cryptic  Times article published on May 8. Entitled “Synthetic Marvels Arouse 
Scientists,” the article is based on an interview with then-Secretary of  
Commerce Herbert Hoover.76 The future president was at that moment 
preoccupied with large amounts of  synthetic methanol made from coal in 
Germany,  which, he said, could bankrupt U.S.  methanol producers who 
made the alcohol out of  wood using a process three times more expensive. 
The article noted that methanol was a paint thinner and base for a variety of  
chemicals.  Without drawing any direct connection, the Times also quoted 
Hoover as saying that the Commerce department “had not been asked to take 
an investigation of  the poisonous or non-poisonous qualities of  tetraethyl and 
did not contemplate entering into the present controversy.”   The article does 
not mention any particular reason or context for Hoover’s statements. The 
juxtaposition of  two apparently unrelated items may have simply been an 
artifact of  the reporter’s technique, but methanol was related to the tetraethyl 
lead controversy  by professional journals.  Methanol was among the “Liquid 




Moreover, Commerce was a few days away from issuing a report on the widespread use 
of  methanol and ethanol fuels in Europe, as pure fuels or more often as antiknock additives. The 
report provided detailed statistics on use of   alcohol blended fuels  in France, Germany, England, 
Italy and other countries.78 It could have contradicted the statements of   Ethyl officials, especially 
Midgley, who claimed that “so far as science knows” no other substance could combat engine 
knock.  Opponents of  tetraethyl lead such as Yandell Henderson and Alice Hamilton frequently 
insisted that alternatives were available but apparently had very few specifics.  About this time, 
two letter writers to the Times reflected the general public misinformation.  One noted that “lead 
is a most insidious poison ... (and) a harmless substitute should be sought.” The other claimed 
that the “ultimate aim should be total electrification.”79
 The letters are significant because they reflect the "information gap" between science and 
public policy.   Indeed, throughout the entire controversy before the Public Health Service 
conference, between October 1924 and May 20, 1925,  no newspaper article took notice of  
unleaded antiknock fuels already being sold in the U.S. and Europe.  
Very few people were aware of  both the policy problem and the scientific information.  
The Commerce Dept. alcohol fuel report was never publicized, and no references to the report 
appear in any newspapers during this period.  It is possible that  Hoover was in a position to shift 
the focus of  debate to an area that might have proven troublesome for Ethyl, but he did not.  His 
lack of  action at a critical moment kept the focus of  public attention  away from alternatives and 
on the narrower question of  proof  of  public health problems. As a result, public health advocates 
carried a greater burden of  proof  as the stage was set for the Surgeon General’s May 20 
conference. 
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THE  INTERNAL  CONTROVERSY  OVER  ETHYL 
During the fall of  1924 and spring of  1925, as public health scientists battled industrialists 
in the pages of  the nation's newspapers, a private controversy raged among the corporations 
directly connected with leaded gasoline:  General Motors and Standard Oil of  New Jersey, which 
created the Ethyl Gasoline Corp., and E.I. du Pont de Nemours, which was a one-third owner of  
General Motors and the primary manufacturer of  tetraethyl lead. This internal controversy 
concerned safety standards in manufacturing, the availability of  raw materials, the possibilities of   
alternatives to lead, and the tenure of  Kettering and Midgley as president and vice president of  
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. These behind-the-scenes arguments show some of  the real problems at 
issue.  
  Industry historians have not acknowledged any internal debate. For example, Joseph C. 
Robert's 1983 corporate history of  Ethyl claimed that following  the Bayway disaster, the 
manufacturing process “was discovered to be a hazardous operation that required new and 
stringent safety regulations,” and that tetraethyl lead was “lethal far beyond original  estimates.”1 
Actually, the original estimates were quite serious, as we have seen in Chapter Three.  In 
addition, the private debate about the speed of  production, the number of  lives being lost and 
the alternatives have not before been acknowledged in print, although many of  the historical 
documents cited here have been available for over two decades. 
In 1922, letters from scientists at Harvard, Yale and Pottsdam (in Germany) universities  
warned Charles Kettering and Thomas Midgley that tetraethyl lead was a “creeping and 
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malicious” poison that had already had deadly effects.2 These warnings were tossed off  lightly, as 
we have seen. Midgley, for example, told a Cornell professor that lead colic was “nothing to 
worry about.”3 
Du Pont corporate executives were first informed about tetraethyl lead in March of  1922 
when Pierre du Pont, on the board of  General Motors, wrote that tetraethyl lead is “a colorless 
liquid of  sweetish odor, very poisonous if  absorbed through the skin, resulting in lead poisoning 
almost immediately.”4   By October, the du Pont corporation contracted with G.M. to produce 
1,300 pounds of  tetraethyl lead per day for $2.00 per pound. Those 1,300 pounds would amount 
to 100 gallons of  pure tetraethyl lead or enough to boost the octane of  120,000 gallons of  
gasoline per day by about seven points.  Planning began immediately for a new process line at the 
extensive du Pont chemical and gunpowder works at Deepwater, New Jersey, across the Delaware 
River from Wilmington, Delaware.     
Meanwhile, General Motors set up a 7 gallon per day manufacturing line in Dayton, 
Ohio in 1922 to produce samples  for prospective customers. G.M.'s product went into  the first  
leaded gasoline to be sold at a service station, an event that occurred in Dayton, Ohio,  on 
February  1, 1923. By late spring 10 more stations had begun using Ethyl gasoline.  
In April of  1923, construction began on the large scale du Pont plant.  Irenee du Pont  
wrote du Pont's technical director, W.F. Harrington:  “It is essential that we treat this undertaking 
like a war order so far as making speed and producing the output, not only in order to fulfill the 
terms of  the contract as to time but because every day saved means one day advantage over 
possible competition...”5  
As an important aside, this note to Harrington establishes that du Pont, Ethyl and G.M. 
officials were worried about competition in 1923. The problem was not other sources of  
tetraethyl lead which, of  course, would have infringed on G.M.'s patents,  but rather other types 
of  antiknock additives and refining processes which were beginning to come into the market at 
the time.  The point is important because  officials with G.M., Ethyl and Standard publicly 
claimed that no alternatives existed to tetraethyl lead. 
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Meanwhile, the du Pont plant's  opening was delayed because “a considerable number of  
men  had been more or less seriously affected”  in the trial runs of  the new system.  By 
September, 1923 the 100 gallon per day operation was in full production, although at least one 
worker was in the hospital and others had begun to complain of  strange hallucinations of  flying 
insects.  Workers began calling the plant the “House of  Butterflies.”6  On September  21, Frank 
W. Durr, a 37-year-old process operator who had worked for 25 years for du Pont, became the 
first of  eight du Pont employees to die of  lead poisoning over the next two years.  Du Pont took 
additional precautions and no other workers died of  lead poisoning in Deepwater until the 
summer of  1924, when production was stepped up to meet new demands. Altogether, between 
1923 and 1925, eight du Pont workers died. Du Pont’s official unpublished history of  the Ethyl 
controversy, written in 1936 in preparation for an anti-trust suit, contrasts its eight deaths in two 
years with  Standard’s five within one week: 
 The available records seem to show plainly enough that there was no reckless 
rush [to get out production]... When the full measure of  the peril became apparent, it 
seems not too much to say that protection against it was put ahead of  every other 
consideration... [The du Pont deaths] represent no sudden holocaust due to the neglect of  
precautions that should clearly have been taken but rather the slow and gradual toll which 
humanity has always paid, and perhaps must always pay, for the conquest of  new and 
dangerous ground. [Also] against the price which was paid, definite and permanent 
progress in bringing this humanly valuable new art to a basis of  assured and permanent 
safety was accomplished. And finally, there was no public hysteria;  and within the du 
Pont Company, there was no panic and no despair of  the final outcome.7  
Du Pont’s pride that no public hysteria greeted developments at Deepwater is interesting 
in light of  the secrecy surrounding the tetraethyl lead production unit.  According to the New 
York Times,  the death of  veteran employee Frank Durr was not mentioned in any of  the local 
newspapers, although two days later, as a point of  contrast, the accidental electrocution of  
another man employed by du Pont for two months was reported on the front page of  the local 
newspaper. “They suppress things about the lead plant at Deepwater,” said the editor of  the 
Penn’s Grove Record, according to the Times.8  
Demand for Ethyl fluid grew rapidly in 1923 and skyrocketed in January 1924 when 
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G.M. signed exclusive contracts with Standard Oil Co. of  New Jersey  (now Exxon), Standard Oil 
Co. of  Indiana  (now Amoco) and Gulf  Oil Co. to distribute the new antiknock fluid on the East 
Coast, the Midwest and the South, respectively. The contracts stipulated that adding three grams 
of  Ethyl fluid per gallon would have the same antiknock effect as adding 40 percent benzene.9  
Du Pont had continual problems meeting G.M.’s increasing demands for tetraethyl lead 
through its bromine-based process. In June 1924 Kettering  complained that the “whole program 
is prejudiced” because du Pont was moving too slowly.10  At the same time,  the G.M. Dayton 
staff  was said to be “depressed to the point of  giving up the whole tetraethyl lead program.”11  
 Standard Oil Co., meanwhile, had developed and patented a new kind of  tetraethyl lead 
manufacturing process based on ethyl chloride rather than bromine. Alfred P. Sloan, chairman of  
G.M., believed that competition would help hold du Pont back from potential price increases in 
the future and that the Standard patent position would force concessions from G.M.  Standard’s 
new process, then, was seen by G.M. as something that had to be brought into the operation. 
From another perspective, it might be said that Standard used its new process and patent position 
with ethyl chloride to get in on the ground floor of  the Ethyl business.   According to court 
testimony in later years, du Pont officials were unaware that G.M. was about to forge a 
partnership with Standard that would create the company called the Ethyl Gasoline Corp. in 
August, 1924.12 
Standard's  chloride process was slightly cheaper than du Pont’s original bromide process 
by about four cents per pound (about 52 cents per gallon) of  pure tetraethyl lead that would be 
diluted 1,200 times in gasoline. The retail level difference would be one-twentieth  of  a cent 
($0.0005) per gallon of  gasoline. However, the chloride process involved higher temperatures and 
pressures, which made it far more dangerous than the bromine process that had already killed six 
or seven workers and poisoned hundreds of  others.  Du Pont  engineers  had serious reservations 
when G.M. decided to allow Standard Oil Co. to build a tetraethyl lead plant using the chloride 
process at their refinery in Bayway, New Jersey,  as the du Pont internal history  emphasizes.13  
Because du Pont Corp. owned one third of  G.M. stock and was a partner in everything G.M. did, 
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Du Pont engineers felt they had a right to insist that manufacturing be kept in one place for 
safety’s sake, especially considering the severe safety problems they already faced. 
 When du Pont’s use of  the new chloride process came up for consideration in the spring 
of  1924, a du Pont engineering committee insisted on approaching it with the idea of  a closed 
system. Du Pont engineers wanted to keep the entire series of  highly volatile chemical reactions 
closed off  and isolated from workers from start to finish. Planning began in April, 1924 and 
construction began in September, 1924, but the du Pont ethyl chloride plant did not start 
operating for ten months. In contrast, Standard took less than three months to design and build 
the Bayway, N.J. plant, beginning in June 1924. 
As demand accelerated in the summer of  1924,  du Pont stepped up the older bromide 
production line from around 200 gallons per day to 400 in June, then 500 in July, and then 700 
by August. As a result,  Guiseppe Cianci, 24, a sludge laborer, died of  lead poisoning on July 30; 
Frank A. Hanley, 28, a pipefitter, died August 12; and a 47-year-old janitor, Sim Jones, died 
October 20 after absorbing lead into his feet through the holes in the soles of  his shoes.   Du Pont 
engineers were alarmed at the deaths that, like those to come in Bayway, were preceded by wild 
and violent hallucinations.   
The internal controversy came to a head when a delegation of  du Pont chemists led by W. 
F. Harrington visited Standard’s newly opened Bayway plant in September, 1924.  The contrast 
between the du Pont approach and the Standard approach was evident from the moment 
Harrington and his team walked through the door.  The internal du Pont history said the 
engineers were “greatly shocked at the manifest danger of  the equipment and methods [and] at 
inadequate safety precautions,” but their warnings were “waved aside.”14  
Harrington and the du Pont engineers saw a large, open factory floor with three main 
work areas. In the first area, an enormous iron vessel shaped like two ice cream cones top to top 
was rotating on its side. From within the vessel came the muffled sound of  explosions as sodium  
reacted violently with ethyl chloride and lead.  As the double cone rotated, steel balls which had 
been placed on the inside churned through the boiling sodium to ensure proper mixing. When 
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the reaction calmed down, a crane moved the double cone to the second work area, where men  
unbolted the hatches over the narrow ends, releasing pungent concentrated fumes from inside. 
They attached steam lines and condensers, and tetraethyl lead was distilled in much the same 
way that whiskey is distilled from a vat of  beer. When the distillation was over, workers opened 
the iron vessel once again and scraped the steaming,  leftover lead mush through a grate in the 
floor with shovels, gloves and boots. As the mush went through the grate, workers recovered the 
steel balls that would be used to agitate the next batch. Workers were directly exposed to the toxic 
fumes at  every stage of  production, and the sole precaution  taken by Standard was to issue 
rubber gloves and boots. Du Pont engineers were surprised, in the end, that so few of  the 49 
workers died at Bayway.   
Kettering and Midgley at General Motors  not only refused to listen to du Pont's 
warnings, they actually wanted du Pont to adopt Standard’s process in order to produce as much 
as possible for the market.  Harrington protested. “I personally thought it was too dangerous a 
process for us to use,” he said, and du Pont got permission in the summer of  1924 to proceed 
with a closed ethyl chloride system that had been in the planning stages since April.15 Du Pont's 
new closed process involved a stationary reactor with permanent agitators, a contained transfer 
system to a distillation unit in the floor below, and finally a contained recovery system for the 
leftover sludge.  Irenee du Pont felt that, had the company been given more time, the more 
dangerous ethyl chloride process could have been made much safer.  “In due course the more 
dangerous trip [technical development] could have been made safe, but it was an expensive trip 
to have tried it more or less prematurely in the hands of  novices,”  du Pont said, referring to 
Standard’s Bayway  engineers.16  
Although a grand jury acquitted Standard of  criminal negligence at the refinery in 
February  1925, Irenee du Pont and his engineers believed that Standard had made a serious 
error of  judgement. "Notwithstanding ... foreknowledge of  the peril, the precautions taken in the 
small manufacturing operation at Bayway were grossly inadequate,” said du Pont's unpublished 
history of  the event.17  Probably a better reflection of  the tone of  the internal  controversy, 
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however, was this closing statement concerning Standard’s Bayway plant by a General Motors 
attorney in the 1953 anti-trust suit: 
They put up a plant that lasted two months and killed five people and practically 
wiped out the rest of  the plant. The disaster was so bad that the state of  New Jersey 
entered the picture and issued an order that Standard could never go back into the 
manufacture of  this material without the permission of  the state of  New Jersey. In fact, 
the furor over it was so great that the newspapers took it up, and they misrepresented it, 
and instead of  realizing that the danger was in the manufacture, they got to thinking that 
the danger was exposure of  the public in the use of  it, and the criticism of  its use was so 
great that it was banned in many cities and they had to close down the manufacture and 
sale of  Ethyl....18  
The state of  New Jersey had also forbidden du Pont to manufacture tetraethyl lead. 
Following  an investment of  $60,000 in a ventilating system that changed the air every 40 
seconds, however, the governor of  New Jersey allowed du Pont to continue. 
  
 Kettering Examines Potential Alternatives  in Europe
As Standard built a new tetraethyl lead plant, the giant oil company also built a new 
relationship with General Motors. On August  18, 1924, officials of  both companies signed 
contracts creating a joint venture called the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation.   Charles F. Kettering 
was appointed president and Thomas A. Midgley was made second vice president and general 
manager. “The whole thing was in an evolutionary stage,” G.M. President Alfred P. Sloan said 
later, “and it had to be accepted by the oil industry... The fact that they [Standard] were in the 
thing in an important way would give the stamp of  approval of  the biggest oil company on the 
material. It would give us enormous prestige.”19
The name of  the new Ethyl company was  “argued out at length” in board meetings at 
Standard’s headquarters at 26 Broadway, New York City.  Alfred Sloan said the company "ought 
to inject into the name [the idea] that we were working on standards rather than that it was a 
commercial proposition.”20 In other words, the name should reflect that a new, higher quality  
fuel would become the “standard.” Kettering, however, had already been using the name Ethyl in 
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early marketing, in the Bureau of  Mines study and other correspondence. Over Howard and 
Sloan’s apparently mild objections, Kettering's "Ethyl" won. 
 Yet there was no doubt about who was really in charge of  the new Ethyl Corp. On 
October 8, 1924, as  Kettering prepared to leave for Europe, he must have been reminded of  this 
fact as he went to Sloan’s office to pick up his passport, tickets on the White Star Line’s ship 
Homeric, express checks,  letters of  credit, letters of   introduction, and memos about the process 
and profitability of  tetraethyl lead. Kettering also carried six copies of  one memo, the “tetraethyl 
lead chart of  receipts.”21    
Although they had a new company to handle the antiknock compound, the still-tentative 
nature of  G.M.’s commitment to tetraethyl lead at this point is evident in the du Pont history of  
leaded gasoline.   
 In the summer of  1924 [when Kettering planned the European trip] the 
extremely hazardous nature of  tetraethyl lead was already known to G.M., du Pont and 
Standard Oil; and the peril which this might involve for the commercial future of  the 
joint enterprise was appreciated. Fatal results in a total of  five cases had already attended 
the handling of  the material at Deepwater and Dayton.... Irenee du Pont, in writing to 
(G.M. president Alfred) Sloan,  commented ... ‘It [tetraethyl lead] may be killed by a 
better substitute or because of  its poisonous character or because of  its action on the 
engine.’22  
The “better substitute” was probably Kettering’s main reason for going to Europe in the 
fall of  1924, but the ostensible motive was that, as full scale production and marketing geared up 
for tetraethyl lead in the summer of  1924, a secondary raw material turned out to be in short 
supply. The element bromine was desperately needed to market Ethyl because, as Midgley had 
found in 1923, pure tetraethyl lead would form a glaze over spark plugs after a few thousand 
miles unless a "scavenger" was used to clean it off. Bromine, used as ethylene dibromide (EDB), 
was the best material available. Made mostly from brine water or dried sea salt, the annual world 
production  of  bromine was less than would be needed for a month’s production of  Ethyl fluid, 
although some European and North African facilities apparently had room for growth.  The 
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major source of  bromine in the U.S. was Dow Chemical Co., du Pont’s major rival, and the 
major international source was I.G. Farben, the German chemical conglomerate.  Although 
bromine could be acquired from Dow, it was not  cheap.  A one million dollar short-term 
contract with Dow had been approved in 1924, but  G.M. and du Pont were not happy about the 
price. 
Kettering sailed in mid-October and stayed at the Hotel Cecil in London, where he met 
with British colonial officials about bromine from the Dead Sea in Palestine. On October 26, 
1924, he left for Paris and signed in at the Hotel de Crillon. There he received a telegram  
informing him of  the disaster at Bayway. Beginning that day and continuing through the week, a 
flurry of  telegrams were charged to his room. The telegrams have been removed from the 
archives, but some of  the mail correspondence survives.   G.M. patent attorney James McEvoy, in 
Paris with Kettering, reported to  Sloan  that Kettering “is very upset and worried, and neither he 
nor I can understand how Standard allowed this matter [the Bayway disaster]  to obtain such 
broad publicity. The situation was just as at Dayton, and I do not see why it could not have been 
handled in the same way.”23  Sloan returned McEvoy’s  letter November 11:  
Unfortunately, something like five men were lost and we received a very great deal 
of  unfortunate publicity. Fortunately for us, although our name was connected with it, the 
Standard Oil Company’s name was more involved than ours... However ... nothing has in 
any way developed as a result of  the accident to throw into the picture anything that we 
did not know four or five months ago when we sat around the table and analyzed the 
hazard. Therefore, logically, we should in no way make any change at all in the 
development of  the project. On the other hand, it must be recognized that 
psychologically we are in a very much different position and it is much more important 
than it was four or five months ago not to have a repetition of  this kind.. Therefore, we 
have all agreed that we should immediately withdraw the ethylizers and go to bulk 
distribution. 
“Ethylizers” were one-liter bottles of  Ethyl fluid that would be poured by hand into the 
clear glass tops of  retail service station gasoline pumps of  the era. Sloan wrote that no one had 
reported injury from the ethylizers and added that since the company was “more on the defensive 
than we were before” the company should blend Ethyl into gasoline at the “bulk distribution” 
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level, not the retail service station.24  
It is interesting that Kettering was travelling with McEvoy, the patent expert, when he was 
ostensibly looking only for sources of  bromine to produce.   “I went over to Europe with two 
things in mind: the brines of  the Dead Sea and the French bromine plant in Tunisia,” Kettering 
said in his private 1946 memoir.  He did go to Tunisia to examine the bromine production 
operations there for eight days in mid-November, and he was in touch with British officials whose 
permission would be needed for trade with Palestine. However, Kettering had more than 
bromine on his mind.  He was also in touch with Standard’s president Frank Howard, who 
coincidentally was in Europe at the same time, and Carl Bosch of  I.G. Farben. A telegram from 
Bosch was waiting when he returned from Tunisia to Paris. 
The meeting between Kettering and Bosch, possibly with Howard and McEvoy present, 
took place at one of  I.G. Farben’s research laboratories in  Manheim, Germany on November 28 
or 29. Bosch “was naturally very interested as to how we would be in the chemical business at 
all,” Kettering later said.25  Quoting Bosch, Kettering  continued: “‘I cannot understand what 
you are doing in chemicals. The thing that worries me is how you fellows stumbled onto 
tetraethyl lead.’  I said, ‘You being one of  the great chemists of  the world, how would you have 
set the hurdles for people to stumble over?’ And he said, ‘That is what worries me.’ I told him we 
did it with the atomic table and a pin board. He said, ‘That might work in America, but I could 
never get my fellows to do it that way.’”26   At the time, it should be remembered, German 
chemical industries were by far the world’s leaders. It was widely believed that the U.S. had the 
petroleum, but that Europeans understood its composition and technology. However, most 
European researchers had left fuel knocking alone, according to one view, considering it  the 
“happy hunting ground of  those who deal in magic.”27  
However,  concern about military defense led to development of  strong alternative fuels 
production programs in many nations without oil reserves such as Germany, France, England, 
Italy, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and others.28 The alternatives included coal-derived 
benzene and methanol and agriculturally derived ethanol. Blended with gasoline in 20 to 50 
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percent proportions, the fuel blends did not produce the knock that straight American gasoline 
did. Since beverage alcohol was still legal in Europe, the complicating problems of  Prohibition 
did not deter alternative fuels production. On the contrary, the fuel and chemical business was 
specifically encouraged in this direction by government research, tax incentives and, in some 
cases, mandatory blending programs. All of  these fell into the category Kettering had previously 
called the "high percentage class solution."  
In addition, German chemists were  working on low percentage class solutions. In their 
November, 1924 meeting, Bosch gave Kettering a secret new antiknock substance to try out in his 
engine, but he did not tell him what it was, even when Kettering correctly guessed the secret. The 
substance was iron carbonyl, and Kettering fired off  a telegram, probably to Sloan. The undated 
draft telegram, written on Hotel de Crillon stationary, and reproduced here with strikeouts, aptly 
demonstrates  Kettering’s excited state of  mind: 
Badiche (Farben) have new compound  antiknock. Co  saw demonstration and 
made few  rough measurements -- Requires about two and one half  times as much as  
ours. Cost very low.  Can produce their material at 21 cents per pound. This would make 
a lead   I figure that with duty included freight etc. The  Their compound would cost 
seventy cents for equivalent one pound lead. Their proposition is to furnish material at 
cost and take half  the difference between our lead  mixture cost and their equivalent as 
profit.  Their compound byproduct of  nitrogen fixation plant. They will disclose nature 
of  product after commercial agreements have been made. It is metallo-organic and they 
feel is covered by our patents. This is so very  interesting as  must be considered prior to 
any  other things. May be a carbonyl of  cheap metal. Non-poisonous.  (Kettering to Sloan, 
1924, GMI Archives). 
Kettering’s level of  interest in iron carbonyl indicates that he was ready, after the deaths in 
Dayton, Deepwater and now Bayway, to abandon lead and move forward with iron. Tetraethyl 
lead at the time cost $1.66 per pound from the bromine process and $1.16 from the chloride 
process.29 To pay an equivalent price of  70 cents would clearly be attractive. 
 Kettering tried iron carbonyl on a Buick engine while in Europe and (in later years) said 
he had been  disappointed. Apparently, iron carbonyl caked onto the spark plugs like tetraethyl 
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lead without bromine, and it may have affected the lubricating ability of  engine oil. Aware of  
Ethyl’s troubles in the U.S., Bosch stressed that iron carbonyl was  “practically non-poisonous and 
much cheaper to manufacture than tetraethyl lead.”  In any event, “we weren’t as interested in 
[licensing] iron carbonyl as the IG Farben Co. was in selling it to us,” Kettering said later.30   
Bosch and other Farben chemists insisted that iron carbonyl did not cause the lubrication 
problems and cylinder wear that Kettering suspected. “During our own experiments and those 
made by motor car manufacturers and other reliable people,” said a 1926 Farben memo,  “these 
troubles in the lubricating system have never -- not even by way of  intimation -- been found. 
Generally speaking it could be ascertained that the prejudice against the use of  iron carbonyl was 
caused by the  -- in itself  -- harmless red coating, which is found in the compression chamber... It 
has been proven by many experiments that a grinding action is not in evidence.”31 
Ethyl, du Pont and Farben signed several agreements covering sale and manufacture of  
iron carbonyl antiknock additives in the U.S. in February  and August, 1925, but not all was 
amicable. “ I don’t blame BASF [a Farben subsidiary] for feeling sore,” Irenee du Pont said in 
June, 1925. “They know Kettering saw a sample of  iron carbonyl though they didn’t disclose 
what it was... He was keen enough to recognize what the material was, return home and file a 
patent application thereon. Without knowing the prior history that appears to them to be a rather 
sharp practice, though it would have been avoided ... if  they’d been candid with Kettering under 
a pledge not to apply for patent.”32  Kettering later said he did not remember personally applying 
for a patent on iron carbonyl, but “we knew I.G. Farben had been making iron carbonyl long 
before I went over there.”  The patent activity behind the scenes raises doubts about  Kettering’s 
conclusion that problems with iron carbonyl were insurmountable.  Contacts continued over use 
of  iron carbonyl until in 1927, du Pont signed an agreement with  I.G. Farben to market it in the 
U.S. Yet  ignition and lubrication problems were said to have never been solved.33 
 In meetings with chemists and in his glimpses of  the Farben plant where iron carbonyl 
was made, Kettering was also probably aware that Farben was manufacturing synthetic methanol 
from coal at a cost of  around 10 to 20 cents per gallon. This, too, could have been a competitive 
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element in the struggle for the antiknock market.  Certainly,  Ford Motor Co. was aware of  it, 
and provided information about the process to the Surgeon General’s committee looking into 
leaded gasoline in August of  1925.34 Synthetic methanol as a fuel substitute was also mentioned 
in Industrial & Engineering Chemistry in August, 1925 and in a New York Times article in May, 
1925.35  
Kettering Returns with Possible Alternative  
Kettering returned without a good source of  bromine but with a possible alternative to 
tetraethyl lead. He wasted no time catching up with the researchers in the Dayton labs. A memo 
on December 22 dealt with the need for weekly reports and a focus on specific problems in 
copper-cooled engine research and other areas.36 Waiting on his desk was a memo from T.A. 
Boyd describing new British attitudes toward tetraethyl lead. British researchers were skeptical 
about lead and had been more committed to blends of  ethyl alcohol, benzine and gasoline; 
although, Boyd noted, the attitude was changing.  W.R. Ormandy and E.C. Craven had written 
in an October report that tetraethyl lead had helped create a fuel capable of  withstanding high 
compression, but “as lead salts are cumulative poisons, the results of  large-scale employment 
might lead to trouble.” Henry Ricardo said that while most fuel mixtures had been fully 
characterized, the new fuel “dopes” still needed research. “Those known at present have, it is 
true, some serious drawbacks, but there is no reason to suppose that other more practicable 
substances may not exist.”37  This was, apparently, an improvement over earlier more negative 
attitudes. 
 Bayway and the public controversy dominated the Ethyl board of  directors meeting held 
December  23, 1924,  at Standard’s headquarters at 26 Broadway. Frank Howard and two other 
Standard board members “were in a blue funk over the whole [Bayway] thing,” recalled Irenee 
du Pont, who became a member of  the board at the meeting. “The directors were very much 
afraid about it. They didn't know what was going to happen to them.”38  According to du Pont's 
memo of  the meeting, iron carbonyl had been set aside a year or two beforehand “because it was 
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doubtful if  the material could be produced commercially at a reasonable figure.” Technical 
problems were not mentioned in du Pont’s memo, but discussions on methods of  negotiation with 
I.G. Farben and patent positions held by the two companies clearly indicate an ability and desire 
to go forward. 
Also at the December board meeting, Standard billed the Ethyl Corp. for its net losses 
from Bayway, which included $100,000 in damage suits from workers and families that Standard 
was apparently ready to settle out of  court. In effect, G.M. and du Pont agreed to share the cost 
of  the Bayway disaster. Since Standard had been acting as an agent for the Ethyl Corp. at the 
time, Ethyl should pay the entire bill, du Pont said, “unless there had been gross carelessness 
[and] we could hardly take that position...”39   
On Christmas Eve, 1924, the day after the board meeting, Kettering, Howard and du 
Pont chief  engineer Harrington visited Surgeon General Hugh Cumming in Washington and 
asked him to hold a public hearing after the Bureau of  Mines and Columbia University reported 
their findings. “In the prevailing state of  strong prejudice and excited fears, the new industry was 
fortunate in having the question of  the health risk in the use of  tetraethyl lead actively taken 
up ... by the U.S. Public Health Service,” according to the  du Pont history of  leaded gasoline. By 
this time, Yandell Henderson had already asked the Surgeon General for a conference on 
tetraethyl lead. At some point in late 1924 or early 1925, Kettering also visited with Commerce 
Dept. Secretary Herbert Hoover. The future president was interested in the Ethyl dilemma, 
although later the New York Times quoted him as saying that the Commerce department “had 
not been asked to take an investigation of  the poisonous or non-poisonous qualities of  tetraethyl 
and did not contemplate entering into the present controversy.”40  A Commerce Department 
report dated May 15, 1925 on alcohol fuel use worldwide shows that Hoover was aware of  the 
alternatives.41 
  Over the holidays and during the winter of  1925, Public Health Service (P.H.S.) 
representatives visited the Bayway and Deepwater refineries, talked extensively with engineers, 
and became convinced that safe manufacturing was at least theoretically possible. Du Pont 
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engineers, especially, believed that if  given the chance they could create an entirely closed 
environment safe for workers who handled deadly chemicals. However, during February and 
early March of  1925, four more workers died in the new  ethyl chloride process tetraethyl lead 
refinery.42 
This time, the names of  the workers and the circumstances of  the deaths were disclosed 
by the company. The plant was repeatedly started up and shut down in an attempt to improve 
process safety.   Finally, on May 2, 1925, the Deepwater plant was completely closed, and in June, 
1925,  the news that eight (or possibly nine) employees had died in the tetraethyl lead plant came 
out in the New York Times.    “It is absurd to say that the du Ponts have suppressed anything,” 
said C.K. Weston, head of  the du Pont publicity bureau, to a Times reporter in June, 1925.  The 
four or five deaths from September 1923 to October, 1924 were not treated as “news” because 
there was no public interest until after the Bayway disaster, he said. Weston also said that the du 
Ponts were “well known for their interest in their employees” and “spared no expense” to protect 
their health. He said  that he had heard "Butterfly Factory" was the workers name for the plant. 
“Some of  them  drew pictures of  butterflies on the walls of  the plant,” he said.43
Ethyl's Public Relations in the Winter of  1925 
With a few months to go  before the Surgeon General's hearing, Kettering and other 
Ethyl officials began to think about public relations.  A banking associate put Kettering in touch 
with  Allan Hoffman, editor of  Scientific American, who expressed a  “desire to be helpful to 
you.” The associate, Seward Prosser of  Bankers Trust, also said “it  is  important to have him 
(Hoffman) on our side.”44  Within a few months, public relations expert Rex F. Harlow would also 
be working on Ethyl publicity.45 And by 1926, Columbia University journalism teacher James T. 
Grady, who was part-time editor of  the American Chemical Society's news service and a veteran 
of  the Herald Tribune, would also work with Kettering and Midgley to get the Ethyl story out in 
speeches and press releases.  
Most important at this stage would be the scientific defense of  tetraethyl lead to fellow 
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scientists. Midgley took on the defense at the American Chemical Society conference in April, 
1925. Midgley’s discussion began by listing his discovery's benefits  -- conservation of  petroleum, 
reduction of  carbon monoxide, improved mileage and lowered initial  cost of  cars. Although 
most of  Midgley’s arguments were self-serving,  scientists may have been surprised when he 
arrived at the central premise of  his discussion and flatly claimed that no alternatives existed to 
Ethyl gasoline. Midgley's conference paper, as quoted by a New York Times  reporter and printed 
in Industrial & Chemical Engineering, said:  
So far as science knows at the present time, tetraethyl lead is the only material 
available which can bring about these [antiknock] results,  which are of  vital importance 
to the continued economic use by the general public of  all automotive equipment, and 
unless a grave and inescapable hazard exists in the manufacture of  tetraethyl lead, its 
abandonment cannot be justified.46
The sweeping claim was strange in a number of  respects, but especially because, as many 
scientists knew, it directly contradicted Midgley’s own work and that of  his associates.47 Also, as 
noted above, the rush to manufacture tetraethyl lead had been based on the concern about 
competition from other sources of  antiknock additives.48  In fact, Midgley's paper was riddled 
with contradictions. It put the focus of  controversy on the manufacture  of  tetraethyl lead, 
although public health was the primary concern. It exaggerated the potential for conservation 
(although not as much as other partisans did).49 It said the cost of  cars would decrease, but higher 
compression engines (despite advantages) were heavier and inherently more expensive, as 
Midgley himself  had acknowledged in conversations at Society of  Automotive Engineers 
meetings.50  In short, very little about Midgley's 1925 ACS paper seems in synch with his 
previous work.  Either Midgley was a clumsy liar or his ACS paper had been subject to heavy 
handed editing by someone who was not very familiar with his work. Either way, no journalists 
and apparently none of  his fellow scientists took public notice of  the contradictions. 
What was really going on behind the scenes?  If  eliminating engine knock was vital to the 
continued  economic use of  automobiles, did that mean that General Motors was afraid that oil 
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might be running out?  Was the company preparing for the day when the oil wells ran dry by 
boosting compression to the point where alternative fuels could be effectively used?  This would 
be consistent with the du Pont history that, as noted in Chapter Three,  mentions this transition 
to alternative fuels as the “important special motive” for the original antiknock research.51 It is 
consistent with Kettering, Midgley and Boyd’s 1920-22 interest in alcohol fuel as "of  course, the 
fuel of  the future" and especially in Yale University research into cellulose feedstocks for alcohol 
fuel. It is consistent with the “universal assumption” (noted by Scientific American  in 1920) that 
alcohol would be the fuel of  the future. It is also consistent with the concern over the depletion of  
oil reserves and market conditions of  the era, in which alcohol sold at a cost within the same 
economic range as gasoline. 
The idea of  using tetraethyl lead to pave the way for alternative fuels is not  consistent 
with existing histories of  Ethyl Corporation or the oil industry. Research into ethyl alcohol fuel is 
not mentioned in Joseph C. Robert’s corporate history of  Ethyl, in  Rosamond Young in Boss 
Ket or in T.A. Boyd's Professional Amateur.  Nickerson’s history mentions a “synthetic knock-free 
fuel” from cellulose without naming it. Williamson and Daum do not use the word alcohol in 
their history of  the oil industry.  Stuart Leslie noted ethyl alcohol as one of  the many useful 
possibilities Kettering found while studying the knocks, but Leslie said the expense of  alcohol and 
the supply possibilities led Midgley and Kettering to conclude it was “a will o' the wisp.”   
However,  it is not at all inconceivable that Detroit would keep its eyes on the horizon of  
foreseeable oil reserves if  they were expected to run out in 20 years. Nor is it inconceivable  that 
existing alternative fuels -- ethyl and methyl alcohol, benzene, and others --  would be considered 
as the most likely alternatives when oil ran out. On the other hand, it is possible that alternatives 
were largely  forgotten after tetraethyl lead was discovered, despite the papers written by Boyd 
and Midgley, or seen as difficult to use given the extraordinary regulations surrounding 
Prohibition, or, perhaps, seen as too threatening to Standard Oil Co., which had become a 
partner in G.M.'s a fuel venture.  Unfortunately, many of  the records that might help settle the 
question, such as the Lead Diary, day-to-day records of  the Dayton labs, minutes of  the Ethyl 
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board of  directors and others are not in the archives. 
Kettering and Midgley Forced out of  Ethyl 
On April 21, two weeks after Midgley’s ACS paper was delivered, he and Kettering  
attended another board of  directors meeting of  the Ethyl Corp. in Standard’s headquarters at 26 
Broadway.  One step that had to be taken was to suspend the sale of  Ethyl brand leaded gasoline 
until the P.H.S. inquiry was over. Ethyl announced the move May 5, 1925. 
Another step involved a surprise reorganization of  the management by the board of  
directors. As the General Motors and Standard executives discussed the upcoming P.H.S. 
conference, they pointedly noted that Midgley and Kettering had not confronted many of  the 
business problems of  building the Ethyl Gasoline Corp. “I have felt from the very beginning of  
the formation of  this company, in fact, I felt a year before it was formed, that we would make 
progress much more rapidly and more constructively if  we had more of  a business side to the 
development,” G.M. President Alfred Sloan had written to fellow board member Irenee du Pont 
just before the board meeting. The letter to Sloan described a meeting with the third principal 
party in the Ethyl triangle, Standard Oil president Walter Teagle. Sloan told du Pont that he and 
Teagle agreed that Kettering had to go. Sloan warned du Pont that Kettering had been “violently 
opposed” to losing control of   Ethyl Corp. Sloan said that he had left "the boys" (as he called 
Kettering and Midgley)  in place despite serious misgivings, believing that his point would 
eventually become so obvious that it would have to be recognized.  “We felt that it was a great 
mistake to leave the management of  the property so largely in the hands of  Midgley who is 
entirely inexperienced in organization matters.”52  Kettering and Midgley should go back into 
research, where they belonged, he said. Sloan proposed Earl Webb, a G.M. lawyer, as the new 
president. Whether or not Kettering and Midgley argued against their firing, the board accepted 
Webb as the new president of  Ethyl. 
The reorganization of  Ethyl was not publicly announced. In fact,  Kettering was 
introduced to the May 20 Surgeon General's conference as the "president" of  Ethyl Gas Corp. 
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even though he had been officially replaced a month before.  Company historian Joseph C. 
Robert noted Kettering later said that he had been “fired to create a position for a man who 
would make more money.”  Robert’s interpretation is that Kettering made a “jocular 
oversimplification,”  and in effect, agreed that a management-oriented president would help 
G.M. and Standard make more money.53 An alternative interpretation is that Kettering was 
disappointed about (or even as Sloan said, “violently opposed” to) losing control. 
Kettering’s genius lay not in manufacturing but in organizing research, and it is no 
surprise that he was let go. No  picture of  the situation is available from his perspective and he 
never mentioned it in his unpublished Ethyl memoirs.  However,  Kettering may have wanted to 
take the corporation in different and potentially less profitable directions which had been blocked 
at the research level.  The announcement from G.M.’s Dayton labs of  a new synthetic alcohol 
"Synthol" fuel in the summer of  1925 is one indication of  alternative technical directions.  The 
fuel was said by the United Press to be a mixture of  benzene, alcohol and iron carbonyl, or, by 
the New York Times account, benzene, tetraethyl lead and alcohol. Both methyl and ethyl 
alcohols may have been involved. Used in combination with a new high compression engine 
much smaller than ordinary engines, “Synthol” would “revolutionize transportation”54 the 
articles said, and motorists would get 40 or 50 miles per gallon.  Perhaps Kettering would have 
continued other antiknock research,  broadening the field instead of  letting it stagnate around 
one product. Other oil companies, especially Sunoco, made a point of  finding substitutes for 
Ethyl leaded gasoline in the mid to late 1920s.55 By October, Kettering noted that t the search for 
a substitute for petroleum had become problematic:  “Many years of  development may be 
necessary  before the actual development of  such a substitute," he said.56   However, Kettering 
always held out hope, his friend Charles Stewart Mott said later, “that if  a time ever came when 
the sources of  heat and energy were ever used up ... that there would always be available the 
capturing of  the amount of  energy that comes from the sun... One of  the ways was through 




Although many of  the details are hazy, some generalizations about the internal 
controversy over the future of  the Ethyl Gasoline Corp. emerge from legal histories, unprocessed 
archive documents and trial testimonies.  Clearly, Du Pont engineers understood the danger of  
the chemical and showed some concern for their workers. At one point, du Pont engineers 
refused outright to adopt Standard's grossly inadequate manufacturing techniques, despite a great 
deal of  pressure from G.M.  Standard was concerned with maximizing profits on the ground 
floor of  the new enterprise, and having designed a new chemical process for making Ethyl brand 
leaded gasoline, rushed to make it. However, the manufacturing plant was so unsafe that it 
operated only two months before workers started dying.  General Motors pushed Standard and 
du Pont to move as quickly as possible because G.M. officials were privately worried about the 
competition from alternative anti-knock fuels which they publicly claimed did not exist.  
The motives of  the man at the center of  all the action are hard to discern.  Although a 
practical man and a proud scientist, Charles F. Kettering must have been disappointed at the 
public outcry over Bayway and the subsequent loss of  control over what was essentially his 
creation. The supreme irony must have been  to go through the motions of  defending the 
corporation and speaking as its president at the Surgeon General's conference on May 20, 1925 
after he had been secretly replaced a month before.  The announcement of  a “revolutionary” 
new type of  fuel in August, 1925, would appear to be the kind of  trial balloon that had been 
floated in 1922, when Kettering wanted to impress Detroit with the public interest in a fuel-
saving additive. Whether or not Kettering was able to force concessions out of  Detroit in 
response for backing off  the “Synthol” fuel revolution is unknown, but “Synthol” was never 
heard from again. For the rest of  his life, Kettering confined his ideas about alternative fuels to 
abstract discussions about photosynthesis and did not initiate concrete research programs. For 
G.M., du  Pont, Standard and Ethyl, the internal controversy was ending even as the Surgeon 
General’s committee had begun its study. Kettering and Midgley had been removed from the 
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picture, the engineering process had been made safer, and as they knew, the Surgeon General's 
committee of  experts would not find any problems affecting workers in Ohio. 
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THE CONFRONTATION CONTINUES  
 Alice Hamilton’s eyes blazed; her voice shook with emotion. “You are 
nothing but a murderer,”  the silver-haired Harvard University scientist declared 
to  Charles Kettering. As America’s leading expert on worker safety and lead 
poisoning, Hamilton had reason to believe that Kettering was to blame not only 
for the negligence involved in the Bayway  deaths and injuries, but also for the 
thousands more that she believed would follow if  General Motors (G.M.), du 
Pont  and Standard Oil of  New Jersey allowed their joint venture, the Ethyl 
Gasoline Corporation, to renew sales of  leaded gasoline.1 
The confrontation between Hamilton and Kettering took place in the 
hallway of  a Washington, D.C. federal office building a few blocks southeast of  
the US Capitol on the morning of  May 20, 1925  during a break in a Public 
Health Service (P.H.S.)  conference on leaded gasoline.  G.M. researcher  T.A. 
Boyd witnessed the scene and later wrote in an unpublished memoir about the 
fire in Hamilton’s eyes and the bite in her words.
According to Boyd, Hamilton said: “Why, there are thousands of  things 
better than lead to put in gasoline.”  At this, Kettering must have drawn up his 
gangling, crane-like frame and looked down in surprise at this frail woman. He 
answered her with the detached amusement that colleagues admired but 
Hamilton must have found grating:
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  “I will give you twice your salary if  you will name just one such 
material,” Boyd recalls Kettering saying. “Oh, I wouldn’t work for you,” was 
Hamilton’s supposed response, which Boyd saw  as “weak and unprofessional.”2 
In his own unpublished memoirs of  the event, Kettering recalled the 
confrontation more charitably. “Dr. Alice Hamilton of  the Harvard Medical 
School was of  the opinion that under no circumstances should the product be 
sold; but that, if  it had the high values that we claimed for it, other materials 
should be substituted in its place at once. She said that she felt perfectly 
confident that there were at least 50 compounds that would be better than lead. 
I asked her to give us the names of  a few. She replied that it was not her business 
to invent antiknock materials, but that anybody who  had any knowledge 
whatever of  organic chemistry would would know what those compounds 
were.”3
 Hamilton apparently did not attach as much importance to the private 
confrontation in memoirs or letters.4 She saw the conference as a David and 
Goliath confrontation, “with Standard Oil and the du Ponts on one side and, on 
the other, a few scientists and the New York World.”5  It may have come as 
something of  a surprise to see Kettering wrapped in the mantle of  objective 
science. Perhaps Hamilton was angry, but Boyd and Kettering’s  pictures of  her 
seem out of  character.  In confrontations with industrialists whose policies 
endangered workers,  Hamilton usually engaged in a spirited argument ending 
with a direct and frequently warm-hearted appeal to the kindness of  the owner 
or factory manager, urging him to greater heights of  humanitarian feeling.6  She 
usually tried to turn confrontation into cooperation without compromising her 
principles. Although the dialogue may have occurred more or less as Kettering 
and Boyd recalled,  the interpretation depends greatly on perspective. 
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The Public Health Service Conference 
The confrontation between Hamilton and Kettering illustrates the 
extreme differences between scientific viewpoints at the P.H.S.  conference on 
tetraethyl lead.  Some 87 participants gathered in the Butler building at Third 
and B streets in May 1925 represented labor groups, oil companies, universities 
and government agencies.  Also crowding into the  Treasury department 
auditorium that Wednesday  morning were a dozen news reporters. Absent was 
Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, who as head of  the agency overseeing the 
P.H.S., should have given welcoming remarks. However, Mellon's own  Gulf  Oil 
Co. had exclusive contracts to distribute Ethyl gasoline in the Southeastern U.S. 
at the time, and he may have wished to avoid the appearance of  impropriety.7  
Interior Secretary Hubert Work gave the opening address instead. The Assistant 
Secretary of  Treasury, the Surgeon General, and Charles Kettering are listed as 
principal  speakers; others from labor, universities and industry are listed in 
specific panels. Significantly, Kettering's authority was equated with that of  
impartial government officials.  Kettering opened the conference by describing 
the development of   antiknock fuels:  
We found out that with ordinary natural gas we could produce 
certain [antiknock] results and with the higher gravity gasolines, the 
aromatic series of  compounds, alcohols, etc., we could get the high 
compression without the knock, but in the great volume of  fuel of  the 
paraffin series we could not do that.8 
This apparently authoritative statement skims across several questionable 
premises to the conclusion Kettering obviously desired.  In the first place, 
aromatics are made from petroleum and refining for increased aromatic content 
could improve a fuel's anti-knock rating. Also, alcohols do not necessarily have to 
be made from petroleum -- they can be made from other materials and mixed 
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with gasoline to improve anti-knock rating. No one at the conference directly 
questioned the premise, although several public health scientists insisted in a 
general way that alternatives were available. 
Subsequent discussions at the conference  sharpened points of  
disagreement and focused on the need for more information.  Midgley, Howard 
and others from the Ethyl side testified, as did Hamilton, Henderson, and 
scientists at Columbia University, concerning the immediate and long range 
public health risks from lead in exhaust fumes versus the general benefits of  
leaded gasoline. Also at issue was whether the burden of  proof  should be on 
industry or public health advocates. Industry officials, such as Frank Howard of  
Standard Oil,  argued that with limited oil reserves, conservation through more 
efficient engines was needed. They said regulation over minor fears, such as the 
impact of  lead on public health, would stifle the progress of  industrial 
civilization. Hamilton, Henderson and other public health experts maintained 
that in the case of  such uncertainty about public health, the burden of  proof  fell 
on the industry and not on those concerned about public health. Industry 
should have to prove a new chemical safe; it was not up to scientists to prove it 
unsafe, they said. Further, Henderson and Hamilton insisted that industry could 
find alternatives. 
Government officials had little to say at the conference, other than to 
note that there were no laws that allowed the P.H.S. to regulate chemicals in the 
same way that the Food and Drug Administration and the USDA regulated 
pharmaceuticals and meat packing. However, one result of  the conference, 
partially in response to criticism of  the 1924 Bureau of  Mines report., was the 
announcement that the Surgeon General would form its own investigating 
committee.9 
Most news reports focused on the announcement of  an investigating 
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committee, but as might be expected, each newspaper had a different view of  
what was significant.  The Times attempted to quote from many different points 
of  view, noting an especially dramatic confrontation between Howard and 
Grace Burnham of  the Workers Health Bureau.  As the Times reported it, 
Howard said: "Present day civilization rests on oil and motors... We do not feel 
justified in giving up what has come to the industry like a gift from heaven on 
the possibility that a hazard may be involved in it..."  A few moments later, 
Grace Burnham stood up said: "It was no gift of  heaven for the 11 who were 
killed by it and the 149 who were injured." (Actually, 17 men had been killed 
and many more had been injured).  The  Times also briefly took notice of  Alice 
Hamilton who "urged the men connected with the industry to put aside the lead 
compound entirely and try to find something else to get rid of  the knock.”10 
The Herald Tribune carried excerpts from an  Associated Press article 
that emphasized the industry viewpoint. The headline said:  "Ethyl Gas Safe, 
Say Experts, If  Used with Care."  The Herald Tribune did not mention the 
appointment of  a committee of  experts or any of  the scientists who spoke out 
against Ethyl;  only  industry representatives were quoted.   The afternoon  
Journal carried what at first glance seems a well balanced article, quoting from 
both sides of  the issue and attempting to achieve an overview of  the conference.  
On careful examination, however, the Journal’s article turns out to have been 
plagiarized without credit word-for-word from the  New York Times.  The Sun 
and the Brooklyn Daily Eagle had apparently forgotten about the controversy, 
and carried no articles about it.  
The World, of  course, had not forgotten. Its May 21 story described the 
decision to name a committee and discussed the "attack" on "doped fuel."  The 
story did not include the Howard - Burnham confrontation over the “gift of  
heaven,” and unlike the Times, the World did not attempt to provide an 
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overview of  the conference. It took the "haystack" approach, piling up facts 
about one aspect of  the event -- the "damning" evidence from the Columbia 
University study that was presented at the conference. In its next story, on May 
22, the World emphasized the search for a substitute to tetraethyl lead, quoting 
Alice Hamilton: "It would be foolish to talk of  the industrial value of  tetraethyl 
lead, when there is a health hazard involved. Men who could discover the fuel 
value of  tetraethyl certainly could invent or discover something equally efficient 
and in no way dangerous. American chemists can do it if  they will."   The May 
22  World report  also  did something quite unusual for journalism of  the day -- 
it discussed something that did not occur. At the end of  the article, this 
paragraph is found: 
Original plans had called for presentation to the Public Health 
conference of  claims of  various persons that they have discovered dopes 
[additives]  for fuels which are as efficient as lead but lack the danger. 
The conference decided at the last minute, however, that such things 
were not in its province, since it was called to consider only the danger of  
lead and not the lack of  danger of  any other chemical or mineral. For 
this reason, the conference adjourned after only a one day meeting, 
where it had been thought at first that four or five days might be taken. 
Many of  the delegates to it held informal conferences today, however, at 
which fuel dopes were discussed.11  
No record of  these “informal conferences” on safe fuel “dopes” is found 
in the news media or in the P.H.S. archives, and the World never followed up. 
That the formal conference was originally scheduled for more than one day  is 
consistent with Secretary of  the Interior Hubert Work’s welcoming address, in 
which he said:  “The purpose of  this conference is very important, and your 
deliberations will take, I assume, some days.”12 On Tuesday, May 19, a New 
York Times correspondent noted that the conference “will be opened tomorrow 
and probably will consume all of  that day and Thursday,” while the New York 
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Journal noted on May 20th that the conference “will continue through 
tomorrow.”13
 Instead, the conference took only one day, and P.H.S. archives offer no 
clue as to why the conference was cut  short.14  One possible explanation is that 
the Surgeon General did not wish to venture beyond the confines of  his 
authority. This would be consistent with the general tenor of  the business-
government relationship of  the era, but it would be inconsistent with plans 
already made and the aggressive and suspicious attitude toward tetraethyl lead 
taken by the P.H.S. in the 1922-24 period.    More likely is the possibility of  
pressure from higher up the chain of  authority in the government.  With 
Andrew Mellon as Secretary of  Treasury, the P.H.S. may have been pressured to 
cut the hearing short.  Mellon was known for intervening in government when 
family oil and banking concerns were affected.15  Also, Mellon Institute scientists 
had been closely following Ethyl and had worked with the Bureau of  Mines on 
experiments on Ethyl gasoline in Pittsburgh.16  Whether or not  Mellon directly 
influenced the content of  the conference, it is clear that business interests of   
Gulf  Oil Co. and the Mellon Institute corresponded closely with those of  the 
Ethyl Corp., G.M. and Standard Oil.  
 
The Public Health Service Appoints an Expert Panel  
At the end of  the one-day Washington conference on leaded gasoline, 
Surgeon General Hugh Cumming announced that he would appoint a blue-
ribbon panel of  seven experts from universities to study the tetraethyl lead and 
report back in January, 1926.  The panel was appointed a month later and was 
composed of   independent scientists from Johns Hopkins, Harvard, Yale, 
Vanderbilt and the the Universities of  Chicago and Minnesota.17 Hamilton and 
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Henderson were not asked to join the committee, but respected senior 
colleagues at their institutions were.  The Ethyl Corp. agreed to stop marketing 
Ethyl gasoline until their report had been completed. 
This in itself  seemed a victory to Hamilton, since the problem of  
regulating industry had apparently been taken out of  the hands of  corporate 
ownership and turned over to university scientists without a protracted fight in 
Congress. This shift in the locus of  authority had taken place, Hamilton noted, 
under the “glare of  publicity” and, as we will see, Hamilton felt indebted to the 
news media and particularly the World for its role in the Ethyl controversy.  The 
combination of  a muckraking news media and the scientists advocating 
government intervention in the affairs of  the nation’s largest industries was, as 
Hamilton knew, the powerhouse behind the progressive reform movement of  
1900 - 1912 and earlier reform movements as well.  She was apparently gratified 
that even during the 1920s nadir of  the progressive movement, the public 
interest could be defended by the old alliance. 
 Much of  the victory Hamilton seemed to celebrate was, however, 
symbolic. The Surgeon General's committee was not directly involved with the 
study and voiced some objections at the end of  the course of  the study which 
were not made public. The committee met June 14 and June 28 to consider the 
design of  the study and corresponded with the P.H.S. on the plan of  
investigation during the summer.18 
In July, 1925,  J.P. Leake of  the P.H.S. Hygiene Laboratory was assigned 
to conduct the study.19 Two garages in Dayton, Ohio -- one using leaded 
gasoline and one not using leaded gasoline -- were to be selected and the 
employees tested for blood stippling and fecal lead accumulation. Two more 
garages in Washington, D.C. were to have been added to the list "if  time and 
personnel permit," according to the preliminary plan.20 Committee member 
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C.E.A. Winslow wrote back saying that the Washington garages should be 
included and that it was "most essential that the study cover three garages in 
which ethyl gas is used and one which it is not used." Winslow also argued for 
larger test samples or workers but  agreed that the test plan seemed "most 
admirable."21  
The actual study began early in October, 1925.  Two groups of  Dayton 
and Cincinnati, Ohio workers (one of  drivers and one of  mechanics) who had 
been exposed to leaded gasoline were compared with two similar groups that 
had not been exposed. A control group of  men working in lead industries was 
also examined. Overall, 252 case histories were taken. Men were given physical 
exams and blood and stool specimens were analyzed.  Researchers found that 
drivers exposed to leaded gasoline showed somewhat higher "stippling" damage 
to red blood cells, while garage workers exposed to leaded gasoline showed 
much more damage to red blood cells, and one quarter of  those exposed had 
over one milligram of  lead in fecal samples. In contrast, over 80 percent of  the 
industrial workers showed large amounts of  lead in fecal samples. Although 
techniques for measuring lead levels were primitive in contrast with today’s 
standards, it is probable that workers with  blood damage and high amounts of  
lead in fecal samples had absorbed amounts of  lead that would today be 
considered dangerous, according to toxicologist and lead historian Jerome 
Niragu.22   Even then, the lead burdens were considered high. In a Bureau of  
Mines final report about the study in 1927,  the Surgeon General’s Committee 
report is noted as having found blood cell stippling “to a relatively high degree” 
in garage mechanics whose exposure had been relatively short -- as little as two 
and a half  days.23   
One find that raises questions about the integrity of  the study is that 
leaded gasoline samples from Cincinnati  appear to have about half  as much 
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lead than they should have had during the time the study was taking place. In 
the first draft of  the report presented to the committee  December 22, 1925,  J.P. 
Leake, said that "not very far from the plant where we make our studies" four 
gasoline samples from service stations ranged from 75 percent to 55 percent less 
lead than expected.24
As the study progressed over the first weeks of  October, a General 
Motors Executive Committee meeting in Detroit, Michigan received this 
unsigned memo dated October 25, 1925: 
 The committee has seen nothing that would justify its taking the 
position that the sale of  tetraethyl lead involved a hazard any greater 
than any other manufacturing operation. The president (of  General 
Motors) said that he feels quite confident that the (Public Health Service) 
committee report will not be unfavorable to our continued production of  
this compound.25
TABLE I   
SURGEON GENERAL'S COMMITTEE 
ETHYL TEST RESULTS 
Control Ethyl Control Ethyl     Exposure 
chauffeur chauffeur garage garage         to 
worker worker     Lead Dust 
No.men 36 77 21 57 61
% showing 
definite 
stippling 12 12 24 46 93 
% showing over 
./3 mg. lead per 
gram ash 6 2 6 14 81 
Clinical 
symptoms 0 0 0 0 23
Source: Anon, (probably J.P. Leake), Draft report to Committee on Tetra Ethyl Lead, December 
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22, 1925, C.E.A. Winslow papers,  Box 101, Folder 1801, Yale University Library, New Haven, 
Ct.
G.M.'s inside information was on target.  The most important finding of  
the committee was that none of  the garage workers and drivers had any of  the 
outright symptoms of  lead poisoning that killed 17 refinery workers and 
poisoned at least several hundred more between 1923 and 1925. As a result, the 
committee concluded that there were “no good grounds for prohibiting the use 
of  Ethyl gasoline.” Not all the committee members agreed with that assessment. 
In a meeting on December  22, 1925, committee member David L. Edsall of  
Harvard objected that “we would be presenting a half-baked report” unless the 
committee studied “the effects this is going to have on others.”  Reed Hunt of  
Harvard noted that the “big question” was whether the committee should 
absolutely prohibit tetraethyl lead or not. “If  we say we shouldn’t absolutely 
prohibit it, then we should say that money should be appropriated to study any 
further hazard.”26  C.E.A.  Winslow of  Yale insisted on and got the following 
statement inserted into the report:  “A more extensive study was not possible in 
view of  the limited time allowed to the committee.”27  
In the end, the report warned that the uncertain danger and the 
incomplete data did not lead it to a definite conclusion: 
Owing to the incompleteness of  the data, it is not possible to say 
definitely whether exposure to lead dust increases in garages when 
tetraethyl lead is used. It is very desirable that these investigations be 
continued... It remains possible that if  the use of  leaded gasolines 
becomes widespread, conditions may arise very different from those 
studied by us which would render its use more of  a hazard than would 
appear to be the case from this investigation. Longer exposure may show 
that even such slight storage of  lead as was observed in these studies may 
lead eventually in susceptible individuals to recognizable lead poisoning 
or chronic degenerative disease of  obvious character... The committee 
feels this investigation must not be allowed to lapse.28
Winslow also recommended that the "search for and investigation of  
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antiknock compounds be continued intensively with the object of  securing 
effective agents containing less poisonous metals (such as iron, nickle, tin, etc.) or 
no metals at all."29   The recommendation was based on correspondence with 
Ford Motor Co. that Winslow forwarded to  L.R. Thompson of  the Public 
Health Service, asking that a file be established on alternatives. The letter to 
Winslow reads as follows: 
August 15, 1925 
ALCOHOL FOR MOTOR FUEL 
Further to my letter of  June 19th: 
You may probably have observed the production of  synthetic 
alcohol as brought out by the Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik [BASF of  
I.G. Farben], now being produced in Germany at the rate of  60,000 
gallons per month. Such alcohol is reported to be produced for between 
10 cents and 20 cents per gallon and has much promise as a mixture 
with hydrocarbon fuels to eliminate knocking and carbonization. 
(signed) Wm. H. Smith,  Ford Motor Co.30 
The letter, clearly, is a fragment of  more extensive correspondence which 
has been lost in the Public Health Service files. Winslow's recommendation 
about continuing the search was not incorporated in the final committee report.  
Although disappointed in the report, Winslow wrote Henderson, who was in 
England in the winter of  1925, that he "did not see how things could have gone 
differently."  
Meanwhile, Ethyl officials announced that they had been vindicated, and 
after agreeing to warning labels on leaded gasoline, began to market it again in 
the spring of  1926. These warning labels would become familiar to three 
generations of  motorists and would appear in virtually every service station 
except Sunoco: “Contains lead (tetraethyl) and is to be used as a motor fuel only. 
Not for cleaning or any other use.”  
The news media had written sporadically about the controversy  during 
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the summer and fall, and by January 21, 1926, it was a back page item even in 
the New York Times. "Report No Danger in Ethyl Gasoline," the headline said. 
While there were "no good grounds" for prohibiting tetraethyl lead, "continued 
study was proposed." Prominently mentioned was fear of  eventual "sterility of  
the race."31
The World's headline that day said "Poison Gasoline Declared Safe For 
Sale Again." The article noted that the committee of  scientists strongly 
recommended (rather than proposed) further research. The article also pointed 
out, in a face-saving exaggeration, that "drastic regulations" would be required 
for use of  leaded gasoline.32 
Thus, the controversy that had started out with such force and 
vehemence ended with a whisper, and the restless spotlight of  publicity moved 
on.  
Ethyl Narrowly Avoids Further Controversy  
The findings of  the Surgeon General’s committee closed off  much of  the 
public debate about leaded gasoline in 1926, but  two events might have 
reopened it immediately.  First, new production in Denver, Colorado was 
organized so poorly that additional deaths would have certainly occurred had 
not du Pont engineers intervened. Secondly, the product was implicated by the 
British Air Corps as one of  several causes of  the September, 1925 wreck of  the 
U. S. Navy airship Shenandoah.  
With renewed market demands, Ethyl Gasoline Corp. signed a contract 
for new production in the spring of  1926 with American Research Co., a small 
manufacturer in Denver, Colorado.  On a visit to the facility in the spring of  
1926, Kettering's replacement at Ethyl, Earl Webb, asked what precautions were 
being taken to protect workers. The president of  American Research said “none 
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whatever.” Webb asked,  “Do you wear rubber gloves or anything of  that kind, 
rubber aprons or anything?” No,  he said, “We handle it like any ordinary 
product.”
“It’s surprising someone hasn’t died in your outfit,” Webb said.33  It is 
unclear what action, if  any, Webb took after making this remark.  It was only 
after du Pont engineers objected to the new contract that it was terminated by 
Ethyl board member Irenee du Pont because, du Pont later said, “the risk of  
serious catastrophe is too great to be considered.”34 
Signs began appearing across the country in Standard, Esso, Amoco and 
Gulf  stations saying “Ethyl is back." Competing service stations sometimes put 
up humorous responses saying that their fuel “never had to leave.”35  However, 
many technical problems with Ethyl remained unsolved. In a May, 1926 memo 
from Alfred Sloan to Webb noted that valve corrosion with Ethyl gas was still so 
severe after 2,000 to 3,000 miles as to make a car “inoperative.”  He said he had 
been concerned about the valve sticking problem before the product was pulled 
off  the market. “Now that we are back in again and are considering pushing the 
sale to the utmost, I think we ought to be concerned with this question.”36  
An additional cause for concern  appeared in the spring of  1926 when 
an article in the British journal Engineering linked Ethyl with the wreck of  the 
U.S. Navy airship Shenandoah the previous year. The airship was the first U.S-
made lighter-than-air craft, or dirigible, and was called the “pride of  the U.S. 
Navy.”  The Shenandoah two-year-old craft was on a public relations tour across 
the American Midwest on September 4, 1925 when it encountered a violent 
storm at dawn over a rural section of  Ohio.  Because two of  five engines were 
out, and at least one more was having serious trouble, the airship did not have 
the power to move away from the storm's center. When the storm hit, the wind 
carried the ship up several thousand feet in a few seconds. As the dirigible 
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gained altitude, the helium inside the ship's frame expanded, and safety valves 
that should have released some of  the helium failed. When the ship reached 
12,000 feet it ripped in half, and the crew clung to twisted girders and dangling 
gondolas in the dark storm. Out of  43 crewmen, 16 were killed.37  
An official inquiry blamed the storm as the direct cause of  the ship’s loss.  
The inquiry reported that the original engineering decision to reduce the 
number of  safety valves when the ship was under construction was an “error in 
judgement” that also led to the ship's breakup.38  The inquiry also brought out 
the fact that the airship was having engine troubles. The “untimely failure” of  
two engines meant that the ship could not avoid the vortex of  the storm, 
according to Col. Charles G. Hall, an Army officer aboard at the time of  the 
accident. “I believe that, had it been possible to have had the full speed of  power 
of  all five engines continuously, it would have been more probable that  we 
would have been successful in not being drawn into the vortex of  the storm that 
ultimately wrecked the ship,” Hall told the Naval commission of  inquiry.39
The reason for the engine trouble was never clarified at the inquiry. 
However, in April, 1926, the British journal Engineering published a summary 
of  an Air Ministry laboratory's investigation of  fuel additives. After running a 
Napier Lion 450 hp engine for 100 hours on an Ethyl aviation gasoline blend 
containing 5 cc of  tetraethyl lead, spark plugs “showed signs of  having been 
severely overheated” and three of  the plugs were “useless.” In another test, the 
engine was run 100 hours, and then switched to 20 percent benzol. “The engine 
commenced detonating and overheating, and it was considered inadvisable to 
take a power curve under these conditions.” Following these remarks,  Air 
Ministry engineers noted: 
It is said that the engines of  the ill-fated airship Shenandoah with 
a compression ratio of  6:1 used a mixture of  Aviation spirit with 10cc of  
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ethyl fluid per gallon, which would probably lead to similar troubles at 
full power.40
The fact that the Shenandoah used Ethyl gasoline was a point of  pride 
for the Ethyl Gasoline Corp.  In a G.M. press release dated April 24, 1925, 
Thomas Midgley noted that the engines used on the Shenandoah had for some 
time been using Ethyl gasoline “as being the fuel best suited for this type of  
high-efficiency motors” [sic].41 
After the link between the disaster and Ethyl gasoline in the Shenandoah 
was made by the British Air Ministry, the Ethyl Gasoline Corp. began an 
internal inquiry. T.A. Boyd wrote Graham Edgar, an Ethyl scientist, asking for 
the facts about the use of  Ethyl gasoline in the Shenandoah. “It was our 
understanding here that while their intention was to fuel with Ethyl gasoline, it 
was not actually used for some reason,” Boyd said.42 No response is available in 
the archive. Even if  Ethyl gasoline was not used in the Shenandoah on that 
September trip, the second engine test run by the British in which severe 
overheating occurred after a switch from Ethyl to benzene shows that, one way 
or another, Ethyl could have contributed to the disaster. 
It is interesting that Midgley advised against using Ethyl brand leaded 
gasoline in aircraft engines two years previously, as was briefly noted in Chapter 
Three.   In a letter to Navy Lt. B.G. Leighten, who was about to attempt a 
record breaking flight over the Pacific Ocean, Midgley said: 
I would recommend, in view of  the crucial character of  a trans-
Pacific flight, you use a blended fuel rather than a gasoline treated with 
an antiknock compound. We have made great progress in overcoming 
the spark plug and valve trouble caused by the presence of  some of  these 
compounds in the fuel. But we have not yet solved the problem to our 
entire satisfaction; and in view of  the fact that it is essential that no 
engine trouble of  any kind develop, it seems wise not to risk the use of  




Although research on solving the problems with tetraethyl lead 
proceeded between 1923 and 1925, valve and spark plug problems persisted, as 
we have seen above in the 1926 memo from Sloan to Webb. 
 Such problems probably contributed to the  Shenandoah disaster. 
Although no single problem can be isolated as a direct cause of  the crash, a mix 
of  engineering failures is evident.  "The exact cause of  the crash is still being 
debated today," said historian Peter Andrews. "Poor piloting, poor ship design 
and inadequate helium resources were all brought forth."44  The role of  Ethyl 
gasoline in the engine failure that led to the accident may be yet another cause 
for debate. 
Ethyl Concern about “Substitutes” 
   As we have seen, Kettering and Midgley of  G.M. and Frank Howard of  
Standard insisted at the P.H.S. conference that no substitute could be found for 
Ethyl brand leaded gasoline. Howard said it had come like a “Gift of  God.”  
Four months later, Howard surveyed the substitutes in a private memo to 
Kettering. 
 “There are three types of  Ethyl Gasoline substitutes now on the market, 
as follows: 1) vapor-phase cracked products; 2) benzol blends; 3) gasoline from 
napthenic-base crudes.”  The “cracked” gasoline and napthenic crude gasoline 
had low knock ratings that did not justify the 3 cent premium price, he felt. 
“Benzol blends are, of  course, in another category,” Howard said, “... equal or 
superior of  Standard Ethyl Gasoline in knock rating.”  Howard also said that 
Standard’s benzol blend was so well established  in the Baltimore-Washington 
territory that they could not replace it.  Blending ethyl into higher base octane 
gasoline from napthenic crude oil  would help in New Jersey “where the Gulf  
No-Nox competition is severe, having a knock value not quite the equal of  Ethyl 
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Gasoline on the average, although the difference is very small.”45  Although 
the P.H.S. may not have been aware of  it, many refiners had turned their 
attention to premium antiknock gasolines in order to compete with the new 
Ethyl additive being sold by Gulf  (now Chevron), Standard of  Indiana 
(American / Amoco) and Standard of  New Jersey (Esso / Exxon). In fact, 
worries about the  competition had caused the original problem of  worker 
deaths with  reckless manufacturing schedules, as we have seen in Chapter Five. 
Regular unleaded gasoline at this time had an octane rating in the high 
50s to low 60s, while engine compression ratios hovered between 5 and 6 to 1.  
By 1940,  engine compression ratios of  new cars were as high as 8 to 1, while 
octane ratings of  fuels ranged from about 80 to 85.  Some of  the increase in 
automotive compression ratios was due to the improvement of  fuel with Ethyl,  
but improved refining operations were a much more important factor.  Three 
cubic centimeters of  Ethyl only raised base gasoline by about 9 points, whereas 
the catalytic reforming raised the base by 20 points. This fact has not gone 
unrecognized. “The major factor [in improving the engine] was the 
improvement in refining processes to get a better, more knock-free base 
gasoline,” T.A. Boyd said in an oral history interview with Frank  Howard. “Yes, 
that’s right,”  Howard responded.46 
During the 1920s controversy, and long after it, alternatives of  equal or 
possibly superior technical quality were well known and widely employed. 
Although this fact seems rather obvious, it has been repeatedly denied. In a 
memoir written in 1945, Kettering asserted  that  “no compound other than 
tetraethyl lead has ever been found that can be used in practice as an antiknock 
agent.”47  This statement  seems to indicate that even his private memoirs may 
have been written under some constraint or concern for corporate image. 
During the summer of  1925, when the fate of  the Ethyl Gasoline 
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Corporation hung in the balance, Kettering developed a new fuel idea called 
“Synthol”  at  the Dayton labs.  The breakthrough was announced in the same 
way that Ethyl was announced in 1923 and selenium was announced in 1921:  
an unnamed G.M. spokesman at the Dayton research labs claimed it would  
“double gas mileage.”48   Synthol fuel was a mixture of  benzene, alcohol and a 
metallic additive -- either tetraethyl lead or iron carbonyl.  Used in combination 
with a new high compression engine much smaller than ordinary engines, 
“Synthol” would “revolutionize transportation.”49 Engines would be much 
smaller and get 40 or 50 miles per gallon. Speculation about “Synthol” was 
apparently accelerated by the rumor that Ethyl would not return to the market. 
One syndicated cartoonist, Will B. Johnstone, pictured "Synthol" and small 
engines powering lounge chairs down the street and jewellers using magnifying 
lenses to repair tiny motors.50 Whatever happened to the Synthol idea is not 
known -- no reports on its ultimate fate are found in the archives. 
Due to the broad availability of  substitutes for tetraethyl lead, the Ethyl 
Gasoline Corporation decided in 1927 to loosen restrictions and to end the 
exclusive 1924 contracts with Gulf, American and Esso and sell tetraethyl lead 
to any refiner or marketer who qualified. By 1933 it was sold without an Ethyl 
brand on the pump. “Ethyl corporation realized that by limiting the sale of  
Ethyl fluid to only premium grades, they were stimulating the refining industry 
to solve the problem of  engine knock in other ways," said historian Augustus 
Giebelhaus. "Thus the competition presented by [Sun’s] Blue Sunoco, [Atlantic 
Refining Co.’s] White Flash ... and other non-leaded, antiknock gasolines 
pushed the Ethyl Corp. into a major marketing challenge.”51  Ethyl's sales pitch 
to the oil industry was simply its “cheaper costs and greater flexibility” in 
refining.  Thus,  the "only compound that could be used in practice," the 
indispensable “gift of  God," was in fact one less-than-celestial additive among 
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many.   
Approaching the International Markets 
Ethyl was not received with enthusiasm in Europe, where alternatives 
had been employed as a matter of  government policy for many years. In France, 
the combination of  defense needs and farm surplus led the government to 
require the use of  alcohol blends in most gasoline beginning in 1923. Many 
other European governments supported either farm-based ethanol (ethyl 
alcohol) or coal-derived methyl alcohol either through tax incentives or 
mandatory blending programs or both.  The French program had problems,  
"due in part to the poor results obtained when such fuels were first introduced 
and also to the casting of  discredit upon such fuels by its adversaries who profit 
in the fuel business,” said Charles Schweitzer, a research chemist in the Melle 
complex.52 Schweitzer also noted that “the health properties of  lead tetraethyl 
constitute an obstacle in its general use,” and that the French minister of  
hygiene said using it on crowded streets constituted a hazard.53   
Meanwhile in Britain, a controversy over use of  Ethyl gasoline arose in 
1928.  The Daily Mail quoted a number of  British scientists as saying that 
leaded gasoline posed a public health hazard. "Your courtesy in keeping us 
informed of  such developments is helpful and I am grateful for its continuance," 
Surgeon General Hugh Cumming wrote Ethyl president Earl Webb that year 
after Webb sent information on the British controversy.54  
Cumming was not only grateful. Within a few years he became positively 
helpful.   In 1931, he cabled from a conference in Paris: "Have Leake and Bevan 
send Carriere our and British Reports. Favorable outlook."  Leake and Bevan 
were PHS employees, while Carriere was the Swiss minister of  health, according 
to a PHS memo attached to the cable.  The memo also said: "Of  course, this 
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refers to Ethyl Gasoline."55   The omissions in this cable are interesting. Was 
Ethyl such a high priority of  the  P.H.S. that the Surgeon General could cable 
home from a European meeting and simply refer to "reports" and have it be 
known that it  refers "of  course" to Ethyl?  Apparently, marketing Ethyl was a 
high priority for the Public Health Service in the 1930s. 
Cumming also provided letters of  introduction for Ethyl officials to the 
public health directors of  other countries, paving the way for Ethyl sales. "This 
will introduce you to Mr. E.W. Webb, President of  the Ethyl Gasoline Corp.," 
Cumming wrote to the public health officers of  most Latin American nations in 
1934. Cumming assured the public health directors of  these countries that 
Webb had fully consulted with the US Public Health Service. "The preliminary 
health study was made by the United States Public Health Service," which, 
Cumming said, was the basis of  the regulations followed in the U.S.56 
Cumming also helped Ethyl expand its sales in the U.S. In 1928 he wrote 
a letter to the New York City Sanitary Advisory Committee stating that the 
"opinion expressed by the PHS committee ... three years ago has been 
confirmed by subsequent experience and we still believe there are no good 
grounds for prohibiting the use of  such gasoline under the proper regulations."57  
He also wrote letters helping Ethyl overcome minor regulatory problems with 
state legislatures and public health authorities. 
Problems with worker exposure to Ethyl fluid in refineries and service 
stations continued to occur.  In 1928, Julius Stieglitz of  the University of  
Chicago, who had been a member of  the 1925 Surgeon General's Committee 
on tetraethyl lead, wrote to complain about an "infraction of  the spirit if  not the 
letter of  the regulations" on tetraethyl lead from spillage and other workplace 
exposures to concentrated Ethyl fluid.  Ethyl Corp. responded to Cumming that 
Dr. Robert  Kehoe "whose duty it is to visit various sections of  the country and 
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examine the most exposed cases" believed the problem was under control.58  
How many of  these cases existed is not clear, but they may have been substantial 
and they may have continued throughout the history of  the product. For 
example,  in 1960 several U.S. Army  fuel depots reported incidents in which 
workers were injured, and one in which eight workers died from lead poisoning 
after cleaning out  sludge that had settled in old fuel storage tanks.59   
Ethyl in the 1930s
The idea that anti-knock compounds that could substitute for tetraethyl 
lead was not openly acknowledged by industry, despite the memos exchanged 
between  Kettering and Howard noted above.  Apparently, the idea was also 
difficult for government to acknowledge. For example,  in 1933, the USDA 
found that Ethyl leaded gasoline and 20 percent ethyl alcohol blends in gasoline 
were equivalent in terms of  brake horsepower developed. These tests, 
conducted  at the Navy’s  engineering experiment station in Annapolis,  were 
never made public.60    
In the spring of  1933, a dispute about encouraging widespread use of  
ethyl alcohol blended with gasoline swept through Midwestern state legislatures 
and Washington, D.C.  Dozens of  proposals to provide tax incentives for alcohol 
fuel were heard in statehouses and in Congress; two states passed tax incentives. 
The oil industry reacted with heavy negative publicity and an all-out public 
relations campaign designed to disparage and discredit alcohol fuel in any way 
possible. This period has been addressed in other histories,61  although there are 
aspects of  controversy that are to this day the subject of  anti-trust litigation and 
continued historical research.62 
In 1936, all public criticism of  leaded gasoline in commercial speech was 
overruled by the Federal Trade Commission, which said that "disparaging 
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remarks" about its danger would be considered an unfair trade practice.  The 
ruling came in response to an advertisement for Cushing gasoline, which 
advertised it was not "doped" and said: "It stands on its own merits and needs no 
dangerous chemicals -- hence you can offer it to your customers without doubt 
or fear." In its restraint order, the FTC said Ethyl gasoline "is entirely safe to the 
health of  [motorists] and to the public in general when used as a motor fuel, and 
is not a narcotic in its effect, a poisonous dope, or dangerous to the life or health 
of  a customer, purchaser, user or the general public."63   Ethyl was "said to be 
the only chemical used commercially for mixture with gasoline for the purpose 
of  eliminating the 'knocking'..." the FTC said in a press release.64  
Clearly, the picture about alternatives was as confusing in  1936 as it had 
been a decade earlier.  When the Justice Department investigated the Ethyl 
Corp. in preparation for a 1937 anti-trust suit, it found that the catalytic 
cracking process was "the only available competing method of  increasing the 
anti-knock rating of  gasoline..."65   And in a stipulation in the suit, the Ethyl 
Corp. said: 
High anti-knock values may be and are also obtained by the 
addition to gasoline of  benzol and alcohol, but insufficient quantities of  
the former are available to permit its use in any large amount of  
gasoline ... while the use of  alcohol is relatively new in the United States, 
though it has been used extensively abroad for many years.66
At this point, Ethyl leaded gasoline was used in 70 percent or more of  
American gasoline67  and in all but one major brand  -- Sunoco.  Despite the 
market success,  only 10,000 of  the 12,000 wholesale fuel dealers in the US  
received licences to carry Ethyl products. The anti-trust suit developed when 
dealers complained to the Justice Department that Ethyl was enforcing its view 
of  "business ethics" on the market. Dealers who cut prices or who used alcohol 
or benzene in other fuels were not allowed to wholesale Ethyl's lead additive. “It 
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seems clear that the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation has exercised its dominant 
control over the use of  Ethyl fluid substantially to restrain competition by 
regulating the ability of  jobbers to buy and sell gasoline treated with ethyl fluid 
and by requiring jobbers and dealers to maintain certain prices and marketing 
policies...” a 1937 Department of  Justice memo said.68   Ethyl lost the suit at the 
Federal District Court level in 1938 and at the Supreme Court in 1940. The 
company was ordered to make the product available to any customer who met 
minimum technical criteria.69  
A second major anti-trust case filed by the Justice Department in the 
early 1950s against du Pont Corp. involved Ethyl. It focused primarily on the 
competitiveness of  the relationship between du Pont, General Motors and 
Standard Oil Co. in various sectors, including fuel development. Du Pont won 
the case, in part because company memos showed that in 1924 it was not aware 
of  G.M.'s pending partnership with Standard to form the Ethyl Gasoline 
Corporation. In addition, cooperative research on leaded gasoline between the 
major parties was not found to have been in violation of  anti-trust law.70   
Updating the Ethyl Controversy:  1940 to 1986 
Public health controversy about leaded gasoline was subdued if  not 
entirely submerged in the late 1940s and '50s, in part because University of  
Cincinnati physician Robert Kehoe performed a great many studies that argued 
that some amount of  lead was normally present in the body. Kehoe's studies 
claimed that lead was relatively harmless and most cases of  lead poisoning came 
from improper nutrition which hampered excretion of  normally occurring 
lead.71  This became the predominant scientific view despite findings, some as 
early as 1943, that even after lead poisoned children were "cured" and blood 
lead levels were reduced, they still had significant mental problems.72   Also,  a 
Ethyl.Controversy
191
study of  Philadelphia tenements in 1955  showed children becoming ill and 
dying from eating chips of  lead-based paint. The study was considered a 
landmark because it took lead research beyond the world of  "occupational 
diseases" and back to the general question of  its impact on public health and the 
environment.73 
Historian William Graebner said of  the predominant view of  lead: 
Quite simply, the lead industries had engineered the 
development, dissemination and perception of  knowledge concerning 
the lead hazard... The result was the suppression of  genuine pluralism 
within the scientific community. Here and there, a dissident voice could 
be heard. But so complete was the industry domination of  research into 
and knowledge of  the hazards of  lead that the central paradigm for 
understanding lead and its effects remained that pioneered by Kehoe 
and his associates in the 1920s and 30s.74   
Meanwhile, concern about the environment was growing with the 
problem of  smog in the Los Angeles basin.  A group of  scientists and citizens in 
1953 formed the Air Pollution Control Foundation to study smog and 
recommend remedies for it. One citizen suggested that lead was partly 
responsible for smog formation. Although unsupported, the suggestion was 
enough to alert General Motors. Kettering kept close track of  the group, which 
eventually led to the formation of  a state committee on air pollution but which 
also dropped lead from its list of  priorities.75 
In 1959, Ethyl asked for an increase in permissible gasoline lead level 
from three to four  grams per gallon.  A Public Health Service committee 
considering this request noted: 
It is regrettable that the investigations recommended by the 
Surgeon General's Committee in 1926 were not carried out by the 
Public Health Service. Such studies should be undertaken without 
further delay to assure the validity of  the present decision [to raise 
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permissible lead levels] and to guide future committees76 ...
In Europe that same year, debate over urban air pollution began in 
earnest  with the International Clean Air conference of  1959 sponsored by the 
World Health Organization. Lead was mentioned as a major concern of  only 
the Italian research effort.77 In the U.S., debate mushroomed in 1966 with the 
Senate Public Works committee’s first hearings on air pollution.78  By the time 
the first Clean Air Act was passed in 1970, the recommended solution was to 
introduce catalytic converters for unleaded fueled vehicles, which became 
standard after 1975. The converters would not function after being exposed to 
leaded gasoline, which was one primary reason for the introduction of  unleaded 
gasoline.  Ethyl attempted to assert in federal court that it was being deprived of  
its property without due process. But the courts upheld the right of  the E.P.A.  to 
mandate unleaded gasoline.79 The courts also heard the mounting evidence of  
brain damage to children exposed to leaded gasoline.80 The Reagan 
administration flirted with deregulation of  environmental rules for gasoline in 
1982,81   but the  E.P.A.  quickly backed off  that position when leaded gasoline 
was clearly linked by medical authorities to high blood lead levels and physical 
abnormalities in children.82 The E.P.A.  proposed a 90 percent mandatory cut in 
lead content for gasoline in 1984.83 By 1986, the lead phaseout had been 
accelerated, and lead had almost vanished from  gasoline in the US. The issue 
had come full circle, from the discovery of  tetraethyl lead in December, 1921 to 
a government-ordered phase-out 65 years later.
 In most of  the Third World, however, the brain damage, hypertension 
and other  effects of  leaded gasoline, especially on urban children or people 
living close to highways, have yet to be dealt with. U.S. factories still export 
tetraethyl lead to other countries for their gasoline, although most tetraethyl lead 
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is today made in other countries under license agreements with Ethyl and du 
Pont.84 
Historian Samuel P. Hays noted that almost all of  the events in the series 
of   controversies over Ethyl leaded gasoline reflect intense differences of  opinion 
between  industry affiliated scientists and public health scientists. These 
differences clearly were related to institutional affiliation. Scientists working at 
hospitals or with the Centers for Disease Control, the E.P.A. or public health 
organizations held a far different view of  scientific facts than those who were 
affiliated with the Lead Industries Association or the International Lead-Zinc 
Research Organization.   Another important factor in the debate was the role of  
professional specialization, Hays argued. Although the conventional wisdom is 
that science is a unifying force, "increasingly specialized knowledge fractures 
science and fosters intense dispute." The lead issue involved, in its later years, 
differences between scientists who specialized in nutrition or inhalation, 
occupational health or biogeochemical cycles, clinical pediatrics and laboratory 
research.85 
Not surprisingly, the specialization and fractured approaches to science 
that marked the end of  the debate over leaded gasoline in the 1970s and 1980s 
were  evident in the beginning of  the debate in the 1920s. When Alice Hamilton 
called Charles Kettering "nothing but a murderer" at the Public Health Service 
conference in May, 1925, the two scientists were glaring across a gulf   that 
would characterize the lead debate, and many other similar debates, for the rest 
of  the century.  
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ETHYL AND THE NEWS MEDIA : 
HISTORICAL TREATMENT AND CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 
 Histories of  Ethyl leaded gasoline tend to describe the discovery as an 
enormously successful invention worthy of  Thomas Edison and the controversy 
surrounding it as, at best, a misunderstanding on the part of  the news media. This 
chapter  focuses on the question of  the performance of  the news media, especially 
the seven major New York City newspapers that covered the controversy closely.  
According to many accounts, journalists did not understand the scientific 
problem and misinterpreted the problems inherent in manufacturing a difficult 
chemical as a danger to public health.  Industry  historians have also seen the press 
promoting “sensational publicity,” “wild stories,” “panic,”  “lurid details,” and 
“shocking cartoons depicting Ethyl ... squeezing blood from an innocent public.” 
They repeated the speculation of  industry leaders who believed the press 
“invented” the phrase “loony gas.” They blamed the N.Y. World for inflaming 
public opinion and fabricating out of  wholecloth visions of  sudden, rampant 
insanity on the streets of  Manhattan.  These views are unsubstantiated by any 
actual research on the part of  the industry historians or the general historians 
whom they have influenced. The views tend to follow a  stereotype of  a rare and 
pugnacious form of  yellow journalism. What is most objectionable about them (or 
any stereotype) is that the misperception obscures an important truth.  Stereotypes 
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of  the press in this case obscure the deep concern over public understanding of  
science and technology of  two leading editors who set the agenda for the Ethyl 
controversy:  Carr Van Anda  at the New York Times and Walter Lippmann at the 
New York World.   As shown in Chapter Eight, both men were champions of  
science and believed that the scientific method had enormous importance for 
civilization.   
This chapter first examines the historical record concerning the news   
media's performance in the Ethyl controversy and then examines the facts about 
seven daily newspapers from New York City that covered the controversy.  
The Historical Record of  the News Media in the Ethyl Controversy 
Aside from a few self-congratulatory articles in the New York World and a 
comment that "journalistic vigilance" has done what government has not in the 
New York Daily News, no contemporary newspaper commented on the general 
performance of  the news media in the controversy. 
 In 1927, as the controversy faded and the last of  the critical articles 
disappeared from popular magazines, the Ethyl Gasoline Corp. printed a sales 
pamphlet called "A Brief  Story of  Ethyl Gasoline." The story of  its discovery 
followed the Motor magazine "trial and error" saga in which the solution to the 
anti-knock problem appeared only after a thorough scientific search. This story 
would become the often-repeated description of  how leaded gasoline was 
discovered.1   
Ethyl advertised leaded gasoline extensively in the 1930s,  but little of  
substance was written for public consumption until 1939, when  Ethyl employee 
Graham Edgar wrote a dry account of  the precautions taken in making leaded 
gasoline for an industry journal.2  Sometime in the mid-1940s, a short memorial 
article recalling Midgley and his contributions to science appeared in an unknown 
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magazine, entitled "It all Began When..."3 
Two unpublished legal histories of  the Ethyl controversy were written and 
later influenced historians to some extent.  In 1927, Frank A. Howard of  Standard 
Oil Co. of  New Jersey wrote a private history of  Ethyl Gasoline at the request of  
the U.S. Department of  Justice. Howard focused on the contacts between Standard 
and General Motors between 1919 and 1924, when collaboration on research and 
marketing led to the 50-50 partnership between the two companies in creating the 
Ethyl Gasoline Corp.  Howard also discussed the Bayway incident, and his attitude 
is indicative of  corporate views: 
This catastrophe received widespread notoriety, much of  which was of  
a misleading nature, indicating that the poisoning had come from the 
gasoline itself  rather than from the process of  manufacturing the [Ethyl 
fluid]. Certain newspapers undertook campaigns against the product and 
were supported by persons claiming to have particular scientific knowledge 
of  the dangers attendant on its use... As a result of  this agitation ... the 
Surgeon General of  the U.S.  called a conference of  health officials and 
other interested persons in Washington4 ... 
A second internal history was written in 1936 by  N.P. Wescott at the du Pont 
Corp., partly because of  the pending expiration of  patents and partly because of  
another Justice Department inquiry, this time involving a full-fledged anti-trust suit 
against Ethyl.  The du Pont Corp. emphasized the importance of  the du Pont role 
in developing a safer manufacturing process for tetraethyl lead. As noted in 
previous chapters, the du Pont history was sharply critical of  the role of  Standard 
Oil Co. in manufacturing tetraethyl lead at Bayway; and it indicated that tetraethyl 
lead was seen strategically as a transitional fuel to renewable ethyl alcohol fuels 
from cellulose.  The history also noted the "storm" of  publicity over the sudden 




The violent and spectacular nature of  this strange malady had at once 
attracted newspaper attention; and the dramatic sequence of  deaths from 
the small   [Standard] operation was naturally played up, with various lurid 
implications. 'There was front line publicity in every paper in the country,' 
according to a review of  the occurrence in the 1924 annual report of  the 
Ethyl Gasoline Corp., 'and mention was made of  the accident abroad.' A 
widespread state of  panic and public hysteria followed... A sensational 
'crusade' was carried on by the New York World.5 
 World War II interrupted retrospection in the chemical and automotive 
industries, but in the mid- and post-war years, memoirs about Ethyl gasoline 
started to be written.  In 1943, Thomas A. Boyd, a lab assistant to Midgley, began 
sorting several thousand pages of  original documents called the "Lead Diary," 
which included lab notebooks, correspondence, reports and factory orders 
surrounding the 1919 to   1933 development of  Ethyl leaded gasoline.  This "diary" 
has apparently been withheld by General Motors from the GMI archives and is still 
not available to researchers. From the diary, Boyd, Charles Kettering and the G.M. 
public relations staff  distilled a series of  memoirs that were never published.  What 
prompted this organization of  materials and memoirs is unclear, although the 
death of  Thomas Midgley in 1943 may have been a factor. Another may have been 
the 1938 anti-trust suit against Ethyl, and yet another may have been the 1942 
investigations by Sen. Harry S. Truman's  committee into how Ethyl gave leaded 
gasoline technology  to German industries in 1938.  In any event, it may have 
seemed that an explanation for the discovery of  Ethyl gasoline might be needed.  
Boyd's first unpublished memoir,  "The Early History of  Ethyl Gasoline," was  
completed in June, 1943.6  It was an extensive overview of  the research and 
development efforts beginning in 1916 and continuing through the 1920s.  It is  
highly defensive about the question of  safety precautions for workers, claiming that 
all efforts were made to warn and guard against poisoning.7 Boyd also dealt 
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extensively with the public side of  the controversy:  
There was front page publicity in the New York papers and in almost 
every newspaper in the country. A story in the New York Times was 
headlined:  'Odd Gas Kills One, Makes Four Insane' ...  Some more 
expressive writer in another paper dubbed the stuff  ‘looney gas...’ In contrast 
to the criticism and adverse propaganda in the popular press, the technical 
journals almost universally took an impartial or unprejudiced position. Dr. 
H.E. Howe, editor of  Industrial and Chemical Engineering, for instance, 
published in the Dec. 1924 issue of  that journal a fine editorial on the 
subject. Also, Dr. H.C. Parmelee, editor of  Chemical and Metallurgical 
Engineering, tried to help calm the hysteria of  the moment about Ethyl 
Gasoline. But nevertheless, the propaganda continued, fostered chiefly in the 
press by the New York World, but also by some labor union publications... So 
great was the effect of  the events and of  the flood of  propaganda upon the 
public and upon the boards of  health that in May, 1925, Surgeon General 
Cumming felt compelled to call a conference ... 
Note that Boyd said that the conference was a result of  both the "effect of  
events" and the "flood of  propaganda." Later industry-oriented accounts would 
omit the former and emphasize the latter.  Also, note that Boyd said a newspaper 
writer invented the term "loony gas."  (Whether or not this is true is discussed 
below). 
In 1945, Charles Kettering began drafting his own memoirs about the 
invention of  Ethyl gasoline.8  Kettering had planned to write a book on Ethyl "as a 
typical case of  the means by which new things get started," according to one note,9  
viewing the many problems surrounding Ethyl as the "price of  progress." However,  
Kettering was not completely in touch with the facts when the memoir was 
transcribed. Kettering asserted that the 1924 - 26  Ethyl controversy was basically a 
misunderstanding that occurred after a flawed experiment on leaded gasoline was 
run at Yale university: 
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 One of  the [Yale] professors got in touch with one of  the writers of  
the New York World. It seems that this particular writer had had a brother 
who suffered ill effects from lead poisoning which he had contracted from 
the handling of  type metal and, therefore, he felt that the public should not 
be exposed to any other form of  lead.  The publicity which was brought 
about by the publications of  these articles in the New York World resulted in 
our going to Dr. Cumming, who was then Surgeon General, and asking him 
to start an investigation, because it was foolish for us to try to continue unless 
we had this point completely determined.10
 This story about a writer who knew about lead poisoning appears no where 
else and could not be checked, but clearly there was more going on than one 
writer's concerns.  From the drafts and papers assembled for the memoirs, Ethyl 
and General Motors public relations staff  began assembling a compilation called 
the "Green Book" and entitled "Historical Summary: Ethyl Corporation, 1923 
-48."  It was never printed, but the assertion that GM and Ethyl were under attack 
by the press  shows up several times.  “Many outsiders freely predicted that the 
tragedy meant the end of  the company," said one version. "The New York World 
conducted a campaign of  publicity against the public sale of  gasoline containing 
the company’s antiknock compound and labelled it  'loony gas.'"11  
 Meanwhile, several small public relations articles entitled "The Tetraethyl 
Lead Saga"  and "The Product that Nobody Wanted"  were printed in Du Pont 
Magazine in 1947 and in 1951 respectively. The former did not mention any 
controversy other than  "difficulties" that had to be overcome. The latter was a 
short article based on the premise that a chemical discovered in 1852 had no use 
until, in 1921,  scientists discovered one.12  
The controversy was also downplayed in scientific circles.   Edgar noted in a 
1951 American Chemical Society paper: "At one time, many doubts existed over 
the safety even of  gasoline containing [lead], but 25 years of  extensive study and 
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experience have proven [it]... safe as normally used.13
The first short public account of  the discovery of  Ethyl in the years following 
the controversy was written by Midgley's former laboratory assistant T.A. Boyd and 
appeared in 1950 in a Society of  Automotive Engineers paper entitled "Pathfinding 
in Fuels and Engines."14 Soon afterward, a pamphlet entitled "The Trail of  the 
Arbutus,"15  highlighted the heroic view of  the discovery, beginning with the first 
discussions about engine knock in 1916 between Kettering and Midgley and 
culminating with the discovery itself. 
A second and somewhat more detailed account of  the discovery of  Ethyl was 
written by G.M. public relations staff  writer Stanton P. Nickerson in 1954. The 
history brought to light many of  the positive details that had not been known about 
Ethyl, including the collaboration of  university chemists at MIT, Harvard, Yale, 
Cornell, Johns Hopkins, the University of  Cincinatti and others, and the 
investigation of  alternatives such as an unnamed "synthetic knock-free fuel from 
cellulose." Like many others in Ethyl, Standard and GM who had been caught up 
in the controversy, Nickerson took a dim view of  the news media.  Nickerson  
claimed that publicity was in and of  itself  the cause of  intervention by the 
government: 
 Newspaper publicity in May of  1925 focused public attention on 
several deaths caused by lead poisoning among those exposed to tetraethyl 
lead during its manufacture and handling... [Quoting Dr. Robert A. Kehoe, a 
physician consulting for Ethyl] ‘the major significance of  the events of  May, 
1925 lay in the fact that they created in the public mind an apprehension 
concerning hazards associated with the distribution and use of  leaded 
gasoline which, while wholly unjustified, was so great and so widespread as 
to require official action on the part of  the health authorities of  the U.S. 
government.’16
Another public relations effort was a Kehoe article for Ethyl News in 1962 
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claiming that “intensive medial studies show that lead ... compounds  in auto 
exhaust create no hazards.” The historical aspect of  the controversy was not 
mentioned, but the controversy over air pollution building in the 1960s was 
acknowledged as “increasing interest in the cleanliness and purity of  the air...”17  
  Many company officials sincerely believed that they were under attack by 
the news media.  At one point, for example,  Irenee du Pont told a federal court in 
1952: “The newspaper accounts got a lot of  people stirred up and confused over 
the danger.”18    Earl W. Webb, president of  Ethyl Corp., had the following 
exchange with an attorney at the same anti-trust suit on April 9, 1953:19  
Q:  Mr. Webb, on assuming  presidency of  Ethyl Gasoline Corp. [in 1925]   
you realized the most important problem was the health situation. 
A:  There had been unfavorable publicity about it. 
Q: They called it “loony gas,” did they not? 
A: The New York World did. 
Clearly, corporate executives felt that the press in general and the World in 
particular had treated them unfairly, and that their "health situation" was the 
creation of  the unfavorable publicity.    
The first biography  of  Charles F. Kettering was written in 1957 by T.A. 
Boyd and called  Professional Amateur.  Boyd based the work on the series of  
unpublished memoirs (discussed above) and his own memories, capturing some of  
Kettering's jocularity and the sense of  adventure he brought to his scientific 
research.  Boyd did not give even a partial account of  the  controversy, which he 
reduced to the “concerns of  doctors” that were met by “a long and thorough 
investigation.”20   
In a 1961, a  biography of  Charles F. Kettering, Boss Ket was written by his 
niece, Rosamond Young.  The biography included a lengthy account of  the 
discovery of  Ethyl gasoline, building on the memoirs and public relations accounts 
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at General Motors and Ethyl Corp. The biography echoed the romantic and heroic 
view of  the discovery along with a disdain for the role of  the press:  
News of  the deaths spread through the country like lightning. 
Everywhere people who had used Ethyl gasoline in their automobiles 
became frightened. Further hysteria was created when the fact was published 
that deaths from lead poisoning had occurred earlier at Dayton and at the du 
Pont Deepwater plant. Sensational stories in the press had everyone believing 
that gasoline containing Ethyl accidentally dropped on the hands lowered 
blood pressure, causing unconsciousness and death before the victim could 
wash his hands. Dr. Yandell Henderson, a Yale University expert, declared 
that breathing exhaust fumes from Ethyl gasoline attacked the brain and 
nerves, causing delirium, paralysis and death. ‘Loony gas’ as the papers 
labeled it, became notorious overnight... Midge [Thomas Midgley] made a 
trip to New York during the investigations. Although he demonstrated that 
Henderson’s statements were false by washing his hands in tetraethyl lead in 
the presence of  reporters, the wild stories continued. It was useless for him to 
point out that the fatalities had been caused by heedlessness of  the workers 
and that ethyl was harmless when properly handled.21 
 Young provides no evidence of  frightened people or of  hysteria, and does 
not say exactly which “wild stories” continued or even why she considered them to 
be wild. It is also interesting that she blames workers for "heedlessness" to 
workplace hazards. 
Boss Ket was published the same year as the definitive and ostensibly 
scholarly industry history of  oil, Williamson and Daum’s The American Petroleum 
Industry. The work  is exhaustive in many details; but dealing with the Ethyl 
controversy, it merely notes that tetraethyl lead sales had been halted in 1925: 
The immediate cause [of  the halt in sales] was a report of  45 cases of  
lead poisoning, with four fatalities, at Jersey Standard’s pilot plant for the 
ethyl chloride process at its Bayway refinery. The subsequent publication of  
findings by the Bureau of  Mines from extensive tests that no health hazard 
existed from the exhaust of  leaded gasoline did not curb the panic. 
Investigations by a committee appointed by Surgeon General Hugh S. 
Cumming finally cleared the way to resumption of  sales a year later...” (after 
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handling precautions were developed).22 
 Again, no description of  "panic" is given, and the history is flatly inaccurate 
regarding the number of  workers who died.23
Another corporate history written in 1983 by Joseph C. Robert  focused in 
part on the discovery of  Ethyl gasoline by Charles Kettering and  researchers T.A. 
Boyd and Thomas Midgley. Robert discussed the technical problem behind finding 
and developing anti-knock gasolines, adding very little not already available in 
Boyd and Young’s biographies.  Like them, Robert also blamed journalists for 
fanning the flames of  controversy: 
The tragedies [of  the dead workers] provided the journalists covering 
the event with an excuse for coining the phrase ‘looney gas’ which for a long 
time clung to gasoline containing the new additive. Newspapers in the U.S. 
and abroad gave sensational publicity to the Bayway story, picturing in lurid 
detail the agonies of  the ill and dying.24 
 Here Robert passes along as a positive fact T.A. Boyd's speculation that the 
press created the term "loony gas."  It is  embellished with the further speculation 
that journalists were seeking to discredit Ethyl Gasoline Corp.  Like Boyd and 
Young, Robert does not provide any supporting evidence. 
Two important interpretations of  the Ethyl controversy are found in the 
literature in history of  technology. The first is Thomas P. Hughes' 1979 discussion 
about the discovery of  tetraethyl lead as exemplary of  a "reverse salient," that is, a 
key technical problem that must be improved if  the broad front of  technological 
advance is to continue. Hughes was interested not so much in the Ethyl story itself  
but in the question of  how inventors choose their problems and how they arrive at 
solutions. The tetraethyl lead story provides details closer to the heart of  these 




To some historians, Hughes notes, Midgley was an excellent researcher and 
his discoveries of  tetraethyl lead and chlorofluorocarbons were "beautiful pieces of  
pure, or at least deliberately planned, research." Midgley recognized knocking as 
the reverse salient in engine development and "tried out all elements possible in a 
so-called Edisonian style."25 Hughes did not deal with the public controversy. 
 David Hounshell and John Smith’s 1988 book about the du Pont Corp., 
Science and Corporate Strategy, briefly mentioned the public controversy: 
Newspapers across the country, but particularly the New York World, 
detailed the horrible effects of  loony gas. Public health authorities in several 
states considered banning the use of  tetraethyl lead. Deaths had occurred 
earlier, but none had received the publicity of  the Standard (Bayway) 
incident...26  
 Hounshell and Smith’s almost perfunctory criticism seems plausible but is 
unsupported by facts. It is likely that they did not read the newspapers of  the era,  
since they would have also found that health authorities in several cities and states 
did not just "consider" banning tetraethyl lead. Between 1924 and 1928, many 
cities and states did, in fact, ban it, as was noted in Gerald Zilg's earlier history of  
the du Pont Corp.,which claimed that workers died from a lead compound that 
"newspapers promptly condemned as 'loony gas.'"  The history also said "the 
country was in a furor" and that "federal intervention was necessary to avoid a 
national panic."27
Four general histories and a magazine article that re-examined the Ethyl 
controversy from a broader perspective have been published in recent years.  
Joseph Pratt noted in a 1980 paper that environmental discussions of  the 1970s 
about water pollution, leaded gasoline and refinery safety were taking place without 
reference to their long history. He described the events leading up to the leaded 
gasoline controversy:  
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 A series of  accidents involving tetraethyl lead catapulted debate over 
the new product from the internal correspondence of  government agencies 
onto the front pages of  newspapers throughout the nation... As the incident 
at Three Mile Island altered the context of  debates on nuclear safety in 
1979, so the highly publicized accident at Bayway pushed the discussion of  
the possible health effects of  tetraethyl lead into a broader, more public 
forum, giving the opponents of  the product added ammunition for renewed 
attack. The publicity created by newspaper headlines such as “Tetraethyl 
lead in victim’s brain:” and by magazine articles such as the Nation’s  
“Standard Oil’s Death Factories” and the Literary Digest’s  “Insanity Gas” 
helped create a national concern over leaded gasoline.28 
  
Althought Pratt's history is generally insightful,  the  New York Times 
November 13, 1924 story about lead found in the brain at an autopsy is hardly 
representative of  Times coverage; nor are the other headlines representative of  
general trends.  Pratt also takes a politically utilitarian and relatively shallow view 
of  the news media in that it "gave" opponents ammunition. Didn't the news media 
also "give" proponents ammunition? Which side "got" the most "ammunition?" 
Another important history of  technology, Stuart Leslie's 1983 biography  
Boss Kettering,  devoted a chapter to Kettering's study of  anti-knock fuels. Leslie 
focused primarily on the discovery of  leaded gasoline and its context in the general 
fear of  an oil shortage and associated long-range automotive engineering decisions. 
The story of  the discovery followed the "trail of  the arbutus" saga in greater detail 
than had been available before and mentioned alternatives to Ethyl leaded gasoline 
for the first time in any history. Also, Leslie used publicity as a signifier of  the 
controversy's  depth and vigor.  “Headlines dubbed leaded gasoline as ‘Looney Gas’ 
and shocking cartoons depicted Ethyl as a greedy giant squeezing blood from an 
innocent public.”29  Although Leslie's biography  is exemplary in many respects, the 
description of  the public controversy is  impressionistic, not factual. Moreover, the 
cartoons in question have not been located.30  
One labor history that paid more attention to the public controversy was 
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David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz’ 1989 book Dying for Work, that contained 
two chapters on the Ethyl imbroglio. Although generally accurate and relatively 
well informed about the performance of  the news media, Dying for Work did 
repeat the canard that the poisonings were “due to what the newspapers called 
‘loony gas.’” The authors also accepted the premise that the elimination of  engine 
knock with tetraethyl lead "allowed for the development of  the automobile 
essentially as we know it today."31  As we have seen in Chapters Three and Five, a 
good many alternatives were available and were used to boost octane. The question 
as to whether the automobile would have been significantly different had tetraethyl 
lead been banned in 1925 is wide open, as this dissertation has argued elsewhere.  
Another important historical interpretation of  the Ethyl controversy is found 
in a dissertation concerning Alice Hamilton, a professor of  public health at 
Harvard University during the time in question and an outspoken opponent of  
Ethyl gasoline.  In the absence of  federal regulations, scientist - advocates like 
Hamilton welcomed a role for the news media in bringing the issues out into “a 
blaze of  publicity” in conferences between  health advocates and industrialists.32 
This “conference system,” a transitional phase in public health regulation in the 
conservative 1920s, depended on a role for the press, according to a dissertation on 
Hamilton by Angela Nugent Young.  “The novelty of  the acute symptoms caused 
by tetraethyl lead, scientists’ ignorance of  the chemical’s physiological effects, and 
the possibility of  risk to drivers using leaded gasoline sparked popular interest in 
the hazards of  the new technology," Young said. "The press devoted unusual 
attention to the tetraethyl lead victims...” Novelty, uncertainty and the possibility of  
public risk, said Young, were factors that sparked interest.
Also,  in a 1992 Mother Jones article on the modern impacts of  the Ethyl 
Corp., journalist Nicholas Regush recalled the 1924 controversy as leaving "at least 
five dead and 35 others suffering from tremors, palsies and hallucinations ... The 
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press soon dubbed the substance 'loony gas.'"33  
Thus, even the Ethyl Corp.'s worst critics have been deeply affected by the 
industry view of  its history. It is also important to  look at what has not been said. 
Until 1980,  only the company viewpoint about the Ethyl controversy was available 
in print unless one somehow knew to return to the newspapers and magazines that 
originally wrote about the public controversy.  A spate of   critical histories about 
the oil industry  written in the 1970s and 80s completely missed the Ethyl 
controversy. At a time when interest in the oil industry was resurgent and when the 
public health problems of  leaded gasoline were again being debated,  an historical 
vacuum prevailed.  Carl Solberg’s  Oil Power, a highly critical history of  oil 
industry manipulation of  politics, economics and foreign policy,  described Ethyl  as 
“Kettering’s magic antiknock fluid” and followed Young’s account of  the 
controversy to the letter34 . The Ethyl controversy is not even mentioned in  The 
Control of  Oil by U.S. Senate staff  attorney John M. Blair, nor does it appear in  
Anthony Sampson’s The Seven Sisters,  James Ridgeway’s Powering Civilization or 
Daniel Yergin’s  The Prize.35 
Content Analysis of  News about the Ethyl Controversy 
Previous chapters showed that news coverage of  the Ethyl controversy in the 
leading newspapers of  New York city -- the Times, the  World,  the Herald 
Tribune, the  Journal and the the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, --  presented both the 
industry and the public health side of  the story.  Yale professor Yandell Henderson,  
recognized as an expert by industry scientists and public health scientists,  had seen 
a potential danger to the public. For the news media to ignore his views and print 
nothing in the "public interest" (as a Standard Oil spokesman requested) would 
have been unthinkable and irresponsible.  Even the du Pont Corporation's 1936 
internal history  conceded that the “violent and spectacular nature of  this strange 
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malady had at once attracted newspaper attention,” and that the dramatic 
sequence of  deaths at Bayway “was naturally played up.”36 Certainly, all industry 
spokesmen had a chance to present their side of  the story, and in all but the World 
newspaper, they successfully obtained the largest portion of  the copy (as will be 
quantified below).  
Journalists showed some enterprise in their use of  sources.  They interviewed 
political and industry authorities, as would be expected, but also tracked down 
workers and concerned scientists. They questioned authorities not only about the 
Bayway, New Jersey  refinery, but also Deepwater, New Jersey  and Dayton, Ohio, 
where other workers had died in the months before the Bayway disaster. On the 
critical side, the news coverage tended to follow the action rather than broaden 
public debate. Reporters wrote about workers who died, about public officials who 
investigated, about doctors who attempted a cure and about scientists and 
industrialists who issued press releases. In only one case, that of  the Herald 
Tribune’s note about Thomas Midgley's 1923 American Chemical Society paper, 
did readers learn anything about the scientific record, and in that case a lack of  
follow-up ensured that  Midgley was not held accountable for the difference 
between his public relations posture and his other professional papers. (The 
professional and personal links between James T. Grady and Thomas A. Midgley 
may have been a factor.  Grady, a former Tribune editor and journalism professor 
at Columbia University, became a paid public relations advisor to Midgley around 
this time.)  Although reporters and editors were clearly alarmed at the 
extraordinary events at Bayway,  coverage was not  “lurid”  except in Hearst’s 
Journal, in which every event was painted in the most lurid colors.  And since most 
of  the Journal’s coverage of  the Ethyl controversy was plagiarized word-for-word 
from other newspapers, the lurid sensationalism was in fact far less than might have 
been expected.    
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Industrialists, historians and editors at the World itself  have all concluded 
that the  World played a leading role in "crusading" against Ethyl gasoline. Yet  its 
news accounts were accurate, factually oriented and "objective," in that they did 
not reflect outright personal biases of  the writer or the editor.  Certainly differences 
in tone, style, source selection and basic political orientation were visible between 
the World and the  Times,  although both approached the issue with a basic 
commitment to the public interest.  
The factual orientation of  the articles calls into question the interpretation 
of  the term "crusade" by various interests.  On May 5, 1925 the World indulged 
itself  in a pontifical set of  self-congratulatory front page articles on its “crusade” 
against Ethyl gasoline. “Dangerous Leaded Gasoline Sale Stopped After Fight by 
the World,”  a three-column headline said. The article below described “the story 
of  the World’s successful fight to stop the sale of  tetraethyl gasoline pending a 
thorough inquiry into its danger.”  Another story also noted that “Dr. Yandell 
Henderson of  Yale took a large part in the crusade.” In a sidebar, Henderson was 
quoted as writing:  “I congratulate the World heartily for the high service it has 
rendered, for without the intelligent support given this undertaking no such victory 
could have been achieved.”  Yet the World’s self-declared crusade appears on the 
surface to be little more than a few congratulatory articles linked to routine 
coverage of  an important issue.   Aside from its reliance on public health 
authorities, the World did not engage in the kind of  crusade that was common a 
generation before. It did not assault Standard Oil or General Motors on the front 
pages. No one was reviled in editorials. Instead, coverage was thoughtful and even 
handed, and if  university sources were higher on the agenda than they were at the 
Times, the question of  editorial prerogative looms larger than outright bias.   The 
use of  the term"crusade" seems to have been something of  a mutually accepted  
anachronism.  If  it was convenient for the World to believe its mild-mannered 
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"crusade" was effective, it was equally convenient for industry to believe what 
appeared to be the same thing. In the end, the fact that no libel suits resulted from 
the extensive coverage demonstrate, at least, that the facts reported in the World 
could not be challenged in court. 
Perhaps most irritating to industry, the World’s articles lent more credibility 
to public health scientists than industry scientists, as is noted below in a quantitative 
content analysis. Where the Times and other newspapers tended to minimize or 
downplay public health scientists, the World printed twice as much from them as 
the Times.  The World also initiated negative articles.  For instance, the public 
would not have known about the Harvard criticism of  the Bureau of  Mines study 
or poisoning of  Columbia University researchers had not the World made the 
issues public. The Times, in contrast, merely reacted to negative articles and 
initiated only positive articles, such as the April 6 story on Midgely’s statements to 
the ACS conference, the April 5 story on the SS Ethyl and the May 8 story about a 
trade editor defending leaded gasoline. The Times printed rebuttals to negative 
news, but often did not print the negative news itself. The Times was accurate, 
factually oriented and “objective,” although it had a markedly different orientation 
toward the protagonists in the controversy.  
The differences between the two newspapers represent variations in the news 
and political judgements of  editors and the  orientation of  each institution toward 
scientific authority. Simply put, the World gave dissident scientific voices far more 
credibility and viewed industry scientists more skeptically than the Times.  The 
difference can be graphically demonstrated through a simple exercise in  content 
analysis of  source reliance in the Ethyl controversy.  
Granted, considerable debate surrounds the use of  quantitative methods in 
historical research. One frequent objection is that  quantitative analysis has been 
used in a reductionistic fashion, as if  thorny and multi-faceted historical questions 
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were easily answered by compiling statistics.   Another view is that historians should 
resist the tendency to mimic social sciences.37 Even so, this  content analysis is 
intended to address an historical question within the context of  other historical 
research.   
Analysis of  News Source Orientation in the Ethyl Controversy 
One important question that emerges in the history of  the Ethyl controversy 
is the extent to which the New York World stood out from other newspapers in its 
approach to news coverage. The question involves the justification for the praise for 
the World from university scientists Yandell Henderson of  Yale and Alice Hamilton 
of  Harvard and the condemnation of  the World by Charles Kettering, Thomas 
Midgley, T.A. Boyd, Alfred P. Sloan, Irenee Du Pont -- all members of  the industry 
--  and by many industry-oriented historians such as Joseph C. Robert.  
No qualitative impression of  the World’s coverage quite clarifies the picture 
as well as a simple exercise in content analysis. In this case, the unit of  analysis 
most appropriate is source reliance, which has been used to analyze controversial 
trends in news coverage in recent years. The selection of  sources is one way that 
the news media "wield enormous gatekeeping responsibility," said D. Lasorsa in a 
review of  sources quoted about the 1987 financial crash.38  Source selectivity has 
also been used to evaluate news coverage about illegal drugs in the 1970s.39 Despite 
its potential usefulness, it has not been widely employed for historical content 
analysis. 
The seven newspapers considered in this analysis represent the broad 
spectrum of  the New York city press in the 1920s era. The New York Times, stolid 
and ostensibly dispassionate; the World, a liberal intellectual newspaper without 
much depth in science; the  New York Journal , which along with the American 
was William Randolph Hearst’s sensational subway tabloid newspaper; the Herald-
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Tribune, the recently merged and still-shaky partnership of  Horace Greeley’s 
Tribune and James Gordon Bennett’s Herald; the Sun, an aging relic of  the 19th 
century; the Daily News, more concerned with beauty pageants and murders than 
scientific controversies; and the small  Brooklyn Daily Eagle. Specialized daily 
newspapers like the Wall Street Journal and the Daily Worker were omitted from 
the content analysis. The New York Daily Graphic and the American were the only 
major daily newspapers of  general circulation from the period to be omitted since 
no archives of  the papers exist for the time period in question.40 
The content analysis included 124 articles printed about the Ethyl 
controversy during the 15-month period of  October  27, 1924 through Jan 20, 
1926. The Times alone printed 51 articles, by far the largest number of  articles; the 
World printed 24 articles, the Journal 15 articles, and the others covered only 
highlights of  the news, printing six to 12 articles each. Although the World printed 
fewer articles than the New York Times,  they tended to be twice as long, resulting 
in about the same amount of  coverage between the two papers. 
Methodology 
Three independent coders measured the text of  the articles and noted the 
apparent source of  the information in inches or halves of  inches.  For example, if  
the article quoted an official of  the New Jersey health department, it was assumed 
that the official was the source, and the source was noted as such. In only one case 
was this problematic: the Journal  plagiarized large volumes of  its material 
verbatim from the New York Times and the Herald Tribune. For the purposes of  a 
content analysis it is best to conclude that the Journal editor’s source reliance is 
reflected in the copy  as it is, notwithstanding wholesale plagiarism. 
Coders were instructed to measure the text  of  the article with a ruler and to 
note the column inches of  copy provided to categories of  sources. For example,   
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industry affiliated sources included General Motors, du Pont, Standard Oil and 
Ethyl Corp., while university sources included  Yandell Henderson of  Yale; Alice 
Hamilton, Cecil Drinker and David Edsall of  Harvard; Frederick Flynn and others 
from Columbia. If  no source was apparent, the information was attributed to 
background / unknown. The measurement for column inches was converted into a 
figure for total number of  words by adjusting for the number of  words found in a 
representative column inch. This  adjustment allowed an equal comparison despite 
differences between the typesetting styles of  the seven newspapers. It was also 
necessary in order to adjust for the various magnifications with which copies of  
microfilmed articles were made in various archives. 
The measurement for inter-coder reliability followed standard procedures.  
Each coder measured at least 20 articles that had been measured by other coders, 
for a total overlap of  over 30 percent.  The sums of  the differences between coders 
in assigning adjusted column inches to categories were divided by the number of   
inches measured by both coders. The inter-coder reliability factor of  84.4 percent 
and 85.9 percent was derived among the three individuals, which is within an 
acceptable range. 
Findings of  the Content Analysis 
The most striking result of  the content analysis involves the difference 
between the investment of  credibility in scientific sources between the Times and 
the World. The volume of  coverage by the two newspapers is similar, but the 
frequency of  publication and distribution of  source reliance is remarkable different. 
While the Times printed 51 articles during the crisis period, the articles averaged 
6.3 inches in length, while the World printed 24 articles with average lengths of  
over 15 inches. 
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The  charts (seen here) show the contrast between the source reliance of  the 
newspapers.  Charts No. 1 and No. 2 show that the Times relied heavily on 
industry sources, devoting almost 7,000 words to information from General 
Motors, du Pont, Standard Oil Co. and Ethyl Corp, for a total of  36 percent of  all 
coverage.  The Times also relied heavily on state and local government sources, 
giving them over 5000 words, for a total of  26 percent of  coverage.  University 
scientists were given a smaller amount of  space, amounting to about 3,000 words 
or about 17 percent of  the total.   In contrast, the World relied quite heavily on 
university scientists, citing them in over 9,000 words of  coverage, or 42 percent,  
giving industry only 5000 words (26 percent) and government only 3,000 words (19 
percent).  Thus, the Times provided readers with more industry-sourced 
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information than the World, but  the World included much more university-derived 
information than the Times. 
Chart No. 2 shows the percentage of  each paper’s coverage and compares it 
to an overall average. Clearly, the highest industry source reliance was found at the 
Times, with the lowest reliance on university sources at the Herald Tribune. 
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Chart No. 3 is simply another cut at the information in Chart No. 1, taking 
the categories of  sources in comparison. Again, there is a striking contrast between 
the coverage of  the New York Times and the New York World in terms of  source 
reliance.  
In summary, the World gave university scientists three times more space than 
did the New York Times and far more than the other newspapers. The World's  
articles were longer and much more likely to provide detailed information on the 
university public health experts' views of  leaded gasoline.  Other newspapers, such 
as the Sun and the Daily Eagle, attempted to balance industry and university 
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sources, but the Herald Tribune virtually ignored the university sources and relied 
heavily on industry and medical officials.  
Who Called it Loony Gas? 
 As noted above,  industry historians have claimed that the press invented the 
term “loony gas” and used it frequently in coverage of  the controversy.   T.A. Boyd, 
Rosamond Young and General Motors’ public relations history said the World 
labelled Ethyl as “loony gas.” Ethyl president Earl Webb testified in federal court 
that the World called the product “loony gas.”   Historian Joseph C. Robert said 
the term loony gas “clung” to Ethyl, while historians Hounshell and Smith said 
“newspapers detailed the horrible effects of   loony gas,” and historians  Rosner and 
Markowitz said the deaths were “due to what the newspapers called ‘loony gas.’”  A 
1992 Mother Jones article asserted that  “the press soon dubbed the substance 
'loony gas.'" 
It is interesting to contrast these interpretations with the first  news article 
about the Ethyl controversy. It was printed on the front page of  the New York 
Times on October  27, 1924, under the subhead: “Called It “Loony Gas Building”: 
Employees at the plant revealed that the experiment building was 
known as the ‘loony gas building.’ Men who took up work in this building 
came in for  ‘undertaker jokes’ and serio-comic handshakes and farewell 
greetings when their comrades learned of  their action. So far as could be 
learned, no special warnings were given employees working with ‘loony gas’  
nor apparently did they sign documents relieving the company of  
responsibility.41   
This account corresponds with a June 1925  Times report concerning the 
Deepwater, New Jersey,  du Pont plant: 
One of  the early symptoms [of  strickened workers] is a hallucination 
of  winged insects. The victim pauses, perhaps while at work or in a rational 
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conversation, gazes intently at space, and snatches at something not there. 
The employees at Deepwater have ironically dubbed the plant “‘the House 
of  Butterflies..’” C.K. Weston, who is head of  the du Pont Publicity Bureau 
said ... [he] had heard of  the workers name for the plant. ‘Some of  them 
drew pictures of  butterflies on the walls of  the plant,’ he said. ‘This disease is 
somewhat like delirium tremens. Instead of  seeing snakes, the men see 
butterflies.’42 
Clearly, the term "loony gas" was invented by workers and not by the news 
media.  It might never have been used at all if  Standard Oil had followed the 
philosophy of  Ivy Lee,  its public relations counselor,  and had made public the 
facts about Ethyl leaded gasoline right awayt.  As it was, the term "loony gas" was 
used far less than might be imagined from the histories mentioned above. It was 
used in 12 headlines out of  126 New York daily newspaper articles on Ethyl 
gasoline;  the World used the term twice in a headline.  The vast majority of  terms 
used in headlines were neutral and described the company or the product: Ethyl 
gas, leaded gas, tetraethyl gasoline, or Ethyl gasoline.  Descriptive and colorful 
terms were used in the first five days of  the controversy in October, 1924, but other 
terms were used far more often than “loony gas.” The terms tended to indicate 
either uncertainty ("odd gas," "mystery gas," "new gas,") or  danger ("insanity gas,"  
“mad gas.”)  It is important to recall that  Ethyl,  Standard and General Motors 
officials repeatedly refused to talk with New Jersey health and labor officials or the 
press during the time of  uncertainty and danger and that the actual name of  the 
product was unknown.    
The World's use of   the term "loony gas" was innocuous. It is found in an 
inside (not front page) headline in the first stage of  the controversy in October, 
1924. Later, in May, 1925, the term was used once again in quotes showing it was 
meant in a joking tone. The World did use terms such as “mystery gas” and “mad 
gas” in the period when Standard refused comment, but after the mystery was 
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settled, the World relied on neutral terms such as Ethyl, tetraethyl or leaded 
gasoline. None of  the World’s headlines tended any more toward the sensational 
than the Times. 
 The New York Times, the Sun, the Herald Tribune  and the Daily News 
never used the term "loony gas" in a headline, although the Times used the term in 
a subhead the first day (October  27, 1924) and used terms like “odd gas,” “insanity 
gas” and  “poison gas” in headlines during the first week.   The sensationalistic  
Journal used the term "loony gas" five times in 15 articles, but these, too, were 
primarily in the initial stage of  the controversy,  and neutral terms such as Ethyl 
Gas were usually used in headlines after October, 1924. The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 
also a somewhat sensationalistic newspaper, used the "loony gas" term five times  in 
the first week of  the controversy, but like the others, used "Ethyl gas" afterwards. 
   Why the term “loony gas” stuck in the minds of  the Ethyl corporation 
officials as an invention of  the press and in particular of  the World is unclear from 
this data. The term was not a prominent feature of  the contemporary news 
reporting of  the controversy.  What is interesting is that the perceptions of  Ethyl 
officials greatly affected historians even though they had easy recourse to non-
corroborating documents. What this suggests  is the degree to which such 
perceptions may have colored other areas that were far more difficult to 
corroborate.  
Conclusion
Although the Ethyl controversy occurs during at an important juncture of  
public policy and the philosophy of  science and technology, the public controversy 
has not been considered in any great detail by existing histories, and the role of  the 
news media in the public controversy has been perceived in an extremely negative 
light. This perception is surprisingly strong, considering that is has been formed 
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without even minimum reference to primary documents that  are immediately 
available. 
The significance of  the disdain for the news media is not simply that 
American industry and labor historians may have uncharitable views of  of  the 
media that journalists might reflexively call a "kill the messenger" syndrome.  Nor is 
it deeply troubling that historians with a broader agenda did not check the 
newspapers  to ensure that they were not passing along a small but undeserved 
canard. 
The unfortunate aspect of  the historical misinformation is that a more 
accurate view of  a news media  struggling to cover science and apply scientific 
principles to journalism has been obscured. (That topic is taken up in the next 
chapter).  What is also troubling is that history has left Americans without a record 
of  public controversy in scientific and technological areas. The consequences of  
this lack of  a record may be far greater than can be explained here. One may have 
been that the emotionally colored and deeply entrenched positions in the 
environmental controversies of  the 1960s and 70s might have emerged in a 
different way had there been a tradition of  public debate in the area. Another 
consequence may be that the public interest  perspective has remained dependent 
on authorities with their own hidden interests.  
The omission of  the Ethyl controversy from historical accounts of  
automotive and petroleum histories of  the 1960s through the 1990s is highly 
significant given the intent of  many of  these histories to deal with public policy and 
environmental problems.  The omissions demonstrate the influence of  the ideology 
of  industry and the myth of  heroic invention on historians,  even upon those who 
are apparently trying to be critical of  the oil and automotive industries. In addition, 
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 SCIENCE NEWS IN THE 1920s 
The differences in the two news agendas that are depicted in Chapter 
Seven reflect the philosophies of  two leading New York editors at the time of  
the Ethyl controversy:  Carr Van Anda  at the New York Times and Walter 
Lippmann at the New York World.  Historians who have attempted to portray 
the news media of  the 1920s era as ignorant or unconcerned about science 
and technology, some of  whom have been discussed in Chapter Seven, are 
widely off  the mark. 
 This chapter begins with a general overview of  the history of  science 
journalism and continues with the contrast between the Times and the World 
coverage of  the Ethyl controversy as influenced by the different philosophies 
of  journalism and science held by  Van Anda and Lippmann.  It concludes 
with a discussion of  the models of  science news coverage that have been used 
in history and proposed by communications researchers. 
A Brief  History of  Science Journalism to 1925
The early origins of  popular news about discovery and science might 
be traced back to Christopher Columbus' printed newsletter of  1493, 
announcing the results of  his first expedition to the Indies. Or perhaps 
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"science journalism" could be traced to the occasional report in newsletters 
from the houses of  Taxi and Fugger that  circulated around Europe in the 
early 16th century and discussed such topics as witch burnings and the effect 
of  weather on crops.1 The expansion of  printing and publishing, and the 
availability of  books such as De Re Metallica (1556)  and De Re Navali (1536), 
broke down the "secrecy and mystery" of  many crafts traditions in the 16th 
century that  would  lead to an expansion of  technology and, in turn, an 
expansion of  scientific knowledge.2  However, the tradition of  truly popular 
science writing can be said to have emerged by the late 17th century, when 
Bernier le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657 - 1757) lectured and wrote for the Paris 
magazine Mercure Galant about astronomy and physics "in the least 
philosophical manner possible." Science writing should be, he said, "neither 
too dry for the gentry nor too superficial for the scientist."  Fontenelle's idea of  
public involvement in science was to encourage people to spend evenings 
peering through telescopes trying to see the people living on the moon.3
Publik Occurences, America's first newspaper, contained reports of  
smallpox “raging in Boston” and other “epidemical fevers.”  It was suppressed 
in 1690 by the governor of  Massachusetts.4 Another early media controversy  
involved an  argument around 1720 between New England Courant 
publishers James and Benjamin Franklin and the Rev. Cotton Mather over 
smallpox inoculation in Boston. The Franklins opposed it in the Courant, 
while Mather printed pamphlets, gave sermons, provided physicians with 
information and demonstrations and conducted a study to prove his point.5   
Social reform was a concern of  the British press in the late 17th and 
early 18th centuries, and reform efforts were linked to medical and scientific 
arguments.  In 1699, the London Spy, provided an  "alehouse view of  English 
society" with articles such as "Hell in an Uproar," (about the Bedlam lunatic 
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asylum) that set the stage for more scientifically-oriented reform movements in 
years to come.6 Campaigns for sanitation, prison improvement, child welfare, 
worker safety and temperance were a reaction to the steaming slums of  18th 
and 19th century London.  One of  the first public health campaigns was 
directed against cheap gin and was sparked by William Hogarth’s 1750 book 
Gin Lane, which described shocking depravity and brutality caused by 
alcoholism. The campaign used newspaper editorials, petition drives, public 
events and organized lobbying of  magistrates and other officials. In response, 
Parliament quickly regulated gin sales. The campaign “was a prototype of  
public health agitation that  was to assume crucial significance in the 19th 
century,” said historian George Rosen in his classic History of  Public Health.7   
John Howard, High Sheriff  of  Bedfordshire, published State of  the Prisons in 
1777 that  described the evils of  prison in terms of  their impact on the health 
of  the surrounding community. “He thus showed that people are galvanized 
into action when the facts about social disease are forced upon them and that 
an aroused public opinion could be employed as a lever to compel reform,” 
said Rosen.8     
An unprecedented increase in popular education about science and 
medicine emerged in the 18th century through books, magazines and 
newspapers.9  Physicians such as Benjamin Rush published regular articles on 
medicine in a variety of  American and British magazines, varying vastly in 
tone, accuracy and content.  They contained advice about hygiene and herbal 
remedies, epidemics, medical curiosities, and theories of  disease.10    Reform 
and the spread of  scientific knowledge was occasionally suppressed. For 
example, the discovery of  the origins of  the Devonshire Colic (lead sheets in 
the presses of  cider mills) was hotly controversial, as we have seen in Chapter 
Two.11 Also, a school for mechanics at Royal Institution was dismantled in 
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1802. "I was asked rudely what I meant by instructing the lower classes in 
science," wrote Thomas Webster of  the school.  "It was thought to have a 
dangerous tendency."12 
Yet popularization of  science continued with lectures by notable 
scientists,  through articles by scientific and medical professionals and, 
increasingly, in articles by laymen attempting to understand science. A 
prominent early American journalist concerned with science was Baltimore 
editor Hezekiah Niles, whose Niles Weekly Register (published 1811 - 1849) 
was concerned with a broad spectrum of  human activity beyond politics and 
foreign affairs. He regularly wrote about developments in medicine, 
technology, exploration, economics, chemistry, physics and astronomy.  In an 
1816 article about sunspots, Niles neatly summed up the old and new views of  
the world:  "One class of  philosophy calls every extraordinary appearance a 
judgment or a sign; another class views everything as the working of  matter 
and motion.  These two sets are at war with each other. The one denounces 
the other as superstitious or aesthetical..."13
Niles Weekly Register belonged to an elite group of  publications that  
by the 1830s found itself  competing with cheaper publications supported in 
part by advertising. In 1835, the New York Sun, one of  the new "penny press" 
newspapers, managed to embarrass many of  the more expensive publications 
by printing an extraordinary story that  the Sun claimed had come from the 
Edinburgh Journal of  Science. The story involved Sir Percival Lowell's  
supposed discovery of  winged inhabitants on the moon and contained 
elaborate descriptions of  their cities. The expensive papers published the story 
as if  they, too, had picked it up from the Journal of  Science,  and when the 
hoax was uncovered and no such Journal of  Science was shown to exist, they 
"were reduced in stature" and the penny press got a boost.14  
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By the 1840s, the Sun, the Herald, the Tribune and other daily 
newspapers routinely sent reporters to courthouses, police stations and 
battlefields in search of  news.  Science, meanwhile, was beginning to find a 
voice in a new group of  science magazines, including Scientific American, 
Science, and Popular Science Monthly.  By the end of  the 19th century, 
newspapers contained enough science material that they tended to introduce 
readers to areas better covered by  specialized magazines. The specialized lay 
publications, in turn, served as introductions to medical journals and books, 
according to Terra Ziporyn, in Disease in the Popular American Press.15  
"American interest in scientific matters burgeoned in the 1860s and 70s" with 
the new publications and with regular science and medical columns in general 
interest magazines, Ziporyn said. 
As the 19th century ended, muckraking magazines, such as McClure's 
and Munsey's,  showered a generation with scandals about tainted meat and 
milk, patent medicines, worker safety and a host of  other abuses of  corporate 
and scientific power.  Muckraking fervor accomplished some of  the intended 
reforms by the first decade of  the 20th century, but the public grew tired of  it. 
There continued to be a preference for the sensational "yellow journalism" 
approach in among some levels of  the culture. 
The two largest newspapers practicing "yellow journalism" at the turn 
of  the 20th century were William Randolph Hearst's New York  Journal  and 
Joseph Pulitzer's New York World.  Both played up the sensational and 
emotional aspects of  science, usually with disregard for facts but sometimes on 
behalf  of  the public interest. Journal editors,  for example, paid a new 
bacteriology  laboratory in 1904 to run fecal coliform tests on oysters, ice and 
milk sold throughout New York City; not surprisingly, the lab found extensive 
contamination.16  Pulitzer's World ran a column called "Wonders of  Science" 
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that  presented science news as "exciting" and "miraculous."17  The formula 
for a good science story was often to play up the exciting aspects as much as 
possible.  The news about the 1910 return of  Halley’s Comet, for example, 
might involve a picture of  a pretty girl, a “good nightmare idea like the 
inhabitants of  Mars watching (the comet) pass,” pictures of  scientists and “a 
two-column boxed ‘freak’ containing a scientific opinion that nobody will 
understand, just to give it class.”18   
Yellow journalism was never the style of  the New York Times, but 
when Van Anda became managing editor in 1901, he attempted to refocus the 
profession's attitude toward the news in general and science in particular. He 
believed that journalists, like scientists, had to be disinterested observers ready 
to accept the facts as they were rather than see them through pre-existing 
prejudices.   He is sometimes described as a "scientist as well as a journalist." 
He lionized scientific expeditions and research with as much enthusiasm as his 
meticulous and  cold-blooded personality would allow. While Pulitzer and his 
executive editor Frank Cobb were still dressing up news about Halley's Comet 
with pretty girls and Martians, Van Anda was directing serious science 
coverage of  polar expeditions, archaeological excavations, medical and 
astronomical discoveries and new technologies. These signalled a new era of  
science, and Van Anda believed it was important to understand science and 
not see it as merely a source of  entertainment.  
Taking science seriously paid off  more than once.  With his interest in 
the new wireless radio-telegraph, Van Anda had a reporter listening when the 
Titanic sent out a distress call. The Times scored a major coup with a wireless 
interview of  the Titanic radio operator who had been rescued by another ship. 
Van Anda was himself   famous for his scientific acumen. He once corrected an 
interpretation of  Egyptian hieroglyphics from King Tut's tomb shown in a 
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news photo. On another occasion, he noticed something amiss in a photo of  a 
blackboard behind Albert Einstein, who was visiting Princeton University for a 
lecture. The equation on the blackboard was wrong, he claimed.  When 
Einstein was shown a photo of  the blackboard, he studied  it a few moments, 
confirmed the error and said the equation must have been mistakenly 
transcribed by an assistant.19  
Because of  Van Anda, the New York Times employed an exacting 
standard that  excluded all but the most scientific and respected points of  view.  
Cures for cancer and other sensational stories with little authoritative backing 
were rare in the Times. Other newspapers, notably the Herald, the Tribune 
and Sun,  frequently followed the Times' lead, while Hearst's Journal (and its 
twin, the morning American) preferred sensationalism. 
TABLE TWO  
NEW YORK CITY DAILY NEWSPAPER CIRCULATIONS 1924 
Morning Afternoon Sunday 
World 361,000 271,000 575,000 
Journal (Hearst) 300,000 -- -- 
American (Hearst) -- 641,000 1,090,000
Times 333.000 --- 535,000 
Sun -- 258,000  --- 
Tribune 131,000* -- -- 
Herald 166,000* -- -- 
Daily News -- 633,000* -- 
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Sources: New York World, Sept. 19, 1924, p. 3.
   * Richard Kluger, The Paper (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 210. 
   Note:  The Herald and Tribune merged in March, 1924. 
Pulitzer's  World  was both a "yellow" journal and a champion of  
progressive causes at the turn of  the century, but  as the years went by, Pulitzer 
became determined to make his newspaper respectable without losing its soul.  
Unlike the Journal, the World  by 1910 began to be influenced by the 
widespread movement toward scientific positivism that had been taken up a 
decade earlier by Van Anda at the Times. This movement, which coincided 
with the Progressive reform movement, promoted professionalism and 
objectivity, not only in the field of  journalism but also in art,  history, social 
science and engineering.20 
From the gold-domed 14-story office building on Park Avenue in lower 
Manhattan,  Pulitzer and his successors at the World labored over a 
"drastically independent"  newspaper that  championed "progress and reform" 
and that  would never tolerate "injustice or corruption" and "never be afraid to 
attack wrong, whether by predatory plutocracy or predatory poverty."21   With 
a dedicated following, the World was the second largest circulation news 
operation in New York, somewhat  behind Hearsts' evening Journal and 
morning American and ahead of  the Times, the Sun, the newly merged 
Herald Tribune and others, as seen in Table Two, above. Yet the empire under 
the World's gold dome was not as secure as it might have seemed from the 
outside.  Just before his death in 1911, Pulitizer had chosen Frank Cobb, a 
brilliant editor, to lead his paper. Cobb was remembered as a great editor, but 
his death  in 1923 left a vacuum at the top. The new executive editor Herbert 
Bayard Swope, and the relatively young editorial page director, Walter 
Lippmann, were both newcomers in their positions in 1924.  They sensed that 
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the World's progressive constituency was changing in the "Jazz Age," and 
worked to improve the paper's news and editorial content.  According to 
historian Edwin Emery, the World  “failed to keep pace with its orthodox rivals 
in complete coverage of  the news, even though it sometimes performed 
brilliantly.” On the other hand, many of  the World’s “subway-riding readers” 
began succumbing to the “lure of  the tabloids.”22 Thus, at the time of  the 
Ethyl controversy, the World was losing subscribers from both the high and 
low ends of  the spectrum of  readers. 
Science coverage in the World also failed to keep pace or to entertain. 
The trend in coverage was an improvement over the days of  pretty girls and 
Martians, but its science writers and editors were inexperienced and 
undiscriminating. In the era of  the Ethyl controversy, the World’s science news 
offerings included "cheap gold" from sea water, oranges “curing” baldness, 
and healing by cosmic forces.23 Stories about cancer cures abounded. Yet there 
were also stories about the ethical problems of  genetic control, Thomas 
Edison’s ideas about education through film, and even a highly speculative 
story about a scientist named Robert Goddard who thought he could send a 
rocket around the moon.24 The approach, then, was somewhat democratic -- 
the sensational, the speculative and the scientific received more or less equal 
treatment, if  for no other reason than it was impossible to determine which 
was which. 
Standards for science writing were not a major preoccupation for the 
World's 1920s editor Herbert Bayard Swope, a man described as a 
"flamboyant, self-publicizing, high living promoter.”  Swope said that "the 




We had men who made journalistic history. No poll parrots they -- no 
mere echoes of  the songs sung by hired hands. They always insisted on 
seeing the central figure... They refused to take 'no' for an answer... 
That was the best method of  obtaining accuracy -- the prize element 
good journalism...25  
Clearly, Swope's reliance on authority to produce "accuracy" 
represents the older "objective" model of  reporting.  Swope's formula for 
setting the news agenda, on the other hand, was simply to “take one story each 
day and bang the hell out of  it."26  This was the apparent strategy behind the 
World coverage of  the Ethyl controversy. While the story was developing, the 
World wrote about it frequently, quoting authorities freely and occasionally 
"banging" it in a self-promoting manner reminiscent of  Pulitzer and Cobb’s 
era. However, once the pace of  developments slackened the story was 
forgotten.  
Swope's counterpart on the editorial page could not have been more 
opposite. Walter Lippmann was cool-tempered, intellectual and inclined to 
write editorials that  closely weighed many sides of  political arguments. A 
graduate of  Harvard who had first served as editor with Herbert Croley’s New 
Republic and had worked with Woodrow Wilson’s post-World War I 
diplomatic efforts, Lippmann’s Progressive and Socialist views had evolved, in 
the crucible of  the war’s disappointments,  into a liberal democratic theory 
that was to have profound influence on the thinking of  New Deal politicians in 
the 1930s.  From the 1930s to the 1960s, Lippmann’s name became a 
household word as one of  the nation’s most pre-eminent columnists and 
pundits, and his views on objectivity and the role of  the press have been well 
characterized elsewhere.27 Around the time of  the Ethyl controversy, 
Lippmann was skeptical that the press could help inform public opinion to the 
extent that it supported the “original dogma of  democracy,” which was the 
ideal of  an informed electorate making wise choices in the public interest. 
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Science, for Lippmann, exemplified the difficulties of  an informed electorate, 
but it also represented a powerful institution that could stem the tide of  
totalitarianism and an approach to life that could potentially replace religion. 
Although most Americans were not ready to accept science as a 
religion, they did see science as a mysterious and highly competent new force 
in their lives.  After World War I, people "were ready to believe that science 
could accomplish almost anything, and they were being deluged with scientific 
information and theory," wrote historian Frederick Lewis Allen.28   Images of  
scientists in the news media were  "omniscient, powerful, well-meaning and 
heroic," according to a  survey of  popular magazines between 1910 and 1955. 
The survey also found that public interest in scientific topics peaked in 1926.29 
 The effects of  World War I and the commercialization of  new 
technologies had much to do with the new appreciation for science. In a single 
generation, a handful of  inventors had completely transformed American life.  
Edison, Ford, Bell and the Wright Brothers had become the American 
equivalent of  a pantheon of  saints. Although none of  these  inventors began 
as scientists per se, the prestige of  their accomplishments spilled over onto all 
scientific and technological enterprises of  the age.  Historian Marcelle La 
Follette provides dozens of  examples of  the supremacy of  scientific authority 
and of  the public perception of  a close link between science and technology in 
this period.  “Automobiles, radios, pocket cameras, electric appliances, 
synthetic materials ... each new product improved or changed American life 
and all carried at least the aura of  being based on scientific achievement,”  La 
Follette said.30  
The controversy over Einstein's theory of  relativity, settled by the 
Michaelson-Morley experiment demonstrating that gravity could bend light, 
had been heavily covered by the New York Times in 1919. It showed that 
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scientists were not always in accord and that the public could be interested in 
even the most arcane topics if  they were controversial.31 Other more down to 
earth controversies were highlighted in the press in the 1920s, and no one 
could look at the state of  science and technology and imagine that they had 
delivered unalloyed blessings.   Somber accounts  about scientists dying from a 
modern "leprosy" known as radiation poisoning were featured on front 
pages.32  Oil pollution had become serious enough to alarm beach resort 
owners, the Corps of  Engineers and harbor insurance companies in the early 
1920s.33  There were also thousands of  routine traffic fatalities, carbon 
monoxide poisonings, electrical fires, train and subway wrecks, steamship 
sinkings, and other disasters every year -- the entire host of  side effects of  
science and technology.   
The Ethyl controversy contributed to the contradictions in the public 
perception of  science and technology.  The many blessings of  science had 
clearly come at a cost, and the sobering truth was beginning to dawn that the 
cost had not been fully counted.  Yet at the same time, the philosophy of  
science that had produced such extravagant results in technology was just 
beginning to catch hold in various professions, including journalism. The 
leading journalists of  the era were not about to abandon science and 
technology, or even look at it too skeptically, while at the same time asking 
science and technology to carry so much of  the momentum of  their own 
philosophical approach to life and their own profession.  
Van Anda, Lippmann  and the Ethyl Controversy 
The spirit of  disinterested inquiry that  motivated science was taken up 
in many professions around the turn of  the 20th century,34 and it had 
profound importance on developments in journalism.  Carr Van Anda, 
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managing editor  of  the Times between 1901 and 1925, was one of  the early 
proponents of  scientific journalism .  Walter Lippmann, editorial page editor 
of  the World in the 1920s, was also vitally concerned with science. 
 The difference between their two approaches represents an important 
distinction in discussions about public understanding of  science and 
technology and the influence of  the scientific method on journalism.   Van 
Anda understood science and technology like no other journalist before or, 
possibly, since. His approach to science journalism involved constant study and 
personal development of  expertise in (or “knowledge of ”)  science and 
technology. 
 Lippmann did not understand the facts of  science and technology so 
much as he attempted to understand their importance in the cauldron of  
social change. He was more concerned  with “knowledge about” science and 
technology and its impact on society and public policy.35 
They had a great deal in common, in that both men believed that the 
scientific spirit  had enormous importance for civilization and had immediate 
implications for their own profession. Not only were both Van Anda and 
Lippmann very much in favor of  scientific and technological progress, but they 
wanted the profession of  journalism to internalize the methods that made this 
progress possible.  Journalism was “particularly amenable” to the scientific 
approach, they believed.36
However, they also had different political philosophies.  Van Anda, like 
the Times itself, tended to be politically  conservative, pro-business, and 
suspicious of  government regulation. Lippmann championed the liberal 
interventionist theory of  government.   These approaches and philosophies 
reflected the institutions in which the men served and also influenced the way 
issues were handled in their institutions. We do not have a great deal of  
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information about Van Anda’s personal philosophy,37   but as an expert in 
science, steeped in the ideology of  scientific progress in the heroic era of  
invention,  he might be expected to agree with the views of  Charles F. 
Kettering and Thomas Midgley.  As the acknowledged science expert on the 
Times staff, Van Anda may very likely have influenced (or written) an 
unsigned Times editorial that held that the "sentimental view" of  the tragedy 
at Bayway  must not be allowed to stand in the way of  progress. Although the 
Times provided a generous amount of  space for  critics of  GM, Standard and 
Ethyl -- even more space for Henderson’s abrasive speech of  April 24, 1925  
than the World --   Times  editors clearly deferred to industry, which they saw 
as having the greater scientific authority. They did not invest a great deal of  
credibility in the public health concerns of  university scientists.  
Public health authority was seen in a different light at the World.  The 
scientific spirit that  animated Van Anda was also prized at the World, but it 
might be described as having more of  the liberal scientific spirit that  tends to 
resist authority and question dogma.   Lippmann had noted in 1914 that 
journalism was “particularly amenable” to the scientific approach: 
 It does not matter that the news is not susceptible of  
mathematical statement. In fact, just because news is complex and 
slippery, good reporting requires the exercise of  the highest of  scientific 
virtues. They are the habits of  ascribing no more credibility to a 
statement than it warrants, a nice sense of  the probabilities, and a keen 
understanding of  the quantitative importance of  particular facts.38 
In a speech twenty years later, in 1931, Lippmann said that the 
scientific method was the heart of  the liberal concern of  “remaining free in 




 Liberalism has always been associated with a passionate 
interest in freedom of  thought and freedom of  speech, with scientific 
research, with experiment, with the liberty of  teaching, with the ideal 
of  an independent and unbiased press, with the right of  men to differ 
in their opinions and be different in their conduct. That is why it is 
associated with resistance to tyranny, with criticism of  dogma and 
authority, with hatred of  intolerance.39 
Thus, Lippmann’s idea of  the scientific approach to journalism has 
little in common with the idea of  stilted objectivity as a guarded and neutral 
approach to facts, or to naive empiricism and the piling up of  fact after fact.  It 
was, rather, the spirit of  the unfettered search for the truth.  “Of  necessity, the 
interpretation [of  events] must be an exploration, tentative, sympathetic and 
without dogmatic preconception. And whoever attempts it, whether as a 
working newspaperman, as a scholar or as a statesman must find that he is 
sailing an uncharted ocean.”40 
 Science itself  had become a destroyer of  the moral old order and the 
source of  a new social order, Lippmann said.  Civilization  depends on science 
and technology, which depends on people who refuse to put their own desires, 
tastes and interests first.  This scientific code in turn rests on “an elaborate 
method for detecting and discounting prejudices” through peer review and 
controlled experiments.   “This method provides a body in which the spirit of  
disinterestedness can live and it might be said that modern science --  not in its 
crude consequences but in its inward principle, not, that is to say, as 
manifested in automobiles, electric refrigerators and rayon silk, but in the 
behavior of  the men who invent and perfect these things -- is the actual 
realization in a practicable mode of  conduct which can be learned and 
practiced, of  the insight of  high religion.”  
Lippmann believed, then, that scientists were (or should be) completely  
disinterested, and automotive inventors (even after the Ethyl controversy) were 
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his premier exemplars of  the scientific spirit.  Lippmann railed against those 
who would “distort the basis of  public discussion by the shrewd manipulation 
of  evidence” as having succumbed to the anti-democratic temptations of  the 
era. The scientific spirit he promoted was so powerful, he believed, that it 
could (in a sense) replace religion. “It is no exaggeration to say that pure 
science is high religion incarnate,” he said in  A Preface to Morals.   
Lippmann believed that scientists were more powerful than politicians, 
but that they must be protected from politics.  He wrote to a friend: "Science is 
power if  you can fence off  the area in which it operates long enough... but the 
rate at which science expands is much slower than the pace of  politics.."41 He 
believed that regulation of  technological industry  was unquestionably needed, 
but unlike the previous generation of  Progressives, he thought regulation  was 
only a makeshift solution.   In  Public Opinion,  he said the “Great Society” 
was, at its core, made by engineers and could be “brought under human 
control only by the technic which created it.”42 This is an echo of  the idea of  
professional responsibility that  swept through the engineering profession 
between the turn of  the 20th century and the 1930s.43  A few years later, in A 
Preface to Morals, Lippmann said the “social history of  last 75 years has in 
large measure been concerned with the birth pains of  an industrial philosophy 
that will really suit the machine technology and the nature of  man.”  This new 
philosophy would be a departure from “naive” capitalism, that  produced a 
“shocking” waste of  natural resources and “a whole chain of  social evils.” 
Among these were not only obvious evils, like child labor, but also the extreme 
reaction to the social evils, such as communism,    and the moderate necessity 
of  government “policing” of  science and technology. The trouble with 
government policing was that there was “no way to make sure that the 
policemen will themselves be civilized. .. The fundamental problem is not 
Ethyl.Controversy
251
solved. It is merely deposited on the doorsteps of  the politician.” Lippmann 
may have been thinking of  the complexities of  the Ethyl controversy when he 
said: “Every year as the machine technology becomes more elaborated, the 
legislative control for which the prewar progressives fought becomes less 
effective...44 “    In a 1931 speech he said the old progressive antagonism 
toward industry had been outpaced by events:  
The Progressives of  the last generation were attempting to 
police what seemed to them an alien intruder upon their normal 
existence. For us the problem is to civilize and rationalize these 
corporate organizations ... The simple opposition between people and 
big business has disappeared because the people themselves have 
become so deeply involved in big business... This does not mean the 
economic problem is solved. It means rather that the problem has 
become subtler and greater... [The economic system] must somehow 
be made stable and yet it must expand so that the standards of  life may 
rise; it must invite the shocks which inventions and technical 
improvements produce, and yet it must also learn to insure security and 
continuity.45 
Historian  Edward L. Schapsmeier notes that Lippmann’s ideas about 
government intervention had their origins in the Federalist doctrine 
championed by Alexander Hamilton and carried on in the “American System” 
supported by Henry Clay, Matthew Carey and Baltimore editor Hezekiah 
Niles. This was not, Schapsmeier notes, the individualistic, laissez faire, small-
government democratic theory of  Jefferson and Jackson. It was, rather, the 
thread of  Republican / Progressive “active government” picked up from Clay 
by Abraham Lincoln and expanded by Theodore Roosevelt, which had taken 
a turn toward the left of  the political spectrum in the era of  big business 
reform and Woodrow Wilson and which, with the help of  Lippmann and 
others, would evolve into the New Deal.46   
 The pure food and drug laws of  the early 1900s were one turning 
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point in this evolution.  Republicans originally backed the laws, but Democrat 
Woodrow Wilson promised greater enforcement as part of  his 1912 campaign 
platform. The  laws did not cover public health threats from sources other 
than foods and drugs. In fact, there existed no mechanism for federal 
involvement in the Ethyl lead controversy, nor, in pro-business Republican 
climate of  the 1920s of  Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge and Herbert 
Hoover, were such mechanisms likely to be set up.
 Lippmann’s insistence that a disinterested spirit ruled science and 
technology must have seemed almost as tenuous as the hope for disinterested 
capitalism. Could the shock of  the introduction of  Ethyl be seen as something 
that  inventions naturally produce?  Could he have seen a disinterested spirit 
among industrial authorities who claimed  Ethyl leaded gasoline had no 
substitute and was vital to civilization?  If  he did not, as might be suspected, 
perhaps Ethyl was seen as an exception to the general rule;  perhaps these 
anomalies were not  crucial problems to Lippmann. 
Although Lippmann refers to the Ethyl controversy in some 
correspondence, he does not mention it in his books, nor is it addressed by his 
biographers. In accounting for this, it is important to recall that the broader 
scope of  Lippmann's philosophy was concerned at the time with the very 
urgent fight against the rising tide of  both fascism and communism. Science 
and industry did not need more control, he continued to insist in 1937.  “The 
naive interpreters of  the modern world who have justified the increase of  
authority in order to realize the promise of  science find themselves facing the 
awkward fact that science is being crushed in order to increase the authority 
of  the state.” He also promoted a synergistic marriage of  science and 
government in extraordinarily utopian terms: “Out of  the union of  science 
with government there is to issue a providential state, possessed of  all 
Ethyl.Controversy
253
knowledge and of  the power to enforce it. Thus at last, the vision of  Plato is to 
be realized: reason will be crowned and .. the philosophers are to be kings.”47 
Given the luxury of  historical hindsight, it would seem that the grand 
alliance between science and government saved civilization from Nazi 
Germany and Communist Russia, and that Lippmann’s very prominent 
advocacy played an inspirational role. To some extent, we might say that the 
price of  salvation involved the continuation of  “naive” capitalism and the 
continued uncushioned shocks from science and technology in the emerging 
“Great Society.”    
Lippmann, in summary, believed that industry needed guidance but 
resisted widespread regulation because he was convinced that the interests of  
democracy and of  science and technology were closely linked. He understood 
that the news media was often expected to play a  symbolic role in helping 
address imbalances in governmental power.  The imbalance, in the Ethyl case, 
had been created through the arguably premature application of  a new 
technology with dangers unacknowledged by industry. Although Lippmann 
did not think that newspapers could “take up the slack” for public 
institutions,48 he  believed that government regulation was an important 
interim step toward addressing “a whole chain of  social evils” brought on by 
unrestrained “naive” capitalism.49 Here Lippmann and colleagues from the 
Times differed; the liberal philosophy of  government intervention was not 
shared by the politically conservative Van Anda or his newspaper, which 
abhorred government interference in private business. 
Advocacy, science and the news:  Walter Lippmann and Alice Hamilton 
By the end of  the 19th century, the news media had increasingly 
become the focus of  the nation’s political life and, with it, attempts at reform. 
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James W. Carey suggests that the increasing influence of  the mass media led 
reform movements to tailor their messages to satisfy the demands of  
professional communicators, which led to the conscious staging of  speeches, 
demonstrations and marches -- in short, to the creation of  pseudo-events.50  
Social movements increasingly depended on the press to relay their concerns 
to the general public and attract new members, according to Richard 
Kielbowicz. Citing modern sociological research, Kielbowicz notes that the 
news media prefers to report dramatic, visible events; relies on authoritative, 
centralized sources; and has limited newsgathering resources and routines.51 
With these insights, both Carey and Kielbowicz see reform organizations 
molding themselves to an increasingly rationalized and ubiquitous information 
system of  the late 19th century. 
Yet there is another form of  advocacy to which the press is susceptible, 
the kind of  advocacy that offers solid expertise in exchange for the opportunity 
to inform from a clearly stated viewpoint. It is a symmetrical, friendly and 
mutually supportive exchange, which is exemplified in the relationship 
between Walter Lippmann and Alice Hamilton.  Lippmann was not an expert 
in science, as we have seen,  but he did have knowledge “about” science, and 
when affairs became complex he turned to experts who could guide him.  One 
of  his  advisors Alice Hamilton, who, as we have seen, was a medical doctor,  
Harvard University professor and public health expert. 
 Hamilton and Lippmann had met through their friendship with New 
Republic publisher Herbert Croley and his wife.52 The young Lippmann, then 
in his mid-20s and working at the New Republic, was a dashing Harvard 
graduate with a presence so impressive that he might have been on his way, as 
John Reed once said, to the presidency. Lippmann was obviously charmed by  
Hamilton, who was then  in her mid-40s.  He described her with these glowing 
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remarks:  “In a platonic world she will represent the idea of  feminism, no 
amenities required. She has the most satisfying taste of  all personalities I've 
ever met -- wine and silver and homespun."53 Hamilton lamented Lippmann’s 
support of  the war effort in 1916, but through mutual friends like Felix 
Frankfurter, Kitty Luddington and the Croleys, the two stayed in touch over 
the years.  
As a Harvard professor and the national expert on lead poisoning, 
Hamilton  was appointed to be a fellow U.S. delegate with Surgeon General 
Cumming to the League of  Nations health conferences.  She was keenly aware 
of  the controversy brewing over tetraethyl lead at the Public Health Service in 
the 1922-24 period, probably because Cumming consulted with her about it.  
She was also very concerned with a coming need for publicity. A letter from 
National Consumer League president Florence Kelly to a foundation member 
on April 18, 1924, six months before the Bayway disaster, noted that Alice 
Hamilton would meet with them on the 28th in New York to “present them 
the necessity for immeasurably more publicity than  is possible to get through 
all the agencies working in this field.”54  The exact topic and results of  this 
meeting are not known, but clearly Hamilton was intent on a direct approach 
to some news media without using "agencies." A few months later Kelly  
suggested a meeting with Lippmann to a Consumers League colleague 
working on a labor compensation issue. “Walter Lippmann as a former 
socialist might still have some bowels of  compassion about it,” Kelly said with 
an insight that had probably come from Hamilton.55 In April, 1925, Hamilton 
wrote Kelly, saying: “It seems to me that what we need is more publicity on the 
subject of  occupational poisoning. Look at this situation in NJ which Miss 
(Katharine) Wiley (of  the state Consumer’s League) has been uncovering 
(working women’s exposure to radium) and tetraethyl deaths which took place 
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in New Jersey...”56  And in the days before the May 20, 1925 Public Health 
Service conference, Hamilton wrote a friend that it was a David and Goliath 
story, with "a few scientists and the World" standing against giants like du 
Pont, General Motors and Standard Oil.57 
Some of  the correspondence between Hamilton and Lippmann during 
the 1924-25 Ethyl controversy may have been lost, but later correspondence 
refers frequently to their work together in the Ethyl case as well as in the 1927 
- 28 case of  the New Jersey  dial painters -- the “radium girls” -- who were 
dying from occupational exposure to radioactive radium. The Ethyl issue 
evolved somewhat differently than the radium issue,   since the Workers 
Health Bureau and Yandell Henderson had taken the lead while Hamilton 
was in Europe in the fall of  1924.  However, it is likely that major elements of  
the Ethyl story, such as the Harvard critique of  the Bureau of  Mines study and 
the poisoning at Columbia University -- both of  which were first carried by 
the World  --  came to Lippmann’s attention through Hamilton.  The depth of  
their professional and personal friendship is evident, for example, in a letter 
that  insisted that Lippmann and his wife visit for a weekend sometime in the 
summer at Hamilton's Hadlyme, Connecticut home. The letter also noted:  
“There is a situation at present which seems to me in need of  the sort of  help 
which the World gave in the tetra-ethyl affair.”58   
In 1928, Hamilton wrote Lippmann:  
When I thought of  the plan to ask the Surgeon General to call 
a conference on radium I felt that it would be of  no use unless 
publicity added its pressure, not because he is personally unwilling, but 
because Washington is so cautious and niggardly in its attitude toward 
the Public Health Service. We should never have got the one on tetra-
ethyl lead without your help.59 
Lippmann responded: “We should be very glad to help on the radium 
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investigation, but we would be able to do something effective only if  we were 
supplied with the necessary technical information of  which we have none, of  
course, ourselves.”60   
The May 20, 1925 Public Health Service conference on leaded 
gasoline described in Chapter Six was the first of  its kind, created in both the 
vacuum of  political authority and the spirit of  government - industry 
cooperation.  Alice Hamilton called it  the “conference system,”  but it was 
actually not  a “system.” Instead, as we have seen, the conference was a 
symbolic device to deal with  unprecedented public health controversy and 
provide the appearance of  action. Hamilton called it an “informal, extra-legal 
method” that  was effective “given a new and striking danger which lends 
itself  to newspaper publicity.”61  
Publicity was the key to the system, and sympathetic editors like 
Lippmann were the key to publicity.  “Under the scrutiny of  the press, 
conference participants discussed occupational hazards in a responsible 
fashion,” according to a 1982 dissertation by Angela Young. “As Hamilton 
described them, parties to the conferences debated ideas; they did not contest 
for power. She described each meeting as a reasoned discussion of  
occupational hazards, and ignored the politics which intervened to channel 
debate, engender conflicts and restrict the conferences’ resolutions.” The 
conferences “tested the limits of  academic debate and American politics in 
resolving such problems.”62 However, they exemplified an attempt at a model 
of  public relations described by James Grunig as the "two-way symmetrical" 
model, in which compromise, negotiation and mutual understanding from 
equal power positions occurs.63
Hamilton believed that publicity was "a wonderful thing," as she wrote 
a friend a few days before the Public Health Service conference. "It may be 
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the pebble with which David will kill Goliath."64  This optimistic faith was 
shared by a generation of  reformers, according to Hamilton biographer 
Barbara Sichermann, "and it made her somewhat complacent about the long-
range impact of  passing episodes such as the [PHS] conference which, while 
briefly focusing public attention on a new industrial poison, did nothing to 
regulate these substances."65
On the other hand, Lippmann’s affinity for social advocacy and a 
symbolic conference  animated by publicity was far less optimistic. His view 
was that the press could not be expected to "take up the slack" for public 
institutions: 
The press has often mistakenly pretended that it could do just 
that [take up the slack].  It has at great moral cost to itself  encouraged 
a democracy still bound to its original premises to expect newspapers 
to supply spontaneously for every organ of  government, for every 
social problem, the machinery of  information which these do not 
normally supply themselves.66
Yet clearly, Lippmann felt that the responsibility to “signalize” an event 
that  had public importance could not be shirked, and the World did cover the 
Ethyl controversy in as much depth as it could. 
When Hamilton wrote to Lippmann on July 5, 1928, asking how to 
proceed with the publicity for the radium conference, her letter reflected some 
of  the strategy behind the Ethyl conference.  The plan, Hamilton said, is:
 to send a letter with many signatures from interested 
physicians to the Surgeon General and on the day following before he 
has time to answer, to send it to you for publication.  Now I am 
ignorant as to the proper etiquette in such a matter and must trust to 
you for guidance. If  the interval allowed is too short or if  there is some 
proper procedure which we have not observed, I hope you will either 
let us know or proceed according to your judgement if  you do not need 
anything further from us.”67 
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A letter from Hamilton to Florence Kelly, following the 1928 radium 
conference, demonstrates the influence of  publicity in both the radium and 
tetraethyl cases: 
The (radium) conference struck me as very successful and the 
manufacturers far meeker and readier to be good than the tetraethyl 
lead men were. It is often the weapon of  publicity which we hold up 
our sleeves that impresses them and makes them ready to do what we 
(scientists) tell them to.  If  the Surgeon General appoints as well chosen 
a committee as he did for the study of  tetraethyl lead you need not be 
afraid that the matter will not be well and thoroughly handled.68
In light of  this correspondence, it seems clear that Alice Hamilton and 
Walter Lippmann worked together in publicizing what both felt was a just 
cause, although Hamilton was more optimistic about the chances for success 
than Lippmann.   For Hamilton, the problem was one of  restraining those 
who created new public health dangers. In both the tetraethyl lead and radium 
cases, mutual political interests and personal friendship worked to bridge an 
“extra-legal” gap that  the news media could approach symbolically if  it had 
the authority of  science behind it.  Lippmann’s fellow editorial writer on the 
World,  Alan Nevins,  later said:  "The journalistic world is hungry ... for the 
solidity, exactness and special expertness of  the best scholars."69  He might well 
have been talking about Alice Hamilton, who was able to provide that 
exactness, that  “necessary technical information,” that “knowledge of ” 
science that the World “of  course” did not itself  possess. 
Hamilton did not approach the confrontation with the Ethyl Gasoline 
Corp. and its partners with the idea of  defeating corporate interests, but 
clearly she was disappointed in the committee's findings in 1926. Still, she  
counted the conference a victory of  sorts because it brought industrial 
questions of  public health into a negotiating process with government as 
advised by disinterested university experts:  
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If  she expressed satisfaction with half  measures, it was also 
because she was realistic about the difficulty of  gaining absolute 
control over industrial diseases... For the most part, she believed that an 
agent would be eliminated only when a substitute was discovered or 
when it was so dangerous that even the best plants could not offer 
adequate protection to their workers. Under such circumstances, she 
readily accepted piecemeal change and small victories.70
 Hamilton's advocacy was motivated by something more than 
informing the public or using public opinion to pressure industry.  Hamilton 
envisioned a continued "conference system" that would lead to negotiation 
and compromise, and this was in fact the more satisfactory result of  the 1928 
radium conference. Thus,  the Ethyl controversy set the stage for 
environmental regulation through a cooperative system that provides a clear 
early example of  the Grunig model of  two way symmetrical communication.71 
Liberal Regulation and other Paradoxes    
This chapter has explored some of  the history of  science news writing 
and attempted to explain some of  the philosophy of  news media's leading 
editors in their approach to science and technology. These approaches were 
not uniformly applied nor were they always consistent with the apparent 
lessons of  the Ethyl controversy. One small inconsistency has to do with Walter 
Lippmann’s split from the Progressive movement over regulation of  big 
business and tight regulations over monopolies and trusts. More and more 
people depended on big business as part of  their lives; it could not be 
regulated from afar any more, he believed.  Yet the Ethyl controversy was 
settled by the appointment of  a special panel of  university based experts 
which Lippmann backed and which implied that industry was more or less 
negotiating over future regulations.    
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A  larger inconsistency involves Lippmann’s continued belief  that a 
disinterested and objective scientific spirit was at the heart of  American 
science and technology, specifically in terms of  inventions such as the 
automobile and the refrigerator.  This view was expressed after the Ethyl 
controversy in his 1929 book,  A Preface to Morals.   How did Lippmann 
reconcile this belief  with the concern that GM, Standard and du Pont had 
chosen a dangerous technology that merely suited their interests? How could 
industry say there were no alternatives when public health scientists said they  
were readily available?  One group of  the scientists surely had non-objective 
interests in the outcome -- either that, or there was no scientifically  objective 
approach to the controversy.  Yet Lippmann’s faith in the “disinterested and 
mature” spirit of  science and technology was apparently unshaken by the 
Ethyl controversy or similar  technological disfunctionalities. Historian Charles 
Rosenberg has noted that the more tenuous an area of  scientific knowledge 
and the smaller its verifiable content, the more easily its data may be bent to 
the purposes of  the scientists in the domain,72 and that provides part of  the 
explanation of  the ease with which industry scientists were able to get their 
way.  Perhaps Lippmann simply regarded the Ethyl controversy as anomalous 
rather than symptomatic of  science and technology.  
 Another inconsistency has to do with why Lippmann and the World 
attempted a more or less objective reporting approach and yet paid so much 
attention to public health authorities when Van Anda of  the Times paid more 
attention to  industry scientists.   This is the kind of  question that  might easily 
be distorted from the present perspective:  one might say that Lippmann got it 
“right” because he had more “knowledge about” science and had friends like 
Alice Hamilton supplying him with “knowledge of ” science. With 20-20 
hindsight, we now know that lead is a threat to public health.73  However, in 
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the 1920s, it was difficult to be certain that this was a fact. Given the general 
uncertainty, other explanations for the differences in news coverage appear to 
be more appropriate. 
  One other explanation for differences might be that the World’s 
support of  dissident authorities was accidental. Perhaps Lippmann and his 
editors at the World simply didn't know enough to discriminate.   The Times’  
Van Anda, with his acumen in scientific matters, was skeptical about 
authorities outside the mainstream of  science, while the World labored under 
no such restriction. Cancer cures, trips to the moon -- who could know what 
marvel of  science was right around the corner?  
Another possible explanation is the “story / information”   dichotomy 
noted  by Michael Schudson in Discovering the News. Schudson described 
what he saw as a fundamental difference in the Times and the World models 
of  news -- the former using an “information” model, emphasizing orderly 
facts and abstractions, and the latter the “story” model, emphasizing feelings. 
“We cannot infer fairness or accuracy from the fact that the Times held to an 
informational model of  journalism,” Schudson said. “Information journalism 
is not necessarily more accurate than story journalism... The Times ... trusted 
to information, that body of  knowledge understandable in itself  without 
context (or within a context taken for granted).”74 The Ethyl controversy tends 
to support  this idea to some extent. For example, the Times provided more 
concrete facts about the controversy than any other newspaper but did not 
initiate any critical stories about Ethyl. If  public criticism was aired by an 
authority, the Times would cover the criticism and the rebuttal faithfully and 
at great  length. However, the Times did not go out of  its way to get to the 
bottom of  the controversy.  It “followed” the news and presented  information 
that  had already become public. The World,  on the other hand, did not 
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present a detailed account of  each minor development. Instead, it attempted 
to  provide insight into the controversy by quoting the incisive information 
from critics. It did not reprint lengthy public relations statements by industry 
sources but it went out of  its way to print as much critical information as was 
available. The World’s stories, although not as frequent, also tended to be 
more than twice as long. 
In other respects, the information / story dichotomy does not  hold up. 
Aside from the basic source agenda, the tone and style of  both Times and 
World articles (and others) are heavily information-oriented and remarkably 
similar. Most of  the 126 articles studied in this dissertation began with some 
concrete development, quoted several authorities, avoided direct injection of  
the writer's personal opinion and had no narrative theme or story-like 
conclusion. There was very little story telling despite the potential for a strong 
emotional link to public fears about poison gas.  Also, if  any “story” emerged 
from the controversy, it was found in the Times in a semi-fictional and heroic 
narrative written by the Mellon Institute about the S.S. Ethyl’s search for “the 
riches of  the sea.” 
Most compelling is the simple political explanation.  “In the emphasis 
and choice of  news, the Times and World were guided by their political 
biases,”  Schudson said.75 This “scarcely dazzling” conclusion was one that  
Lippmann had noted in 1920 in a New Republic article on the Times bias in 
its coverage of  the Russian revolution.  “The news as a whole is dominated by 
the hopes of  the men who composed the news organization ... The chief  
censor and the chief  propagandist were hope and fear in the minds of  
reporters and editors.”76  Lippmann came to work for the World precisely 
because of  his already well-known politics. His  liberal post-Progressive belief  
that government had to tame corporations if  they were to be accepted by the 
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populace was close to the World’s existing liberal political agenda.  
 The World, then, was the one newspaper that had the political 
independence  to comfortably challenge the authority of  Standard Oil Co. 
and General Motors over its choice of  technology.  In the process, the World 
helped address an early environmental problem as part of  the “conference 
system,” which as noted in Chapter Six, was a  largely symbolic attempt to 
reconcile conflicting scientific authorities.  Although the World could signalize 
the importance of  events, it used the objective and interpretive models of  
reporting, which had their limits. The World did not penetrate the 
technological smoke screens around tetraethyl lead and it  could not "take up 
the slack," as Lippmann said, for government oversight.  
Models of  News Reporting  
If  service to the public interest is the basic yardstick by which we 
measure the performance of  the news media, the shortcomings of  the New 
York City newspapers in the Ethyl controversy  had little to do with the alleged 
offense of  sensationalism.  To industry, perhaps any coverage would have been 
objectionable because the issue itself  was "unprecedented," as a New York 
Times editorial said. Where the news media had only within the past century 
become a novel and unpredictable factor in general politics in the U.S. and 
Europe, now the news media was stepping into a new role and becoming a 
novel and unpredictable factor in technological and scientific developments.  
When W.G. Thompson of  Standard Oil and Ethyl's medical committee told 
reporters that "nothing ought to be said" about the Bayway disaster in the 
public interest,77 what he probably meant was that interference from people 
who didn't understand the issues would be a new element in the politics of  
science and technology, and that might, in the long run, work against the 
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public interest. This argument, like that of  military dictators who promise a 
"greater freedom," smacks  of  paternalistic arrogance, but it does contain 
more than a grain of  truth. Reporters were indeed on new territory in the 
1920s, having dropped (to some extent) the partisan reporting models of  the 
19th century.  (For the sake of  clarity, an overview of  news reporting models is 
provided in Table Two at the end of  this chapter). 
Like most other professions, journalism was heavily influenced by the 
quest for scientific objectivity  at the turn of  the 20th century;  and, like the 
others, it retreated in the face of  confusion and complexity in the 1920s and 
1930s. For example, noted muckraker Ray Stannard Baker said around 1906: 
"Facts, facts, piled up to the point of  dry certitude,  was what the American 
people really wanted."78  By the mid-30s, Baker had not found certitude in 
mountains of  fact, and admitted he could not understand (much less solve) 
many of  the tremendous problems in the world: "The factors are too 
complex," he said.79  This may sound like nothing less than a modern realistic 
outlook, but it is probably best interpreted as a lament about the demise of  the 
scientific method not only in  journalism but also in history, social sciences and 
other fields. That “objectivity” became a watchword in journalism around the 
same era, the mid-30s,  has been seen by historians Michael Schudson and 
Peter Novick more as a longing for the ideal, a reflection of  what had been 
lost, rather than the introduction of  a new professional code of  conduct. 
If  certitude could not be found in piles of  dry objective facts (or what 
one historian called the “haystack” technique of  reporting)80 perhaps 
authorities could at least provide interpretations of  facts that  could be 
compared. This approach, advocated by Lippmann and embodied in the title 
of  Curtis McDougall’s 1930s vintage journalism textbook Interpretive 
Reporting, is still the most significant model for  reporting controversy.81 The 
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problem with this approach, as noted by Edward Jay Epstein, is that 
“journalists are rarely if  ever in a position to establish the truth about an issue 
for themselves, and they are therefore almost entirely dependent on self-
interested sources for the version of  reality that they report.”82  
Therefore, according to Leon Sigal:
In the absence of  any foolproof  criteria for choosing sources 
who are likely to provide valid information, journalists are uncertain 
about whom to believe. They cope with uncertainty by continuing to 
rely on authoritative sources. The presumption of  hierarchy, that those 
at the top of  any organization are the people in charge and that those 
in subordinate positions do what their superiors tell them to, underlies 
the journalists criterion for selected sources even though the journalists 
themselves recognize that this presumption is often of  doubtful 
validity.83
Typically,  if  authorities differ in their interpretations, the reporter 
emphasizes two extremes for clarity and brevity. This reductionism is derisively 
known in the journalism profession as the “he said - she said” approach.  Its 
lack of  nuance, especially with regard to complex scientific and technological 
issues,  has been frequently noted. In the 1950s debate over the link between 
cancer and cigarette smoking, the Tobacco Industry Research Committee was 
established as "an authoritative front organization."  Whenever a researcher or 
doctor was quoted in the media as saying that smoking caused cancer, the 
committee and its public relations consultants made certain that someone with 
an authoritative voice was quoted as saying it did not or that there were 
problems with the research.84 
Similarly,  in a 1993 controversy over the role of  natural volcanic 
processes  in creating atmospheric chlorine responsible for ozone depletion, 
Alan S. Miller, director of  the Center for Global Change, wrote:  "When it 
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comes to questions of  scientific fact, printing 'both sides' of  an issue can be 
seriously misleading.  Unless the reader is an expert in the field being 
discussed, he or she has no basis to judge the qualifications or validity of  the 
facts presented."85 Similar dilemmas are typical in the greenhouse / global 
warming issue and most others. 
As we saw in the Ethyl controversy coverage, the news media in the 
1920s was inclined to print both industry and public health claims and let it go 
at that. Some newspapers emphasized the industry agenda, and some 
emphasized the public health agenda, but both sides were represented in most 
articles because the news media did not have the expertise to view authorities 
and facts from an independent perspective. 
   Acquiring that expertise has long been a fundamental practical 
problem for journalists. In 1967,  Irving Kristol lamented the lack of  expertise 
at the New York Times and said that most of  the news reports did not read as 
if  they had been written by people who had read journal articles or even basic 
texts in their particular field of  reporting.86 The antidote is an approach to 
reporting that might called the Van Anda model because, as noted above,  
New York Times editor Carr Van Anda was known between 1900 and the 
1920s for his specialized scientific expertise. By the 1990s, news media 
institutions such as the American Press Institute, the Center for Foreign 
Journalists, the Knight Center for Specialized Journalism and others have 
attempted to educate journalists in specialized fields like nuclear physics, 
international finance, biotechnology and medical ethics.  
 If  specialization helps rationalize news coverage, calming the “restless 
spotlight” and overcoming the "he said - she said" problem, the fundamental 
problem of  distinguishing authority remains.   Science writer Joanne Rodgers, 
for example,  believes  journalists who themselves become authorities do not 
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remain disinterested. In Europe, where the majority of  science writers are 
Ph.D.s or M.D.s, the press is “highly uncritical and heavily defensive of  the 
scientific and medical establishment.”87 
Each of  these approaches to public understanding of  complex issues 
has its  drawbacks.  The haystack approach suffers from positivistic naivete, 
the interpretive approach suffers in surrendering discretion to hierarchical 
authority, and the expert reporter approach, although useful, suffers from a 
potential toward bias as a reporter becomes an authority. The lack of  
institutional resources is problematic as well in all three cases.  As Walter 
Lippmann noted, public opinion informed by the news media cannot by an 
organ of  direct democracy.  "It is not workable. And when you consider the 
nature of  news , it is not even thinkable... At its best the press is a servant and 
guardian of  institutions ... In the degree to which institutions fail to function, 
the unscrupulous journalist can fish in troubled waters and the conscientious 
one must gamble with uncertainties."88 
Another approach suggested by Melvin Mencher in his textbook News 
Reporting is a multi-layered reporting approach resembling triage in an 
emergency room.  In the Mencher approach,  important stories receive 
detailed research treatment described as "level three," while run of  the mill 
news articles get relatively superficial "level one" treatment.  
A major departure from the reporting routine is suggested in Tom 
Koch’s Journalism for the 21st Century.   Koch notes that the primary sources 
for what is usually called “news” are interviews with authorities.  He suggests 
that infinitely replicable and connectable electronic databases and other media 
may create a “radically new relationship” between journalists and reader / 
audiences by making in-depth information available to readers on demand. 
This new technology overcomes what Koch sees as journalism's greatest 
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handicap: the “oral tradition of  news” that  turns declarative statements into 
facts and, by virtue of  personal relationships with sources and other 
institutional constraints, impedes the accreditation of  substantive materials. 
Where Walter Lippmann once insisted that journalists must trust authorities 
because the “the books and papers are in their offices,”  now, with electronic 
publishing techniques, it is theoretically easier for reporters to examine those 
books and papers and place them directly into public circulation. By doing so, 
Koch argues, journalists of  the 21st century may provide an “objectifying 
context” to the news where their counterparts a few decades before could 
not.89   
Electronic access to government documents will make some 
information easier to obtain but may also be a shield behind which portions of  
the government hide. A federal and state-by-state debate over public access to 
computerized government records in the 1990s is evolving into a series of  
pitched battles and has certainly  not yielded a bonanza of  new information. 
Even if  it does, the news media will remain a restless spotlight and the 
problem of  public understanding of  technological and scientific problems 
seems unlikely to be resolved simply by the use of  a new information 
dissemination technique.
On the other hand, there is the possibility that journalism itself  could 
evolve into a system of  gateways through which in-depth information and 
educational programs could be readily obtained.  From this standpoint, news 
itself  would be redefined as the most visible and immediate portion of  a larger 
body of  data, that is,   a "presentizing" context for information and education 
rather than a mainstream of  important data  in need of  an "objectifying" 
context.  In such a case, the contribution of  the journalist would be to provide 
an independent public interest perspective. 
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It is interesting that the handicap of  the oral tradition Koch points out 
in modern environmental controversies was also problematic in the Ethyl 
controversy.  Statements made by Kettering, Midgley and Standard Oil 
officials to the news media were treated as “facts” even though "objectifying" 
research would have showed that the oral statements contradicted published 
scientific papers. It should be noted that reporters for the New York World 
were apparently aware of  the contradiction.  In any event, there is probably 
little they could have done about the contradiction because a direct challenge 
to a news source was something that, by tradition, took place only in the 
question and answer format of  an interview, a news conference or on the 
editorial page.  If  the source did not rise to the bait and make a statement, if  a 
source refused to answer questions, there was no basis for directly contrasting 
contradictory information in a news “story,”  although a news analysis, feature 
or editorial might include such items. The World’s  May 3, 1925 Sunday 
feature comparing Henderson and Midgley did probe some of  the questions 
in a  thoughtful way, as did the Times' June 22, 1925 background article on 
the du Pont Corp.'s tetraethyl lead plant,  but they were alone among many 
other simple news articles that reflected an information disfunction due to the 
limitations of  the oral tradition.  
This problem of  structural limitation  was compounded by the 
apparent complexity of  the scientific and technological aspects of  the Ethyl 
controversy.  Ironically, an independent interpretation would have been less 
problematic than reporters probably have imagined.  A few hours of  research, 
beginning with a glance at the Readers Guide to Periodical Literature,  would 
have turned up hundreds of  articles on other anti-knock fuels and on lead-
related occupational disease published in the years before the Ethyl 
controversy. A search of  Chemical  Abstracts, also available in New York 
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libraries, would have shown that Thomas Midgley held several patents on 
alternative anti-knock fuels and that other scientists had also patented 
alternatives. The question as to why authorities who insisted that they were 
employing the scientific method and yet were not considering the range of  
alternatives might, at least, have opened a broader debate. 
The problem of  how the news media informs public opinion about 
scientific and technological controversy does not appear to be amenable to a 
simple change in reporting technique. Although "objectifying context" may be 
an improvement over  "interpretive" models, which are themselves 
improvements over "objective" models, science news coverage and public 
understanding of  the issues over the 20th century seems to have improved 
only gradually.   
Using any model,  the best that journalists can hope to achieve in a 
given situation is to balance their built-in reliance (or over-reliance) on 
authority with a sense of  social responsibility. Journalists may use contrasting 
interpretations, in-depth knowledge or electronic access as tools. However,  
good reporting still requires, as Lippmann said,  the exercise of  intellectual 
virtues:  ascribing the warranted credibility to a statement;  retaining a sense 
of  the probabilities;  and balancing an understanding of  the quantitative 
importance of  particular facts. 
In the final analysis, Lippmann may be right in saying that much of  
the problem lies outside the domain of  journalism. It is the responsibility of  
government and the scientific community to provide oversight and to ensure 
that scientific authority, technological development and the public interest are 
at least relatively close. However, in many  cases  neither government nor the 
scientific community performs adequately; that is when the news media 
becomes the court of  last resort for ideas, technologies and scientific theories 
Ethyl.Controversy
272
that should have been better accredited within their own domains.  The 
problem has to do, in part, with the sclorosis and calcification of  a 
bureaucratized system of  science and technology put in place in  World War II 
and not changed substantially in 50 years.  
The accelerating pace of  technological change and the increasing 
complexity of  related issues has caught democracy with its guard down.  
There is very little in reporting technique that can go beyond a simple striving 
for independence of  perspective, and less opportunity for the news media as a 
whole to take up the slack for government institutions in helping public 
opinion guide policy than might be hoped at this juncture of  history.  The ray 
of  hope we find in a study of  the Ethyl controversy is that the use of  any 
methods more vigorous than the purely "objective" oral tradition would have  
at least cleared away the basic issue of  the importance of  Ethyl brand leaded 
gasoline to the survival of  industrial civilization. Two hours in the library 
would have shown a reporter that plenty of  alternatives were available and 
that the claims by industry scientists were nothing more than attempts to 
deflect more controversy by issuing pronouncements that had the appearance 
-- the ring -- of  scientific authority. 
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TABLE  THREE 
 MODELS OF SCIENCE NEWS REPORTING 
Model Technique Comment 
Partisan Heroic narration, Emotional appeal disguises 
   persuasive rhetoric or    motives of  writer; 
   other non-factual approach    Typical in 19th century  
Objective "Haystack" all   data Limited by space constraints 
  (pile up dry facts)  Doesn't aid public understanding  
Prone to easy manipulation 
Interpretive Quote both sides Helps public understand 
"He said - she said" Tends to be fair in politics 
Prone to manipulation in science 
Discretion surrendered to authority 
Specialist Know everything Difficult and time consuming 
(Van Anda) Print all accredited facts Increases reporter-editor friction 
 Less source manipulation 
Easier to recognize authorities 
Reporter becomes authority 
Layered Three layer research Generalist focuses on select areas 
reporting Focus 3rd layer on  Less prone to manipulation 
(Mencher)     important news Serious research encouraged, 
    departure from "oral tradition"  
Objectifying Use computer research  Instant specialist / news in depth 
Context  Report original documents Avoids "oral tradition" problems 
(Koch)    electronically Less prone to source manipulation 
 Much easier to recognize authorities 
   Reliant on incomplete computer data 
Depends on wide use of  new systems 
Independent Recognize origins of  info  Less prone to source manipulation 
Perspective Search for other sources Broadens reporter research burden 
"Presentizing" context Maintains public interest tradition 
   for education     in novel situations 
Better, but not a solution to the 
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   dilemma of  public understanding of  







THE RING OF AUTHORITY 
AND THE PROBLEM OF PERSPECTIVE 
This dissertation has described a little known but important controversy in the history of  
technology and journalism. Chapter One introduced the specific purpose of  the dissertation in 
understanding the role of  the news media in the Ethyl controversy. It noted that the role has been 
misunderstood by historians and that this has led to an over-reliance on archives which tend to be 
selective in favor of   industry perspectives. Chapter One also suggested that new approaches to 
the technical issues are opened by taking the public controversy seriously.  
 Chapter Two reviewed some of  the literature about the Ethyl controversy, noting that the 
role of  the news media has received almost uniformly negative historical treatment  despite a lack 
of  research. Chapter Two also located the  context of  the Ethyl controversy in the deepening rift 
between positivistic science linked with the ideology of  industry on the one hand and a 
humanistic science linked with  labor, consumers and progressive political movements on the 
other.  In addition, chapter Two also described the conservation and public health movements 
and the trend toward technological regulation as components of  world views in conflict during 
the Ethyl controversy. 
Chapter Three provided a new interpretation of  the technological context of  the 
discovery of  leaded gasoline based on information recently made available at the G.M.I. (General 
Motors Institute) Alumni Collection archives in Flint, Mich. In the face of  expected oil shortages 
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by the 1940s, the main thrust and “special motive” of  General Motor’s fuel research in the 1919 - 
1923 period appears to have been to raise compression ratios in engines to facilitate the 
anticipated shift to non-petroleum sources of  liquid fuel.   Of  particular interest to Kettering and 
researchers was ethyl alcohol (which Midgley called "of  course, the fuel of  the future") 
manufactured from farm products, from petroleum and eventually from cellulose residue from 
farming and forestry.  Metallic anti-knock additives such as lead were originally considered 
transitional devices to ethyl alcohol and not final and perfected products in and of  themselves.  
Chapter Four examined the news media's approach to the lead poisoning deaths of  five 
workers at the Standard Oil refinery in Bayway, New Jersey in late October of  1924. When G.M. 
and Standard Oil officials maintained silence about the origin and nature of  tetraethyl lead 
during the first week of  news coverage,  the news media used workers’ ideas (“loony gas”)  and 
descriptive terms (“mystery gas”) for the unknown product. Chapter Four also shows that the 
news media generally deserved credit for the routine public service of  bringing out the facts of  
the Ethyl controversy and providing some space for all points of  view, which is consistent with its 
professional responsibilities. The news media were not able to understand the controversy deeply 
enough to compensate for the  government in the area of  public health oversight and 
technological regulation. Yet the news media apparently assumed it was more limited than it was, 
and public understanding of  the context of  the controversy was hampered by the lack of  
research which would have been considered routine in areas more familiar to the press.  
Chapter Five explored the private controversy between the various interests, and showed 
that the haste with which the Standard and du Pont manufacturing plants were assembled in the 
1923 - 1924 period was a result of  the  fear of  competition from alternative anti-knock additives. 
The hurried approach  led to the deaths of  17 workers and the poisonings of  hundreds more. To 
keep their options open,  G.M. , Standard, du Pont and Ethyl officials patented a number of  
alternatives and debated them among themselves;  yet their public posture was to absolutely deny 
that alternatives existed and to vilify their critics.
 Another important point made in Chapters Five of  this dissertation is that the hazards of  
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tetraethyl lead were well understood by industry as early as 1922.  Industry historians have 
claimed that only after the October 1924 deaths at Bayway, New Jersey were G.M. and Standard 
Oil appraised of  the danger of  tetraethyl lead. This is clearly inaccurate given the internal 
warnings from independent scientists two years beforehand, the secret formation of  the inter-
corporate "medical committee" in the spring of  1924, the unpublicized deaths in Deepwater, 
New Jersey, and Dayton, Ohio in the spring of  1924, and the private arguments between du Pont 
and Standard engineers in the summer of  1924.   
 Chapter Six discussed the May 20, 1925 conference sponsored by the Public Health 
Service in Washington, D.C. that heard from most viewpoints in the Ethyl controversy.  The 
conference was cut short from its original longer schedule and avoided discussion about 
alternatives to tetraethyl lead.  The conference also led to the appointment of  a blue ribbon 
investigating committee that by January, 1926,  issued a preliminary finding that  "no good 
reason" could be found for prohibiting the sale of  leaded gasoline. The committee was given a 
short lead time and no money to supervise Public Health Service researchers. Moreover, some 
components of  the original plan, such as surveys of  garage employees outside of  Ohio,  were 
dropped for economic reasons. Despite the strong recommendations of  the blue ribbon 
committee,  no subsequent studies were performed on the public health aspects of  leaded 
gasoline until the 1960s. Experts from Ford Motor Co. had been in touch with committee 
member C.E.A. Winslow of  Yale about alternatives to tetraethyl lead,  but despite Winslow's 
request, mention of  alternatives was not included in the final report.  
Chapter Six also shows that, at a crucial moment in the controversy, the attitude of  the 
federal government moved from skeptical oversight to commercial  support of  Ethyl. In the 1922 
- 1924 period, the Surgeon General expressed serious concern about  leaded gasoline. However, 
in May, 1925, the Surgeon General cut short the conference,  avoiding discussion of  alternatives. 
By the late 1920s and early 1930s the Surgeon General wrote letters of  introduction for Ethyl 
officials to health ministers of  foreign nations and actively promoted Ethyl brand leaded gasoline 
at European scientific conferences. Also, the Commerce Department kept quiet a May, 1925, 
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report that contained detailed information on the use of  alternatives to Ethyl leaded gasoline in 
foreign countries.  The Interior Department performed a supportive study of  tetraethyl lead with 
the Mellon Institute ( funded by interests that owned Gulf  Oil Co., a marketer of  Ethyl), which 
did not take real-world conditions into account.  Meanwhile,  studies which  directly compared 
Ethyl leaded gasoline with alternatives, such as one by U.S.D.A. and U.S. Naval Academy 
researchers on ethyl alcohol blends, were never published.
The failure of  government oversight was matched by the failure of  the peer review 
system. No automotive or chemical engineering peers of  Kettering or Midgley   directly 
challenged sweeping claims that alternatives to Ethyl brand leaded gasoline did not exist.1 
Challenges by non-peer scientists across disciplines tended to refrain from direct statements about 
the technical efficacy of  tetraethyl lead or specifics about alternatives, although it was clear that 
advocating use of  known substitutes was one of  the best strategies of  public health advocates in 
other controversies.  
In Chapter Seven, a review of  the historiography of  the Ethyl controversy found that at 
best historians have ignored the news media and at worst they have cast it in the role of  
purveying sensationalistic yellow journalism and ignoring the industry perspective. A content 
analysis of  sources quoted by leading New York newspapers in the controversy showed, on the 
contrary, that industry sources heavily dominated the news coverage. 
Another interesting finding was that while the New York World and the New York  Times 
used similar models of  objective reporting, the editorial agenda was strikingly different when it 
came to coverage of  the two  opposed factions of  scientists. While the World cited university 
public health scientists in over  9,000 words of  copy between 1924 and 1926, the Times cited 
university sources in only 3,000 words. On the other hand, while the World cited industry 
scientists (and other industry sources) in 5,000 words of  copy, the Times cited industry sources in 
6,500 words.  These differences in source reliance reflect a basic political difference that is evident 




In addition, an analysis of  the use of  the term “loony gas” also showed that the supposed 
sensationalism of  the news media had been greatly exaggerated and that the term had been 
coined not by an "imaginative" news media (as has been frequently claimed by industry 
historians) but rather by the refinery workers who were quite familiar with the effects of  tetraethyl 
lead.  It might be noted that this relatively small point reflects the contemporary distance between 
company executives and their workers as well as the influence of  the industry perspective on 
mainstream historians.  
Chapter Eight continued the discussion about the news media with a look at the history 
of  science news and the philosophies of  two of  the leading editors of  the era, Carr Van Anda of  
the  Times and Walter Lippmann of  the World.  The struggle of  these two men to understand 
the changes that science had brought about in their world, along with their overwhelmingly 
supportive attitude toward the doctrine (or ideology) of  scientific progress,  shows that there is no 
contextual basis for industry historians to portray the news media as waging an anti-scientific 
campaign against Ethyl.  A better historical interpretation of  the problem is that the news media 
recognized the uniqueness of  the controversy but did not check patents, chemical abstracts or 
scientific journals to ensure the accuracy or depth of  its reporting.  Thus, the contribution of  the 
news media in understanding the Ethyl controversy was to keep score but not broaden the 
debate, and in that respect, the media failed as much as the government or the peer review 
system.  The media did not inform the public about possible alternatives or the extent to which 
worker deaths occurred through the negligence of  Standard Oil Co. of  New Jersey, E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours, or General Motors Corp.  Why these ideas were difficult to approach until recently, 
and only with the collapse of  the paradigm of  tetraethyl lead as a "successful" invention,  speaks 
to the the way in which authorities moderate the relationship between science and technology  
and the public interest.  One aspect of  the problem is the extent to which the public can be 
expected to understand the broad outlines of  scientific information in order to guide policy 
decisions. Another aspect is the extent to which the public interest can be subordinated to private 
interests through the clever manipulation of  information by expert authorities. 
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These twin facets of  the problem of  scientific understanding in policy issues -- how much 
the public can understand versus how much the scientists are willing to disclose -- are reminiscent 
of  the "two cultures" debate which emerged around essays of  scientist / author C.P.Snow in the 
1950s.  The intellectual life of  the whole of  Western society was increasingly being split into two 
polar groups, Snow said: literary intellectuals at one pole and scientists at the other.  The result 
was that society could not "think with wisdom" and was missing "creative chances."  The gap 
between the two cultures should be closed "for the sake of  the intellectual life and ... for the sake 
of  Western society living precariously rich among the poor who needn't be poor if  there is 
intelligence in the world."2  
Most of  the attention in closing the gap has been focused on popularizing science, on 
making it accessible to the public. The Ethyl controversy is a problem which emerges from the 
other side of  the equation, that is, from the scientific side of  public understanding. Although 
scientists were deeply divided over the introduction of  Ethyl leaded gasoline, those who opposed 
Ethyl were influenced by humanistic concerns. For example,  Alice Hamilton's professional 
outlook was deeply rooted in the Hull House experience. Yandell Henderson had been deeply 
concerned about poison gas manufacturing during World War I. 
 As was noted in Chapter Eight, understanding and questioning scientific authority is not 
traditionally the long suit of  journalists. In fact, science had been taken seriously by most 
newspapers only in the post World War I era, and reporting methods   had not been well 
developed. For example, Walter  Lippmann felt that "we would be able to do something effective 
only if  we were supplied with the necessary technical information of  which we have none, of  
course, ourselves."  He would never have said this about politics. He would never have agreed 
that effectiveness in political reporting was  a matter of  being supplied with  the necessary 
information, as opposed to going out and finding the information for himself. He tended to be as 
empirical, in that respect, as any scientist. Nevertheless, the Ethyl controversy demonstrates what 
can happen when the news media mistakenly believed that the responsibility had become too 
complex for its resources and too easily surrendered an independent perspective to the presumed 
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safety of  a false balance between news sources.  The comparison between the World and the 
Times coverage of  the Ethyl controversy in Chapter Seven tells us that editors chose different 
points at which to locate the fulcrum of  the superficial balance. The discussion about science 
writing in Chapter Eight provides additional context.  However, we also need to ask why so many 
critical points about the Ethyl controversy eluded the news media and the public when they were 
potentially so closely at hand. We need to ask what role scientific authority played in influencing 
the debate.  
The Ring of  Authority and the News Media 
Charles Kettering once told a group of  newspaper editors a story about a reporter who 
missed the news about the first airplane flight: 
When the Wright brothers made their first  flight at Kitty Hawk, they telegraphed 
home to their sister Catherine in Dayton: "We have just completed first successful  flight 
in heavier than air machine and will be home for Christmas." 
When Catherine received this telegram she called up the [Dayton] newspaper 
office ...  "I have an item for your paper," she said, and she read the brothers' telegram. 
"Well," replied the reporter after several moments pause, "We are certainly glad to 
hear that the boys are going to be home for Christmas." 
[Later] the reporter ... said that everyone knew the Wright brothers were trying to 
fly, but no one believed they would succeed, because they had all been told by so many 
authorities that flying in a heavier than air machine was impossible.3  
Kettering enjoyed the story because it demonstrated that presumably unassailable 
authorities could be quite wrong -- such as those who did not think heavier than air machines 
could work.  Many scientists had challenged authority in previous ages and had dared to think 
and experiment for themselves.  Kettering saw an important lesson in the turnover of  
authoritative views.  He often encouraged other scientists and engineers to push back the limits 
of  science and not be bound by the conclusions of  those who had studied the problem before. It 
is a little ironic, although very much in character,  that he also encouraged journalists to do the 
same. 
At the time of  the Ethyl controversy, Kettering’s successes with the electric starter, the 
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Delco engine, anti-knock gasoline and other engineering problems had made him one of  
America’s  most respected scientists. His presidency of   the Society of  Automotive Engineers in 
the post-World War I era confirmed and reinforced his authority.  Kettering’s colleagues held him 
in high esteem, in part for his genius and in part for his jocular, collegial manner that set the style 
for a generation of  engineers in the way that Chuck Yaeger set the style for a generation of  test 
pilots and astronauts in the 1960s. 
Kettering was a formidable authority,  in a sense an "elevated" authority, rather than 
merely an expert. This is reflected even in the typography of  the proceedings of  the Public 
Health Service conference of  May, 1925 published several months afterwards. In the table of  
contents, Kettering’s opening discussion shares top billing with the Assistant Secretary of  
Treasury, the Secretary of  Interior, and the Surgeon General. The rest of  the speakers who 
followed Kettering are all listed under various subheadings, such as "industry" and "public 
health." Only Kettering appears to share authority with government officials.  His discussion of  
the “history of  tetraethyl lead in relation to gas engines” was, of  course, an appropriate starting 
point for the P.H.S. conference; and since he represented Ethyl Gasoline Corp. and General 
Motors, no one would have expected him to give a completely disinterested account.  Yet few 
could have known how deeply such interests would affect the issues at hand.  The general faith in 
science and in the professionalism of  engineering obscured the levels at which Kettering was 
capable of  promoting corporate interests while appearing to be concerned with the public 
interest. That is, to take a page from public relations theory, Kettering practiced an asymmetrical 
approach to public controversy,  although,  as an elevated authority he was expected to take a 
symmetrical approach and incorporate broader public interest goals into his own thinking.4 
As noted in Chapter Six, Kettering told the P.H.S. conference that  G.M. had tried a 
number of  materials that allowed high compression without engine knock. They were 
impractical because “in the great volume of  the paraffin series we could not do that.”5 This 
conclusion skims across several overlapping assumptions: 1)  first, that  additives  were needed, 
rather than more refining or blending of  other fuels;  2) that they had to be made from the 
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paraffin series, that is, from petroleum, and not some other resource;  and  3) that non-petroleum 
additives did not exist or were not available.  
Kettering’s statement may be self  serving, but was it a deliberate falsehood? Kettering 
knew that new catalytic refinery processes were twice as effective as tetraethyl lead and were 
being used at the time by Sunoco and Atlantic Richfield, according to correspondence written 
shortly after the P.H.S. conference concerning “substitutes” for Ethyl gasoline.  He also knew that 
anti-knock additives were routinely made from coal, wood, farm crops, desert plants and even sea 
kelp, and they were often within the same price range as gasoline in both the U.S. and in Europe.  
G.M. researchers Midgley and Boyd had noted the technical qualities of  these additives in several 
published papers and in many office memos to Kettering. They had contributed to professional 
research on non-leaded anti-knock additives.  They had tested a 30 percent blend of  ethyl alcohol 
and gasoline by driving a G.M. car running on the blend to a Society of  Engineers meeting two 
months before tetraethyl lead was discovered. Yet Midgley later told a chemical engineering 
conference that “so far as science knows” only tetraethyl lead could bring about anti-knock 
results; and  Kettering told the P.H.S. conference that alternatives were known but “we could not 
do that.”6 
Some distinction must be recognized between arguments to the effect that alternatives are 
expensive, impractical or problematic and arguments to the effect that alternatives do not exist, 
are not known to science, or cannot possibly be manufactured or used. The distinction is between 
a reasoned scientific judgment   that may be open to question and an absolute and categorical 
denial that assumes full authority and admits no questions.  By omitting many significant details 
and glossing over troublesome questions, Kettering assumed full authority and gave the P.H.S. 
conference a carefully crafted evasion concerning alternatives to tetraethyl lead.  However much 
we may wish to avoid assessing 1920s industrial secrecy in modern terms, it is difficult to see the 
statements of  Ethyl, G.M.  and Standard officials as anything less than a distortion of  the basis of  
public discussion by a  shrewd and defensive manipulation of  evidence. In other words, Kettering 
and Midgley created a technologically  sophisticated falsehood, wrapped it  in a smokescreen of  
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jargon, and sealed it with the "ring" (or external appearance) of  authority. 
The ring, in this case, was false. Ethyl brand leaded gasoline was not the product of  a 
scientific method which dispassionately considered all alternatives. Scientist and philosopher Carl 
Hempel notes that an adequate scientific explanation considers "first of  all, what consequences 
each of  the different alternative choices is likely to have.”7  The alternatives to tetraethyl lead 
were not discarded on the basis of  their technical efficiency, their availability or their cost at the 
pump. Public health and economic issues aside, tetraethyl lead itself  presented serious engine 
problems, as was evident in the crash of  the airship Shenandoah. It  was also less effective at 
raising octane than other processes (such as the new catalytic refining processes), and was less 
thermodynamically efficient than alcohols or benzenes.  
Tetraethyl lead was chosen for  non-scientific reasons. First of  all, it had more profit-
making potential for General Motors and Standard than the other alternatives. In 1923, Midgley 
estimated (as we saw in Chapter Three) that G.M.  could capture about 20 percent of  the 
gasoline market at three cents gross per gallon, or about 36 million dollars a year.  In fact, by 
1933, General Motors and Standard Oil split gross profits of  at least a quarter billion dollars per 
year, an amount that grew to half  a billion per year by the end of  the decade.  Other "octane 
boosting" techniques were technically and even economically feasible but they involved other 
companies, and the profits would be spread out among many corporations.  Ethyl leaded 
gasoline, on the other hand, provided G.M. and Standard with  concentrated profits.  Aside from 
financial gain, another important motive was a desire to stay the course after so much company 
prestige had been invested. In addition, the view of  public health concerns as sentimental, 
unmanly and even socialistic was also prevalent and weighed against any "slowing" of  progress in 
the name of  public health.  
 The myth encouraged by the Ethyl Gasoline Corp. for many decades was that its product 
emerged from scientific research, was the only anti-knock product available,  and was temporarily 
subjected to public prejudice and hysteria whipped up by the news media. That, however,  is an 
all too convenient fiction.  The reality is that the nation's largest corporations decided on a 
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technological direction that was most profitable and that they were scarcely concerned with  their 
own workers or the general public health. 
In the apparent absence of  corporate responsibility, how are worker health and public 
health  constraints to be applied? In the democracy Vannevar Bush and so many others fought to 
maintain in the 1940s, public opinion depends on scientific authority to adequately establish the 
premises of  policy debates. In the Ethyl controversy we see scientific authority narrowly 
pigeonholed:  public health scientists found it difficult to discuss the alternatives known to 
chemical and mechanical engineers, and industrial scientists could not (or would not) consider 
public health from their colleague's perspectives.  Fragmented science led to an uncertain ground 
for public policy debate in the news media. 
Cross disciplinary debate in the news media has been noted as a danger by historian 
Marcel LaFollette, who said the problem with news media over-reliance on scientific authority 
was that authorities would speak in areas for which they were not qualified and that journalists 
would “too often quote what is actually political or social commentary as scientific assertion of  
fact.” So long as science is considered to be the paramount authority, La Follette concluded, 
“there will be significant potential for abuse.”8 
The opposite problem occurred in the Ethyl controversy. Here we find the abuse well 
inside the scientists’ expertise and the public interest criticism emerging from scientists in other 
disciplines who were not considered to be qualified authorities.  Oversight of  scientists within 
their own area of  expertise is clearly quite difficult for government, the press and ordinary people 
-- peer review is widely assumed to be the counterbalance. Yet dissenting expert opinion is almost 
always contained within a discipline, and peer review is hardly a substitute for public interest 
oversight.  In order to speak out, scientists must rise above or ignore peer review. As  Rae Goodell 
noted in her  1977 book, The Visible Scientists, those who were able to publicly speak within 
their areas of  expertise tended to be established scientists free from peer pressure.9  Few critics 
ever attain such a position.  Moreover, peer review has not had a good track record in 
encouraging the application of  technology to public interest ends rather than private goals.   
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  One aspect of  this long standing debate involves the problem of  engineering 
professionalism.  Edward Layton has seen the problem as an ideological struggle between 
conservative and progressive engineers.10  David Noble saw it as a struggle by engineers in 
general to avoid capitulating to the business elite.11 Samuel Fluorman took issue with both of  
these perspectives, saying that, realistically, corporate culture did not seem to consist of  ‘good’ 
engineers seeking to protect the public from ‘bad’ managers.  “Technological mishaps are almost 
never caused by unethical conduct and almost always by ignorance, carelessness or ineptitude,"  
he said.  Engineers usually identify with their company and feel little need to be “freed” to 
protect the public interest.  The historical theory holds even less water today, Fluorman said, in 
an age where regulations, rather than professional ethics, stand in the way of  technological 
disasters.12
Each of  these models can be applied to the Ethyl controversy. Using Layton's model, 
progressive engineers like H.R. Ricardo backed alcohol fuel. Also, the “good” engineers of  du 
Pont  attempted to protect their workers from the “bad” management of  G.M. and Standard 
because they appreciated the dangers of  tetraethyl lead manufacturing.13  Using Noble's model, 
engineers like Kettering and Midgley saw tetraethyl lead as a bridge to a better source of  energy, 
but they  were undercut by the corporations who removed them from management in 1925 and 
told them to go work on something else. Fluorman's idea that usually ignorance or carelessness is 
to blame does cover some of  the ground, but it doesn't quite explain the deaths of  17 tetraethyl 
lead workers and the nationwide commercialization of  Ethyl leaded gasoline. 
 On the broader point, however, the models don't work.  The Ethyl controversy is not 
about conflicts among engineers or between engineers and managers. It is a conflict across 
scientific disciplines that, when intractable, turned political, and when volatile, turned public. 
When industry refused to withdraw, a symbolic resolution in the form of  a well publicized 
conference and a blue ribbon committee restored at least the sense that such conflicts could be 
approached and that authority could be trusted. In other words, the paradigm of  scientific 
authority was temporarily repaired. Industry held back regulation of  leaded gasoline for 60 years, 
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and only after "overwhelming" evidence piled up was anything done about what must be seen as 
the most obvious public health and environmental problem in history. 
Were scientists and engineers expected to live up to a standard of  conduct that went 
beyond private interests? Were they expected to be disinterested and objective? Of  course they 
were. The theme of  science delivering humanity and the sanctity of  the scientific method are 
ideas which resonate throughout the literature of  the 20th century.  The accumulated hopes and 
dreams of  generations were deeply attached to science. Lippmann and many others seriously 
expected science to replace religion and explicitly saw the scientific attitude as near holy.  
 To the extent that the discovery of  Ethyl leaded gasoline was seen as "scientific," the 
product was associated with a greater good. Carleton Ellis, president of  the New Jersey Chemical 
Society, was quoted as saying Ethyl gasoline “rests on a true scientific foundation.”  The 
American Chemical Society saw the deaths at Bayway as insufficient reason for abandoning a 
way to increase the power of  gasoline, and from this the New York Times took its cue:   “As there 
is no measurable risk to the public ...  the chemists see no reason why its manufacture should be 
abandoned. That is the scientific view of  the matter, as opposed to the sentimental.”14  
These conclusions were based on the assumption that the scientific method had been 
employed in developing tetraethyl lead and that the most scientifically objective course of  action 
had prevailed in corporate policy -- an assumption that may seem naive in the modern era.  
Today it is commonplace that scientists and engineers are not necessarily objective in the sense 
that they can set aside their political and commercial interests. The scientific method guarantees 
very little and technological problems are not always approached by objectively weighing and 
balancing scientific facts.  “Perfect objectivity” as one scientist said recently, “is a myth."15  The 
bitter disputes in recent years over the safety of  nuclear reactors, the effects of  electromagnetic 
fields and toxic chemicals (such as dioxin) and a thousand other issues demonstrate that the 
scientific method alone cannot resolve many of  the questions created by scientific and 
technological progress, much less address the broad social and human questions for which people 
held such hope at the dawn of  the 20th century.  In fact, many of  the important controversies 
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about science and technology involve not straightforward issues of  technical policy but rather, as 
Carl Hempel said, “intricate complexes of  technological and moral issues.” The fundamental 
problem for Hempel was whether such complex issues could be solved by using the scientific 
method.  Although science could not provide validation of  categorical moral judgments, it could 
assist in clarifying moral decisions.  “In order to make a rational choice between several courses 
of  action, we have to consider, first of  all, what the consequences  each of  the different 
alternative choices is likely to have. This affords the basis for certain relative judgments of  
value16 ...”   Of  course, if  we ignore the alternative choices, or are not informed about them, we 
have no basis for the relative judgments of  value, which help form the independent perspective 
that was so lacking in the Ethyl controversy.   
It is ironic that Walter Lippmann, who of  all non-partisan observers had the clearest 
possible contemporary window into the Ethyl controversy, clung to the belief  that science could 
validate categorical moral judgments and offer a way out of  the morass and drift that 
characterized politics of  the era. Lippmann and many others believed that political science could 
end wars and social science could create a free and classless society. Hadn’t physics and chemistry 
revolutionized the world? What more would science do for mankind when applied to society?  
When Walter Lippmann gave science the leading role in rescuing civilization in his 1914 book, 
Drift and Mastery, he was simply amplifying an ideal of  objective science that had taken deep 
roots at all levels of  society. In 1928, several years after the Ethyl controversy,  Lippmann again 
insisted that the spirit of  objectivity was at the heart of  the invention of  automobiles, 
refrigeration and other technologies  and said that it should be at the heart of  journalism. In  
1937, he promised that by uniting the authority of  science and the authority of  government  we 
would at last realize the vision of  Plato and the philosophers would become the kings. These 
ideas make it seem as if  Lippmann did not understand the Ethyl controversy, or that he saw it as 
anomalous and not symptomatic.  
  Led by Lippmann and other positivists, Americans virtually begged their politicians to 
put on white lab coats in the opening decades of  the 20th century.  The threat of  fascism in the 
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late 1920s and 1930s further blurred the lines between American political and scientific authority. 
In the 1940s, the atomic bomb punctuated the power of  that authority like no other event had 
ever done before. However, mounting uncertainties about the scientific enterprise and the 
challenges posed by technological dilemmas had already been eroding the authoritative ring of  
objective science.  At first, after World War I, many of  the flaws were seen only  on the theoretical 
or academic levels.  As the philosophy of  naive empiricism began to crumble in the tide of  
cynicism, the Ethyl controversy  represented an early indicator of  the ill health of  and pending 
reaction against the  objective authority of  science in the late 20th century.  This reaction might 
not have been so strong had journalists of  the 1920s realized that the ring of  authority was not 
an intrinsically insurmountable holy sanctuary  so much as it was one of  many  temporary and 
contingent constructs that promoted a few interests for a short time. Irenee du Pont, for example, 
said of  Ethyl's board of  directors following the Bayway disaster: "They didn't know what was 
going to happen to them."  In another time, or in another country, they might very well have 
gone to jail.  The terror from the inside of  the ring of  authority could not be felt or seen from the 
outside, where it appeared unassailable, but it was none the less real because only from inside did 
its temporary and contingent nature become apparent. 
 In an essay on authority and social change, John Dewey once said that individualism in 
revolt against authority is an historical paradigm that we tend to take for granted because it has 
been a dominant historical model over the past few centuries.  We tend to think that social 
authority is the enemy of  individual freedom because of  the historical experience of  bloody 
revolutions against unreasonable authorities, especially in America and France.  This is an 
immature perspective, he said. The more important problem is the ongoing relationship between 
authority and freedom. Dewey rejected laissez-faire economics that attacked all authority along 
with the concept of  intransigent authority that created confusion and chaos by resisting change. 
He urged an organic union of  freedom and authority employing corporate or “organized 
intelligence” such as that embodied by science.17 
Late 20th century popular culture has carried the myth about social authority into the 
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realm of  scientific authority and reached the identical conclusion -- that it is the enemy of  
freedom -- despite the schizophrenia inherent in simultaneously depending upon technology and 
yet psychologically rejecting it.  No doubt the many insults of  science and technology -- the atom 
bomb, pesticides, radiation, air pollution and so on -- have led us to the conclusion that, as 
Barbara Tuchman put it,  "the fairy godmother, Science, turns out to have brought us as much 
harm as good."18 No doubt, as  Lewis Mumford said, the “horn of  plenty” is little more than a 
“magnificent bribe” meant to get us to overlook the insults of  technology.  The same idea is 
ubiquitous in popular science fiction -- from Mary Shelly's 1828 book Frankenstein to modern 
films such as E.T.,  Terminator II,  Lawn Mower Man and many others. Scientists are the bad 
guys; technology is wrong; the individual human spirit (which must be at odds with technology)  
is what counts. 
 The cultural rejection of  science and technology is an historic shift with tremendous 
consequences.  Outright love of  science and technology once was, as Jules Verne said, the 
American “birthright.” Now the love affair is over, but the machine is still happily munching in 
the garden. The tragedy is in part the erosion of  the possibility that a broader vision of  science 
and technology could help solve some of  the problems. 
One day, when American science and technology is recognized as obviously second rate, a 
commission will be formed to discover just who sold the "birthright." The obvious scapegoat, so 
aptly identified by industry historians, will be the news media's negativity and pessimism, which 
snatched away American enthusiasm for the once hallowed domain.  Right wing conservatives 
may well believe that the media lost the "war" for scientific supremacy just as they believe that it 
"lost" the war in Vietnam. Yet we can see in the Ethyl controversy just how convenient  it is to 
blame the messenger for the message and just how accurate such an historical conclusion would 
be.  
The venom directed toward the news media and public health reformers in the 1920s is 




Opposition to environmentalism, of  course, is as old as the movement itself. Those 
who used public resources to create wealth for themselves -- the timber and cattle barons, 
the mine operators, the oil companies, big agriculture, and industries that regarded the air 
and water as free commodities, as a commons into which the could pour their polluting 
effluents, predictably and consistently reacted to efforts to control their activities with  the 
tolerance of  a nest of  angry rattlesnakes.19
By reporting facts and interpretations of  facts, the news media could be considered an 
agent of  control over activities that affect "the commons."  Although not a policing agency, its 
watchdog function alone tends to arouse the ire of  companies that expect to use public resources 
without question. Even when the news media tend to be supportive of  industry, as were the New 
York Times and the Herald Tribune during the Ethyl controversy, the very existence of  
controversy is enough  to trigger hypersensitivity. The Ethyl controversy shows how easily and 
effectively scientific and technological authority could be invoked by industry in the 1920s. It also 
shows that the public interest in science and technology is not always effectively guarded by the 
news media, whose institutional claim to disinterested guarding of  the commons is theoretically 
valid but only as pragmatically sound as the length of  its attention span.  
As Jacob Brownowski once said, what is at stake in public understanding of  science and 
technology is, in the end, democracy.  For a bored public to abdicate an interest in science is "to 
walk with eyes open into slavery."20 The problem  remains one of  public vigilance,  the 
development  of  an independent perspective among citizens and an increase in appreciation for 
debate among scientists and engineers. Citizens may not understand all the technological details, 
but they may not need to so long as the salient points become part of  the debate.  Alternative 
technological approaches are not as difficult to understand or to implement as is often assumed, 
given access to data and an independent perspective.  In short, the barriers to public 
understanding of  science and technology are not necessarily insurmountable if  the press and the 
people are awake.  
An important conclusion that emerges from a study of  the Ethyl controversy is that the 
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ring of  authority is tentative and the participation of  the public is not contingent upon the 
mastery of  every detail if  at some point an independent perspective is brought to bear on 
"knowledge about"  scientific and technological problems.  In other words, the leaded gasoline 
question was never that difficult to understand, but it had to be resolved through political rather 
than scientific methods.  
The Ethyl controversy was one of  many  reversals for the idea that science and 
technology would save humanity, an idea which opened and characterized much of  the 20th 
century.   One of  history’s great ironies must surely be that the century that began with such a 
grandiose notion now ends with  so many  intricate complexes of  technological and moral issues 
dependent on political and social methods to resolve them.   
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Chronology of  leaded gasoline  
(Note: This version reflect improvements over the original dissertation as of  
2013.) 
3000 BCE — First significant mining and refining of  metalic lead.
500 BCE-300 AD — Roman lead smelting produces dangerous emissions.
c. 400 BCE – Hippocrates describes lead poisoning
250 BCE — Greek philosopher Nikander of  Colophon in 250 BC reported on the colic and 
anemia resulting from lead poisoning.
200 BCE – 400 AD — Development of  lead mines in Spain and Greece; Extensive use of  lead 
in household utensils and cooking ware; Widespread use of  sweet-tasting “sapa,” a sweet 
aromatic syrup from grapes containing about one gram of  lead per liter. Because of  its sweet 
taste, many Romans used it in food. Upper class Roman lead intake of  lead is estimated at 35 
mg/day to about 250 mg/day.
c. 200 BCE! Greek poet and physician Nicandor describes lead poisoning
100 BCE — Greek physicians give clinical description of  lead poisoning.
c. 100 AD!! Pliny the Elder describes primitive respirators made of  ox bladders used by workers 
producing vermilion (to avoid breathing mercury fumes).! Pliny the Younger says lead poisoning 
is prevalent amongst mine slaves.
1400s – 1500s – Lead used as a poison by Lucrezia Borgia, Catharine de Medici and others. 
(Lewis, 1985).
1621 — Lead first mined in North America.
1700 — Bernardo Ramazzini observes: “The skin [of  lead workers] is apt to bear the same color 
of  the metal … Demons and ghosts are often found to disturb the miners.”
1767 – George Baker investigates the Devonshire Colic, finds cider mills have lead-lined presses. 
(Smith, 1986).
1829 — ! Description of  lead poisoning by an anonymous Roman hermit! translated by 
Humelbergius Secundus, 1829 (Lewis, 1985).
Hence gout and stone afflict the human race;
Ethyl.Controversy
304
Hence lazy jaundice with her saffron face;
Palsy, with shaking head and tott’ring knees.
And bloated dropsy, the staunch sot’s disease;
Consumption, pale, with keen but hollow eye,
And sharpened feature, shew’d that death was nigh.
The feeble offspring curse their crazy sires,
And, tainted from his birth, the youth expires.
1853 – Tetraethyl lead (TEL) discovered by Carl Jacob Loewig (1803 – 1890), chemistry 
professor at the University of  Zurich.
1857 — Scientific American notes:
It is remarkable that this metal (lead), when dissolved in an acid, has the property of  imparting a saccharine taste 
to the fluid. Thus the common acetate of  lead is always called ‘sugar of  lead.’ It was perhaps on this account that 
the Greeks and Romans used sheet lead to neutralize the acidity of  bad wine — a practice which now is happily 
not in use since it has been found that all combinations of  lead are decidedly poisonous. (Aug. 29, 1857, p. 403).
1860 – Charles Dickens writes of  lead poisoning in the Uncommercial Traveler
I saw a horrible brown heap on the floor in the corner, which, but for previous experience in this dismal wise, I 
might not have suspected to be ‘the bed.’ There was something thrown upon it and I asked what it was.
‘Tis the poor craythur that stays here, sur; and ‘tis very bad she is, ‘tis very bad shes been this long time, and ‘tis 
better she’ll never be … and ‘tis the lead, sur.’
‘The what?’
‘The lead, sur. Sure, ‘tis the lead-mills, where women gets took on at 18 pence a day, sur, when they makes 
application early enough, and is lucky and wanted; and ‘tis lead pisoned she is, sur, and some of  them gets lead 
pisoned soon, and some of  them gets lead pisoned later, and some but not many, niver; and ‘tis all according to the 
constitooshun, sur, and some constitooshuns is strong, and some is weak, and her constitooshun is lead pisoned, bad 
as can be, sur … ‘
1887 — US medical authorities diagnose childhood lead poisoning.
(Also see Timeline of  Lead, Coalition to end Childhood Lead Poisoning).
1906 — US lifts tax on non-beverage ethanol to encourage use as fuel and competition for oil 
industry. (For information about ethanol as an alternative to leaded gasoline, see Timeline of  
Alcohol Fuel on Wikipedia.)
1909. France, Belgium and Austria ban white-lead interior paint.
1910 — Alice Hamilton‘s pioneering study of  lead industries for state of  Illinois! finds extensive 
worker poisoning and conditions that would close factories in Europe. Hamilton becomes 
America’s foremost expert in lead poisoning.
1914 — Pediatric lead-paint poisoning death from eating crib paint is described.
1916 — Dayton Electric Light Co. (DELCO) president Charles F. Kettering asks researcher 
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Thomas A. Midgley to begin working on problem of  engine knock in DELCO electric generators 
used in rural areas for electric lighting.! Midgley discovers iodine as anti-knock but it’s too 
expensive.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Delco sold; Kettering starts Dayton Metal Products Co. (DMPC).
1917 — Kettering and Midgley test fuels for Army Air Corps at Wright airfield.! Alcohols and 
benzenes are listed as best anti-knock substances available but unsuitable to aircraft engines 
except in blends with gasoline.
1918 — Kettering and Midgley! manufacture cyclo-hexane “Hecter” from benzene; war ends 
before production can begin.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Midgley patents benzene / gasoline blend as anti-knock.
1919 – General Motors buys DMPC and makes Kettering research vice president
!!!!!!!!!!! –! Midgley discovers analine anti-knock additive after being given two weeks to find 
something to make Detroit GM headquarters happy. But analine
is expensive, dangerous and foul-smelling.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Mounting concern about long term petroleum supplies and declining quality of  
gasoline. Some automotive engineers advocate lowering compression ratio to enable use of  low-
quality fuels. In a speech to the Society of  Automotive Engineers, Kettering says that would be 
wasteful and advocated high compression engines and improving the quality of  gasoline with 
additives.
!!!!!!!!!!! !– Alice Hamilton invited to join Harvard School of  Public Health.
1920 – Anti-knock research proceeds but frustration sets in. Du Pont disagrees with idea of  
analine injectors.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Midgley patents analine injectors; also patents anti-knock blend of  ethyl alcohol and 
cracked (olefin) gasolines.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Scientific American says that because of  its antiknock effect in blends with gasoline, 
there is a “universal assumption that [ethyl] alcohol in some form will be a constituent of  the 
motor fuel of  the future.” (Dec. 11, p. 593. Also see “Henry Ford, Charles Kettering and the Fuel 
of  the Future.“)
1921 — Anti-knock research almost abandoned; Midgley discovers potential of  selenium and 
tellurium by accident.
!!!!!!!!!!! — (July) Boyd explores ethyl alcohol production from cellulose at Yale.
!!!!!!!!!!! — (August – December) Systematic tests of  metallic elements for antiknock.
!!!!!!!!!!! — (October) Midgley demonstrates 30 percent ethyl alcohol blend in gasoline as anti-
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knock to Indiana Society of  Automotive Engineers meeting. According to unpublished notes 
from the meeting now among documents at Flint University archives, Midgley said:
“Alcohol (ethanol) has tremendous advantages and minor disadvantages… (such as) clean burning and freedom 
from any carbon deposit… [and] tremendously high compression under which alcohol will operate without 
knocking… Because of  the possible high compression, the available horsepower is much greater with alcohol than 
with gasoline…”
!!!!!!!!!!! — (December 9) First tests of  tetraethyl lead in GM labs by Thomas Midgley. Substantial 
decrease in engine knock.
!!!!!!!!!!! — (December) Kettering proposes product name “Ethyl” because solvent (ethyl alcohol) 
used to suspend lead in fuel, but the choice confuses (perhaps deliberately) the “high percentage” 
route to anti-knock additives with the “low percentage” route.
1922 – Continued tests of  tetraethyl lead. Valve, spark and exhaust failures are problems. 
Scavenger such as ethylene di-bromide (EDB) needed.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Strong letters of  concern about safety of  tetraethyl lead by fellow scientists and Public 
Health Service to General Motors.
!!!!!!!!!!! — September — First demonstrations of  effect of  tetraethyl lead on engine knock\ at 
American Chemical Society (ACS)! convention.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Continued interest by Kettering, Midgley and Boyd in ethyl alcohol as the fuel of  the 
future.
– League of  Nations bans interior lead paints.
1923 — January — Midgley takes a few months off  to recuperate from lead poisoning.
!!!!!!!!!!! — February 1 — First commercial sale of  Ethyl Gasoline in Dayton, Ohio.! GM 
production line goes into full operation. No health tests conducted at this time.
!!!!!!!!!!! — March — Midgley awarded American Chemical Society Nichols Medal for discovery 
of  tetraethyl lead’s anti-knock effect in gasoline.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Two dead, 40 “under observation” from lead poisoning at GM pilot scale lead 
production plant in Dayton Ohio. Dates unknown.
!!!!!!!!!!! –! September — Du Pont begins production at Deepwater, N.J. (across bay from 
Wilmington, Del.)! Frank W. Durr, 37, first worker known to die of  lead poisoning Sept. 21 from 
TEL process.
!!!!!!!!!!! — September — First safety tests begin at Bureau of  Mines, Pittsburgh, Pa.
!!!!!!!!!!! — October 20 — Sim Jones, 47, janitor, becomes the second Du Pont worker to die of  




1924 — January– Contracts for exclusive sales rights to Standard of  New Jersey (Exxon), 
Standard of  Indiana (Amoco) and Gulf  Oil Co. specify that three grams tetraethyl lead produces 
anti-knock value of  40 percent benzene.
!!!!!!!!!!! — February — New “ethyl chloride” process goes into operation at du Pont. Medical 
committee formed with du Pont, GM and Standard physicians, W. Gilman Thompson presiding.
!!!!!!!!!!! — New ethyl chloride process planned by du Pont. Medical committee formed with du 
Pont, GM and Standard physicians.
!!!!!!!!!!! — June –Standard Oil of  New Jersey plans ethyl chloride mini-process (semi-works) at 
Bayway, N.J., across bay from New York City.! Kettering and Midgley insist on stepped-up 
production, calling it “war orders” due to competition for octane additives! which, they will later 
insist, does not exist.
!!!!!!!!!!! — July 20 — Frank Hanley, 23, another du Pont worker, dies of  lead poisoning as 
production is tripled over original capacity.
!!!!!!!!!!! — August 12 — Joseph Clancy, 23, another du Pont worker, dies of  lead poisoning as 
production is tripled over original capacity.
!!!!!!!!!!! — August — Ethyl Gasoline Corp. formed as 50 / 50! partnership between General 
Motors and Standard Oil of  N.J. Kettering made president and Midgley made vice president of  
operations.
!!!!!!!!!!! — September — Du Pont engineers voice grave concerns about safety of  Standard semi-
works at Bayway. Concerns brushed aside.
!!!!!!!!!!! — September 26 – October 30 — Six Standard Oil refinery workers die violently insane 
following daily! exposure to tetraethyl lead fumes at
Bayway Ethyl plant. They are: Henry C. Becker, Ernest Oelgert, Walter Dymock, William 
McSweeney, William Kresge, and Herbert Fuson, all of  Elizabeth N.J. An additional 33 workers 
are hospitalized. Some, like Joseph Leslie, will spend the rest of  their lives at Graystone 
Psychiatric Hospital, and from 1932 on, at the Marlboro Psychiatric Hospital, both in New Jersey. 
(Note: Sometimes this is noted as five deaths. The first, Henry C. Becker, occurred Sept. 26, a few 
weeks earlier than the others, and is sometimes omitted).
!!!!!!!!!!! — October 11 — Kettering sails for France on the White Star liner Homeric to attend 
secret negotiations between I.G. Farben and Standard Oil Co. at the Hotel Crillon in Paris. 
Kettering is particularly interested in Farben’s iron carbonyl additive.
!!!!!!!!!!! — October 27 — First headlines in New York city newspapers about leaded gasoline 
deaths at Bayway.
!!!!!!!!!!! — December 23 — Ethyl board of  directors meets at 26 Broadway in New York. The 
board authorizes $100,000 compensation to workers,! considers variety of  alternatives to 
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tetraethyl lead, and worries about legal consequences from Bayway accident.
!!!!!!!!!!! — December 24 — Kettering and du Pont technical director W.F. Harrington meet with 
Surgeon General Hugh Cumming in Washington D.C.
1925 — February — Criminal charges are dropped against Standard by a New Jersey grand jury 
investigating the deaths and injuries.
!!!!!!!!!!! — February 13, 16, 28 — Three more workers die at the du Pont Ethyl plant in 
Deepwater, NJ: Federick DeFiebre, Robert F. Huntsinger, and Loring M. Boody.
!!!!!!!!!!! — February — I.G. Farben licenses iron carbonyl anti-knock additive to a du Pont Corp. 
subsidiary, retains 35% rights.
!!!!!!!!!!! — March 27 — James Connell is the last worker to die at the du Pont Deepwater plant 
before it is closed down.
!!!!!!!!!!! — April 6 — Midlgey claims at an American Chemical Society meeting: “So far as 
science knows at the present time, tetraethyl lead is the only material available which can bring 
about these [anti-knock] results.” The claim is a bald-faced lie that contradicts Midgley’s own 
published research.
!!!!!!!!!!! — April 21 — Kettering and Midgley are secretly fired as president and vice president of  
Ethyl Corp. at a meeting of  the Ethyl board of  directors at 26 Broadway. Both continue to work 
for General Motors. Kettering continues to pretend to be the president of  Ethyl in official 
meetings that summer.
!!!!!!!!!!! — April 30! — Yale university public health scientist claims Ethyl gasoline represents “the 
greatest single question in the field of  public health which has ever faced the American public.”
!!!!!!!!!!! — May 4 — Joseph Leslie and an unknown number of  other victims from the Bayway 
plant quietly transferred from Reconstruction Hospital in New York City to Greystone 
Psychiatric Hospital in New Jersey. Leslie will spend the next 40 years in psychiatric institutions 
due to nerve damage. His family is devastated.
!!!!!!!!!!! — May 15 — Dept. of  Commerce quietly publishes report on alternative anti-knock fuels 
used in 19 foreign countries; report is not discussed in interviews, in the press or at PHS in May 
20 conference.
!!!!!!!!!!! — May 20 — US Public Health Service holds conference to discuss viewpoints on Ethyl 
controversy and appoints blue-ribbon committee to conduct independent inquiry. Alice Hamilton 
and others insist that alternative anti-knock compounds are available, but consideration of  
alternatives is suspended as conference is cut back from two to three days to only one day. 
According to a 1950 memoir by T.A. Boyd, a confrontation between Hamilton and Kettering 
took place in a hallway during the conference recess, in which Hamilton privately said to 
Kettering: “You are nothing but a murderer” and “There are thousands of  things better than 
lead to put in gasoline.”! Kettering laughs at Hamilton.
Ethyl.Controversy
309
Frank Howard of  Standard Oil says: “As a result of  10 years research … we have this apparent 
gift of  God of  three cubic centimeters of  tetraethyl lead… It would be an unheard-of  blunder if  
we should abandon a thing of  this kind merely because of  our fears.” Responding to Howard 
was Grace Burnham, director of  the Workers Health Bureau, who pointed out that tetraethyl 
lead “was not a gift of  God when those … men were killed or 149 men were poisoned.”
!!!!!!!!!!! — The Youth’s Companion says of  the leaded gasoline controversy: “No one disputes the 
facts of  the case, which are that much of  the lead in the gasoline comes out of  the exhaust pipe 
as a fine impalpable dust, which, if  breathed into the lungs in sufficient quantity, is capable of  
setting up lead poisoning in the body. And any physician will tell you that lead poisoning is a very 
serious matter… The question is whaether the lead dust would be produced in sufficient quantity 
and under such conditions as to become a danger to public health. Some chemists are sure that it 
would and that the use of  ethyl gasoline ought to be forbidden by law. Others are equally sure 
that it would not.” (June 11, 1925, p.398)
!!!!!!!!!!! — September 4 — USS Shenandoah, Navy dirigible, wrecks in heavy storm over Ohio 
following engine failure, killing 26 crew members. Contribution of  Ethyl fuel to engine failure 
does not emerge in U. S. inquiry. When the British scientific publication Engineering blames the 
crash on the use of  Ethyl gasoline in March, 1926, a flurry of  G.M. memos confirms that the 
Shenandoah used Ethyl.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Sept. 25 — Frank Howard writes a private memo to Kettering noting three 
“substitutes” for Ethyl then on the market: 1) vapor-phase cracked products; 2) benzol blends; 3) 
gasoline from napthenic-base crudes.
!!!!!!!!!!! — October — Public Health Service study of  252 drivers and auto mechanics in Dayton 
and Cincinnati Ohio begins. Researchers find that drivers exposed to leaded gasoline showed 
somewhat higher “stippling” damage to red blood cells, while garage workers exposed to leaded 
gasoline showed much more damage to red blood cells, and one quarter of  garage workers had 
over one milligram of  lead in fecal samples. In the final published report in 1927, the Surgeon 
General’s Committee says blood cell stippling was found “to a relatively high degree” in garage 
mechanics whose exposure had been relatively short — as little as two and a half  days.
!!!!!!!!!!! — December 22 — Surgeon General’s Committee member David L. Edsall of  Harvard 
objects that “we would be presenting a half-baked report” unless the committee studies “the 
effects this is going to have on others.”
1926! — January 26 — PHS committee releases a report that finds “no good grounds” for 
prohibiting Ethyl gasoline but insists on continued tests:
Owing to the incompleteness of  the data, it is not possible to say definitely whether exposure to lead dust increases in 
garages when tetraethyl lead is used. It is very desirable that these investigations be continued… It remains possible 
that if  the use of  leaded gasolines becomes widespread, conditions may arise very different from those studied by us 
which would render its use more of  a hazard than would appear to be the case from this investigation. Longer 
exposure may show that even such slight storage of  lead as was observed in these studies may lead eventually in 
susceptible individuals to recognizable lead poisoning or chronic degenerative disease of  obvious character… The 
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committee feels this investigation must not be allowed to lapse.
No independent tests are conducted until 1960s. Also, a list of  alternatives to tetraethyl lead 
proposed by C.E.A. Winslow of  Yale is kept from final report.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Market strategy becomes rigid standardization, restricted selling and development of  
demand for “Ethyl” brand until April, 1933.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Earl Webb, Ethyl’s new president, visits American Research Co. in Denver, Colorado 
and observes a lack of  precautions. “It’s surprising someone hasn’t died in your outfit,” Webb 
says. Later that year, Irenee du Pont overrules Webb in an Ethyl board of  directors meeting and 
insists that the contract be cancelled. “The risk of  serious catastrophe is too great to be 
considered,” du Pont says.
1927 — Du Pont and I.G. Farben sign agreement for anti-knock iron carbonyl marketing in the 
U.S.
– Final report on TEL health studies published by Bureau of  Mines.
– Robert A. Kehoe of  the University of  Cincinatti begins experiments with TEL, finds “no 
effect” below a certain threshold. (Note: Kehoe’s work was financed by Ethyl, and is seen by 
historians as an example of  industry hegemony over science. See Rosner & Markowitz, 1989.)
1928 — Controversy over use of  leaded gasoline breaks out in Britain; scientists concerned, 
London Daily Mail articles discuss lead;! Ethyl gets approval from UK government.
!!!!!!!!!!!– September — Julius Stieglitz of  the University of  Chicago, who had been a member of  
the 1925 Surgeon General’s Committee on tetraethyl lead, along with N.P. Leach, a director of  
the American Medical Association, write to complain about an “infraction of  the spirit if  not the 
letter of  the regulations” on tetraethyl lead from spillage and other workplace exposures to 
concentrated Ethyl fluid.
1933 – Farmers advocate mandatory or tax-encouraged use of  ethyl alcohol as fuel anti-knock 
instead of  Ethyl leaded gasoline. Iowa State University and several Midwestern companies begin 
experimenting with and selling 10 percent ethyl alcohol in gasoline as anti-knock fuel.! American 
Petroleum Institute urges oil industry to fight back vigorously.
!!!!!!!!!!! — April — Ethyl marketing strategy switches to broad unbranded use in any gasoline;! 
wholesalers begin to be licensed by Ethyl. Sales shoot up.
!!!!!!!!!!! !– Ethyl Corp. denies license to sell Ethyl to wholesalers using ethyl alcohol blended 
gasolines, selling cheaper than majors or violating!”business ethics” as defined by Ethyl and 
Standard, according to F.B.I. report.
!!!!!!!!!!! !– U.S. Navy researchers at Annapolis find that Ethyl leaded gasoline and 20 percent ethyl 
alcohol blends in gasoline were almost exactly equivalent in terms of  brake horsepower and 
useful compression ratios. The 1933 report was never published.
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1934 — January — Standard Oil public relations expert Ivy Ledbetter Lee meets with Adoph 
Hitler to offer advice on how to reconcile Americans to the Nazi government. In July, Lee is 
brought before an outraged House Un-American Activities Committee for questioning about 
contacts with the Nazis. He died Nov. 9 of  that year from a brain tumor.
1935 — Ethyl and Standard agree to provide I.G. Farben technology and know-how to 
manufacture tetraethyl lead in Germany. A similar agreement is reacheed with Montecatini for 
TEL manufacture in Italy.
1936 – Chemical Foundation finances factory to turn grain into ethyl alcohol for blending into 
anti-knock gasoline.! “Agrol” fuel (10 to 20 percent ethyl alcohol with gasoline) sold in 2,000 
stations across Midwest. The plant goes bankrupt by 1939.
!!!!!!!!!!! !– June 13 — Cushing Gasoline and Refining Company is ordered to cease disparaging 
remarks about Ethyl. Cushing advertised its gasoline was not “doped” and said: “It stands on its 
own merits and needs no dangerous chemicals — hence you can offer it to your customers 
without doubt or fear.” The Federal Trade Commission said this was an unfair trade practice. 
Ethyl gasoline “is entirely safe to the health of  [motorists] and to the public in general when used 
as a motor fuel, and is not a narcotic in its effect, a poisonous dope, or dangerous to the life or 
health of  a customer, purchaser, user or the general public.” Ethyl was “said to be the only 
chemical used commercially for mixture with gasoline for the purpose of  eliminating the 
‘knocking’…” the FTC said in a press release about the decision.
1937 — Ethyl Gasoline Corp. indicted for violations of  Sherman Anti-Trust Act related to 
enforcing business “ethics” on the market by denying wholesalers licenses to sell Ethyl. Some 
10,000 out of  12,000 wholesalers in the US are licensed. Ethyl appeals and loses suit in Supreme 
Court 1940.
!!!!!!!!!!! !– January 8 — Midgley awarded ACS Perkins medal.
1938 — Standard transfers technical know-how for tetraethyl lead production to I.G. Farben of  
Germany;! Farben promises but never delivers synthetic rubber production technology in return.
1939 — Ethyl Corp.’s tetraethyl lead is marketed in virtually all American gasolines except 
Sunoco, which uses select crudes, more expensive refinery processing and tertiary-butyl alcohol to 
reach regular and premium octane levels.
1942 — Sen. Harry S. Truman’s war investigating committee exposes a treasonous pre-war 
relationship between American companies Ethyl, Standard Oil (Exxon), General Motors and 
DuPont on the one hand and the German chemical company I.G. Farben on the other. By the 
mid 1930s, Farben had been taken over by the Nazis. Standard company memos described the 
relationship as a “full marriage” which was “designed to outlast the war” no matter which side 
won.
GM, Ethyl and Standard Oil gave the Nazis leaded gasoline production technology in return for 
a patents on synthetic rubber, a critical strategic material. Although the U.S. companies did very 
little research of  their own, they vigorously protected the German synthetic rubber patents. 
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When the war opened, supplies of  natural rubber from southeast Asia were cut off  by the 
Japanese, and meanwhile, the Standard – Nazi connection was blocking the development of  
synthetic rubber. The episode is considered to be a classic case of  economic warfare , and was 
recognized as such at the time; British intelligence, for example, called Standard Oil a “hostile 
and dangerous element of  the enemy.” (Stephenson, 1976; Borkin, 1978).
1943 — Three quarters of  US synthetic rubber production comes from alcohol based butadiene 
process rather than petroleum processes.
1944 – November 2 — Thomas Midgley found strangled by a harness he was using to get out of  
bed at his home in Columbus, Oho. It was probably a suicide. Midgley had been unable to walk 
for the previous four years, although he had given an address at the ACS meeting Sept. 11, 1944.
1945 — US Army says it wants “a method of  removing tetra-ethyl lead from leaded gasoline so 
that the gasoline can be burned in stoves, lanterns and small engines.” (April 29, 1945, NYT, p. 
E9).
1950 — Dr. Arie Haagen-Smit identifies causes of  smog in LA as interaction of  hydrocarbons 
(cars largest source) and oxides of  nitrogen. Additional concerns about leaded gasoline begin 
emerging.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Eugene Houdry, a petroleum engineer, announces development of  a catalytic 
converter for auto exhaust to cut down carbon monoxide. (WSJ, Dec. 4, 1950) The combination 
of  the catalytic converter and unleaded fuel would not be implemented for another 30 years.
1952 — General Motors and du Pont face a federal anti-trust suit for restraint of! trade in 
gasoline additives, automotive paints and other chemical industries. US Supreme Court rules that 
research collaboration is not a violation of  the Anti-Trust Act.
1953 – First serious post-war concerns about lead as an air pollutant surface in Los Angeles. 
Kettering follows issues closely through memos from industry observers as well as clips from 
newspaper articles.
1954 — Octel begins TEL production in England.
1958, 1959 — US Sen. Richard Neuberger and Rep. Paul Schenck introduce legislation 
requiring the US Surgeon General to hold public hearings on exhaust fumes and control 
standards. Schenck said the auto industry opposed the legislation “with everything it could throw 
into it.” (WP Feb. 26, 1960).
1959 — US Public Health Service approves Ethyl Corp. request to increase lead in gasoline.
1959 – California becomes first to impose automotive emissions standards, requiring “blow-by” 
valve to recycle crankcase emissions back through the carburetor. Automakers combine to fight 
mandatory use of  the $7 device, a fight which leads to an anti-trust suit by the U.S. Justice Dept. 
that is not settled until 1969.
1960 – Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Arthur S. Fleming urges adoption of  “smog 
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killer” devices on cars. (WP Feb. 26, 1960).
!!!!!!!!!!! — Sept. 9 — Eight workers die handling TEL, according to an article in American 
Industrial Hygiene Journal, Dec. 1960, p. 515-17.
1962 — General Motors and Standard Oil of  New Jersey (Exxon) abandon Ethyl
Corp., selling it to Albemarle Paper Co. for $200 million in a leveraged buyout
which the corporations themselves finance.
1965 – Clair Patterson publishes “Contaminated and Natural Lead Environments of  Man,” the 
first to show that high lead levels in industrial nations are man-made and endemic. (Arch Environ 
Health. 1965 Sept 11:344-60.)
!!!!!!!!!!! — Sept. 9 — American Petroleum Institute responds to Patterson, saying that while the 
findings “may be of  academic interest … they have no real bearing on the public health aspects 
of  lead. Contrary to Mr. Patterson’s conclusion, the mass of  evidence proves unquestionably that 
lead isn’t a significant factor in air pollution and represents no public health problem in any 
way.” (WSJ Sept. 9, 1965)
!!!!!!!!!!! — December 13 – 15 — Public Health Service holds a symposium on leaded gasoline, 
hearing from Robert Kehoe and Clair Patterson. Kehoe tells the scientists: “There is not enough 
lead in our environment to be a health hazard to anybody. Those who say there is are ignoring 
the substance of  the scientific work that has been done.” (WP Dec. 19, p. A14). Harriet Hardy of  
MIT argues that small doses of  lead could be a contributing factor to disease, and cites studies 
that suggest links between lead and mental retardation. (NYT Dec. 16, p. 22).
1966 – June 8 — Hearings on leaded gasoline begin in U.S. Senate and include testimony from 
Robert Kehoe, a scientist working for industry, and Clair Patterson, a UCLA scientist who 
exposed Kehoe1s fraudulent industry research.
In one of  the most sterling moments in public health and environmental history, Patterson tells 
the committee:
“It is not just a mistake for public health agencies to cooperate and collaborate 
with industries in investigating and deciding whether public health is endangered – 
it is a direct abrogation and violation of  the duties and responsibilities of  those 
public health organizations.”!
The hearings, chaired by Sen. Edmund Muskie, lead to extended debate about the need for new 
regulatory agencies and new approaches to regulations.
!!!!!!!!!!! — US Public Health Service publishes report “Protecting the Health
of  Eighty Million Americans” stating that old problems of  worker safety
and health were not solved and new technological challenges were complex. The




1969 — Auto makers settle suit by Justice Department for conspiracy to delay the development 
of  pollution-control devices.
1970 — Jan. 22 — General Motors president Edward Cole promises “pollution free” cars by 
1980 and urges the elimination of  lead additives from gasoline in order to allow the use of  
platinum-based catalytic converters. The irony of  GM abandoning leaded gasoline is not lost on 
the public — or Ethyl Corp. — since GM scientists discovered the anti-knock (octane boosting) 
effect of  lead in 1921.
1971 – Ethyl Corp. officials claim to be victims of  a “witch hunt,” and say environmentalists are 
using “scare tactics” by blaming lead for the fall of  the Roman Empire.
“The clincher by all prophets of  doom is that someone started the rumor that lead was the cause of  the fall of  the 
Roman Empire… The legend always gets fuzzy — sometimes it is caused by lead-lined aqueducts, other times it is 
from their wine being drunk from lead-lined flasks.” — Ethyl vice president Lawrence E. Blanchard, Jr. 
“Washington Press Briefing,” National Press Club, Jan 18, 1971.
1972 — Feb 22 — EPA announces that all gasoline stations will be required to carry “non-
leaded” gasoline in the future to protect catalytic converters (which! reduce other auto exhausts 
such as carbon monoxide). EPA asked the Dept. of  Health Education and Welfare “to provide a 
health basis for the planned! reduction…” But HEW “informed EPA that they could not support 
the reduciton of  lead in gasoline for reasons of  adverse health effects since no medical or 
scientific data were available to indicate that it was a hazard to health.” EPA delays setting 
standards until 1973, then is sued by Ethyl Corp.
– July 1 — Lancet reports death of  four workers cleaning a tank that held TEL. Blood lead levels 
were between 64.2 and 92.5 ug/dL.
1974 — May 7 – 8 — Hearings before the Panel on Environmental Science and Technology of  
the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of  the Committee on Public Works. Sen. Joe 
Biden (D-Del) calls for “a panel of  medical scientists having expertise in the field” to perform a 
literature review, but concludes: “In my opinion, lead from auto emissions does not constitute a 
public health hazard.”
J. Julian Chisolm also testifies about a “normal population without undue exposure to lead” 
having blood lead in the range of  10 to 30 ug/dL. “No adverse health effects have been 
demonstrated in such groups,” Chisolm says, though he cautions that some may show blood 
metabolism effects. He also blames lead paint for most of  the country’s problems: “The extent to 
which the removal of  lead from gasoline would ameliorate this problem is uncertain, but 
probably quite small.” Others, notably Herbert Needleman, disagree.
1975 — New car models made with catalytic converters which require unleaded gasoline. Ethyl 
Corp. unsuccessfully proposes “lead tolerant” catalytic converters.
1976 – March 19 — Preliminary decision in Lead Industries Association v EPA; court says EPA 
has authority to regulate leaded gasoline. Even if  there is no certainty that lead in gasoline is a 
danger, “awaiting certainty will often allow only for reactive not preventive regulation,” says 
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judge J. Skelly Wright. The lead phasout begins, and by June 1979, nearly half  of  all US gasoline 
is unleaded.
1978 — Energy Tax Act creates ethanol tax incentive, expanding use of  ethanol anti-knock fuel 
additives in US.
1977 – Testing by public health scientists shows correlations between high levels of  lead in 
children’s blood and brain damage, hypertention and learning disorders.
1979 — Herbert Needleman begins first large study of  behavior and intelligence as influenced 
by lead exposure.
1980 — June 27 — Final decision in Lead Industries Association v. EPA, affirms EPA regulations 
for leaded gasoline, allowing the phase-out to go forward. Judge J. Skelly Wright says:
The national ambient air quality standards for lead were the culmination of  a process of  rigorous scientific and 
public review which permitted a thorough ventilation of  the complex scientific and technical issues presented by this 
rulemaking proceeding… To be sure, even the experts did not always agree about the answers to the questions that 
were raised. Indeed, they did not always agree on what the relevant questions were. These disagreements underscore 
the novelty and complexity of  the issues that had to be resolved,
!!!!!!!!!!! — National Academy of  Sciences says that leaded gasoline is the greatest source of  
atmospheric lead pollution, and estimated daily intake of  0.3mg per person.
!!!!!!!!!!! — National Security Act of  1980 requires that all gasoline be blended with a minimum 
of  10 percent ethanol. Mandate is dropped during Reagan administration.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Gasohol Competition Act requires oil companies to stop their discrimination against 
sales of  ethanol – gasoline blends.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Ethyl reports it has expanded overseas business tenfold between 1964 and 1981.
1981 — Vice President George Bush’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief  proposes to relax or 
eliminate US leaded gas phaseout, despite mounting evidence of  serious health problems.
1982 — Reagan Administration reverses opposition to lead phaseout.
1983 — EPA reports that between 1976 and 1980, amount of  lead consumed in gasoline 
dropped 50 percent and corresponding blood-lead levels dropped 37 percent. The benefits of  the 
lead phaseout exceed its costs by $700 million.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Howard Mielke first reports that leaded gasoline in city soils are a factor in childhood 
lead poisoning, beginning a long record of  research on the topic.
1983 — University of  Virginia press publishes UVA historian Joseph C. Robert’s corporate 
history:! “Ethyl: A History of  the Corporation and the People Who Made It.”! He acknowledges 
Ethyl’s role in underwriting the costs of  the book in the preface. Many factual details are grossly 
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inaccurate and interpretive perspective is entirely hagiographic.
1984 — City of  Chicago first to order end of  all leaded gasoline sales since New York City 
ended ban on leaded gasoline in 1928.! Newspapers conclude the Chicago order is first in the 
nation, indicating extent of  historical amnesia concerning the Ethyl controversy.
1985 — Jack Lewis of  EPA writes “Lead Poisoning: An Historical Perspective,” in which the 
1921 development of  leaded gasoline is depicted as technologically inevitable. “… Other 
substances had all fallen by the wayside in the frantic search for a fuel additive that would 
improve engine performance and reduce engine knock.”! This is far frolm true.! Lewis’ depiction 
of  recommendations for more research were shunted aside, he says, “… during the gin-soaked, 
jazz-crazed Roaring Twenties.”
1986 — Citing conclusive evidence of  brain damage from leaded gasoline, phase-out of  92 
percent of  all lead in gasoline ordered by EPA.! Practical effect is banning of  tetraethyl lead from 
U.S. market.
1986 – Primary phaseout of  leaded gas in US completed. Study shows health benefit to 
technology cost ratio at 10:1.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Safe Drinking Water Act amended to set standards for 83 contaminants and ban use 
of  lead pipes and solder in new drinking water systems.
1990 - Leaded gasoline is “The Mistake of  the 20th Century” according to C.M. Shy of  the 
UNC School of  Public Health in a paper published by the World Health Statistics Quarterly.
The environmental health calamity caused by lead in petrol could have been avoided if  the initial warnings had 
been heeded and better preliminary research of  the health issues had been carried out. Nevertheless, incontrovertible 
proof  of  causality should not be required before regulations are made to protect public health. (Shy, C.M. “Lead 
in petrol: the mistake of  the XXth century.” World Health Stat Q. 1990;43(3):168-76.)
1991 – OECD says that phasing out leaded gasoline was the most important lead poisoning 
prevention action possible for any national government.
1992 — Rio environmental summit calls for worldwide lead phaseout.
1994 – US researchers declared “lead poisoning remains the single most significant preventable 
disease associated with an environmental and occupational toxin”; and “Although lead in 
gasoline represents only 2.2 percent of  total global lead use, leaded gasoline is by far the single 
most significant source of  lead exposure in urban areas”
!!!!!!!!!!! — UN Commission on Sustainable Development called on all governments to eliminate 
lead from gasoline.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Blood lead levels show 78 % declines from 1978 to 1991 during leaded gasoline phase-
out.
!!!!!!!!!!! — American Academy of  Pediatrics study shows direct relationship between lead 
Ethyl.Controversy
317
exposure and IQ deficits in children.
1995 — December – Final US phase out leaded gasoline for road-use vehicles. US EPA press 
release says: “The elimination of  lead from gas is one of  the great environmental achievements 
of  all time,” [EPA Administrator Carol M] Browner said. “Thousands of  tons of  lead have been 
removed from the air, and blood levels of  lead in our children are down 70 percent. This means 
that millions of  children will be spared the painful consequences of  lead poisoning, such as 
permanent nerve damage, anemia or mental retardation.” The actions taken today, although 
procedural, mark the end of  a quarter-of-a-century of  work to keep Americans safe from 
exposure to lead from gas.”
!!!!!!!!!!! — April 14 — Ethyl v. EPA — The only reason to ban a gasoline additive is to prevent 
the failure of  emissions control systems, the US Court of  Apeals for the District of  Columbia 
says. Public health concerns were not a sufficient reason for the denial of  Ethyl’s application to 
sell MMT (methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl) as a gasoline additive.
1996 — Feb 20 – OECD member nations, World Bank, signed a Lead Declaration placing lead 
petrol phase-out as the number one action for each OECD country. The report links public 
health with economics and notes that the health costs of  leaded gasoline are far higher than the 
benefits to a few refiners and gasoline distributors.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Lead poisoning is linked to anti-social behavior in a study by Dr. Herbert Needleman, 
a psychiatrist at the University of  Pittsburgh Medical Center. The study is published in the 
Journal of  the American Medical Association and caps a long line of  studies about physical and 
behavioral problems caused by leaded gasoline and lead paint. “I’m not saying that lead exposure 
is the cause of  delinquency. It is a cause and one with the biggest handle to prevention.” He 
explained: “Lead is a brain poison that interferes with the ability to restrain impulses. It’s a life 
experience which gets into biology and increases a child’s risk for doing bad 
things.” ( Aggressiveness and Delinquency In Boys Is Linked to Lead in Bones by Jane Brody, 
Feb. 7, 1996, New York Times.)
1999 – Rick Nevin submits! How Lead Exposure Relates to Temporal Changes in IQ, Violent 
Crime, and Unwed Pregnancy ! Environmental Research, Volume 83, Issue 1, May 2000, Pages 
1-22.!  “Long term trends in population exposure to gasoline lead were found to be remarkably 
consistent with subsequent changes in violent crime and unwed pregnancy,” Nevin says.
2000 – Jan 1 — European Union bans leaded gasoline as a public health hazard.
!!!!!!!!!!! — US Senate resolution declares last week of  October as national childhood lead 
poisoning prevention week. Information at the Centers for Disease Control lead pages. 
International lead poisoning awarness day is towards the end of  October.
2001 — June -- Declaration of  Dakar sets timetable for removal of  leaded gasoline from Sub-
Saharan Africa through United Nations Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles.
!!!!!!!!!!! — May 25 — Gilbert Grosvenor, chairman of  the National Geographic Society and 
former editor of  National Geographic magazine, is elected to another term on the Board of  
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Directors of  the Ethyl Corp.
2002 – the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) took two decisions to protect 
children’s health from exposure to lead. Firstly, the WSSD Plan of  Implementation (POI) called 
for: “Supporting the phasing out of  lead in gasoline.” One result of  WSSD 2002 was that the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) set up the Partnership for Cleaner Fuels and 
Vehicles (PCVF) with a core goal of  global elimination of  leaded petrol.
1999 – 2001 – Reginald Smith Jr., et al, v. Lead Industries Association et al, Case No. 24-
C-99-004490, Circuit Court of  the City of  Baltimore, plaintiffs alleged damage through leaded 
paint and leaded gasoline to six Baltimore children. Case dismissed on preliminary motion, all 
documents sealed at request of  Ethyl Corp.
2004 – Ethyl Corp. changes its name to New Market. Gilbert Grosvenor leaves board.
– Nov. 19 — Ethyl chair Bruce Gottwald funds Virginia Military Institute center for “ethics.” 
Gottwald says he “believes the Institute’s mission of  transforming young men and women into 
tomorrow’s leaders is more important today than ever.”
2005 – The LEAD Group of  Australia publishes a tally of  67 countries that were still selling 
leaded petrol.
2006 — January – Octel changes its name to Innospec.
!!!!!!!!!!! — Jun 6 – SAICM (Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management) 
releases Global Plan of  Action, including a primary goal of  eliminating lead in gasoline within 
the 2006-2010 timeframe. (SAICM Global Plan of  Action page 33 of  84, 6 June 2006).
!!!!!!!!!!! –Sept 9 – LEAD Group web-publishes Lead Mining Stewardship – Grey Lead and the 
Role of  The LEAD Group fact sheet, which proposes “preventing lead from mining companies 
from being sold to the one manufacturer who uses lead to make the leaded petrol additive, that is, 
Innospec in the UK. If  Innospec could not buy lead, hundreds of  millions of  children in the … 
countries still selling leaded petrol would not have to wait until 2010 for the SAICM … goal of  a 
global lead petrol ban to be achieved.”
2007 –! International crime trends linked to pediatric lead exposure by Rick Nevis.!! The study 
found “a very strong association between preschool blood lead and subsequent crime rate trends 
over several decades in the USA, Britain,! Canada, France, Australia, Finland, Italy, West 
Germany, and New Zealand.”
2008 – Beijing PCFV meeting acknowledges it will fail to meet its original target of  a 2008 
global leaded gasoline phaseout.
!!!!!!!!!!! — LEAD Group calls for a ban on Australian lead exports for TEL for road-use and asks 
Xstrata to stop supplying lead to Innospec via Britannia.
2010 — March 18 – Leaded gasoline producer Innospec pays Securities & Exchange 
Commission $40 million in fines for corrupt practices in marketing leaded gasoline, including 
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bribes to public officials in Indonesia and Iraq before and after the 2003 US invasion. See SEC v. 
Innospec, Inc., Civil Action.
The US SEC Complaint against Innospec also names Swiss-based Alcor, “a wholly owned 
subsidiary of  Innospec” and states Alcor’s “financial results were consolidated with those of  
Innospec throughout the relevant period.
2011 April –The estimated global annual impacts of  lead in vehicle fuels were found by Hatfield 
and Tsai in a United Nations-commissioned report to be:
◦ Close to 1.1 million deaths;
◦ A loss of  322 million IQ points;
◦ Close to 60 million crime cases;
◦ Economic loss of  USD 2.4 trillion per year (4% of  global GDP)
!!!!!!!!!!! — June 17 – LEAD Group says that Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Myanmar (Burma), 
North Korea and Yemen are the six remaining countries where leaded gasoline is possibly still 
being sold.
!!!!!!!!!!! — August 25 – The LEAD Group sends a formal complaint to the OECD NCPs of  
Switzerland, Australia, US and UK re: non-compliance of  Innospec and Xstrata with the OECD 
Guidelines for MNE. The US NCP requests a detailed complaint (sent Oct 25).
!!!!!!!!!!! — Oct. 26 United Nations Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles reports that leaded 
gasoline use is almost phased out worldwide.
– Dec. 17 – John Rosen, a pediatrician who fought for higher lead standards since the 1960s, dies 
of  natural causes in New York.
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Alkyl series:   The simplest hydrocarbons form a series from one carbon (surrounded by 
hydrogen) methane to two-carbon ethylene, to propane (3 carbon atoms), butane (4), 
pentane (5), hexane (6), septane (7), octane (8), etc.  (Kettering called this the parrafin 
series). 
BTU -- British Thermal Unit,  the amount of  heat it takes to raise on pound of  water one degree 
Farenheit. Gasoline has about 120,000 BTUs per gallon; ethyl alcohol 80,000; and 
methyl alcohol 60,000. 
Compression ratio -- The amount that the air/fuel charge is compressed in the compression cycle 
of   an internal combustion engine. Before the 1920s, engines typically had 4:1 
compression ratios.  After  tetraethyl lead, ethyl alcohol, catalytic reforming and other 
octane boosting additives were developed, compression ratios of  8:1 became common. 
Ethyl -- Unstable "radical" which binds readily to many other compounds, made up of  two 
carbon and five hydrogen atoms. With a sixth hydrogen it becomes ethylene gas; with an 
oxygen and hydrogen it becomes ethyl alchol. Three ethyl radicals and a molecule of  lead 
is tetraethyl lead.
(See diagram next page)    
Ethyl alcohol -- (Ethanol) -- Common "grain" alcohol found in alcoholic beverages. Used in a 
blend of  10 to 30 percent in gasoline. Ten percent (called "Agrol" in the U.S. in the 1930s 
and "Gasohol" in the 1970s) boosts octane 4 to 5 points; 20 percent boosts octane 9 to 10 
points (depending on base gasoline). Popular in Europe and Latin America beginning in 
1920s.  
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. -- Company formed as a 50 - 50 partnership of  General Motors and 
Standard Oil of  New Jersey on August 18, 1924. 
Ethyl leaded gasoline -- Three grams of  tetraethyl lead, along with halowax oil and ethylene 
dibromide, added to a gallon of  gasoline, boosts octane 9 - 10 points. Developed in 
December, 1921, first marketed in February, 1923. Initial health impact studies begun 
Sept. 1923. Public controversy broke out October, 1924.   
Gasoline -- A seasonally variable blend of  several flamable explosive liquids distilled from 
petroleum; usually made up of  five-carbon to 12-carbon alkyl and complex compounds. 
Octane rating usually between 55 and 65 before catalytic reforming. 
Iron carbonyl -- Octane boosting additive like Ethyl leaded gasoline;  non-poisonous but said to 
hurt cylinder lubrication.  Added at rate of  12 grams per gallon. Sold in alcohol blend as 
"Motolin" in Germany in the 1930s. 
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Knock -- Uneven burning of  gasoline in cylinder which causes piston to knock against sides of  
cylinder; minor knocking is not a serious problem, but loud knocking indicates engine 
damage in progress.  Knocking usually occurs because fuel octane (or anti-knock power) is 
too low for the compression ratio of  the engine. 
Lead -- Pliable metal used in art, construction and household items since antiquity. Lead 
poisoning is associated with high infertility,  mortality  and morbidity rates in ancient 
Rome, where sheets of  lead were used to line wine and grape vats to give a sugary-sweet 
taste.  Blended into gasoline in the US between 1923 - 1986. Still used as octane booster 
in Third World. 
Octane -- A reference system for anti-knock property of  gasoline developed in the late 1920s and 
based on iso-octane (an eight carbon gasoline compound) as having an anti-knock value 
of  100. 
Methyl alcohol -- (methanol) -- Common wood alcohol, a one-carbon alcohol also made from 
coal. Poisonous to drink but a useful fuel or fuel additive. Octane value 110. 
Reforming -- High temperature and pressure refinery treatment for ordinary gasoline of  55 to 65 
octane; boosts octane by 20 to 30 points.  Developed between 1913 and late 1920s, 
perfected by Sun Oil Co.  Severe reforming boosts octane within modern ranges by 
increasing content of  benzene and benzine-related compounds in gasoline. Many modern 
premium fuels are simply 40 percent toluene (methyl benzene) blended with gasoline. 
Tetraethyl lead -- (Three ethyls and lead) First synthesized by German chemist Loewig in 1852;  
highly poisonous with casual cumulative contact, causing hallucinations, labored 
breathing and in severe cases, spasms and asphyxiation. Blended by Ethyl Gasoline Corp. 
into gasoline at rate of  1200:1 or three grams per gallon to provide about 9 point octane 
boost. 
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Tetraethyl lead and the competition: 
Anti-knock premium (octane boosting) fuels of  the 1920s and 1930s
Octane    Wholesale    Region & Dates Used   
Rating Cost (aprox)     Composition of  Fuel
"Regular" gasoline   56   $.10 Global, 1880s - 1930s
Ethyl gasoline   68  $.13 Global, U.S. 1923 - 1986 
             Base + 3 grams tetraethyl lead 
Benzol, Fordsol, etc.   68 $.14 U.S., common in  1920s 
  Base + 40% benzene 
Agrol, gasohol, etc.   65 $.115 U.S. 1930s, 1970s - present 
 Base + 10% ethanol 
Proalcool  (Brazil)   75 (aprox) $.13 Europe, Latin America
1900 -1930s,  1970s, 
Base + 20% ethanol 
Carburant Nacionale   80 (aprox) $.16 French program1923 - 1939 
   Base + 30% ethanol   
Iron carbonyl   80 $.13 "Motolin" Germany, 1930s 
                Base + 12 grams iron 
Catalytic reforming        84 $.12 - .14  Global, 1925-present; 
  "Blue Sunoco," 
   "White Flash" (ARCO) 
Note:    Cost data is based on 10 cents per gallon pre-tax wholesale gasoline cost and 25 cent per gallon alcohol cost, 
which are wholesale rates in place in 1925 - 1935 time frame. (Some oil industry data at the time used 40 
cent per gallon alcohol cost). Substitution of  base fuel with 10 percent ethyl alcohol involves 9 cents worth 
of  gasoline added to 2.5 cents worth of  alcohol. Twenty percent ethyl alcohol is 8 cent gasoline + 5 cent 
alcohol.  
Sources:  Iowa State College, “The Use of  Alcohol In Motor Fuels, Progress Report Number III,” Divs. of  Industrial 
Science, Engineering, Agriculture; Jan. 20, 1933. Also:  Rayburn D. Tousley, The Economics of  Industrial 
Alcohol, Washington State University, 1945;  R.B. Gray, "On the Use of  Alcohol-Gasoline Mixtures with 
Motor Fuels," US Dept. of  Agriculture, unpublished, April 1933 (National Agricultural Library manuscript 
collection, Beltsville, Md.)  Also "Who would Pay for Corn Alcohol?" Iowa Petroleum Commission 
pamphlet, 1935,  American Petroleum Institute library, Washington, D.C.  N. P. Wescott, Origins and Early 
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History of  the Tetraethyl Lead Business, June 9, 1936, Du Pont Corp. Report No. D-1013, Hagley Museum 
& Library, Wilmington, Del. 
AppENDIX THREE 
TABLE FIVE 
Tetraethyl lead and the ethanol:
Octane, compression and horsepower ratings  
Octane    Com- Horse-  
Rating pression   Power  **  
"Regular" gasoline   66         5.6 24.6 
 
Ethyl gasoline   78   6.5 -*- / 50.7 
 
  
10 % ethanol   74   6.1 26.0 
  
 
20 % ethanol    80   6.5 27.2 / 54.1  
 
  
Note:  *  Not tested. 
** NACA engine tests compared horsepower of  base gasoline with 10 
and 20 percent alcohol blends. A second test using a high compression 
(8:1?) tractor engine compared Ethyl leaded gasoline with 20 percent 
alcohol in the base gasoline. 
These tests were performed by the U.S. Navy at Annapolis, Md.  for 
USDA by special request. They were never published.  
Source: Octane, Compression and Horsepower from R.B. Gray, "On the Use of  
Alcohol-Gasoline Mixtures with Motor Fuels," US Dept. of  Agriculture, 
unpublished, April 1933, National Agricultural Library manuscript 






APPENDIX  4  
ALTERNATIVES TO TETRAETHYL LEAD 
USED COMMERCIALLY  1920 - 1940 
 
Tetraethyl lead was only one of  many ways to improve fuel and decrease engine knock. 
Although General Motors and Standard Oil of  N.J. settled on tetraethyl lead, other oil 
companies in the U.S. and other countries routinely used alternative octane boosting techniques.  
Most of  these were already commercial in 1925.  This appendix provides a short description of  
known commercially available  alternatives during this period, with some emphasis on ethyl 
alcohol due to its widely acknowledged prominence.  
 "Cracking" crude oil  
William Burton of  Standard Oil of  Indiana is credited with discovering in 1913 the secret 
of  “cracking” longer chain low volatility fuels (like kerosene) into higher volatility gasoline by 
applying  a combination of  high temperature and high pressure. Early experiments in an Indiana 
refinery involved heating rows of  corked-up vats of  crude petroleum to “cherry-hot” conditions -- 
a rather serious safety risk.  One unexpected benefit of  cracking was the rise in anti-knock value 
of  the fuel.1 However, the cracked fuel had problems with gum formation if  it was stored for a 
few months.  In 1917, Standard Oil of  New Jersey developed the “tube and tank” process which 
was very similar to two or three other cracking operations in use by the Texas Company (Texaco), 
Pure Oil Co. and Universal Products Co. A series of  lawsuits followed in 1922, and an agreement 
to pool patent rights was challenged by the U.S. government in 1924.2  The significance of  the 
new processes was that petroleum chemists were now able to improve fuel without additives. For 
example, the president of  the  New Jersey chemical society, Carleton Ellis, said in November 
1924 that refineries  could improve the anti-knock value of  gasoline in the future “without resort 
to additions such as lead Ethyl.”3
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Following the Bayway disaster and Ethyl’s temporary withdrawal from the market in 
1925,  refiners increasingly turned their attention to premium antiknock gasolines without 
tetraethyl lead. Increased octane “could be achieved through increased thermal cracking, 
blending stocks of  natural gasoline (gasoline absorbed from natural gas) or adding benzol 
[benzene].”4 In 1925, Gulf  introduced “No-Nox” gasoline using benzene at a three cents 
premium over regular, while Texaco, Sinclair and others offered other premium anti-knock 
gasolines without Ethyl.  Sun Oil Co. resisted using Ethyl for decades and developed “Blue 
Sunoco” anti-knock gasoline by using crudes with high napthenic / aromatic (benzene and 
toluene) contents as well as their own improved thermal cracking processes.  Blue Sunoco had an 
anti-knock rating of  70 to 73 octane in 1926, a rating which was comparable to Ethyl premium 
gasoline. Regular unleaded gasoline at this time had an octane rating in the 60s or slightly lower, 
while engine compression ratios hovered between 4 or 5 to 1.  By 1941, the average engine 
compression ratio approached 7 to 1, while octane ratings of  fuels ranged from 80 to 85. 
Iron carbonyl  
Aside from changes in petroleum refinery operations, a variety of  other alternatives to 
tetraethyl lead were known to exist in 1925. One of  the most interesting was iron carbonyl, a 
metal compound developed in the early 1920s by the German chemical monopoly I.G. Farben.  
Like tetraethyl lead, iron carbonyl was soluble in gasoline.
 Ethyl Corp., GM and du Pont officials became greatly interested in iron carbonyl  in the 
months after the Bayway disaster. After Kettering tested  iron carbonyl on his 1924 European trip 
(as noted in Chapter Five), du Pont and I.G. Farben representatives met at Wilmington, Del. on 
April 28, 1925.  Farben officials offered attractive financial terms partly because their U.S. patent 
position was weak (or more accuratly, had been weakened).   It took 3 grams of  tetraethyl lead to 
boost a gallon of  gasoline by about 10 to 12 octane points while it took 12 grams of  iron 
carbonyl. Due to the cost of  isolating the high temperature, high pressure process, however, 3 
grams of  tetraethyl lead were twice as expensive as 12 grams of  iron carbonyl.5 The iron 
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carbonyl option was “attractive as offering [a] possible escape from poison difficulties [of  leaded 
gasoline],” according to du Pont’s internal history of  leaded gasoline.6 In an August 10, 1925 
meeting, a tentative agreement was called off  because Kettering said the iron caused more 
serious engine problems than had originally been thought. And yet, on Jan. 10, 1927, G.M, Ethyl 
and Farben signed a contract to join together in world exploitation of  iron carbonyl with Farben’s 
patent rights recognized. Iron carbonyl was marketed in Germany, Italy and other European 
nations as "Motolin" and "Monopolin" beginning in Sept. 1926 and it was “favorably received 
due to its anti-knock qualities.”7  The fuel was endorsed by a famous German race car driver of  
the era, Herbert Ernst.  It was also marketed “to a limited extent” in the U.S. “until it became 
generally recognized that the great increase in engine wear which its abrasive combustion 
products produce makes its use impractical,” Ethyl’s Graham Edgar said in 1951.  Edgar also 
said that “tremendous [research] effort to reduce this wear” had been undertaken, but no 
specifics were given.  Interestingly, I.G.  Farben always maintained that problems had been 
exaggerated.  “Troubles in the lubricating system have never -- not even by way of  intimation -- 
been found...”8   
Aromatics from coal  
Aromatic or benzine-like compounds were another alternative to leaded gasoline, and as 
noted above, they can be derived from refining high-napthenic crude petroleum (such as 
California crude), or they can be added separately when made from other feedstocks, especially 
as a byproduct of  the coking process with coal.  This class of  chemicals includes benzene, toluene 
(methyl benzene) and xylene (dimethyl benzene). Aromatics were known as early as the 1880s as 
a hazard which “poisoned the blood,” but they did not become major workplace hazards until 
the development of  pneumatic tires and other rubber goods required the use of  powerful 
solvents. Ethyl officials pointed out in the 1970s when defending the use of  leaded gasoline that, 
as an alternative to lead, benzene is a poor choice because it is carcinogenic.9  Although the 
cancer-causing  aspect was unclear at the time, Alice Hamilton was concerned about the 
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expanding use of  benzene in industry and in the fuel supply in 1922. “To the manufacturer, the 
introduction of  this cheap and powerful solvent may seem an advantage,” Hamilton wrote. “To 
the physician, interested in the producer more than the product, it can only seem a disastrous 
innovation in industry.”10  Of  special concern to Hamilton was the use of  benzene “as a 
substitute for motor car fuel.”  The Bureau of  Mines was also concerned about benzene, and 
noted at the Public Health Service conference May 20, 1925, that blends of  benzene and 
gasoline were more toxic to guinea pigs than leaded gasoline.11 The Times noted the evidence 
and also noted that Surgeon General Cumming “called for a list of  motor fuels containing 
benzene.”12 No such list is found in the archives, but some benzene would be found in virtually all 
gasoline, especially after catalytic reforming processes were widely adopted in the 1920s and 30s 
by the oil industry.  
Not only did oil refineries use processes which encouraged the formation of  aromatics in 
gasoline, but many refiners added benzene to boost octane. Surplus  solvent made for World War 
I flooded the fuel market in the 1920s.   Ford Motor Co., for example, used benzene from coking 
operations in “Benzol” fuel from the mid-1920s through the 1950s,13  as did many other gasoline 
marketers at the time. 
Along with petroleum refining and coal coking,  two other German processes were being 
developed in the 1920s which also yielded aromatics and synthetic fuels from coal subjected to  
high temperatures and pressures. These were the “direct” addition of  hydrogen to coal 
(hydrogenation)  and the “indirect” gaseous separation and recombination of  carbon, oxygen and 
hydrogen. Either route will produce aromatics or gasoline-like compounds, although the indirect 
route is best suited to produce methanol and is somewhat easier to develop on a large scale. The 
processes were developed by subsidiaries of  I.G. Farben.  By the mid-1920s, the coal processes 
had been well developed and were attracting international attention.14 Coal based synthetic 
methanol was a source of  concern in May, 1925, when American methanol producers who had 
been using a 60 to 90 cent per gallon wood methanol process appeared to be losing their markets 
to a 10 to 20 cent per gallon coal methanol process.15 
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The development of  alternative fuel from coal in Germany alarmed Standard Oil Co. of  
New Jersey, and with a pending oil crisis of  the early 1920s, Standard scrambled to place itself  in 
a competitive position. Frank Howard and other Standard agents met frequently with Farben 
officials and began a relationship in 1924 designed to stifle international competition in fuels and 
chemicals.  It is likely that Kettering's European trip, in which he accompanied Howard and 
GM's patent  attorneys to visit  Farben officials in Germany, was part of  the beginning of  this 
relationship.  
After new oil fields were opened in the US in the late 1920s, and the oil "crisis" seemed 
remote, Standard continued to integrate its patents and other operations with Farben.  The 
relationship was publicly exposed with the outbreak of  war in 1942 in then-Sen. Harry S. 
Truman’s War Investigations Committee.  Former Assistant US Attorney General Joseph Borkin 
described the secret  contract drawn up between Standard and Farben in a 1978 book: The 
Crime and Punishment of  I.G. Farben.  Borkin explained how the Farben and Standard agreed 
that Farben would stay out of  all fuel markets except for those in Germany, while Standard in 
turn would help Farben protect its patents in the international chemical market. Standard and 
Farben officials met secretly over the years, and the agreement was renewed after World War II  
started in 1939. Officials said the “marriage” of  their two companies would “operate through the 
term of  the war, whether or not the US came in.”16 To seal the bargain, Standard gave Farben 
the technology and know-how to produce tetraethyl lead.  Standard was later accused of  
becoming “a hostile and dangerous element of  the enemy” by British security coordinators,17  
and U.S.  Attorney General Thurmond Arnold privately insisted that Standard’s board of  
directors either face criminal charges or step down and let others run the company during the 
war years.18  Ethyl’s relationship with I.G. Farben was severely criticized in the American press as 
well, despite protests by Standard and Ethyl officials that  sale of  tetraethyl lead technology to 
Germany had been approved by the government.19 
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Ethanol and methanol  (ethyl and methyl alcohol) 
Along with iron carbonyl and aromatics from various processes, a third type of  alternative 
was so well known in the 1920s that its widespread use had been considered the “universal 
assumption” of  scientists before leaded gasoline.20 Alcohols were widely acknowledged as anti-
knock fuels, even by G.M. researchers who invented tetraethyl lead.21
As an aviation fuel, alcohol in blends with benzene and gasoline was the preferred high-
performance anti-knock fuel before tetraethyl lead was available. Navy tests in 1923 provided 
"very satisfactory results," with a 30 percent alcohol blend in gasoline that would "soon take the 
place of  gasoline altogether."22  A Naval Advisory Committee report said in 1925  noted the anti-
knock value of  alcohol / gasoline blends. It cautioned that alcohol  might “reduce the amount of  
food products and its economic soundness is open to question,”  but also noted that alcohol from 
vegetation was not an exhaustible resource and in an emergency could be produced in unlimited 
quantities.23   Also in 1925, a  New York Times  article quoted  Charles F. Roth of  the American 
Chemical Society saying that “the chemical world stands ready to produce synthetic wood 
alcohol ... at a price as low as, or lower than, gasoline now brings.”  
 The U.S. history of  alcohol fuels has been well explored in the 1930s period  by 
Giebelhaus,24 Bernton25 and Kovarik,26   but international history of  alcohol as a fuel has not. In 
the years between the development of  the automobile and World War I, a lively competition with 
races and expositions took place between electric, steam and internal combustion engines as well 
as various kinds of  liquid fuels. An exhibit of  alcohol fueled vehicles and appliances filled the 
Paris exhibition hall in 1902, and alcohol fuel was common in Europe -- and especially   France 
and Germany  -- before, during and after World War I.  
By the mid-1920s ethyl alcohol was routinely blended with gasoline in every industrialized 
nation and even, to a limited extent, in the oil-rich United States.  However, ten to twenty five 
percent alcohol blends with gasoline were more common in Scandinavian countries, where 
alcohol was made from paper mill wastes; in France, Germany and throughout continental 
Europe, where alcohol was made from surplus grapes, potatoes and other crops; and in Australia, 
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Brazil, Cuba, Hawaii, the Philippians,  South Africa, and other tropical regions, where it was 
made from sugar cane and molasses. In some countries, especially France, gasoline retailers were 
required to blend in large volumes of  alcohol with all gasoline sold. Germany, Brazil and others 
more or less followed the “mandatory blending” model.  In other countries, such as Sweden, 
Ireland and Britain, alcohol blends received tax advantages.27 
A tractor operator for American Sugar Co. in Cuba in the 1921-24 period recalled using 
cheap molasses derived alcohol by the barrel at a time when gasoline was expensive to import. 
The practice was to start the tractors with gasoline (which cost 40 to 50 cents per gallon) and 
then run them on alcohol (at 5 cents per gallon) for the rest of  the day. When the tractors were to 
be idled over a weekend or between harvests, a little gasoline was injected into the cylinders to 
minimize corrosion.28  Cuba continued using alcohol fuels throughout the 20th century, 
especially after the communist revolution of  1960, in order to stretch petroleum supplies from the 
former Soviet Union. 
Economic advantages were important in other tropical nations, but were not the foremost 
factor in making alcohol blends mandatory in European nations. In France, insecure supplies of  
oil during World War I led to a research program at the Pasteur Institute on sources of  alcohol, 
including vast marine biomass resources like kelp.29 Continued research by a national fuels 
committee appointed in 1921 led to a recommendations of  a national fuel consisting of  40 to 50 
percent alcohol, and on Feb. 28, 1923, “Article 6” required gasoline importers to buy at alcohol 
from a state monopoly at a volume of  at least 10 percent of  their gasoline imports. “Article 7” 
provided a five-Franc per hectoliter  tax on gasoline to help subsidize the alcohol monopoly.  The 
blend was not accepted by consumers, who were using engines which were specifically adapted to 
gasoline. At a minimum, carburetor settings needed to be changed to allow a greater fuel volume 
when the percentage of  alcohol in the gasoline rose above 20 to 30 percent, and bitter complaints 
flowed in from motor clubs and garages.30  Amendments to the law in 1926 and 1931 helped 
create a more workable blend, and alcohol fuel use rose from 7.8 million gallons per year in 1925 
to 20 million gallons in 1932. 
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Although the French government was initially one of  the most enthusiastic toward 
alcohol, by 1932 so many other nations had surpassed the French effort that one proponent 
explained the “slowness” in reviving alcohol fuels use.  It  “is due in part to the poor results 
obtained when such fuels were first introduced and also to the casting of  discredit upon such fuels 
by its adversaries who profit in the fuel business,” said Charles Schweitzer, a research chemist in 
the Melle complex.31 
National initiatives were also under way in Britain, Italy and Germany, and tax incentives 
were passed in all three nations to encourage the use of  alcohol or alcohol blended fuels. 
In England, a Departmental Committee on Industrial Alcohol reported in 1905 that 
alcohol from potatoes would be more expensive than gasoline, even though  farmers wanted an 
alcohol industry built to absorb crop surpluses. In 1915 “agitation” for an alcohol industry was 
noted.32 A Fuel Research Board experimented with alcohol production between 1917 and 1924, 
and reported that while economics of  traditional crops were marginal, novel crops like Jerusalem 
artichokes might be useful. “The most economical source [of  alcohol] may be found ultimately in 
some of  the luxuriant tropical growths within the Empire,” an article in SAE Journal said.  
“Looking at the fuel question very broadly, the dominant fact is that almost all the fuel supplies at 
present used are what lawyers call wasting securities... As mineral fuels grow dearer, the 
advantage of  fuels of  vegetable origin must become accentuated.”33  By the 1930s, two major 
blends of  up to 30 percent alcohol -- Cleveland Discoll (partly owned by Standard Oil of  N.J.) 
and Cities Service -- were widely used. Discoll continued to be used until the 1970s. 
German firms such as I.G. Farben had by the early 1920s come up with a process for 
making synthetic methanol from coal, a development which was widely reported in the popular 
and technical press and which worried Standard Oil Co. of  New Jersey, as we have noted. 
Observing the synthesis of  methanol and other fuels, the editor of  Industrial and Engineering 
Chemistry said: “We do not predict that these will necessarily be the fuels to supplement our 
diminishing petroleum reserves ... But who shall say? The field is new and the opportunities are 
correspondingly great.”34  The German ethyl alcohol monopoly of  the pre World War I (the 
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Centrale fur Spiritus Verwerthung) had apparently fallen apart in the post-war chaos, but with 
Monopolin blend of  iron carbonyl, alcohol use in fuel climbed from a quarter million gallons in 
1923 to 46 million gallons in 1932.35    In 1930 gasoline importers were required to buy from 2.5 
to 6 percent alcohol relative to their gasoline import volumes, but around 1933, I.G. Farben and 
several oil companies, including an American company (probably Standard), acquired 51 percent 
of  Monopolin.36 Production of  alcohol climbed by 1937 to about 52 million gallons per year as 
part of  Hitler's war preparations.37
In Italy, the first Congress of  Industrial Chemistry which took place in  April 1924 
focused strongly on fuel problems, with a large percentage of  the papers concerned with alcohol 
fuels. A strong scientific endorsement of  the idea of  using surplus crops in the national fuel mix 
led to a national decree on mandatory use of  alcohol fuels in 1925.38  Other nations, such as 
Hungary, Poland, and Brazil would follow the French and Italian examples with mandatory 
alcohol and gasoline blends in national fuels around this time, while the tax incentive approach 
was adopted by many other European nations such as Switzerland, Sweden, Germany and 
Britain.39   The blends usually fell in the 20 percent range, and tended to be used in countries 
with the biggest farm surpluses, biggest defense needs and most limited access to oil. 
The total use of  alcohol as a substitute fuel in Europe may have never exceeded five 
percent, according to one conservative estimate or it may have been somewhat higher.40  
Synthetic  gasoline  and benzene created by I.G. Farben from coal substituted for seven percent 
and 6.5 percent respectively of  European petroleum by 1937. Synthetic gasoline was cheaper (at 
17 to 19 cents per gallon) than alcohol at around 25 cents per gallon.41  
In the United States, variety of  attempts to market a competitor for Ethyl  included a 
Standard Oil experiment in Baltimore in 1923 and "Vegaline" fuel in Spokane, Washington in 
the 1920s.  Competition sprouted up throughout the Midwest in the late 1920s and 1930s. 
Brands included Square Deal, Coryelle, Gurney, Agrol, Alcoline and HyBall. 
Stockpiling of  solvents and crop failures between 1937 and 1939 ended most of  the 
European alcohol fuels programs, and crop surpluses disappeared with the outbreak of  war.  In 
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the U.S., alcohol distilleries turned to war production, especially solvents for smokeless 
gunpowder and synthetic rubber.  The era of  cheap oil in the years following World War II put 
an end to many of  the alcohol fuels programs, although some countries -- notably Brazil, Ireland, 
New Zealand and South Africa -- continued with substitute fuels programs of  one sort or another 
to the present day. 
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Appendix 6  
Research Notes 
6.1  Papers and interviews about leaded gasoline and biofuels  by Bill Kovarik  
since 1993  
Agenda! Setting in the 1924 – 1926 Public Health Controversy over!! Ethyl (Leaded)! Gasoline, 
AEJMC, 1994. One of  the nations first controversies over public exposure to dangerous 
chemicals. The American oil industry, uncomfortable with even the mildest criticism, blamed the 
media for its own problems.
Charles F. Kettering and the 1921 Discovery of  Tetraethyl Lead,! Society of  Automotive 
Engineers, 1994.! Paving the way for non-petroleum alternatives (such as ethanol) was the 
“original special motive” for leaded gasoline.  
Henry Ford, Charles Kettering and the Fuel of  the Future, Society of  Automotive Historians, 
May 1998.! Based on a presentation to the SAH in 1995 on the 60th anniversary of  the original 
Farm Chemurgy conference.  Essentially, Ford supported biofuels as one economic component of  
value-added farm products;  Kettering saw ethanol as improving octane and allowing engines to 
be more efficient. 
Chemcases: Fuels and Society, NSF Funded chemistry education project, Kennesaw State 
University, 2001. The fuels section is one of  several! concerning scientific issues in modern 
culture and describes the steps leading up to and choices parallel to the introduction of  leaded 
gasoline.  
With Good Reason, interview, April 7, 2001. Virginia Public Radio.  
ETHYL The 1920s Environmental Conflict Over Leaded Gasoline and Alternative Fuels, Paper 
to the American Society for Environmental History Annual Conference March 26-30, 2003 
Providence, R.I.
Late Lessons, Early Warnings,Express TV (Denmark) – Award winning documentary has 
interview with Dr. Kovarik
Ethyl leaded gasoline:! How a classic occupational disease became an international public health 
disaster,! International Journal of  Occupational and Environmental Health, October 2005. 
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(Based on 2003 ASEH paper).
Looking South:The world ethanol industry is booming – thanks to the Brazilian example, Com 
Ciência Ambiental (Sao Paulo, Brazil), winter 2007.
Ethanol’s first century: Blending programs in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, paper to 
the 30th International Symposium on Alcohol Fuel, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, November 2006.
National Public Radio interview, Feb 15, 2007  
Back to the Fuel of  the Future,! Life Sciences Symposium, University of  Missouri, March, 2007. 
Freedom Fuels, 2007, documentary about the history and need for biofuels.   
Special Motives:Automotive Inventors and Alternative Fuels in the 1920s!Paper to the Society for 
the History of  Technology, Oct. 19, 2007
Biofuels: History and public debate,(Slide show) University of  Maryland School of  Public Policy, 
April 11, 2008
Biofuels in History, for World Cafe at Concordia University Montreal, Nov. 20, 2010 and 
Missouri School of  Journalism, Food, Fuel and Society conference, Oct. 12, 2010.  
National Public Radio interview, Dec. 21, 2010.  http://wap.npr.org/story/132082560           
European Environment Agency’s “Late Lessons, Early Warnings” report, Jan. 23, 2013.! See 
especially:! Part A – Lessons from health hazards !
Interview with The Tyee, April 10, 2013  http://thetyee.ca/News/2013/04/10/Plants-Into-
Gas/    
The history of  biofuels – for CABI  (Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau International)  the 
international development information organization, published May 2013.
6.2 Further research needed 
Many thousands of  pages of  historical documents are still privately held by the Ethyl Corp., 
Afton Chemical,  New Market Corp., Exxon and General Motors, although many DuPont 
documents appear to have been released to the Hagley Library in Wilmington, Del.  
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The most important missing piece of  the puzzle is The Lead Diary, a collection of  several 
thousand original documents from which T.A. Boyd and Charles Kettering refreshed their 
memories as their memoirs were being written in the 1940s. The last reference to the Lead Diary 
is in the Green Book histories by General Motors public relations staff  created in the 1950s. It is 
unlikely to have been destroyed; and probably is still in the archives of  Ethyl or G.M.
Items missing or withheld from public archives include:
• The “Lead Diary” / several hundred linear feet of  records (possibly 50 to 500 boxes of  files) 
about fuels research from the DELCO / GM Dayton labs in the 1917! -! 1950s time frame.
• Test diaries and day-to-day records of  experiments conducted during 1920 – 22 period when 
tetraethyl lead was discovered by GM researchers in Dayton,!!!!! Ohio.
• Correspondence with & from members of  the Surgeon General"s Committee concerning 
alternatives to tetraethyl lead anti-knock agents.
• Original 1922 – 23 correspondence to Midgley and Kettering from Krause, Hunt, Wilson, 
Henderson and others concerning the dangers of  tetraethyl lead, some of  which may have been 
in the Lead Diary.
• Minutes of  the Board of  Directors of  the Ethyl Corp.
• Minutes of  the Medical Committee of  du Pont, G.M. and Standard.
• Records or memos concerning production issues in Dayton, Ohio, April, 1924.
• Telegrams exchanged between Charles Kettering in Paris and Ethyl Corp.headquarters in New 
York during Oct., 1924.
• Du Pont and other studies of  the resource base for pure ethyl alcohol fuel and other high-
quality fuel components. (One crucial 1919 study was cited in a memo by T.A. Boyd in 1921.)
• Reports of  the Standard Oil and DuPont experiments.
• Memos from Midgley to Kettering about fuel additives, for example,! “Synthol” experiments, 
Dayton G.M. labs, summer 1925.
• Records or memos of  contacts with public officials , especially contacts with Treasury Secretary 
Mellon, with Surgeon General Cummings, and (then) Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover.
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